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Tocqueville and Democracy in the Internet Age is an introduction to Alexis de 
Tocqueville (1805-1859) and his monumental two-volume study Democracy 
in America (1835, 1840) that pays particular attention to the critical 
conversation around Toqueville and democracy since the end of the Cold 
War during the Internet Age. The book is addressed broadly to beginning 
students, specialists, and ordinary curious people who wonder if democracy is 
still possible today and under what conditions. 
“Jon Delogu’s Tocqueville and Democracy in the Internet Age astutely 
connects many of the current issues surrounding the present and possible 
future states of ‘democracy’ in the U.S., France, and the world. The 
author not only makes a convincing case for the relevance of Toqueville 
and democracy in the ‘Internet age’ but also demonstrates a command 
of Democracy in America and the enormous body of criticism and 
commentary on it.”
– William Dow, Professor of American Literature and American Studies, 
American University of Paris, Université Paris-Est MLV
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“Has every other century been like this one? Has man always 
confronted, as he does today, a world in which nothing makes 
sense? In which virtue is without genius and genius without 
honor? In which the love of order is indistinguishable from the lust 
of tyrants? In which the sacred cult of liberty is confounded with 
contempt for the law? In which conscience casts but an ambiguous 
light on the actions of men? In which nothing any longer seems 
forbidden or allowed, honest or shameful, true or false?”
– Tocqueville, Democracy in America (from the Introduction)
“But when the intervals of darkness come, as come they 
must,—when the sun is hid and the stars withdraw their 
shining,—we repair to the lamps which were kindled by their 
ray, to guide our steps to the East again, where the dawn is.”
– Ralph Waldo Emerson, “The American Scholar”

Introduction
As the title indicates, this book is about a particular man, an idea, and 
the time period we live in. The man, Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859), 
was a French aristocrat. His name designates a place in Normandy 
whose people and soil he was linked to, like his father before him, by Old 
Regime ties of loyalty and mutual service. But he was born in the after-
math of the idealistic and bloody French Revolution under Napoleon’s 
dictatorship and therefore had both an intense theoretical and a practi-
cal interest in the history of civil society and the workings of monarchy, 
aristocracy, and especially democracy. After existing as a term of derision 
for over two thousand years,1 democracy had become the name of both a 
form of government and a flourishing way of life in nineteenth-century 
America where he traveled for nine months in 1831 and 1832 to investi-
gate this unexpectedly successful experiment in popular sovereignty.
Tocqueville is most remembered as the author of a two-volume 
study Democracy in America (1835, 1840). It is a digest of his observa-
tions about America and offers argued predictions about democracy’s 
future prospects. It is a work that is still considered by many today, in the 
Internet age, to be “the best book ever written on democracy”2 and “one 
of the wisest books ever written about us” [Americans].3 
Much has been written about Tocqueville, about his book on democ-
racy, and about democracy in general since 1989, the roughly quarter 
century that I am calling the Internet Age, which also coincides with the 
post–Cold War era.4 The purposes and opinions of these recent stud-
ies vary greatly and can strike one as a confusing, formidable mass. The 
task of making sense of Tocqueville and democracy in the Internet age 
is further complicated by the fact that many commentators seem more 
interested in being a sun than a satellite and therefore not all that con-
cerned by what others have to say. I have tried, like Tocqueville, to be a 
better listener, as well as a mediator between individuals who seem not 
to be talking to each other. The result is this book, an extended essay that 
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proposes an open assessment of both Tocqueville and democracy in the 
Internet age and asks what the fortunes of both might be over the next 
few decades.
I first became interested in Tocqueville over a ten year period 
from 1995 to 2005 when I was teaching annual seminars on Emerson, 
Thoreau, Dewey, and William James to French students of English at 
public universities in Toulouse and later Lyon. Despite Tocqueville’s aris-
tocratic French origins, I noticed that he had many links to these four. 
He was only two years younger than Emerson (1803–1882), and he died 
the year Dewey was born (1859, the same year Darwin published On the 
Origin of Species, which was, like the French Revolution and democracy 
in America, a major challenge to static visions of the universe). His death 
occurred a decade after the French civil unrest in 1848 and just before the 
division and destruction of the American Civil War that he had foreseen 
as a strong possibility. Furthermore, he had chronic health problems as 
did Emerson (his eyes) and James (depression), and he died of tubercu-
losis like Thoreau. He was also, like all four of these enormously creative, 
energetic, cosmopolitan Americans, both a thinker (in the moralist, pro-
phetic tradition of essayists from Montaigne and Pascal to Montesquieu 
and Rousseau) and a practical man of action who extolled what Emerson 
called “the infinitude of the private man” and believed in the possibility 
of liberty and justice for all.
While reading The Mind on Fire, Robert D. Richardson’s wonderful 
biography of Emerson, during a university strike in 1995, I learned that 
Emerson had actually met Tocqueville during his second trip to Europe 
in May 1848—one in a long line of revolutionary “French springs.” I was 
also struck by the fact that they had both made bold, soul-searching trips 
to the country and continent of the other practically at the same time and 
for roughly the same length of time—nine months. The time it takes to 
give birth, so to speak, to new ideas, projects, and prophecies, and both of 
them clearly did.
Tocqueville arrived in America on May 9, 1831, and returned 
to France on February 20, 1832. Emerson first sailed for Europe on 
December 25, 1832, and arrived back in Boston on October 9, 1833. 
Therefore Tocqueville could have run into Emerson in Boston, in 
Concord, or somewhere else in America, but I have read no account that 
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says he did. The man known to his family and friends as Waldo had not 
yet become Emerson, and there is no reason that Tocqueville and his trav-
eling companion Gustave de Beaumont, who were officially in America 
as government emissaries doing research on the American penitentiary 
system, would have sought him out.
But by 1848 it was fitting that they should meet in Paris since by then 
both Emerson and Tocqueville were on their way to becoming the pre-
eminent witnesses of the strengths and weaknesses of their respective 
countries, astute readers of the signs of the times, and disturbing ora-
cles about what the future might hold. And of course 1848 was not just 
any year, but the hottest revolutionary period since 1789, which would 
later be a nostalgic source of inspiration if not exactly the blueprint for 
later revolutionary moments in France and elsewhere: 1871 (the Paris 
Commune), the 1930s (with the rise of Nazism and Fascism, the time 
of the Spanish Civil War, and the era of Franklin D. Roosevelt in the U.S. 
and Léon Blum and the Front Populaire in France), and of course 1968 
(Prague, Paris, Berkeley) and 1989 (the Berlin Wall, Tiananmen Square, 
the World Wide Web). The revolutionary upheavals and democratic aspi-
rations that spread throughout the Middle East in 2011, the so-called 
Arab Spring, also elicited comparisons in the French press with the print-
emps des peuples of 1848.5 
However, while they defended liberty and justice, Tocqueville and 
Emerson were both tradition-minded reformists who were largely 
opposed to l’esprit révolutionnaire and to socialism. Emerson famously 
refused to join the utopian communities that seduced many of his friends 
and acquaintances,6 while Tocqueville considered the poet Lamartine’s 
revolutionary zeal foolish;7 and Louis Auguste Blanqui’s advocacy of a 
“dictatorship of the proletariat” in a speech in May 1848, which Emerson 
witnessed firsthand, shocked them both as terrifying fanaticism.8 At the 
time they met, Tocqueville was serving on a constitution drafting com-
mittee to try to insert some checks and balances (such as a bicameral 
legislature) into the precarious French democratic experiment, though 
he confesses in his Souvenirs that the results fell far short of the work of 
Madison, Hamilton, and Jay and did not manage to forestall the eventual 
breakdown of order during the “days of June” or moderate the eventual 
pendulum swing back to total law and order during the Second Empire 
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of Napoleon III.9 We will return in a later chapter to Emerson and 
Tocqueville’s shared aversion to socialism, their sympathy for the indi-
vidual, and their fundamental belief in man’s essential freedom. My point 
here is simply to underline that it was a natural transition for me, after 
having completed my general introduction to Emerson for the French, 
to turn my attention to the second great witness of the American experi-
ment in self-reliant popular sovereignty, Alexis de Tocqueville.10 
The present volume is the product of my thinking about Tocqueville 
and democracy since his bicentenary year, 2005, when I began teaching a 
yearly seminar, on Tocqueville and democracy, to groups of French stu-
dents as well as to visiting foreign students from all over the world who 
choose to study French for one year in Lyon while also taking law, busi-
ness, or humanities courses all taught in English. These classes have been 
enjoyable and instructive. Enrollment has been consistently high, and 
students seem genuinely engaged by the material though very few have 
ever read Tocqueville before and many have never even heard of him. My 
French students seem glad to fill a hole in their culture générale and enjoy 
comparing their contemporary impressions of democracy with those 
of a nineteenth-century “Erasmus student” from Normandy doing field 
research.11 My Asian students, though mostly born after 1989 now, are 
generally curious about the word democracy in the title of the book to be 
studied and particularly interested in Tocqueville’s assessment of democ-
racy’s strengths and weaknesses. For an American professor like me 
trained in the Socratic method and often stymied by tight-lipped French 
and Asian students who usually prefer to listen and take notes in class, 
it’s a relief to find that the material practically teaches itself since most of 
the students are willing to break their habitual silence and readily adopt 
Tocqueville’s own comparative method, pointing out similarities or dif-
ferences between the situation he describes and the political situation in 
their own country. So I am convinced that students find Tocqueville and 
his writings compelling and relevant. Indeed, I would like to report signs 
of a general groundswell of enthusiasm for Tocqueville and democracy 
beyond the classroom as well, because I have sympathy for both, but in 
fact there is little evidence of either.
Reports of a revival or rediscovery of Tocqueville since 1989 or 2005 
are in my view exaggerated. I’ve spent hundreds of hours commuting to 
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work by train over the past twenty years, and I’ve yet to see anyone read-
ing Tocqueville. No one who discovers I’m working on Tocqueville has 
ever said to me, “Ah, j’adore cet auteur!” That Tocqueville is frequently 
mentioned in books or articles, or cited with a line or two pulled out 
of context, everywhere from Vanity Fair to the New York Times to the 
most in-depth scholarly journals, is scant proof that his work is actually 
read, understood, or respected.12 The fact is Tocqueville remains largely 
inaudible13 to older French readers, who are likely to prefer his contem-
porary Balzac (1799–1850) if they’re still willing to read a dead author, 
and shunned by younger French people, who, despite France’s traditional 
love of history, increasingly ignore anything that is not about themselves 
or that happened before they were born.
The same could be said about Americans, even more so perhaps, 
despite Tocqueville’s induction into the Library of America series with 
the Arthur Goldhammer translation of Democracy in America (2004)—
the third translation to appear in quick succession after Mansfield and 
Winthrop (2000) and Bevan (2003) and just before the 2007 Norton 
Critical Edition edited by Isaac Kramnick that opted to recycle the origi-
nal English translation from 1841 by Henry Reeve.14 So there is undeni-
able classroom enthusiasm about Tocqueville. I’ve seen it, and publishers 
have clearly been willing to compete with each other for a share of this 
no doubt small but I guess reasonably secure market. But in the larger 
scheme of things, Tocqueville’s Democracy in America stands as further 
proof of Mark Twain’s definition of a classic—something everybody 
wants to have read but nobody wants to read.
Am I then just preaching to the converted, and to a rather small con-
gregation at that? No, that is not my purpose, nor, as I see it, is there much 
incentive to address myself exclusively to Tocqueville scholars, since a 
perusal of the commentaries published on Tocqueville in the Internet 
age shows that many are manifestly uninterested in taking into account 
what their peers have to say on the subject. As I’ve said, they seem often 
not to have read each other’s work, and what’s more some of the best 
Tocqueville studies of the past dozen years have not been translated out 
of their original language. I would be delighted to be read by Tocqueville 
specialists as well as by curious nonspecialists, and they are both a part 
of my intended audience. But like Thoreau’s Walden (1854), this study 
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is also addressed to “poor students,” especially students poor in imagina-
tion and short of time—not that I think their lack of imagination, narcis-
sism, materialism, and now-focus are all their fault. One could even say, 
after reading Tocqueville, that focusing on short-term gains is perfectly 
normal and to be expected in democratic times. Tocqueville teaches one 
to understand how democracy raises decent but nearsighted men and 
women that I will refer to as “demolanders.”15 
In short, I believe Democracy in America is a marvelous resource, and 
knowing about Tocqueville and democracy is good for students and all 
voting-age citizens, just as I think it’s good to know how irony works, 
to know the difference between classicism and romanticism, and to 
commit to memory a few poems (and write a few of one’s own). I have 
the genuine conviction from the lively thinking I see deployed in term 
papers and final exams that students are truly grateful to have discovered 
Tocqueville, grateful to make some connections and feel less “clueless 
in academe,”16 less “academically adrift.”17 Emerson said the American 
scholar ought “to cheer, to raise, and to guide men by showing them facts 
amidst appearances.”18 That is what Tocqueville did—though ultimately, 
like E. M. Forster, he was not prepared to give more than two cheers for 
democracy—and that is what I intend to do.19 But why this book now? 
It is not for material gain. I already have tenure and make a decent sal-
ary by French standards. I am motivated by an immaterial, I would even 
say spiritual necessity to step up and share my thoughts and feelings on 
this subject—Tocqueville and democracy in the Internet age—during a 
window of time in human history that sees men and women yearning for 
a new “sustainable” direction—for themselves, their loved ones, and the 
planet—and half-aware that if careful attention and application to this 
common search do not come soon, grave consequences for mankind and 
indeed all life forms are likely to ensue. I see myself, therefore, as a wit-
ness, and this book is my testimony and my contribution to that search.
In this pursuit Tocqueville, per se, is not of capital importance, though 
I persist in my belief that he is a valuable resource for discussing democ-
racy and actual democracies and mapping out their future. That is what 
matters most. Editorially, Tocqueville studies is in a relative calm or hold-
ing pattern. The flurry of publications that came out around the bicente-
nary of the author’s birth is over, and the bicentenary of his masterpiece 
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Democracy in America is still a ways off in 2035. Tocqueville’s writings 
received a burst of media attention at the end of the Cold War and the 
beginning of the Internet age (1989–1991), and again around the time of 
9/11, and yet again around the 2005 bicentenary.20 But that attention has 
mostly subsided now, which makes a lucid assessment of that earlier set of 
reflections more possible. And perhaps more valuable, because what has 
become increasingly popular and visible in the post–Cold War Internet 
age is debating the viability, suitability, and sustainability of democracy in 
the world today, a debate that goes on with or without Tocqueville’s help, 
depending on the participants, as part of the larger question about “the 
wealth of nations” and “why nations fail.”21 I will be making my contribu-
tion to that ongoing conversation in the second part of this book after a 
review of Tocqueville’s strengths and weaknesses and those of some of 
the most noteworthy commentators of the past twelve years.
A list of world events since 1989 that have been the focus of discus-
sions about democracy would include the following: the creation of the 
World Wide Web by Tim Berners-Lee and others, the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, the reunification of Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the political and economic changes within Russia and the former Soviet 
satellite countries in Eastern Europe, the Masstricht Treaty establishing 
the European Union (1992), the Tiananmen Square protests in China, 
China’s economic reforms under Deng Xiaoping, the creation of Google 
and the entry of Google into China, the disputed U.S. presidential elec-
tion in 2000, “9/11” and other terrorist attacks (Madrid, Bali, London, 
Mumbai), the war in Afghanistan and the second war in Iraq, the 
American military’s use of “extraordinary rendition” and torture during 
its “war on terror,” the establishment of a five-year term and term limits 
(two) for French presidents, the “reign” of Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela 
Merkel (referred to briefly as “Merkozy”), the election of U.S. presi-
dent Barack Obama (2008, 2012), the French “non” to the European 
Constitution (2005), the Lisbon Treaty establishing further European 
rules on immigration and the Schengen area of free movement within 
the European Union (2007), the global availability of Facebook accounts 
(2006) and Facebook’s IPO (2012), the financial crisis of 2008 and the 
“bailouts,” the “Great Recession” and “austerity” policies that followed, 
mass demonstrations of “indignant” citizens in several Mediterranean 
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countries (2011), and the democratic movements in several Middle 
Eastern countries starting with Tunisia (December 2010) known as the 
“Arab Spring.”
Other events of more local concern, but that of course become 
world events in this Internet age of instant global communication, 
would include the completion of France’s switchover from Minitel to 
the Internet (2012); the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to permit essen-
tially unlimited political campaign spending by corporations and unions 
(Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission, 2010); the Oslo massa-
cre (2011); the bombing of Libya (2011); the government suppression 
of civilian protests in Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain; the English riots against 
state spending cuts (2011); the heating up of the Scottish independence 
movement (2012); the Italian referendums against Berlusconi (2011) 
and his eventual ouster; the return amid protests and charges of corrup-
tion of Vladimir Putin as Russia’s president (2012); and the presidential 
election victory of French Socialist party candidate François Hollande 
(2012), to name just a few.
A more diffuse set of incremental large-scale changes that have also 
entered into debates about world democracy—“too big to fail” or “too 
small to succeed”?—include the spread of automation, personal com-
puters, broadband access, cell phones, and smart phones. There is also 
the impact of so-called social media that has intensified and diversified 
the practices of e-mail, blogging, texting, instant-messaging, “Googling,” 
“Wikiing,” and “Tweeting.” Besides these technological changes in the 
way we live now that some might consider a new “passive revolution” 
(Gramsci) for good or evil, there have been widespread social changes 
such as the corporate, business-minded (and sometimes mafia-minded) 
takeover of the public sphere, the incremental privatization of many pub-
lic government services (in health care, education, transportation, etc.), 
and the growth of individual retirement accounts and online trading, 
as well as the emergence of various countercurrents including the “slow 
food” and “real food” movements, the “antiglobalization,” “altermondi-
alisation,” and “global justice” movements, the “green” movements, and 
loosely organized opposition groups such as the Tea Party in the U.S. 
or the “Indignant” demonstrators in Spain, France, and other European 
countries and the “Occupy” movements inspired by the protests in 
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Cairo’s Tahrir Square since the 2011 winter of discontent with the 
Moubarak regime.
Finally, alongside these specific events and widespread changes and 
trends, one must consider the global pressures that have spurred both 
democratically organized associations of ordinary citizens and cohorts of 
government or corporate-sponsored experts and officials who exhibit a 
marked skepticism or even contempt for democracy and democratically 
elaborated solutions to current world problems.22 First among these pres-
sures is overpopulation, a subject succinctly treated by Aldous Huxley 
in 1958 in his Brave New World Revisited and more expansively in Paul 
Erlich’s bestseller from 1968, The Population Bomb, but curiously absent 
from news headlines today despite the efforts of groups such as World 
Population Awareness (www.overpopulation.org) and readily available 
statistics that show the world population has nearly doubled since 1968, 
from 3.5 billion to 7 billion in 2011, and will reach 9 billion in 2041. 
Other world pressures that are provoked and worsened by overpopula-
tion (though this correlation is routinely ignored by the media) and in 
turn aggravate tensions between democracy believers and democracy 
skeptics include xenophobia and racism; mass migrations and homesick-
ness, pollution and waste disposal; global warming and climate change, 
and shortages of water, food, energy, arable land, hospitable living envi-
ronments, and good jobs. Predating and underlying these contemporary 
pressures on all societies and governments is a long-standing funda-
mental disagreement between democracy believers and skeptics about 
the existence of what New Yorker magazine business columnist James 
Surowiecki calls “the wisdom of crowds.”23 
Tocqueville usually had two things in mind when he talked about the 
birth and growth of democracy. The first was expanding equality of social 
conditions, by which he meant more literate people, more landowners, 
and more people living in basically similar ways when it comes to their 
shared memories, customs and habits, and aspirations. The second was a 
system of government: popular sovereignty—“government of the people, 
by the people, for the people,” as Abraham Lincoln memorably put it in 
his Gettysburg Address (1863). These two notions of democracy are the 
main focus of the first volume of Democracy in America. In the second 
volume that Tocqueville published five years later, he develops a third 
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sense that is democracy as a way of life, and even a religious faith though 
nowhere does he explicitly call democracy a religion. For Tocqueville, 
democracy clearly gives rise to a new species of homo sapiens, the 
demolander, who has different core beliefs and habits, or “mores,” than 
his ancestors.
The least controversial sense of the term democracy is when it is used 
as a synonym for expanded access. When the French, for example, speak 
of something being démocratisé, they usually mean that access to that 
product, service, or institution has increased to the point of becoming 
ordinary, banal, available to nearly everyone (often because of a drop in 
price or some change in the rules that regulate access). If early symbols of 
French démocratisation were the beret, the baguette, and the camembert, 
today they are postsecondary education, a cell phone, and vacation time 
at the seaside or abroad.
The less frequently heard meaning of démocratisation (no doubt 
because it occurs less often) is the expansion of the democratic charac-
ter of a political regime, i.e., an increase of decision-making power in the 
hands of ordinary people, whether elected or appointed. It’s one thing 
to allow, say, student or parent representatives to attend school council 
meetings and sit around the same table with the principal, the faculty, 
and municipal school board members; it’s another thing to let them vote. 
Calls in France for “démocratie réelle” and more “démocratie participa-
tive,” such as one heard during the unsuccessful presidential campaign 
of Socialist candidate Ségolène Royal in 2007, tellingly underscore the 
long-standing preference in the République Française (and many other 
so-called democracies) for low levels of political involvement by ordinary 
people—in effect, democracy without democracy. Your presence may 
be tolerated in the room, or within the territory, but you will have little 
or no power, no say when it comes to public policy-making, no real par-
ticipation. The history of France’s Fifth Republic has been one of liberal, 
though sometimes backhanded démocratisation in the first social sense 
(let the masses have access to cheap—i.e., inexpensive and shoddy—
housing and higher education) and conservative containment of démoc-
ratisation in the political sense. Therefore don’t allow trial by jury, don’t 
let tax-paying foreigners vote, and do allow politicians to hold more than 
one elective office at the same time with no term limits. But France’s 
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ruling class is hardly the only political elite that is annoyed by voting and 
its ground rules (1 person = 1 vote, all votes are to be counted, majority 
rule, etc.) and quietly skeptical or openly hostile to allowing important 
decisions to be decided by popular vote. Democracy skeptics are every-
where. Look around.
One of the reasons there are so many, as James Surowiecki demon-
strates, has to do with the success of the unproven claim that while a per-
son may be smart, people are stupid.24 One might call this a class preju-
dice that the more powerful and highly educated minority have against 
the majority of ordinary people, often pejoratively lumped together as 
“the masses.” For the elite, who quite naturally consider their rule and 
their rules to be the best (being themselves the aristoi, the aristocracy), 
voting and hence democracy equals “mob rule,” and anyone who says 
otherwise is decried as a “populist.”25 “Mob rule” has to be the most 
enduring slur against democracy since the “storming” of the Bastille by 
a “mob” in 1789, and a charge that democracy believers feel they have 
to constantly fend off.26 What Surowiecki goes on to show is that in this 
face-off between snobs and mobs, diverse groups of ordinary people turn 
out to be better decision makers than elites so long as certain precondi-
tions are in place, namely diversity, independence, decentralization, and 
a well-thought-out aggregating mechanism for collecting and tabulat-
ing the results of individual “votes” (whether for a candidate, restaurant, 
or football team). It’s a fascinating and upbeat study if one is a democ-
racy believer, as Surowiecki would seem to be. His concluding chapter, 
“Democracy: Dreams of the Common Good,” strikes a hopeful note in 
the key of Tocqueville one could say.
[Democracy] is not a way of solving cognition problems or 
a mechanism for revealing the public interest. But it is a way 
of dealing with (if not solving once and for all) the most fun-
damental problems of cooperation and coordination. How 
do we live together? How can living together work out to our 
mutual benefit? Democracy helps people answer those ques-
tions because the democratic experience is an experience of 
not getting everything you want. It’s an experience of seeing 
your opponent win and get what you hoped to have, and of accept-
ing it, because you believe that they will not destroy the things you 
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value and because you know you will have another chance to get 
what you want. In that sense, a healthy democracy inculcates 
the virtues of compromise—and change. The decisions that 
democracies make may not determine the wisdom of the 
crowd. The decision to make them democratically does. (271, 
my emphasis).
Surowiecki’s conclusion gets to the heart of the most complex and 
interesting sense of democracy—democracy as a way of life and a belief 
system—that Tocqueville spent most of his time in Volume Two of 
Democracy in America presenting and explaining to his largely skepti-
cal French readership. In that second companion volume Tocqueville 
devotes many chapters to the new kinds of relationships that develop 
between demolanders. Living democratically, as Surowiecki underlines, 
involves a belief in certain shared core values between oneself and one’s 
fellow man (e.g., honesty is the best policy, cheating and dehumaniza-
tion are wrong, being a gracious winner and a good loser is right) despite 
individual differences of taste or direction, as well as a commitment to 
the open-ended, ongoing debate (because circumstances are constantly 
changing) over the virtues and defects of specific policies and prefer-
ences. In a democracy “tomorrow is another day,” as Margaret Mitchell 
had Scarlett say in 1936 about life in 1865. Positions and perspectives 
may (can / are allowed to) change. The eccentric Spartan Yankee Thoreau 
knew this when he concluded Walden with the stirring words, “There is 
more day to dawn. The sun is but a morning star.”
Tocqueville says something similar in the concluding paragraphs of 
Democracy in America when he compares his own partial view of the world 
to that of the “Almighty Eternal Being, whose eye necessarily encom-
passes all things and sees the entire human race and each man distinctly 
yet simultaneously.” In the following two paragraphs Tocqueville affirms 
a natural religion whose core tenet—similar to Thoreau’s credo and to 
Emerson’s “transparent eyeball” declaration from Nature (1836)—is to 
respect the equal dignity of all life. He confesses his reflex to condemn 
what, from his perspective, may strike him as decadent or painful, and he 
affirms his effort to adopt the universal perspective that democracy pre-
supposes and reaffirms at every turn.
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It is natural to believe that what is most satisfying to the eye 
of man’s creator and keeper is not the singular prosperity of 
a few but the greater well-being of all: what seems decadence 
to me is therefore progress in his eyes; what pains me pleases 
him. Equality is less lofty, perhaps, but more just, and its jus-
tice is the source of its grandeur and beauty.
I am doing my best to enter into this point of view, which 
is that of the Lord, and trying to consider and judge human 
affairs from this perspective. (DA II, 401, G833)
Tocqueville’s God, therefore, is a democrat, not a Platonist or republican, 
and Tocqueville, by the work he seems to have done on himself in over-
coming certain ingrained aristocratic tendencies while retaining others, 
invites us on a similar journey of self renewal via questioning, rethinking, 
and ultimately a leap of faith and trust.27 
In the following pages we shall see that democracy, like a loving 
marriage or close friendship, can be not only a way of life—a religion 
or reliance on another person or people—but also a kind of therapy, a 
repairing of the connection with our lost self, with others, especially a 
“significant other,” and with the larger world that we all need and desire. I 
have become newly persuaded of this universal desire for connection from 
reading, of all things, a self-help “guide for couples” by Harville Hendrix 
and his wife Helen Lakelly Hunt, Getting the Love You Want (2008).
Above all else, we seek connection—with parts of ourselves 
that we have repressed, with other people, and with the larger 
universe. We cannot experience life in its fullness unless we 
have an intimate relationship with another human being and, 
beyond that, a feeling of connection with the world around 
us. (xvii–xix)
I can imagine Tocqueville going along with this affirmation since get-
ting the love you want is not all that different from a cooperative approach 
to getting the governance you want. Because of its valorization of hori-
zontal, cooperative relations among co-equals (as opposed to vertical 
relations between superiors and subordinates—however necessary those 
may also be in certain circumstances) democracy, more than any other 
form of government or way of life, favors feelings of ordinary dignity and 
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connection. In its most nontrivial sense, but also that which is most con-
troversial and controversy creating, democracy, like the new language 
codes that are the currency of our Internet age, is an open-ended, ever-
changing system that advances or declines according to cause and effect 
relationships that are difficult if not impossible to direct or determine at 
one go or from a single position—a fact that some may find aggravating, 
but to democrats who recognize both the infinity and the fallibility of 
the private man, it is the saving grace that has so far kept us from making 
too many unrepairable mistakes and allowed us to continue to build new 
connections and honor some old ones.
That democracy makes repairable mistakes is one of the regime’s “real 
advantages” that has received less attention than others,28 but it may be 
one of the most important, especially at the present time. Democracy 
may or may not be too big to fail, especially in the post–Cold War era, 
where it lives on precariously without its oppositional bad conscience, 
Communism, that acted as a useful prod to the “Free World” to live up to 
its name. But it has become, along with the notion of dignity that it both 
presupposes and fosters, the name for a desire for connection and whole-
ness that millions of people, billions even, have pinned their hopes on.
•
Part One of this study begins with a presentation of the main themes of 
Democracy in America and then offers a coordinated critical assessment 
of eight recent Tocqueville & democracy studies by leading American 
and French specialists: Agnès Antoine, Leo Damrosch, Jon Elster, Jean-
Michel Heimonet, Claire Le Strat and Willy Pelletier, Paul A. Rahe, 
Emmanuel Todd, and Sheldon S. Wolin. The distinctive view that follows 
from these commentaries of commentators is that Cold War–era concen-
tration on part 4 of Volume Two of Democracy in America with spooky 
scenarios of "soft despotism" is no longer as pertinent in the Internet age 
when so many, though not all, have already made their peace with "man-
aged democracy" and not only do not find it scary but positively welcome 
it (in Russia, the U.S., and elsewhere). While not discounting the endur-
ing importance of DA II, 4, I will argue that the center of gravity and 
reader's attention should shift in today's world to the earlier Parts Two 
and especially Three of Volume Two where Tocqueville can be helpful 
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in getting us to think better about both personal and public relationships 
that either extend or harm “the spirit of democracy.”29  
Part Two surveys democracy today as measured by various “demo-
cratic audits”30 that have been conducted by groups (such as Democratic 
Audit) and by individuals who are each in various ways following in 
Tocqueville’s footsteps as singular witnesses of democratic practices 
and institutions over a particular territory. Each auditor comments on 
democracy’s strengths, weaknesses, and sources of resistance, but with-
out necessarily coordinating their efforts with those of other auditors 
past or present—a gap I try to fill. In my own audit, a rough measurement 
of advances versus declines of democratic practice in the United States 
and France receives special attention. This survey is then set against 
the background or “distant mirror” offered by several British witnesses 
(Charlie Chaplin, E. M. Forster, Aldous Huxley, and George Orwell) 
who were each deeply affected by the political and social turmoil of the 
1930s, a time that bears many resemblances to our own. Key elements 
from canonical works by these artists are used to highlight points made 
by Tocqueville and latter-day democracy auditors discussed in previous 
chapters. Finally, as a sort of bridge between then and now, I comment 
on some essays by the late British-American historian Tony Judt (1948–
2010), who was in some ways more an anachronistic throwback to 1930s 
modernism than he was representative of his own postmodern time.
Part Three brings the focus back to the contemporary situation of 
democracy and dictatorship today with summaries of important recent 
news items from France, the United States, Russia, and of course the 
Middle East with its “Arab Spring” and widespread civil unrest. After 
this short survey of democracy-related events that took place between 
December 2010 and December 2011, a second chapter discusses the 
emergence of dignity as a human right and then makes use of Tocqueville’s 
isolated but important evocations of dignity to ask whether contempo-
rary dignity-talk is a sign of democracy’s triumph or defeat. Or if it is a 
sign, or perhaps even a battleground, of democracy’s ongoing struggle 
with forces that would seek to contain it with a variety of management 
techniques ranging from the ruthless and brutal to softer, gentler ones 
(such as mass marketing of electronic devices) that insecure, overly pre-
occupied citizens might be all too willing to go along with. Part Three 
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concludes with an inventory of Tocqueville’s policy recommendations 
“to create or secure the independence and dignity” of men and women 
in times of relatively high equality of social condition, which, alas, as he 
noted, are also the conditions most favorable for establishing an absolute 
and despotic government. Based on his experience and his reading of 
other theorists such as James Madison, Tocqueville affirms that the many 
real advantages of democratic government (respect for rights and the rule 
of law, enhancement of the creativity and well-being of the greatest num-
ber, building confidence and self-esteem) cannot be sustained over the 
long term unless auxiliary precautions are put in place that can protect a 
democratic regime against both outside attacks and its own self-destruc-
tive tendencies.
The Conclusion offers a list of ten more specific policy recommenda-
tions articulated with mostly North America and Europe in mind but of 
general interest to any country, region, or other social entity seeking to 
build or block democracy.
In the Appendix the reader will find the answers to twenty factual 
questions about Democracy in America. It is a stand-alone component of 
the book (designed to be read before or after reading Tocqueville), as are 
all the chapters, which can be read profitably each on its own and in any 
order the reader chooses. This is a deliberate concession to the nonlinear, 
click-here-or-there habits of more and more readers in the Internet age. 
At the same time, the book is emphatically not a compilation of essays. 
There is coherence and a definite progression between all the component 
parts even as the “plot” moves between the 1830s, the 1930s, and today. 
Like Tocqueville’s own prose, the book tries to balance seriousness and 
a plain style that is accessible to ordinary readers. Like democracy, I am 
trying to look out for the well-being of the greatest number and convey a 
sense that, although I am the author, “we’re in this together.”
If, as Sheldon Wolin and others have argued,31 democracy is incom-
patible with our divisive contemporary form of CEO-, shareholder-, 
financial-services-driven capitalism with its top-down corporate organi-
zation and ardent worship of profits, capital gains, and endless “growth,” 
then it’s up to people to find a way to treat and heal the individuals and 
communities mangled by capitalism’s destructive side and to place their 
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society on a surer path toward overcoming factionalism and building 
more sustainable relationships and associations.32 
The bottom line, as people living in democratic times love to say, 
is that Tocqueville is a useful guide when it comes to this (re)building 
project, and his usefulness, I claim, has not diminished but increased in 
the Internet age with its ramped up versions of the market and commu-
nications revolutions that the 1830s America Tocqueville witnessed was 
experiencing in its early stages.
I invite you to read on and see if you agree.
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ITocqueville

Chapter 1
Reading Democracy in America
Tocqueville’s masterpiece is Democracy in America, published in two vol-
umes, five years apart, in 1835 and 1840. He also wrote two other notable 
books: the political memoir entitled Souvenirs, written in 1850–1851 
shortly after he had left politics but only published posthumously in 
1893, and The Old Regime and the Revolution (1856).33 Although they also 
display Tocqueville’s illuminating, against-the-grain thinking, some read-
ers find these two works less satisfying than Democracy in America, which 
is the product of a more restless and hopeful young mind. Souvenirs has 
all the daring but also the flaws of many historical memoirs—one enjoys 
being in the company of a brilliant witness of the revolution of 1848, but 
one wonders to what degree the accounts he gives are true and truly valu-
able.34 This lively piece of “life writing” is both highly readable and trou-
bling since, as Paul de Man famously observed, “Autobiography veils a 
defacement of the mind of which it is itself the cause.”35 For somewhat 
similar reasons, to which must be added the facts of advancing age, ill-
ness, and disillusion, The Old Regime and the Revolution is an uncom-
pleted study that a reader may find provocatively stimulating or annoy-
ing by turns. Besides these two works, Tocqueville wrote many other 
shorter pieces: government reports, travel essays, academic and political 
speeches, and countless letters. The still unfinished modern edition of 
his complete works (begun in 1951) will contain somewhere between 
thirty and forty volumes; an earlier Oeuvres complètes published after 
Tocqueville’s death in 1861–1866 under the supervision of his travel 
partner and friend Gustave de Beaumont takes up nine volumes; and 
France’s prestigious Pléiade collection presents a generous selection of 
Tocqueville’s major works, travel writings, essays, and speeches in three 
hefty volumes. Fair or unfair, however, it is on Democracy in America that 
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Tocqueville’s reputation as a writer, theorist, historian, political scien-
tist, and social scientist rests, and it is this work that will be the focus of 
our attention.
The following commentary is the product of several years of teach-
ing Tocqueville to French and foreign undergraduates in France. I am not 
saying this is “all ye need to know,” nor am I offering this commentary 
as a substitute for reading Democracy in America itself. This is why I have 
keyed my remarks to page numbers in the easily available two-volume 
paperback Garnier-Flammarion edition from 1981 and pair them with 
page numbers from the Goldhammer translation, which, being the most 
recent, has the best chance of having profited from observing and weigh-
ing the strengths and weaknesses of all earlier translations.
De la Démocratie en Amérique is about nine hundred pages long, 
while Goldhammer’s Democracy in America is about eight hundred 
pages—French always shrinks a bit in the dryer of an English translation. 
Whatever edition one reads, however, it definitely qualifies as a big book; 
and yet if you read thirty pages per day, in about a month you’re there, 
which makes it entirely manageable as an assigned text in a semester 
course or as summer or weekend reading.
The first volume is divided into two parts of eight and ten efficiently 
organized chapters plus a Conclusion. The second is divided into four 
parts consisting of twenty-one, twenty, twenty-six, and eight chapters 
that vary in length and whose subjects often overlap each other. The first 
volume would be about the same length as the second (roughly four 
hundred pages) were it not for the hundred-page final Chapter Ten of 
Volume One, Part Two, “Some Considerations Concerning the Present 
State and Probable Future of the Three Races that Inhabit the Territory 
of the United States.” This last chapter is a supplement that Tocqueville 
might have considered publishing separately, for example, as a long intro-
duction or review essay of the novel his friend Beaumont wrote after they 
returned from America, Marie, or Slavery in the United States—a portrait 
of American mores (Marie ou l’Esclavage aux États-Unis, tableau de mœurs 
américains, 1835). But in a way it’s fitting for us that this chapter appear 
where it does, because it functions as a pivot between the major concern 
of Volume One, which is the history of Americans and their democratic 
institutions, and what one gets in Volume Two, which is Tocqueville’s 
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nonfictional “portrait of American mores” and his commentary of how 
those mores manifest themselves in daily American life. Mores, which 
rhymes with forays not doors, is the best translation of the French term 
mœurs that Tocqueville probably got used to from reading Montesquieu, 
and it means the “folkways of central importance accepted without ques-
tion and embodying the fundamental moral views of a group.”36 So this 
one-hundred page final chapter on American mœurs, filled with percep-
tively drawn “considerations” of different American types and their rela-
tions with each other, can be viewed as both a supplement to Beaumont’s 
novel and as a spur that may have incited Tocqueville to come back to 
the matter and publish a longer, more detailed, and critical portrait of 
American mores five years later.
If in Volume One Tocqueville seems mostly content to play the dis-
interested scholar and present his observations and considerations with 
only the occasional critical aside or probing address to the reader via 
questions and the rare apostrophe to “you,” in Volume Two he is defi-
nitely willing and able to do some side-taking. He argues in favor of the 
positions he wants to defend and criticizes views and behavior that he 
considers for different reasons to be wrong. This shift from a more dispas-
sionate to a more impassioned Tocqueville can be observed in the two 
Introductions that are included in the French GF edition as well as in the 
Preface to Volume Two.37 All three of these short, argument-driven prefa-
tory declarations convey Tocqueville’s core convictions; namely that 
expanding equality of social conditions is a “providential fact” that marks 
the advent of democracy and the end of traditional aristocracy; that 
France is stuck between two modes of thinking, feeling, and behaving—
aristocratically and democratically—and needs to get unstuck; and that 
American democracy, though flawed and impossible to imitate given the 
specificity of each people’s history, geography, and present circumstances, 
nevertheless offers some useful lessons for France and other Old World 
countries. He is certainly not acting as America’s cheerleader; nor how-
ever is he anti-American or anti-America. Like Publius in The Federalist 
(1788), Tocqueville claims, against his countryman Montesquieu, that a 
democratic republic over a large territory is possible—he has seen it with 
his own eyes—but he does not claim that democracy, i.e., genuine popu-
lar sovereignty with broad participation by ordinary people from all walks 
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of life in the policy-making decisions and daily running of the country, is 
either inevitable, easily sustainable, or without attendant dangers.
Following an early assessment by John Stuart Mill, Volume Two is 
often said to be darker and denser than Volume One, but I disagree. I 
find Tocqueville’s language and rhetorical techniques to be roughly the 
same throughout (more on those techniques later). As for the possible 
negative side effects or “perils” of the “democratic revolution,” which 
Tocqueville says he will not shy away from talking about in Volume 
Two, especially the specter of a new “hard” industrial aristocracy and a 
“soft,” pseudo-democratic, professional-managerial despotism, they were 
already evoked in Volume One and perfectly audible for anyone with the 
ears to hear them. And for those who missed those warnings, there are 
the two Introductions to Volume One and the Preface to Volume Two. 
Here is a passage from each, starting with the first Introduction, which 
includes clear statements of Tocqueville’s observations and convictions:
To educate democracy—if possible to revive its beliefs; to 
purify its mores; to regulate its impulses; to substitute, little 
by little, knowledge of affairs for inexperience and under-
standing of true interests for blind instinct; to adapt govern-
ment to its time and place; to alter it to fit circumstances and 
individuals—this is the primary duty imposed on the leaders 
of society today.
A world that is totally new demands a new political science.
To this need, however, we [French and Europeans gener-
ally] have given little thought. Immersed in a rapidly flowing 
stream, we stubbornly fix our eyes on the few pieces of debris 
still visible on the shore, while the current carries us away and 
propels us backward into the abyss. (DA I, 61–62, G7)
Tocqueville is clearly frustrated by his generation’s inability to carry 
out the French Revolution’s worthwhile program—Liberté, Egalité, 
Fraternité. A few pages later, he switches metaphors, from river to ruins, 
to better get across the idea that his countrymen are stuck between an old 
regime that no longer exists and a new regime that doesn’t yet exist:
Thus we have abandoned what was good in our former state 
without acquiring what useful things our present state might 
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have to offer. Having destroyed an aristocratic society, we 
seem ready to go on living complacently amid the rubble for-
ever. (I, 65, G11)
“All that for this!” Tocqueville laments. The long, disappointing 
outcome of the French Revolution—from the Terror to Napoleon to 
Charles X to Louis-Philippe to a Second Republic and then a Second 
Empire—must be increasingly aggravating as the years go by to the elo-
quent social scientist elected both to the Chamber of Deputies (1839) 
and to the Académie Française (1841). “They still don’t get it!” must be 
his upset feeling, and so in the revolutionary year of 1848 he uses the 
occasion of a 12th edition of his acclaimed masterpiece to say once again 
that France still has the opportunity to learn from the American example 
and change course:
America’s institutions, which were only a subject of curiosity 
under the French monarchy, must become an object of study 
for a republican France. Force alone cannot be the founda-
tion of a new government; good laws are necessary. After the 
warrior, the legislator. The one destroys, the other founds. To 
each his work. If the question is no longer whether in France 
we will have royalty or a republic, we have still to learn if 
that Republic will be agitated or tranquil, fair and steady or 
haphazard, pacific or war-mongering, liberal or oppressive, 
a menace to the sacred rights of property and family or one 
which recognizes and defends them. This is a terrible problem 
whose solution is not only important for France but for the 
entire civilized world….
Yet, this problem, which we have only begun to think 
about, was solved by the Americans more than sixty years ago 
[Tocqueville is probably dating from the time of the ratifica-
tion of the U.S. Constitution: 1788–1848.]
Where indeed could we find greater hope or greater les-
sons? But let us not turn our attention toward America to 
slavishly copy the institutions it established for itself, but to 
better think through those which would be right for us; not 
necessarily to do what they do, but to learn from what they’ve 
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done; and to borrow the principles more than the details of 
their laws. (I, 54, my translation)
That this “terrible problem” has been definitively “solved” by the 
Americans sounds like a gross exaggeration today and probably would 
have to an American in 1848 as well; but from Tocqueville’s perspective 
it may have looked as though the United States had definitely answered 
“Yes, we can” to the “important question” asked in the opening para-
graph of Federalist #1, and, who knows, he may even have been inspired 
by that famous passage and have decided to play the latter-day Madison 
or Hamilton when, like Publius, he considers the “terrible problem” as an 
“important question” addressed to his countrymen (whom he also casts 
in an empowered, decision-making role). Here is Publius:
It has frequently been remarked that it seems to have been 
reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and 
example, to decide the important question, whether societies 
of men are really capable or not of establishing good govern-
ment from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever 
destined for their political constitutions on accident and force.
The stakes are high in 1787 and 1788, as Publius makes clear, and 
Tocqueville, who served on a Philadelphia-like constitution drafting 
committee in 1848, raises them further in his new Introduction that also 
presents a stark choice: A or B.
If we save ourselves, we save all the peoples in our neighboring 
countries at the same time; if we lose our way, everyone will 
lose along with us. The destiny of the world will be markedly 
different depending on whether we come to have democratic 
liberty or democratic tyranny; and whether republican gov-
ernment is to be eventually established everywhere or abol-
ished everywhere depends today on us. (I, 54, my translation)
That “the destiny of the world” depends on what happens in France is 
a long-standing conceit of French “exceptionalism” that understandably 
grates against America’s own brand of exceptionalist grandeur; neverthe-
less, Tocqueville’s underlining of the risk of “democratic tyranny” soon 
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looked prescient after the decisive electoral victory of President Louis 
Napoleon, who would soon become Emperor Napoleon III.
To conclude, here is Tocqueville’s 1840 declaration from the Preface 
to Volume Two justifying the full disclosure that he plans to make con-
cerning the possible perils of the “irresistible” democratic revolution:
Since I am firmly of the opinion that the democratic revolu-
tion to which we are witness is an irresistible fact, and one 
that it would be neither desirable nor wise to oppose, some 
readers may be surprised to discover how often I find occa-
sion in the book to be quite severely critical of the democratic 
societies created by this revolution.
My answer is simple: it is because I am not an enemy of 
democracy that I sought to deal with it in a sincere manner.
People do not receive the truth from their enemies, and 
their friends seldom offer it. That is why I have told it as I see it.
My premise is that many people will take it upon them-
selves to proclaim the new goods that equality promises to 
mankind but few will dare warn of the perils that it holds in 
the offing. I have therefore focused primarily on those perils, 
and being convinced that I had clearly made them out, I was 
not so cowardly as to hold my tongue about them.
I hope that readers will judge this second work to be as 
impartial as they seem to have judged the first. Amid the 
swirl of divisive and contradictory opinions, I have tried for a 
moment to forget the sympathies and antipathies that each of 
them may inspire in me. (II, 6, G480)
By “impartial,” I don’t think Tocqueville had in mind the so-called 
balanced reporting one hears about today, but instead an expression of 
sincere admiration for democracy’s “real advantages,” as he sees them, as 
well as a measured, complete account of its real defects and self-destruc-
tive tendencies. We will return later to the subject of Tocqueville’s theo-
retical stance and his desire to adopt the more just, less partisan point of 
view of the Almighty Eternal Being “whose eye necessarily encompasses 
all things and sees the entire human race and each man distinctly yet 
simultaneously” (II, 401, G832).
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The above quotations, even if not in French, offer a fairly representative 
sample of Tocqueville’s language and rhetorical techniques. If it’s com-
mon for Tocqueville to be the go-to person for a handy quotation, as well 
as for commentators to marvel at how frequently that happens (Gopnik, 
Kramnik), fewer have taken the trouble to explain why Tocqueville is so 
quotable. The obvious answer is that he writes clear, grammatical, idiom-
atic prose about a complex problem—Is democracy possible and under 
what conditions?—that interests lots of people. In a letter to his friend 
Kergolay (November 10, 1836), Tocqueville says that he reads a bit of 
Pascal, Montesquieu, and Rousseau every day. Those are good prose 
models, and Tocqueville seems to have absorbed from them a thorough 
knowledge of the moves that matter in persuasive writing that any lan-
guage teacher or MLA president would be thrilled to see appear in stu-
dent prose.38 Paragraph unity, logical paragraph sequencing, and the 
judicious use of the standard modes of development taught in any com-
position class (e.g., narration, description, examples, classification and 
division, comparison and contrast, process, cause and effect, definition, 
and argument)39 seem second nature to Tocqueville and make his writing 
both engaging and graceful.
Tocqueville’s prose strikes a nice balance between the written and 
the spoken. It’s the prose of an orator, one could say, but not a showy or 
bombastic one (an American weakness noted in DA II, 1, 18). The prose 
is straightforward but not demotic or folksy, sharp but not snarky. And 
though Tocqueville is keen on exposing little-noticed cause and effect 
relationships, unexpected reversals, and the mechanisms of checks and 
balances, his presentations generally rank clarity over cleverness, acuity 
over cute, the tenor over the vehicle. Indeed, his use of metaphor, such 
as the stream and rubble images quoted above, is restrained, and all the 
more powerful for its rarity.40 Poetic attention-getting devices are unnec-
essary because he’s not Emerson addressing a highly diverse crowd in 
some rented church or grange hall, but instead a classically educated 
aristocrat writing to the French “power elite” of his day, whether noble 
like himself or part of the notable bourgeoisie class. Unburdened by the 
need to seduce or conform, Tocqueville is free to move forward with 
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his argument-driven essay as though he were trying to convince his best 
friends, siblings, or parents to accept what he has to say, and no doubt in 
part he was.
Two recurring techniques are worth special mention. The first may 
be something he picked up from the deadpan Pascal, the pragmatic 
Publius,41 or another political philosopher such as Machiavelli, Adam 
Ferguson, or Montesquieu. It consists of using probabilistic, noncategor-
ical adverbs (généralement, rarement, souvent, etc.) and dynamic compara-
tive structures such as “either x or y” “the more x, the more/less y,” “when 
x, then/then not y,” or “if more x, then the chances are more/less y,” etc. 
Here is an example from a discussion about “How Democracy Simplifies 
and Eases Habitual Relations among Americans.”
Many people adduce purely physical causes to explain the 
strikingly unsociable character of the English and their 
reserved and taciturn nature. I am willing to grant that 
blood counts for something, but I believe that the social 
state is far more important, as the American example proves. 
(II, 212, G661)
This paragraph contains (1) a classic “They say / I say” structure 
(which here is articulated around a partial concession: “I am willing to 
grant”), (2) Tocqueville’s characteristic use of comparison and contrast, 
here between vertical aristoland ways and the allegedly more horizontal 
demoland attitudes, (3) a strong comparative, “far more important,” and 
(4) reliance on a supposed observation of opposite behaviors in a simi-
lar situation: two Americans / two Englishmen meet by chance in a for-
eign place; the former are natural, frank, and open with each other, the 
latter are stiff and distant. The point Tocqueville wants to make is that 
democracy favors “weak ties” with their attendant advantages and dis-
advantages: “Democracy does not create tight bonds among men, but it 
does make their habitual relations easier,” he asserts in the first sentence 
of the chapter.
A second recurring technique, basic to all oral presentations, is 
Tocqueville’s tendency to conclude each chapter with a tightly organized 
closing statement that recalls the opening main idea (usually clearly dis-
played in the chapter title as well). He never goes in for wisecracks, but 
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he does like to conclude with a sort of zinger that will have the rousing 
energy of a sonnet’s closing couplet and the memorable impact of a joke’s 
punch line. Thus, the chapter in question concludes with a quick restate-
ment of the whole argument once again:
Americans are as fully aware as we [French] are of the unsocia-
ble attitude of the English toward other Englishmen, and no 
less astonished by it. Yet the Americans are tied to the English 
by origin, religion, and language, and in part by mores. The 
only difference is their social state. Hence it seems fair to say 
that the reserve of the English stems far more from the coun-
try’s constitution than from that of its citizens. (II, 213, G662)
Whether it really seems fair or not, in 1830, 1930, or 2030, is almost 
beside the point; because the empirical truth of the matter becomes sec-
ondary to the theoretical point that Tocqueville wants us to go along 
with (i.e., power struggles are more likely between unequals, and conversely); 
and who wouldn’t, especially when the argument is presented in the tri-
angular form of a joke with the American and the French as relaxed allies 
at the expense of the stiff Englishman?
A second example of a zinger is this conclusion to the comparatively 
long and complex chapter on “Why Great Revolutions Will Become 
Rare” (II, 3, 21):
People think that the new societies will constantly be chang-
ing their identity, while I am afraid they will end up all too 
invariably attached to the same institutions, the same preju-
dices, and the same mores, so that the human race will stop 
progressing and narrow its horizons. I fear that the mind will 
forever subdivide itself into smaller and smaller compart-
ments without producing new ideas, that man will exhaust 
his energies in petty, solitary, and sterile changes, and that 
humanity, though constantly on the move, will cease to 
advance. (G760)
Here we have another variant of the “They say / I say” template: peo-
ple think x, I am afraid of precisely the opposite of x, I fear y. Also, with 
the juxtaposition of “though constantly on the move, will cease to advance,” 
we get an example of what Adam Gopnik (himself a lover of chiasmus) 
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calls Tocqueville’s obsession with tracking “this oscillation of opposites 
in America...following the American boomerang in action” (25). I agree 
with that assessment as well as with his remark that Tocqueville exhib-
its a keen desire to show that seeming contradictions or paradoxes (e.g., 
American people are moving about but not getting anywhere) are really 
perfectly logical upon closer inspection. In sum, Tocqueville’s dynamic 
rhetoric is well suited to depicting both the more clearly graspable and 
the less easily comprehensible aspects of democracy in America.
•
Democracy in America contains roughly twenty-five big ideas and about 
a hundred smaller ones that follow from the major “considerations” as 
he calls them. One of the most important of the top twenty-five is the 
fact that in America religion and liberty are mutually reinforcing and not 
mutually exclusive as commonly believed in certain quarters of post-
Enlightenment France and other dens of Europe.42 
Tocqueville comes back to the subject of religion’s fundamental 
necessity, centrality, and usefulness for democracy many times in both 
volumes.43 By religion, Tocqueville means a system of beliefs, such as one 
finds in any of the Christian denominations, but he is not proselytizing. 
Nothing he says in favor of religion’s complementary relationship with 
a spirit of freedom and democratic practices would seem to exclude, for 
example, Buddhism or any other religion so long as it meets the impor-
tant condition of sticking to its own transpersonal, immaterial, eternal 
plane.44 Religions that meddle too much in the world, says Tocqueville, 
are acting like political parties and will be treated as such and gradually 
lose their other-worldly source of attraction and thereby atrophy (see 
DA II, 1, 5).
In his bicentenary tribute Tocqueville Aujourd’hui (2005), Raymond 
Boudon notes that 96% of those living in the “land of the free” believe in 
God, 93% believe in the soul, and 87% believe in Heaven—statistics that 
astonish many French people, and the more higher education they have, 
the more likely they are to chuckle, shake their heads, and declare that 
Americans are manifestly not free if they believe that! And yet, if they 
only read Tocqueville, they would see that there’s a tension but no con-
tradiction or incompatibility between liberty and belief. As Tocqueville 
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sees it, religious belief (i.e., dogma) frees up disk space, so to speak, and 
allows Americans to think and act freely and creatively in other areas 
once certain spiritual matters are settled and secure. And yet, although 
he sees that this practice of turning off one’s mind in one area so that “lib-
erté d’intelligence” can flourish in other areas is for most people a “healthy 
yoke” (joug salutaire, II, 30), he says he would prefer not to wear it him-
self; and he also notes that it always risks going too far, becoming too 
constraining, and ending all thought.45 
Despite the possibility and drawbacks of excess conformism, a “gen-
teel” tendency that also worried Emerson, Thoreau, and some other 
nineteenth-century Americans who were of two minds about the costs 
and benefits of the Second Great Awakening then sweeping the country, 
Tocqueville does not see much practical evidence in 1831 that religion 
has caused Americans to behave like brainwashed drug addicts as Marx 
famously opined. In Tocqueville’s view, besides indirectly stimulating 
brain activity and economic productivity, religious belief checks democ-
racy’s three worst negative side effects: excess individualism, material-
ism, and nowism (G503). Most of the time, demolanders recognize 
and embrace this regulatory function that religion has to improve their 
lives—it’s part of their “self-interest properly understood” as Tocqueville 
says (DA II, 2, 8). A healthy democracy respectfully acknowledges that 
religion provides life-affirming nourishment to the spirit (soul or mind) 
of man. Religion is chicken soup, not opium, would be Tocqueville’s 
point when he says, “Unbelief is an accident, faith alone is the permanent 
condition of humankind.”46 Or when he declares in one of the most fre-
quently quoted lines from Democracy in America:
For my part, I doubt that man can ever tolerate both complete 
religious independence and total political liberty, and I am 
inclined to think that if he has no faith, he must serve, and if 
he is free, he must believe.47
This and similar pronouncements may account for why Tocqueville 
is largely inaudible for the French, especially French Marxists, and this 
notwithstanding the loud efforts of Tocqueville’s top admirer in twen-
tieth-century France, Raymond Aron, whose L’Opium des Intellectuels 
(1955) owes much to Tocqueville. Following Aron, Raymond Boudon 
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concludes his admiring study with the observation that Tocqueville’s 
messages are “not pleasant to hear, but deserve to be listened to.” That 
they have not been able to compete against France’s “pensée unique”48 
(whether expressed by the Left or the Right) illustrates another ten-
sion that Tocqueville explains in the chapter “On the Omnipotence of 
the Majority in the United States and Its Effects” (I, 2, 7); namely the 
fact that strong majorities are necessary to get things done but frequently 
harmful to minorities and intolerant of opposing views.
The short explanation of the majority’s omnipotence constitutes 
Tocqueville’s second big idea: When the majority recognizes no higher 
authority (e.g., the rule of Law, Justice, God) and “sheer numbers makes 
right” comes to look like an adequate replacement for “might makes 
right,” then majority public opinion in a democracy can acquire an inflex-
ible self-righteousness, intolerance, and omnipotence that can be as ruth-
less and destructive as old-style authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, 
whether secular or religiously inspired.49 Tocqueville’s longer answer is 
excerpted here:
I know of no country where there is in general less inde-
pendence of mind and true freedom of discussion 
than in America…
In America, the majority erects a formidable barrier around 
thought. Within the limits thus laid down, the writer is free, 
but woe unto him who dares to venture beyond those limits. 
Not that he need fear an auto-da-fé, but he must face all sorts 
of unpleasantness and daily persecution. He has no chance of 
a political career, for he has offended the only power capable 
of opening the way to one. He is denied everything, includ-
ing glory. Before publishing his opinions, he thought he had 
supporters, but having revealed himself to all, he finds that his 
support seems to have vanished, because his critics voice their 
opinions loudly, while those who think as he does but who 
lack his courage hold their tongues and take their distance. In 
the end, he gives in, he bends under the burden of such unre-
mitting effort and retreats into silence, as if he felt remorse for 
having spoken the truth…
48 Chapter 1
Tyranny in democratic republics … ignores the body and 
goes straight for the soul. The master no longer says: You will 
think as I do or die. He says: You are free not to think as I do. 
You may keep your life, your property, and everything else. 
But from this day forth you shall be as a stranger among us. 
You will retain your civic privileges, but they will be of no 
use to you. For if you seek the votes of your fellow citizens, 
they will withhold them, and if you seek only their esteem, 
they will feign to refuse even that. You will remain among 
men, but you will forfeit your rights to humanity. When you 
approach your fellow creatures, they will shun you as one who 
is impure. And even those who believe in your innocence will 
abandon you, lest they, too, be shunned in turn. Go in peace, 
I will not take your life, but the life I leave you with is worse 
than death. (I, 353–354, G293–294)
Nowhere else does Tocqueville allow himself to be as over-the-top 
theatrical as here. And you don’t have to be Kafka or Orwell to know 
what kind of persecution he is talking about. The subtle ostracism and 
alienation that the omnipotent majority can provoke is familiar to any-
one who has uttered, published, thought, or done something that goes 
against the mores of a dominant group.50 
A third and perhaps the biggest of Tocqueville’s big ideas is the one 
announced in the very first sentence of the Introduction: “Among the new 
things that attracted my attention during my stay in the United States, 
none struck me more forcefully than the equality of conditions” (I, 57, 
G3). By “equality of conditions,” Tocqueville does not mean that he wit-
nessed a “classless society” composed of a single, massive middle class 
with no rich or poor. It is true however that the 1830s era of “Jacksonian 
Democracy” was a time of increasing egalitarianism (at least if one con-
siders white males and overlooks the unequal civil rights and socioeco-
nomic standing of women, blacks, and Indians—something Tocqueville 
both does and does not do). What he means is that the Anglo Americans 
and Euro Americans he met were a rather homogeneous lot with roughly 
the same “point of departure,” outlook on life, and aspirations.
If America is the land of the free and at the same time a country of 
believers, few have claimed that it is also “the land of the equal”; and yet 
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Tocqueville insists that equality of conditions strikes him as the “original 
fact [fait générateur] from which each particular fact seemed to derive. It 
stood constantly before me as the focal point toward which all my obser-
vations converged” (DA I, 57, G3). Some may reject this claim out of 
hand because for them (like for nineteenth-century feminists, 1960s civil 
rights activists, or recent observers such as Thomas B. Edsall, Timothy 
Noah, Joseph E. Stiglitz, and the chorus of Occupy Wall Street protes-
tors) American inequality is so glaringly obvious and painful. However, 
they may be forgetting that from Tocqueville’s perspective (a French aris-
tocrat living under a constitutional monarchy of distinct social classes 
and highly restrictive rights to vote, assemble, and publish) America was 
comparatively very egalitarian. Aside from the predicaments of women, 
blacks, and Indians whose situations Tocqueville brackets but does not 
ignore, Americans look like a happy band of self-reliant, motivated citi-
zens living out the revolutionary idea/l that “Men are born and remain 
free and equal in rights.”51 Meanwhile in France in 1835, where even white 
males look and behave more like “administrated units” (“des administrés” 
DA I, 131) than citizens, that 1789 declaration may have sounded like a 
broken promise or “bad check” as Martin Luther King, Jr., would say in 
1963 about America’s insufficient investment in emancipation and equal 
rights for all. At any rate, it sort of kills the whole experience of reading 
Democracy in America if one is not willing to grant, at least provisionally, 
Tocqueville’s lead-off claim that the American “état social” is one of “très 
grande égalité” and therefore “éminemment démocratique” (DA I, 107), at 
least when compared to France, England, and many other parts of nine-
teenth-century Europe.
•
In addition to the big three—1. religion and liberty are mutually rein-
forcing and not incompatible (DA I, 1, 2), 2. majority rule is both neces-
sary (to get things done) and potentially dangerous (DA I, 2, 7), and 3. 
equality is real (DA I, 1, 3)—here now is a list of Tocqueville’s other big 
ideas, many of which, as he says himself, derive from the “generating fact” 
of the unprecedented levels of equality he witnessed in 1830s America:
A social state of equality where ordinary people are, taken singly, all 
relatively weak, gives rise to individualism, a rational concern for the 
50 Chapter 1
security and well-being of oneself and an intimate circle of family and 
friends (II, 2, 2).
Equality both loosens and softens the habitual relations (mœurs) 
between otherwise hierarchically opposed groups: master/servant, 
husband/wife, father/son, employer/employee, officer/soldier (II, 
3, 1–5, 8–12).
Communal spirit (esprit communal) is the key to the success of local 
and national politics in America because it builds healthy, productive 
feelings of pride (“We built this city”), co-ownership as stakeholders, 
and shared responsibility and accountability. Local politics is the crucible 
of self-governance where particular private interests and general public 
interests overlap in the “public sphere” to decide and pursue projects for 
the commonwealth (I, 1, 5): “C’est sur la place publique et dans le sein de 
l’assemblée générale des citoyens, que se traitent, comme à Athènes, les affaires 
qui touchent à l’intérêt de tous” (I, 1, 2, 100, G46).
By extending equal rights (to speech and assembly) to all, and pro-
tection under the rule of law, a democracy offers religious practitioners 
a safe haven and the freedom to be different; while religions, by stand-
ing as examples of an orderly community of equals with common inter-
ests that celebrate in some form or other the infinite, the immaterial, and 
the transpersonal, usefully counteract democracy’s negative tendencies, 
notably excess individualism, materialism, and nowism, by periodically 
turning people’s attention away from themselves, from money and next 
Monday. With their various distinct codes and beliefs, some of which can 
strike outsiders as offensive or just bizarre, religions also counter democ-
racy’s inclination to suppress difference, especially thinking and acting 
differently, and to require conformity (in the name of “law and order,” 
“discipline,” or “equality,” or out of secret envy or brute stubbornness) (I, 
2, 9; II, 1, 5; II, 2, 15).
Excess individualism and the constant pursuit of personal well-being 
or eccentric passions can kill off local communal spirit and national soli-
darity (also known as rational patriotism), and therefore must be checked 
by religious services and other freely engaged in (and free or low-cost) 
social institutions and practices such as the postal service, newspapers 
(today of course “the Web”: “the world’s largest public resource”), civic 
associations that entail physical bodies coming together and not just 
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ideas, including political parties, public libraries, parks, museums, and 
schools, as well as elections and jury duty that Tocqueville called “a free 
school, and one that is always open” and “one of the most effective means 
available to society for educating the people” (I, 376, G316).
Despite its negative aspects, democracy also has real advantages, the 
first being that it knows it has faults (including a penchant for waste, haste, 
recklessness, forgetfulness, and mediocrity), something an aristocrat has 
more difficulty admitting to since it’s so easy to equate being the best 
(aristoi) with being perfect and being grand with grandeur. Other real 
advantages of democratic government that Tocqueville names are look-
ing out for the well-being of the greatest number without needing to rely 
on virtuous supervisors (who may be in short supply); building a public-
spirited “rational patriotism” (patriotisme réfléchi, I, 330) where private 
and public as well as local and national interests (a road or railroad, a 
water treatment facility, etc.) are “properly understood” (bien entendu) 
as necessary and necessarily overlapping; building respect for rights and 
law; building self-reliance and self-esteem; getting a lot done (even if 
what gets done is not always of the highest quality or the most durable); 
and making repairable mistakes (I, 2, 6).
Democracy may lack some grandeur and beauty, but it is more just, 
and justice is grand and beautiful (II, 4, 8, 401).
People living in a democracy can be petty, envious, resentful, vindic-
tive, shortsighted, impatient, inattentive, reckless or timid, bombastic or 
mousy; but they also can be honest, fair, open, relaxed, spontaneously 
helpful, generous, caring, and brave. And of course self-reliant and practi-
cal—two of the most commonly cited character traits of Americans, nei-
ther of which is prominent in aristolands since affirming the individual, 
ordinary self is practically heresy (le moi est haïssable), and being practical 
is simply not a priority52 (II, 1, 1; II, 1, 10–12).
People living in democratic times feel relatively equal, including all 
relatively weak and insecure, and therefore they tend to want to get the 
most they can now with the least effort and the least risk of loss (II, 1, 
3, 25). Therefore, demolanders can be tempted to passively make do 
(“You get what you get and you don’t get upset”) or do things on the 
cheap (“That’s good enough”); or sign over their right to self-governance 
to a professional-managerial class of “brainworkers” (humans, animals, 
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or machines); i.e., accepting “voluntary servitude,” “outsourcing,” and the 
“yoke” (joug) of “soft despotism” (“despotisme plus étendu et plus doux”); 
or they may remain children or revert to egocentric, childlike behavior, 
such as demanding scrupulous equality down to the smallest details: 
“That’s not fair!” “Why does she get that?” (II, 4, 6).
Monopolies and specialization in commerce and industry (the pro-
fessional pursuits of most demolanders) could lead to the emergence 
of a new “aristocracy” that would be just as draining and brutalizing for 
those at the base of the pyramid as during the Old Regime, but also more 
relentless and pitiless since this new overclass, these proud “captains of 
industry,” would have none of the traditional feelings of paternal obliga-
tion to lighten the miseries of those it exploits. “Are there no prisons?” 
asks the hard-hearted Scrooge before his rebirth. “Are they my poor?” 
asks Emerson in one of his tough stances in the essay “Self-Reliance” 
(II, 2, 19–20).
While honor in aristocratic societies is derived from conquest in bat-
tle, or from being a descendant of a successful warrior (Tocqueville could 
trace his family back to William the Conqueror!), honor in democratic 
societies comes from work, and for democrats all work is honorable, 
although the most honor tends to redound to those whose activities earn 
the most money (II, 2, 10).
Since democratic honor is derived principally from building and sell-
ing stuff (industry and commerce) and not war, a democratic society has 
two good reasons to want to avoid war: 1) it’s not exactly honorable, since 
the work of war is conquest, which is a predatory form of taking (life, 
treasure, territory) and not making; and 2) it disrupts the work of every-
one else (i.e., it’s bad for business). The only group in a democracy that 
wants war is the army (especially those at the lower and middle ranks, 
who have little or no property at stake and few civilian career prospects), 
since it is their chance to do their job (kill and conquer) and get ahead 
(with medals and promotions thanks to victory and attrition). In mod-
ern times Tocqueville’s analysis would have to be expanded to include 
individuals and groups such as defense contractors and arms dealers that 
benefit from protracted or endless “foreign entanglements” that trans-
form the traditional nonmilitary economy into a “military-industrial 
complex”53 (II, 3, 22–25).
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On the question of freewill and determinism, Tocqueville has an 
intermediate position, close to Emerson’s declaration in the essay “Fate,” 
that affirms man’s free willl while acknowledging certain physical con-
straints (e.g., having lungs and not gills):
Nor can he [man] blink the free will. To hazard the contradic-
tion,—freedom is necessary. If you please to plant yourself on 
the side of Fate, and say, Fate is all; then we say, a part of Fate 
is the freedom of man.
Thus, when it comes to history and historiography (II, 1, 20), 
Tocqueville is as opposed to giving all the credit to “great men” as he is to 
giving it all to “forces,” but he adds it is also probably true that in demo-
cratic times “general facts” are more influential, whereas in ages of aristoc-
racy “particular influences” explain more. This may be why Tocqueville 
forgoes almost all personal anecdotes in Democracy in America, whereas 
in his two other books, Souvenirs and Ancien Régime, concentrating as 
they do on aristocratic-minded France, a particular individual action (or 
inaction) receives much more attention. The following passage is a good 
example of Tocqueville’s compare and contrast technique and his atten-
tion to the specific characteristics of different circumstances.
I am firmly convinced that, even in democratic nations, the 
genius, vices, and virtues of certain individuals can delay or 
hasten the fulfillment of a people’s natural destiny. But these 
kinds of fortuitous and secondary causes are infinitely more 
varied, more hidden, more complicated, less powerful, and 
consequently more difficult to sort out and trace in ages of 
equality than in centuries of aristocracy, where the only prob-
lem is to analyze the particular action of one man or a small 
number of men within a general context…
My own view is that in every period some of the events of 
this world must be ascribed to very general causes, others to 
very particular ones. Causes of both kinds are always encoun-
tered; the only thing that differs is their relative importance. 
General facts explain more things in democratic centuries 
than in aristocratic ones, and particular influences explain 
less. In ages of aristocracy, the opposite is true…
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Historians who seek to describe what goes on in democratic 
societies are therefore right to pay a great deal of attention to 
general causes and to devote their primary effort to uncover-
ing them, but they are wrong to deny the particular actions of 
individuals simply because it is not easy to find these out or 
trace their effects. (II, 2, 20, 108, G570)
At the end of this chapter Tocqueville clearly opposes the “doctrine 
of fatality” that underpins historiography in democratic times, and con-
cludes with a zinger that affirms man’s free will:
A glance at the histories written nowadays would suggest that 
man has no power over either himself or his surroundings…
If this doctrine of fatality, which is so attractive to those 
who write history in democratic times, were to spread from 
writers to readers and thereby infiltrate the citizenry en masse 
and take hold of the public mind, it would soon paralyze the 
new societies and reduce Christians to Turks.
I would add, moreover, that such a doctrine is particularly 
dangerous at the present time. Our contemporaries are only 
too ready to doubt the existence of free will because as indi-
viduals they feel frustrated by their weakness no matter which 
way they turn, yet they are still quite prepared to recognize 
the strength and independence of men joined together in a 
social body. One should be careful not to obscure this idea [of 
free will], because the goal is to exalt men’s souls, not to com-
plete the task of laying them low [car il s’agit de relever les âmes 
et non d’achever de les abattre].” (II, 110, G572)
Turks need not feel too personally attacked here, since Tocqueville 
is using that group as a rather arbitrary heuristic mechanism, just as 
Montesquieu made use of Persians, and the Chinese served as a nega-
tive example for the Scottish philosopher Adam Ferguson (and for 
Tocqueville as well in DA II, 1, 10). In each case the other culture, 
depicted as a static block, serves as the vehicle to send a message to one’s 
own countrymen about the potential for paralysis and stagnation should 
they stop believing in freedom and acting freely.54 
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A group that has more reason to feel prickly about Tocqueville’s clos-
ing remarks are structuralists, especially the twentieth-century Annales 
school of French historians whose emphasis on social structures as 
explanatory forces downplayed the political decisions of “great men” 
emphasized in much nineteenth-century historiography. One may raise 
an eyebrow, however, and point out the irony of Tocqueville’s admon-
ishing conclusion given the crucial importance for his whole enterprise 
of the “generating fact” of the “social state” of “equality of conditions” in 
America. Or one may see this as a sign of Tocqueville’s self-awareness 
and insight about the balancing act and unresolved tension—because 
perhaps unresolvable—that he and all historians must accept as their 
unavoidable individual responsibility.
“Nothing is harder than learning to be free.” By contrast, learning to 
accept despotism is easy. Why? Because although people would like to be 
both free and equal, they tend to have a stronger passion for equality than 
they do for liberty (I, 1, 3; II, 2, 1). What’s more, they will more readily 
give up freedom if they are convinced it is incompatible with equality, 
or if they come to think it’s a good idea to trade in their freedom for the 
law and order that they deem necessary for their security and well-being. 
Tocqueville explains how this works in the following passage from the 
“Real Advantages of Democratic Government” chapter:
[N]othing is harder than the apprenticeship of liberty. This 
is not true of despotism. Despotism often presents itself as 
the remedy for all ills suffered in the past. It is the upholder 
of justice, the champion of the oppressed, and the founder of 
order. Nations are lulled to sleep by the temporary prosperity 
to which it gives rise, and when they awake, they are miser-
able. Liberty, in contrast, is usually born in stormy times. It 
struggles to establish itself amid civil discord, and its benefits 
can be appreciated only when it is old. (I, 335, G275)
Like all romantic moralists from Emerson to Oscar Wilde to Jacques 
Derrida to today’s op-ed columnist, Tocqueville is sure that he’s wide 
awake, but others are dozing or blind. For Tocqueville, there are really 
two passions for equality, one “manly and legitimate,” the other a 
“depraved taste for equality” provoked by envy and resentment in the 
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human heart (I, 1, 3). The following passage that distinguishes these two 
types of equality is frequently quoted:
There is in fact a manly and legitimate passion for equality 
that spurs all men to wish to be strong and esteemed. This pas-
sion tends to elevate the lesser to the rank of the greater. But 
one also finds in the human heart a depraved taste for equal-
ity, which impels the weak to want to bring the strong down 
to their level, and which reduces men to preferring equality 
in servitude to inequality in freedom. Not that people whose 
social state is democratic naturally despise liberty; on the 
contrary, they have an instinctive taste for it. But liberty is not 
the principal and constant object of their desire. What they 
love with a love that is eternal is equality. They lunge toward 
liberty with an abrupt impulse or sudden effort and, if they 
fail to achieve their goal, resign themselves to their defeat. But 
nothing could satisfy them without equality, and, rather than 
lose it, they would perish.
Furthermore, when citizens are all almost equal, it becomes 
difficult for them to defend their independence against the 
aggressiveness of power. As none of them is strong enough to 
fight alone with advantage, the only guarantee of liberty is for 
everyone to combine forces. But such a combination is not 
always in evidence. (II, 115–116, G60–61)
In other words, it’s not easy for individuals who are all relatively weak 
to combine forces, even if the goal is liberty, without giving up some 
liberty now in the hope of getting back that liberty, and more, later. But 
some sacrifices and compromises are more costly than others. (Think of 
the typical “wage slave” or of the workhorse Boxer in Animal Farm.) The 
Americans, Tocqueville says, are lucky that their circumstances and espe-
cially their mores have allowed sovereignty of the people to endure for 
more than sixty years; but other people, such as his countrymen, have 
not been so fortunate or wise.
Furthermore, the passions for equality and liberty are at their highest 
among peoples who are experiencing or have recently experienced a social 
revolution, because the taste of greater equality can feed expectations for 
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yet more equality, and suddenly requests turn into demands, and wishes 
become rights…or riots (II, 2, 3). Similarly, says Tocqueville, a taste of 
greater equality can provoke greater amounts of anger and frustration 
toward any subsisting inequalities—an attack that the dominant may 
fend off with the mocking put-down “uppity.” These matters are treated 
in the chapter on “How Democracy Modifies Relations Between Servant 
and Master” (II, 3, 5) and have lost none of their pertinence.
•
Another topic that has attracted more attention from recent commenta-
tors is Tocqueville’s admiration for American women.55 One may won-
der, however, if this admiration is based less on what they are—which 
is terribly unequal and unfree compared to their white male counter-
parts—and more on what they have not become, which is a mob of 
angry, revenging Medeas.
Tocqueville believes that women set the mores in a given society (“c’est 
la femme qui fait les mœurs,” II, 3, 9, 247). Therefore, to know what those 
mores are and how they work, which for Tocqueville is the key to under-
standing that society, one must investigate the status and habits, thoughts 
and feelings of women. He recalls that in America there is a liberal consti-
tution and a democratic social condition, and these give young American 
women more autonomy than anywhere else in the world. He notes that 
all American youth, including women, are nudged toward independence 
early on, and this is viewed as normal and correct by both children and 
their parents (II, 247). The education of young women is allowed, and it 
is not as prettified or watered down as in aristocratic lands.56 
In France where our opinions and tastes are still a strange mix 
combining vestiges of all the ages of the past, we often give 
women a timid, sheltered, almost cloistered upbringing, and 
then we suddenly abandon them, without guidance or assis-
tance, to the disorders that are inseparable from democratic 
society. (II, 248, G693)
In the U.S., on the other hand, women are given the chance, via edu-
cation, to defend themselves in a world that all Americans know can be 
disorderly, competitive, and cruel. Young American women are not kept 
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from knowing “the corruptions of the world” (“les corruptions du monde,” 
II, 249, G693). Tocqueville admires that in America religious training is 
not used merely to defend the virtue of women, but to arm her reason 
(“armer sa raison”). He finds this training produces women who are more 
respectable and cold (“honnêtes et froides”) than tender and loveable, but 
he admires them nonetheless. He sees it as a trade-off: the education of 
American women makes for a more tranquil and better regulated public 
sphere, but it may come at the price of a rather less charming domestic 
sphere.57 But he concludes these imperfections are “secondary ills, which 
ought to be braved for the sake of a greater interest.” (G694) Ultimately 
Tocqueville is firm in his praise of the American model when it comes 
to the education of women: “a democratic upbringing is necessary to 
protect women from the perils with which the institutions and mores of 
democracy surround them” (G694). In other words, it’s precisely because 
democratic equality and liberty provoke “secondary evils” [maux sec-
ondaires]—games of seduction, single mothers, unwanted pregnancies, 
underpaid employment, sexual harassment and assault, sexual discrimi-
nation, deadbeat absent fathers—that women have to be armed to face 
those eventualities, and developing their thinking capacities and self-reli-
ance is the best possible hope for their future survival and prosperity and 
for the future of democratic institutions.
“The Education of Young Women in the United States” (II, 3, 9), is an 
uplifting chapter that any woman aspiring to live free would find exhila-
rating to read. But there is also a larger message of hope here, and one 
not solely addressed to women; namely that democracy’s vices must 
be answered with more democracy, not resignation or renunciation. 
Tocqueville will have more to say about this in the final admonitory 
chapters of Volume Two. Before turning to Tocqueville’s description of a 
possible, future “soft despotism” in democratic societies (the single most 
interesting part of the book for many of Tocqueville’s Cold-War-era com-
mentators), it’s worth saying a bit more about the real and present soft 
despotism endured by American women to which Tocqueville devotes 
three more chapters (II, 3, 10, 11, 12).
In DA II, 3, 10 Tocqueville extends his cost-benefit analysis of the 
education American women receive. He also reviews the situation within 
the marriages that they partly choose and partly have forced on them (by 
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the strict mœurs and low horizon of expectations within American soci-
ety that they inherit and transmit without getting to choose or rewrite 
them freely). Generally, married American women are obliged to keep 
a stiff upper lip; i.e., they must be stoically pragmatic and forward-look-
ing, not emotional or complaining about the marriages they inhabit. He 
observes a widespread you-made-your-bed-now-lie-in-it attitude that 
leaves little room for public lamentation over their lot or self-pity among 
the women themselves. One gets the impression, he says (whether he 
believes this conceit is another matter), that the American woman enters 
freely into her marriage and must accept the consequences, especially 
the low level of social liberty (and professional opportunity) outside the 
domestic circle: “She has been taught in advance what is expected of her, 
and she accepts the yoke freely and of her own accord. She bears her new 
condition bravely because she has chosen it.”58 Note the recurrence here 
of the freely accepted yoke that Tocqueville had earlier spoken of approv-
ingly in the discussion of the benefits of accepting religious dogma, 
though he demurred that he would not want to wear that yoke himself59 
(II, 19, G493).
In DA II, 3, Chapter Eleven, Tocqueville explains how equality of 
social conditions contributes to the enduring regularity and loyalty 
among married people in America. His short explanation (259) is that 
women and men are too busy pursuing material advancement to have 
extramarital affairs. Two other contributing factors are (1) that women 
and men occupy different spheres (domestic / public) and therefore 
don’t have a lot of opportunities for meeting other potential sexual part-
ners (259), and (2) women in democratic societies have more education 
about “les corruptions du monde” and they are therefore better equipped 
to make an intelligent choice and are allowed greater freedom to make 
that choice. Therefore, once the choice is made there is the feeling of a 
contract that must be honored.
The strictness of the Americans is partly a consequence of 
this. They see marriage as a contract which, though often 
onerous, must be rigorously respected, because the parties 
had the opportunity to study all of its provisions in advance 
and were entirely free to refrain from entering into any agree-
ment at all.60 
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In aristocratic lands, on the other hand, marriage is often an even 
colder contract, not the product of a hot passion considered in tran-
quility; it’s a legal bond to unite property, not a spiritual union of hearts 
(257). Therefore the need for full disclosure (of one’s heart and soul) 
is not deemed necessary (bank accounts and birth certificates suffice), 
nor is there the same importance given to marriage vows and fidelity. 
Infidelity is in fact common, an open secret, for it is considered the heart’s 
compensation for what the law forbids—passion’s revenge on property.61 
Tocqueville then shares in a longish footnote his explanation for why in 
aristolands there are romance novels where extramarital love affairs are 
often sympathetically represented to the reader as the just outcome or 
circumvention of overly restrictive social mores; whereas in demolands 
there are few such books since their laws and social habits do not permit 
the creation of this opposition between passion and property, true love 
and arranged marriage—“since they despair of making irregularity like-
able” (G700). English wife notwithstanding, Tocqueville seems not to 
have delved much into the complexities of Jane Austen or other so-called 
women’s fiction that exploits the easy likeability of irregularities.
Returning to firmer ground, Tocqueville adds a further remark about 
how fighting against one’s social condition tends only to be pursued 
by the mad, or pushes one toward madness (think Romeo or Hamlet), 
and why it is therefore that revolutionaries (especially those involved in 
allegedly necessary, saintly revolutions) are rarely moderate and honest 
but instead extremists and outlaws (258). He then repeats his convic-
tion about the lack of dreaminess among democratic peoples. “No one 
is less given to reverie than the citizens of a democracy, and few are keen 
to abandon themselves to the kinds of idle and solitary contemplation 
that usually precede and provoke major agitations of the heart.”62 In other 
words, it takes leisure and security (which aristocrats have more of than 
democrats) to indulge in the reveries that are the precursors to great loves 
(whether of men, women, ideas, or causes). Besides missing out on Jane 
Austen, Tocqueville would seem to have underestimated Rousseau’s fol-
lowing in America.63 
Tocqueville concludes this chapter with the claim that the French 
Revolution did more to strengthen the morals of the aristocracy than 
it did those of the revolutionaries themselves. The aristocrats had been 
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dissolute and became more orderly, he notes, while the popular classes, 
who had been more orderly under the Ancien Régime, become more dis-
solute (261). In the final paragraph he expresses the belief that eventu-
ally, when all the consequences of the democratic revolution have played 
themselves out—whenever that may be—all classes will be less tumul-
tuous and more orderly in their mœurs. In the meantime, Tocqueville 
writes approvingly again of the American situation: it may lack sex 
appeal, but that lack is more than compensated for, he claims, by the ben-
efits of peace, moderation, and regularity (259). His account can sound a 
bit stodgy, however, like the buttoned-up world of Mr. Banks before the 
arrival of Mary Poppins.
In the next chapter (DA II, 3, 12), Tocqueville explains how in 
America men and women have not sought to be completely equal, and 
he says this would have been a mistake anyway since it would have led to 
weak men and dishonest women (II, 263). Instead they occupy separate 
“circles,”—presumably “separate but equal”; i.e., a version of the argu-
ment later used in the 1896 Plessy vs. Ferguson decision that rationalized 
black/white segregation in the decades following the American Civil 
War. For Tocqueville, this state of affairs is another example of the soft-
ening of mœurs in democratic lands with greater equality of social con-
dition, just like the rapprochement between fathers and sons and mas-
ters and servants. There’s a raising of the low and a lowering of the high 
in all three cases, a movement to a more moderate, horizontal middle 
ground with a proliferation of the supposedly free contract as mediator. 
Tocqueville envisions a future equality between the sexes: “I think that 
the social movement that is bringing son and father, servant and master, 
and, in general, inferior and superior closer to the same level is raising 
woman and will make her more and more the equal of man.”64 
But “l’égale de l’homme,” he insists, does not mean doing all the same 
things as men.65 Tocqueville’s feminism is the 1830s “separate spheres” 
kind, not the American or French feminism of the 1960s and ’70s. It is 
also far from today’s more self-aware contested discourses in this area of 
“gender trouble.” Tocqueville uses metaphors (cercle, sphère) that are still 
being used today by many men (and some women) to divide and con-
quer, even though for two generations now others have “deconstructed” 
this naturalization of political choices as part of their critique of the 
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separate and unequal power of men and women in America, France, and 
elsewhere.66 
In the second half of this chapter, Tocqueville piles on yet more praise, 
as though he felt obliged to make up for others’ contempt, noting that 
American respect for women is often more genuine and less hypocritical 
than European attitudes.
It has often been observed that in Europe the flattery that men 
lavish on women conceals a certain contempt. Although the 
European male may frequently allow himself to be enslaved 
by women, he plainly never thinks of these women in a sin-
cere way as his equals. (II, 265, G707)
Perhaps the most memorable sentence in this chapter comes on the 
next page where Tocqueville applauds the long, fearless, solitary voyage 
of young American women: “In America a young woman undertakes a 
long voyage alone and without fear.”67 Or with fear and maybe a lot of 
anger too, if one thinks of unwed teenage mothers. Or of slaves. But of 
course it’s more uplifting to think instead of Margaret Fuller, Louise 
May Alcott and her “Little Women,” Elizabeth Peabody, Harriet Beecher 
Stowe, or Edith Wharton—the kind of exceptional self-reliant women 
who no doubt impressed Tocqueville during his nine-month journey.
Tocqueville concludes this chapter with his highest praise yet, casting 
his one vote (“I, for one”) for American women as the key to American 
prosperity and the vigorous growth of the American people—the impli-
cation being that millions of others either don’t care, do care but don’t 
vote, or would just plain vote against such a proposition:
I, for one, do not hesitate to say that although women in the 
United States seldom venture outside the domestic sphere, 
where in some respects they remain quite dependent, 
nowhere has their position seemed to me to be higher. And 
now that I am nearing the end of this book, in which I have 
described so many considerable American accomplishments, 
if someone were to ask me what I think is primarily responsi-
ble for the singular prosperity and growing power of this peo-
ple, I would answer that it is the superiority of their women.68 
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It’s understandable and hardly original that Tocqueville bets on 
Christian values, and women as the main carrier of those values, to found 
and secure a new harmonious democratic civilization in fallen Europe. 
The tradition mariale (both Mary Magdalene and the Virgin Mary) has 
a very long history within fallen Catholic Europe as does the Church’s 
ability to overlook its own contributions to that downfall. Thus, viewed 
from America today, such highfalutin’ declarations have the appearance 
of what the French call “évacuation par le haut”; i.e., it looks as though 
the American woman is being kicked upstairs, which may be better than 
being kicked outside or being kicked all the way across the Mississippi 
River onto the Western plains like the Indians. But it’s perhaps small 
consolation for someone to receive those injuries in the form of compli-
ments instead of insults. Faced with the cruel irony that was not uncom-
mon within the brutally civilized American genteel tradition, one has to 
admire the fortitude of the women who banded together in the ensuing 
decades to invent and struggle for more human dignity for themselves 
while also mourning the loss of those who desperately went off the deep 
end toward madness, murder, suicide, or self-exile.69 
•
If I have devoted so many pages to Tocqueville’s views on women and 
their social state within an American society dominated by Anglo-
American males, it is because that case—even more perhaps than the 
cases of the Indian and the Negro that were considered at length near the 
end of Volume One (I, 2, 10)—is the play within the play, the microcosm, 
the synecdoche of the larger story that Tocqueville wants to tell about 
man’s humanity or inhumanity to man, and the role that democracy can 
play in promoting one or the other depending on whether the accent is 
on democratic liberty or democratic tyranny—with the added difficulty 
of not always being able to tell which is which (since one person’s police 
state can be another person’s “homeland security”). It is my view that 
this focus on interpersonal relations will rightly become the most fruitful 
area of borrowing and learning from Tocqueville in the post–Cold War 
Internet age.
After this long digression through sexual politics, Tocqueville turns 
back to politics in general (i.e., questions of power distribution and 
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policy-making) in the fourth and concluding section of Volume Two. 
The main ideas, abundantly developed by Cold War commentators so I 
can be brief, are these: (1) in times of expanding equality of social condi-
tions, total government (tyranny) is more to be feared than no govern-
ment (anarchy); (2) it is easier to establish despotism in times of equality 
than in times of inequality; because (3) democracy favors the concentra-
tion of power (and the elimination of intermediary powers) more than 
aristocracies whose members are each jealously attached to their own 
local privileges and will not yield their regional power without a fight; 
and (4) if auxiliary precautions are not taken to check and counterbal-
ance the negative tendencies of democratic peoples (especially the ten-
dency to become totally caught up in the pursuit of one’s well-being, 
including saving for retirement and doing all one can to insure an “acces-
sible future” for one’s own children), demolanders will not find their 
country invaded by a tough foreign despot, but will instead select one or 
a few from within their ranks to whom they will sign over their liberty in 
exchange for having the complex and time-consuming business of gover-
nance taken off their hands because now they are simply too busy with 
their own affairs to treat common things in common as their less stressed 
out ancestors may have done. These homegrown mild despots will invari-
ably be seen as regular, middlebrow people, “someone you could have a 
beer with,” and they may or may not have the well-being of the greatest 
number uppermost in their thoughts. But whatever they really think, do, 
or get done, Tocqueville predicts they will all feign a strong allegiance to 
the values of equality, liberty, and justice for all.
For many, the climax in Part Four, and certainly one of the most fre-
quently quoted passages of the whole book, comes in these paragraphs 
from Chapter Six, “What Kind of Despotism Democratic Nations Have 
to Fear,” that directly follow a preliminary review of how traditional des-
potism worked in Antiquity.
If despotism were to establish itself in today’s democratic 
nations, it would probably have a different character. It would 
be more extensive and more mild [plus étendu et plus doux], 
and it would degrade men without tormenting them.
I have no doubt that in centuries of enlightenment and 
equality like our own, it will be easier for sovereigns to gather 
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all public powers into their hands alone and to penetrate the 
sphere of private interests more deeply and regularly than any 
sovereign of Antiquity was ever able to do. But the same equal-
ity that facilitates despotism also tempers it. As men become 
increasingly similar and more and more equal, we have seen 
how public mores become milder and more humane. When 
no citizen has great power or wealth, tyranny in a sense lacks 
both opportunity and a stage. Since all fortunes are modest, 
passions are naturally contained, the imagination is limited, 
and pleasures are simple. This universal moderation moder-
ates the sovereign himself and confines the erratic impulses of 
his desire within certain limits….
Democratic governments may become violent and even 
cruel in certain moments of great effervescence and great 
peril, but such crises will be rare and temporary.
When I think of the petty passions of men today, of the 
softness of their mores, the extent of their enlightenment, the 
purity of their religion, and the mildness of their morality, of 
their laborious and orderly habits, and of the restraint that 
nearly all of them maintain in vice as well as in virtue, what I 
fear is not that they will find tyrants among their leaders but 
rather that they will find protectors.
I therefore believe that the kind of oppression that threatens 
democratic peoples is unlike any the world has seen before. 
Our contemporaries will find no image of it in their memo-
ries. I search in vain for an expression that exactly reproduces 
my idea of it and captures it fully. The old words “despotism” 
and “tyranny” will not do. The thing is new, hence I must try 
to define it, since I cannot give it a name.
I am trying to imagine what new feature despotism might 
have in today’s world: I see an innumerable host of men, all 
alike and equal, endlessly hastening after petty and vulgar 
pleasures with which they fill their souls. Each of them, with-
drawn into himself, is virtually a stranger to the fate of all the 
others. For him, his children and personal friends comprise 
the entire human race. As for the remainder of his fellow 
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citizens, he lives alongside them but does not see them. He 
touches them but does not feel them. He exists only in him-
self and for himself, and if he still has a family, he no longer 
has a country.
Over these men stands an immense tutelary power, which 
assumes sole responsibility for securing their pleasure and 
watching over their fate. It is absolute, meticulous, regular, 
provident, and mild. It would resemble paternal authority if 
only its purpose were the same, namely, to prepare men for 
manhood. But on the contrary, it seeks only to keep them in 
childhood irrevocably. It likes citizens to rejoice, provided 
they only think of rejoicing. It works willingly for their hap-
piness but wants to be the sole agent and only arbiter of 
that happiness. It provides for their security, foresees and 
takes care of their needs, facilitates their pleasures, manages 
their most important affairs, directs their industry, regulates 
their successions, and divides their inheritances. Why not 
relieve them entirely of the trouble of thinking and the diffi-
culty of living?
Every day it thus makes man’s use of his free will rarer and 
more futile. It circumscribes the action of the will more nar-
rowly, and little by little robs each citizen of the use of his 
own faculties. Equality paved the way for all these things by 
preparing men to put up with them and even to look upon 
them as a boon.
The sovereign, after taking individuals one by one in his 
powerful hands and kneading them to his liking, reaches out 
to embrace society as a whole. Over it he spreads a fine mesh 
of uniform, minute, and complex rules, through which not 
even the most original minds and most vigorous souls can 
poke their heads above the crowd. He does not break men’s 
wills but softens, bends, and guides them. He seldom forces 
anyone to act but consistently opposes action. He does not 
destroy things but prevents them from coming into being. 
Rather than tyrannize, he inhibits, represses, saps, stifles, and 
stultifies, and in the end he reduces each nation to nothing 
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but a flock of timid and industrious animals, with the govern-
ment as its shepherd.
I have always believed that this kind of servitude—the reg-
ulated, mild, peaceful servitude that I have just described—
could be combined more easily than one might imagine with 
some of the external forms of liberty, and that it would not be 
impossible for it to establish itself in the shadow of popular 
sovereignty itself. (II, 384–386, G817–819)
As I said, for many this is the dramatic climax to Volume Two and the 
whole book, the passage where Tocqueville gets his whale, or it gets him. 
It’s worth noting however that he hardly says anything here that he hasn’t 
said before; but when it comes to sustained theatrical flair and frisson, this 
passage surpasses even the disturbing description from Volume One of 
the modern omnipotent majority’s attack on the soul of dissidents.
Interestingly, both passages make use of anthropomorphism to 
posit the new unnamable force in an imaginable body, even though 
Tocqueville says explicitly that this new mild despotism will most likely 
not be the intention or work of any one “master” or “sovereign,” nor 
even of that which today we fumblingly label with names such as “Paris,” 
“Washington,” “Moscow,” or “Downing Street.” In other words, Hitler 
and Stalin were archaic throwbacks to the hard “sticks and stones” des-
potism of antiquity, especially Rome.70 Orwell recognized that much, 
which is why in 1984 he only has Big Brother exist as a poster, a menac-
ing surveillance system, and of course a name. What he didn’t choose to 
feature (had he read his Tocqueville?) was the new convenient soft-serve 
approach of truly modern headless despotism. This mistake, if that’s what 
it is, was pointed out to him by one of his former Eton professors, Aldous 
Huxley, in a letter.71 Huxley’s much earlier Brave New World (1932) is 
arguably closer to the totally automated despotism that Tocqueville 
had in mind.
But Tocqueville’s story, like Melville’s whale tale, does not end with 
this terrible dramatic encounter, and the actual conclusion to Democracy 
in America that comes about fifteen pages later is more subdued and prac-
tical minded. And it’s a good thing too, because what Tocqueville pres-
ents as something scary, or at least highly objectionable, some people are 
simply not going to find scary. On the contrary, they’re going to welcome 
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it just like they welcome the new convenience store or Internet café open-
ing up down the street. That Tocqueville secretly suspects the possibility 
of this undesired reaction (“Who’s afraid of Trader Joe’s?”) may explain 
why he feels it necessary to ramp up the fear factor. Other contemporary 
readers raised on the gothic, the grotesque, and the fun of scaring them-
selves (and for whom the Cold War is already ancient history) may not 
ever get beyond the sci-fi frisson to ask themselves what they’re supposed 
to think about this new…whatever it is, and more importantly what, if 
anything, they should do about it. Tocqueville, ever the content provider, 
has some suggestions though, and he doesn’t leave us to make up our 
own minds until the very last sentence:
It is beyond the ability of nations today to prevent conditions 
within them from becoming equal, but it is within their power 
to decide whether equality will lead them into servitude or 
liberty, enlightenment or barbarism, prosperity or misery. 
(II, 402, G834)
The first claim about the inevitability of equality of social conditions 
everywhere is something we will return to later. For now, it’s worth focus-
ing on the second claim, “the Robert Frost moment” we could call it, 
which is that nations can choose one of two roads—the grassy road to 
democratic liberty or “the road to serfdom” as one reader of Tocqueville 
famously translated it with the pointed suggestion that to choose servi-
tude would be to choose a return to the stony Middle Ages with its rigid 
caste system and low mobility.72 
But Tocqueville knows that many people, harried democrats as well as 
nostalgic aristocrats, have a less dim view of those stable medieval times. 
That’s why here, unlike at the end of Chapters Seven and Nine of Volume 
One where he thought he could play the schoolmaster and submit ques-
tions to the reader with the reasonable expectation of getting back the 
answers he wanted to hear, Tocqueville declares that there is a decision 
to be made but he does not formulate it explicitly as a question. Nor 
does he try any more shock and awe scare tactics, hectoring, or pleading. 
Although he did not have children of his own, he tries nevertheless to 
behave like a liberal father who wants to see his children, here his readers 
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and by extension all his countrymen, grow up to be independent, creative 
adults and not remain children forever.
Therefore, he says one more time what he believes; namely (1) that 
equality and the democratic mores that develop out of that social state 
are not best thought of as categorically good or bad, (2) that through a 
combination of chance and choices democracy’s specific functioning in 
actual circumstances now and in the future will be more or less free or 
oppressive, healthy or unhealthy, life-affirming or degrading, humaniz-
ing or dehumanizing. Tocqueville has spent nine hundred pages show-
ing how democracy can or could go in many directions depending on 
the awareness and motives of the living actors, large and small, powerful 
and ordinary, who are involved in the process of government or simply 
living and working in civil society and making hundreds of conscious 
and unconscious decisions (votes) per day while going about their busi-
ness. And he explains why, in the last analysis, he favors the more mature, 
legitimate passion for equality that spurs all men to wish for everyone to 
have the opportunity to be strong, free, and esteemed. This position may 
require him to sacrifice some types of grandeur and beauty, and accept a 
certain amount of vulgarity, monotony, mediocrity, and roughness, but it 
is, he believes, more just. He doesn’t go so far as to say that he endorses 
this fraternal vision because it is God’s will, only that it is God’s prefer-
ence. Secularists may even point out that he really didn’t have to invoke 
God at all, just as he didn’t have to say that greater equality in modern 
times is “a providential fact” instead of the outcome of political choices. 
Why? Because he has come to believe, without needing to be told, that 
the pursuit and consecration of liberty and justice for all is itself grand 
and beautiful.
•
This is by no means an exhaustive account of Democracy in America, and 
my focus on what Tocqueville has to say about interpersonal relations in 
democratic lands has not been everyone’s choice. Readers are encour-
aged to compare my Internet Age interpretation to other commentaries 
some of which will be discussed in the next chapter. In Part Three, I will 
return to Tocqueville’s explicit and implicit policy recommendations for 
preserving democratic liberty and fending off democratic tyranny.
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Halfway through my Tocqueville courses I give students a midterm 
“20 Questions” exam to see how well they’ve understood and remem-
bered what they’ve read. If you want to test yourself, before or after read-
ing Democracy in America, here are the questions. Tocqueville’s answers 
can be found in the chapter referenced after each question, and my own 
paraphrase of those answers can be found in the Appendix.
1. What are three of the original conditions that favored the 
spread of democracy among the Anglo-Saxon people in North 
America? (I, 1, ii)
2. When studying democracy in America, why is it necessary to 
examine what happens in individual states before considering the 
union as a whole? (I, 1, v)
3. Why do the citizens of democratic lands often elect mediocre gov-
ernors? (I, 2, v)
4. What are the real advantages derived by American society from 
democratic government? (I, 2, vi)
5. How does the majority in a democratic land become tyranni-
cal? (I, 2, vii)
6. What moderates the tyranny of the majority in the United States? 
(I, 2, viii)
7. What are the main causes that tend to maintain a democratic 
republic in the United States? (I, 2, ix)
8. What are the main characteristics of the American philosophic 
method? (II, 1, i)
9. Why do Americans show more aptitude and taste for general ideas 
than the British? (II, 1, iii)
10. Why have Americans never been as enthusiastic as the French for 
general ideas in political matters? (II, 1, iv)
11. How does religion in America benefit and benefit from demo-
cratic tendencies? (II, 1, v)
12. Why is the study of Latin and Greek beneficial in democratic 
countries? (I, 1, xv)
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13. Why is theater so successful in democratic nations? (II, 1, xix)
14. Why do democratic nations display a more passionate and lasting 
love for equality than for freedom? (II, 2, i)
15. How do Americans combat the effects of individualism with free 
institutions? (II, 2, iv)
16. How do Americans counteract individualism by the doctrine of 
self-interest properly understood? (II, 2, viii)
17. Why are Americans so restless in the midst of their prosperity? 
(II, 2, xiii)
18. What is the influence of democracy on the family? (II, 3, viii)
19. How is it that Americans can be generally serious and yet some-
times behave recklessly? (II, 3, xv)
20. Why do democratic nations have a natural desire for peace 
while the armies within democratic nations naturally seek war? 
(II, 3, xxii)
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faille principalement attribuer la prospérité singulière et la force croisssante 
de ce peuple, je répondrais que c’est à la supériorité de ses femmes.”
69. If Tocqueville is less sensitive to these ironies when it comes to gender 
politics, his vision is more acute when considering the American 
government’s harsh treatment of Indians: “The Spaniards, despite acts of 
unparalleled monstrousness that left them indelibly covered with shame, 
were unable to exterminate the Indian race or even prevent the Indians from 
sharing their rights. The Americans of the United States achieved both results 
with marvelous ease, quietly, legally, philanthropically, without bloodshed, 
without violating a single one of the great principles of morality in the eyes 
of the world. To destroy human beings with greater respect for the laws of 
humanity would be impossible” (I, 452–453, G391).
70. For a definition of the traditional despot, see Sheldon S. Wolin’s description 
in his Tocqueville book: “The despot gathered all the power to himself; 
would not tolerate rivals; eliminated political life; ruled by personal whim; 
lived extravagantly while demoralizing economic life; and, as Montesquieu 
emphasized, used cruelty to create a climate of fear that paralyzed opposition 
and stifled cultural creativity. These conceptions were all inconceivable 
without the dominating figure of the despot himself. The state of society was 
a projection of him. Everything flowed back to him; everything flowed from 
him. Despotism as the abnormality of power.” Tocqueville Between Two Worlds: 
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The Making of a Political and Theoretical Life (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2001), 340.
71. This letter to a former pupil, dated October 21, 1949, is included in the 
Harper Perennial edition of Brave New World and Brave New World Revisited 
(1958). In his Introduction to a 2003 reprint, Christopher Hitchens discusses 
the letter and the Orwell-Huxley, student-teacher relation. The letter and 
Orwell and Huxley’s conceptions of totalitarian states will be returned to in a 
later chapter, “Restore Previous Session.”
72. See F. A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, ed. Bruce Caldwell (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007 [1944]). Aldous Huxley, it seems, agreed: 
“The impersonal forces of over-population and over-organization, and the 
social engineers who are trying to direct these forces, are pushing us in the 
direction of a new medieval system.” Brave New World Revisited, 28.
Chapter 2
Tocqueville’s Commentators
Why read Tocqueville today?
The amount of secondary literature on Tocqueville does not equal the 
mountains of material devoted to many older canonical authors or even 
to some of his contemporaries such as Emerson and Marx. It is however a 
substantial body of work, perhaps two hundred books and two thousand 
articles.73 A large portion of the total, maybe a fifth or a quarter, was pro-
duced within the last twenty-five years; i.e., during the post–Cold War 
era that I’m calling the Internet Age. One might have expected interest 
in Tocqueville to fall off during this period if it’s true that his popularity 
after World War II was linked to the development of “American Studies” 
as an interdisciplinary department or program (attractive to returning 
GIs and other patriots) within many colleges and universities, and to his 
usefulness to the Free World as a champion of liberty in the fight against 
Communism.74 If after the 1989–1991 dissolution of Eastern European 
governments Communism was mostly dead, and if the humanistic 
American academy was dying, being killed off (with interdisciplinary 
studies being a main target),75 or repurposed (as exclusively preprofes-
sional vocational schools, sports camps, wellness centers, or retirement 
community annexes), who could possibly be interested in reading 
Tocqueville? Besides, wasn’t Tocqueville just plain wrong about equal-
ity of social conditions being the distinctive feature of American society? 
And not only wrong about today’s America of extreme inequality76 but 
wrong about nearly every decade in American history going back to the 
1830s.77 Wasn’t he only able to call America egalitarian because he was 
using monarchical France as a skewed yardstick and because he mostly 
bracketed the case of blacks, Indians, and women and underestimated 
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the negative impact on equality of the advancing industrial revolution, 
the market revolution (Sellers78 ), and the communication and trans-
portation revolution (Howe79 )? If so, how could people think it worth 
their while to “rediscover” Tocqueville?80 Surely the French press’s habit 
of marking important anniversaries (10th, 20th, 25th, 30th, 50th, 100th, 
200th, etc.) with articles, special issues, and other publications is not 
an adequate explanation, especially in the case of an author that most 
French intellectuals preferred to ignore for over a century, and also since 
many fairly recent publications in America and France appeared before 
the Tocqueville bicentenary in 2005.
Well, first of all, it is a well-known fact that peace and the “peace 
dividend” did not come through with the end of the Cold War. And the 
celebration of the West’s victory over Communism, of “freedom” over 
“serfdom,” eventually died down, along with the enthusiasm for Francis 
Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man (1992), and was rather 
quickly moved off the front page by Bill and Monica, O.J., and then 
“September 11.”81 
But before 9/11 changed everything, many who were worried 
about finding a new raison d’être for U.S. foreign policy and the military-
industrial complex in the post-Communist era (and thus keeping their 
jobs and keeping Americans fearful and docile) looked to Samuel P. 
Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations” (1992, 1996) for a new global 
ideological conflict to replace the old Cold War. The flap created in 
North America and Europe by and around the books of Fukuyama and 
Huntington (“It’s over!” / “No, it’s not over!”) arguably brought more 
readers to Tocqueville—he who had wondered if democracy in America 
would last, if it could take hold in France, if the Old Regime was dead or 
alive, and which parts of it were worth praising and preserving in order 
to save democracy from itself. Tocqueville’s stock was also boosted by 
the obvious fact that there were plenty of Eastern European Communists 
living on in various guises after Communism, and some of these people 
who had only ever thought of “democracy” and “America” as a dream or 
nightmare may have decided to try and know more, and there was old 
Tocqueville ready to offer his help to those who wanted to investigate, 
weigh, judge, or tutor democracy as he recommended we do (“instruire 
la démocratie”). In other words, world events between 1989 and 2001 got 
80 Chapter 2
more people in America, France, and other places to take a closer look at 
themselves and ask about what Martha Nussbaum has called “the clash 
within,” and for this many have found reading Tocqueville helpful.82 
In addition to recalling these recent events that I’m arguing had the 
unintended consequence of reviving interest in older theories about 
democracy such as Tocqueville’s, it should be said that the fact of 
American inequality (as measured by income, education, health, hous-
ing, profession, etc.…or by the less easily quantifiable notions of rights 
and mores), whether in 2035, 1935 or 1835, does not disqualify the 
interest one might have in the theoretical point Tocqueville is making; 
namely that equality of social conditions among a people is a neces-
sary though not a sufficient condition for democracy and a democratic 
way of life. If a large income gap, education gap, health and health care 
gap, mobility gap, or mores gap makes democracy unworkable, this is 
something that both democracy’s friends and enemies ought to keep in 
mind (for different reasons), and Tocqueville can help you do that. Want 
to kill off democracy and replace it with a corporate, military, or mafia 
model? Read Tocqueville. Want to keep democracy from being taken 
over by or merging with corporations or the mafia or the military? Read 
Tocqueville. Want to keep democracy from committing suicide? Read 
Tocqueville. Want to push democracy over the edge and its people too? 
Read Tocqueville. If Tocqueville’s writings are not exactly a how-to man-
ual, neither are they simply “academic.” In the right hands, his writings 
are a super “apps” store, no matter whether you’re interested in genuine 
ordinary democracy, covert or overt oligarchy (also known as “republi-
canism”), or direct dictatorship.
A Taxonomy of Tocqueville’s Commentators
Tocqueville’s commentators can be grouped and talked about in many 
ways. One, obviously, is by time period. Commentators from the pre-
1989 era can be divided into four groups. In the first are Tocqueville’s 
contemporaries: the first English translator Henry Reeve, important 
early reviewers such as Sainte-Beuve and John Stuart Mill, and the 
author of introductions to the first American editions of Democracy 
in America, John C. Spencer.83 A second scholarly, pre–World War II 
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group takes shape around the time of the centenary with the founding/
framing work of J. P. Mayer, George W. Pierson, and Phillips Bradley.84 
A third high Cold War group takes shape with a new translation (later 
often criticized) by George Lawrence, edited by J. P. Mayer (1966), and 
includes the work of David Riesman, Max Lerner, Martin Lipset, and 
Raymond Aron.85 The joint French-American founding of The Tocqueville 
Review / La Revue Tocqueville in 1979 constitutes the late Cold War con-
solidation of Tocqueville studies as an international field of scholarly 
research. Important figures within this fourth group include François 
Bourricaud, André Jardin, François Furet, Jean-Claude Lamberti, Claude 
Lefort, Pierre Manent, Françoise Mélonio, Robert Nisbet, and James 
T. Schleifer.86 This journal celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary just in 
time for the bicentenary with a special “best of ” anthology, Tocqueville et 
l’esprit de la démocratie (Presses de Sciences Po, 2005).
In the post-1989 era, there are many commentators who are publish-
ing research on Tocqueville for their own reasons. Some are long-term 
projects that may have been started before the events of 1989–1991 
and have little direct connection to them. Two examples would be 
Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone (1995, 2000) and Habits of the Heart: 
Individualism and Commitment in American Life (1985, 1996, 2008) by 
Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, 
and Steven M. Tipton. There are others who may have had their interest 
in Tocqueville spurred on by world events, by personal events, and/or 
by the work of other Tocqueville scholars that appeared in the 1970s and 
80s (Antoine, Heimonet, Janara, Welch, Wolin). And although it may not 
be as strong a habit within American academia, the role played by anni-
versaries in France—a centralized country long obsessed by both math 
and history—is not to be underestimated.
A birth year, death year, or year of publication is not just a handy 
attention-getting device for newspapers and magazines, but an important 
“magic marker” as it were that can drive the organization of conferences 
and seminars, and influence the selection of the authors and ideas to be 
studied in a given year in all French secondary schools and universities. 
They can also influence the syllabi within selective junior college pro-
grams known as “prépas” as well as the list of items to be thoroughly stud-
ied in a dense program of cram courses prior to taking one of France’s 
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concours, the annual competitive exams that grant the winners lifetime 
employment as a civil servant (fonctionnaire) within France’s National 
Education system.87 Publishers know that the pool of students who com-
pete for these coveted jobs are a captive audience. In many ways they 
resemble the eager, docile, anxious, pragmatic, and self-interested demo-
land citizens Tocqueville describes in DA II, 1, and elsewhere. In other 
words, ideal consumers (numerous, predictable, and ready to spend), 
and for publishers this means being able to take risks on items that other-
wise would have a harder time finding an audience. Consequently, there 
are professors who are going to hitch their wagon to a star and profit from 
the momentum, buzz, and sales that anniversaries routinely generate. 
There may be nothing wrong with this random and forced allocation of 
one’s time and attention based on concours and calendar-counting; who 
knows? It does seem to focus the mind, and it has the added benefit of 
regularly yanking the lazy narcissist in each of us away from the contem-
porary prose streaming through our consciousness by exposing us to 
thinkers and thoughts from the so-called past. Is that any worse (or bet-
ter) than having one’s attention decided by Google, some website’s “most 
e-mailed” list, or one’s friends or thesis director? That’s a real question.
At any rate, this cultural practice of the French, which goes on else-
where in somewhat milder forms, needs to be factored in if one wants to 
explain why all of a sudden around Tocqueville’s bicentenary there are 
three new translations of Democracy in America (2000, 2003, 2004), four 
new Tocqueville biographies (De Robien 2000; Benoît 2005; Brogan 
2006; Jaume 2008), new scholarly general assessments (Audier 2004; 
Boesche 2007; Boudon 2005), new essay anthologies (The Tocqueville 
Review / La Revue Tocqueville 2005; The Cambridge Companion to 
Tocqueville 2006), new study manuals (Amiel 2002; Dubois 2004; 
Frioux 2002; Lafitte 2004; Guineret 2007; Ziccardi 2011), and many 
new single volumes and reprints of various selected shorter pieces taken 
from Tocqueville’s Oeuvres Complètes, which of course are in the public 
domain.88 And that’s not counting what’s going on in other media on or 
around 2005, or what’s been produced after 2008 (Craiutu and Jennings, 
Damrosch, Elster, Epstein, Kaledin, Locke and Botting, Mansfield, Rahe, 
Zunz and Goldhammer) or the mute inglorious Miltons who assign and 
Tocqueville’s Commentators 83
teach Tocqueville in undergraduate or graduate courses without leav-
ing any record.
A second way to organize what’s been written by or about a famous 
author is by genre or type. In the case of Tocqueville these would include 
the following: allusion, anthology, article (scholarly, semischolarly [e.g., 
NYRB], mass market), biography, book review, didactic manual, edi-
tion, editor’s introduction, encyclopedia entry, epigraph, essay, the 
Internet (blogs, online journals, forums, conferences, editions, bibliog-
raphies, course materials, etc.), mention, monograph, multiauthor study, 
paraphrase, quotation (short, medium, long), reader, reception history, 
review essay, single-work or single-topic study, translation, translator’s 
note. One might also include various forms of “following in Tocqueville’s 
footsteps” whether conceived as homage, parody, pastiche, or poems.89 
Another genre, perhaps the most frequently used today, might be 
called Tocqueville sauce, a tricky mixture of name-dropping allusion and 
paraphrase that can either carry or bury thinking. An example occurs 
in the Elizabeth Badinter profile referred to above when the author 
Jane Kramer quotes Badinter’s idea of what separates her from “most 
other feminists”:
“I never saw myself as victimized or stifled; I never saw all 
men as oppressors. That one fact—the fact that I didn’t suf-
fer—has shaped my point of view. I know that I grew up in 
a very privileged world, socially, but like Tocqueville, talking 
about the eighteenth century, I think the most privileged classes 
are often the ones least tolerant of inequality. I never expected 
inequality. I was under no pressure to expect it. I had nothing 
to revolt against.” (50, emphasis added)
Similar to epigraph, but less cold and static, Tocqueville sauce is 
a direct (mention) or indirect (allusion) reference to the great man 
smoothly inserted into a sentence that creates various effects (not nec-
essarily all intended). Badinter’s remark is a typical example of softly 
aligning the tutor-speaker’s thoughts with those of a (better) known and 
(more) accepted authority.
I have never come across a willfully antagonistic lead-in or aside 
such as, “And as Tocqueville wrote, in words that are as false today as 
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when they were written…” And yet writers and speakers who sympa-
thetically apply Tocqueville sauce probably underestimate how much 
they may annoy the reader and provoke opposition. With writers like 
Tocqueville who are attracted to paradox and whose thoughts on paper 
are complex open networks, there is a fairly high risk of someone con-
testing whether the speaker’s claim is really supported by the authority 
figure or specially selected quotation, when there is one. In this case, I 
would say that Badinter’s claim may be true within a stable aristocratic 
society; i.e., when “talking about the eighteenth century,” for example. 
It is the basis of the “Christmas spirit” (also known as the “Gospel of 
Wealth” and “giving something back to the community”) that the most 
privileged can indulge in the easiest “to aid its servants and assuage their 
miseries” (DA II, 2, 20, 202, G652). But in a democracy such willing-
ness becomes rarer and, frankly, less desired (because considered patron-
izing), and in its place there arises from different quarters a firm demand 
for social justice (as fairness) that replaces charity (or at least competes 
with it).90 Therefore the least tolerant of inequality (and most strongly in 
favor of “redistributive justice,” in part because they’re likely to benefit) 
tend to be those in the low- to middle-income range, not the most privi-
leged. And so it is very important to specify what century and what type 
of regime one is talking about, as well as other particulars of its history, 
because, as Tocqueville notes, beliefs and behaviors vary significantly at 
different times and places even within the same “state.”91 My point is that 
Tocqueville sauce, though potent, can cause indigestion by obscuring or 
contradicting the point of the person who decides to apply it.
The writings on Tocqueville can also be grouped by language. Up 
until now, more has been written about Tocqueville in English than in 
French, though this might change during this century depending on who 
cares most about Tocqueville and democracy and in what language they 
express that care. Some authors have had their work on Tocqueville trans-
lated into other languages, sometimes more than one. The major works 
of Tocqueville and several of the most intriguing essays (on poverty and 
colonialism, for example) exist in many languages. The Bradley/Knopf 
bibliography lists editions of Democracy in America in Danish, German, 
Hungarian, Italian, Russian, Serbian, Spanish, and Swedish. A casual 
glance at the websites of online booksellers outside the U.S. reveals that 
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translations also exist in Japanese and Chinese. One can also find recent 
work on Tocqueville published in German, Spanish, and especially 
Italian.92 I regret that I can only read French and English competently, but 
it pleases me to know that Tocqueville is being read, hopefully well, in 
those other linguistic and cultural contexts.
To round out this taxonomy, we can list three final arrangements 
according to which what has been written about Tocqueville could be 
organized: audience (students, scholars, ordinary readers), attitude (very 
sympathetic, generally admiring, critical, hostile, complaisant, neutral), 
and purpose (advocate, amuse, doubt, entertain, inform, instruct, judge, 
persuade, question, weigh, wonder, etc.)—and of course a single text 
could have multiple aims and effects.
How to Read Tocqueville / How Not to Read Tocqueville
Of all the writings on Tocqueville during the Internet age that I have been 
able to put my hands on and get to know, I have selected eight texts that 
can serve as examples of how to read and how not to read Tocqueville. 
By reading Tocqueville, I mean an engagement with the complexities of 
his text that at least approximates Tocqueville’s labor to read and under-
stand the complexities of the institutions and mœurs of America and 
France. The four ways not to read Tocqueville can be summarized as fol-
lows. Instead of reading the text, (1) talk about how it was made; (2) talk 
about how it has been read by others; (3) talk about something else and 
use large helpings of Tocqueville sauce (i.e., allusion and quotation) to 
claim that his text is a perfect mirror, illustration, confirmation, prefigu-
ration, etc., of that other thing; (4) talk about something else and claim 
that Tocqueville is of little or no help understanding that other thing and 
therefore not worth reading.
I know that reading is not everyone’s preferred learning style, nor per-
haps should it be. And because I am a teacher and not a salesman push-
ing product, and therefore open to the idea that there is something to 
be learned from mistakes and small achievements as well as from grand 
accomplishments, I have chosen four works that I consider to be flawed 
but interesting, and four others that I consider interesting but flawed.93 
In each group of four, there are two texts in English and two in French. 
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To my knowledge, none of the French texts have been translated into 
English and vice versa. The authors of the texts in the first group are 
Leo Damrosch, Claire Le Strat and Willy Pelletier, Paul A. Rahe, and 
Emmanuel Todd. The authors of the texts in the second group are Agnès 
Antoine, Jon Elster, Jean-Michel Heimonet, and Sheldon S. Wolin. To 
me, the first four exemplify different ways of how not to read Tocqueville; 
the second four are examples of how to read Tocqueville.
Leo Damrosch, Tocqueville’s Discovery of America (2010, 277 pages)
One way not to read Democracy in America is to talk about how it was 
made. This is what Leo Damrosch decides to do, though I am not claim-
ing that evasion was his motive nor that he entirely avoids talking about 
the text. The book is a remake of the récit de voyage told by George W. 
Pierson in 1938 (Tocqueville and Beaumont in America) and is not to be 
confused with James T. Schleifer’s The Making of Tocqueville’s “Democracy 
in America” (1980), for which it is the backstory. There is certainly noth-
ing wrong with doing an original retelling of a good story.
Damrosch’s book was reviewed by Martin Rogoff in the American 
Journal of Legal History and by James Wood in the New Yorker.94 After 
asking the unavoidable question, Why another book on Tocqueville?, 
Rogoff describes this new offering: “In Tocqueville’s Discovery of America, 
Leo Damrosch describes aspects of Tocqueville’s experience in America 
that give us a deeper appreciation of how Tocqueville came to the ideas 
and insights which he so eloquently expressed in Democracy in America. 
Damrosch focuses narrowly on Tocqueville’s American experience itself.” 
Rogoff then makes deft use of a quotation from Isaiah Berlin on the 
strenuous challenge of becoming good at political judgment (because it 
requires paying attention to so many different constantly changing things 
at the same time) and returns to it in his conclusion to say that Tocqueville 
comes close to the ideal described by Berlin and that “Damrosch’s book 
enables the reader to participate in that experience.” But does it enable 
reader participation? How much and what kind? If Tocqueville’s discov-
ery of America is a set of daily events that only really exist thanks to the 
organizing, meaning-making textual event of his diary and other writings 
on the subject, then by focusing narrowly on Tocqueville’s American 
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experience itself, Damrosch may be underestimating the importance of 
Tocqueville’s voyage of the mind (if the metaphor is not abusive) without 
which there would probably have been no discovery of America because 
his political judgment (which occurs in language) would not have been 
exercised. How much of that kind of exercise does the reader get from 
this book? Damrosch is a good storyteller and a knowledgeable tour 
guide (pausing regularly to tie in stops on the journey with a plot-thick-
ening quotation from Tocqueville or some other author), but it seems 
legitimate to ask if the text’s desire for clarity and narrative pace doesn’t 
impede exercising one’s mind over a set of discoveries that of necessity, 
par la force des choses as the French say, can seem obscure (to those whose 
eyes are not yet adjusted) and therefore cause stumbling.
James Wood has similar reservations and chides his Harvard col-
league for giving a too partial (in all senses) account of Tocqueville’s 
discovery—too “scintillating,” too smooth and one-sided to capture 
Tocqueville’s “unadorned intellectual charm” and his constant “tacking 
from anxiety to optimism and back again.” I share Wood’s feeling that 
“Damrosch contagiously enjoys himself ” (106) as he retells the tale—
he could be brought in as a consultant on the screenplay of a rollicking 
“buddy” road trip movie adaptation—but is joy or enjoyment really 
what’s most appropriate given the subject matter?
Reading Damrosch, one is reminded that transatlantic travel in those 
days was calculated in days or even months, roads were often terrible, 
and river travel could be hazardous. It is a wonder, given all the adver-
sity, that in 1831 two twenty-something French aristocrats, who could 
have just continued slouching toward whatever while living off the land 
(labored by others in their service), would choose instead to go off to 
America for nine months like a couple of graduate students doing field 
research, get back alive, and write dissertations that people actually paid 
money to read instead of the other way around. And it is interesting to 
learn about Tocqueville’s reactions to what he witnessed, such as the sol-
emn Fourth of July celebration in Albany, and about the informants who 
shared their views in response to Tocqueville’s many questions.95 But we 
are not enabled to learn as much about Tocqueville’s struggle to make 
sense of it all, because that’s not the story Damrosch chose to tell. Over 
all, the book is informative and enjoyable, simply not all that probing or 
88 Chapter 2
doubting, perhaps because really there is no argument. The book’s bland 
last sentence is a clear sign that something is just not right: “Tocqueville’s 
issues are still with us and still unresolved.” You can’t argue with that.
Claire Le Strat and Willy Pelletier, La Canonisation 
libérale de Tocqueville (2006, 288 pages)
Back at the pre-dawn of the Internet age, so-called reception theory and 
reception histories were for a time one of the more popular forms of lit-
erary criticism that had cropped up in the wake of 1950s formalist criti-
cism and its radicalization in America as “theory” in the ’70s and ’80s. 
These metadiscourses about how reading was being performed within 
a given “interpretive community” were no doubt a welcome change of 
pace for those fatigued or annoyed by the “reading for rhetoric” they’d 
been taught in graduate school.96 The latter activity could be carried on 
by those teaching “comp,” they figured, because they were no longer 
interested in “the meaning of meaning.” They wanted to talk about poli-
tics and history.
In France’s universities things didn’t evolve that way because formal-
ist criticism (especially the twin scholastic exercises commentaire de texte 
and dissertation) continued to play a dominant role within the concours 
system. And formalism’s dominance extended into all the earlier school 
years as well going back to about age twelve since the language curricula 
are all designed in view of some future sorting and selecting procedure, 
and those two exercises along with math testing have been the standard 
French tools for over a hundred years. Therefore reception theory, gener-
ally understood to be a German-American import presented in the work 
of S. Fish, W. Iser, and H. R. Jauss, didn’t catch on in French language 
departments. However it did find a home in sociology departments, 
notably in the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002) and his continua-
tors who were interested in extending the Weberian analyses of the circu-
lation, conservation, and transmission of power and prestige among the 
members of certain professionalized groups.97 
La Canonisation libérale de Tocqueville by Claire Le Strat and Willy 
Pelletier is a late application of such techniques to the world of French 
Tocqueville enthusiasts of the twentieth century. They claim that this 
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group is very homogeneous and dominated by a doxa such that the 
whole community (if that’s the right word) constitutes what Bourdieu 
and others called a “habitus.” For us laypeople, the authors choose to 
convey the idea metaphorically by likening Tocqueville studies to the 
Catholic Church, where Tocqueville would be a sanctified prophet who 
is worshipped by his faithful followers, the pope or “papa” among them 
being Raymond Aron (1905–1983). The book offers a detailed account 
of the genesis and genealogy of this “liberal” “church” founded by Aron, 
Tocqueville, and their sacred texts that together form a sort of holy trinity.
This “canonisation” story deserves to be translated into English and 
integrated within a Western history of ideas, and the history of the his-
tory of those ideas of course. It would be of interest to Tocqueville 
scholars since it provides the most detailed account of “Tocqueville 
and the French” since Françoise Mélonio’s study from 1993. And since 
Tocqueville was French (wasn’t he?), it seems worth keeping up to date 
on the reception history of his writings in France, or a certain France at 
any rate. It would also be of interest to anyone interested in the Cold War 
since the book focuses mainly on the polarized French academic milieu 
between 1955 (the year Aron published L’Opium des intellectuals, which 
formalizes the battle lines between Sartriens and Aroniens) and 1993, 
one could say, since Mélonio’s reception history closes out the Cold War 
period with a last paragraph that tries to bring all parties to the peace 
table for a negotiated truce:
Tocqueville’s work thus has been far more than a link in the 
historical chain of liberalism after Montesquieu and Constant 
and before modern democratic liberalism. The word liberal is 
only attractive in its vagueness. One cannot be simply a liberal. 
One can be an authoritarian liberal, a conservative liberal, a 
monarchist liberal, a republican liberal, a democratic liberal, 
a wise old liberal, a “new kind of liberal” like Tocqueville, or 
even under the Third Republic, “liberalish” or “liberawful.” 
There are liberal practices, liberal sensibilities, liberals who 
were on the Left and on the Right, and sometimes, with the 
help of age, both in succession—but there is no French lib-
eralism. The lineage in which we place Tocqueville’s work 
is less important to us than its exoticism. An aristocrat by 
90 Chapter 2
instinct and a democrat by reason, at the crossroads of French 
and American democratic cultures, Tocqueville has been the 
repressed side of democratic tradition.98 
I think Mélonio is right when she says that Tocqueville is a figure of 
the repressed and that the word liberal is only attractive in its vagueness. 
But for anyone who seeks understanding, that vagueness soon becomes 
off-putting, and one realizes the only language users still attracted to the 
term are ideologues who seek to bash their enemies with it. In America 
those would be the “tax and spend liberals” vilified by conservatives, 
and in France the pro-business cult of “néo-libéralisme” denounced by 
the anticapitaliste Left. That liberal means “left” in America and “right” in 
Great Britain goes unexplained by Le Strat and Pelletier.99 Therefore, it’s 
not surprising, given their choice of title and their view of liberalism as a 
dogma instead of a possible challenge to dogmas and rigidity, the authors 
cannot bring themselves to quote, much less follow, Mélonio’s nuanced 
reading of the term liberal. For them, her closing remarks can only be 
another one of the clever ruses by which the Tocqueville church enforces 
obedience and closes off dissent. When convenient, a clique can always 
deny it’s a clique to those outside the clique. School? What school? What 
doxa? What are you talking about?
In 1993, Mélonio is saying, “Look, it’s over, or it should be over, so 
let’s stop using Tocqueville as a sword and shield, and reinvent some esprit 
communal with which to treat our common interests in common—i.e., 
learning from reading Tocqueville in an open, collegial way.” Le Strat and 
Pelletier will have none of that mushy appeasement talk. For them it’s not 
over, and there’s not a shadow of a doubt that Tocqueville studies as prac-
ticed in France (and presumably in the United States, though they don’t 
bother citing any work on Tocqueville from the last ten years) is part of 
an “ongoing conservative modernization” as their backer Bernard Lacroix 
puts it in an explanation of the raison d’être of the collection this book 
belongs to and that he directs entitled La Politique au scalpel”[Politics 
under the scalpel]. The upshot is a decisive rejection of Tocqueville and 
Tocqueville studies in the history it tells.
One can’t help feeling, however, that the authors are cutting off their 
nose to spite their face with their strident tone, the constant suspicion, 
and especially the decision to include so few actual sentences from 
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Tocqueville in their book; whereas they cut and paste passages from 
Aron and other commentators with a vengeance. Once they’d put their 
case to the reader (resolved: there is a right-wing Tocqueville consen-
sus in France that has locked in certain interpretations of his writings to 
the exclusion of all others; here’s how it got started; here’s how it works; 
here’s why it’s harmful, etc.), why didn’t they just set it aside and go on 
to develop their own alternative vision of Tocqueville, or, if they like, 
argue why reading Tocqueville is a lot less valuable in today’s world than, 
say, reading Mill or Marx or Mitterrand? What was stopping them from 
cutting open that closed “horizon of meaning” they claim hangs over 
Tocqueville studies by writing their own story? Instead they sign off with 
a timid backward-looking hope:
Maybe the investigation will have been worth it, if we get out 
of it [presumably, the closed horizon of meaning mentioned 
at the end of the preceding paragraph] in the strong sense con-
veyed in Balzac’s phrase, “disabused about social grandeurs.” 
[“désabusé sur les grandeurs sociales”] (272, my translation)
By going on at length about an interpretive community whose vision 
they clearly disagree with, yet in the end offering no alternative interpre-
tation of their own, the authors wind up lending even more prestige to 
their opponent (since bad publicity still counts as publicity); and no one 
will know whether their own vision was strong, weak, or somewhere in 
between, because they left the field without writing it up.
Paul A. Rahe, Soft Despotism, Democracy’s Drift: Montesquieu, 
Rousseau, Tocqueville, and the Modern Prospect (2009, 374 pages)
What does Paul A. Rahe want? What’s his dream job? What’s his dream 
for America for the twenty-first century? Is it a dream that takes into 
account the inalienable rights of all men, women, and children—the tall 
and the small—to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness? What would 
be, say, twelve measurable, achievable, relevant actions that he would like 
to see taken—and by whom?—that would move the country closer to 
his vision of what America could and ought to be? And what arguments 
could he offer in favor of his top twelve to someone who might possibly 
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disagree with one or more of his choices and argue instead for a different 
list of policy initiatives?
I’m leading off with these questions to make up for the fact that Rahe 
asks so few. In 280 pages of text plus another seventy pages of detailed 
footnotes, Rahe uses the question mark only twice (258, 310n53). The 
only other question marks that appear in the book occur in some quota-
tions and in the titles of other people’s work. This aversion to the inter-
rogative mood—if that’s what it is—is unusual in a scholarly publication, 
which is generally presumed to be the write-up of a research project built 
around a problem (and set of related questions) that the author wants to 
solve.100 Rahe’s Introduction, however, does not leave the reader guessing 
about what problem he wants to solve and how. After two pages devoted 
to recalling for the reader a selection of historical events and related pub-
lications that deal with the collapse of Communism and some symptoms 
of ill health in the West, Rahe writes, “There is something altogether odd 
and not a little unsettling about these developments, for they leave us 
wondering where to turn” (xiii). Restated as questions, Rahe is asking: 
If Communism just died, and Communism was the West’s arch enemy, 
then why is the West not feeling all that happy and healthy? And what 
should “we” (Westerners?) do now? With whom? Why? So without 
coming right out and saying so, Rahe’s book is a guide for the perplexed, 
a group in which he would seem to include himself—or at least a for-
mer “blind” version of himself before everything became clear to him. He 
offers a solution to our problem at the bottom of the next page:
If, then, we wish to understand whither we are tending, we 
would be well-advised to reacquaint ourselves with a forgotten 
form of political science and to read with care Montesquieu 
and then those, such as Rousseau and Tocqueville, who 
closely followed his lead and expanded in crucial regards 
upon what he had to say. This is, however, easier said than 
done. (xiv–xv)
It should be noted that when Professor Rahe says “read with care” and 
“easier said than done” and throws in gentlemanly archaisms like “whither 
we are tending” and “crucial regards,” he is speaking the language of 
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anyone who has ever come within a hundred miles of a certain private 
university located in New Haven, Connecticut.
The reason such reading won’t be easy, Rahe informs us, is that 
Montesquieu “lived in an age of censorship, and he composed his works 
in conformity with unwritten rules of discretion, intimating that which 
could not with profit be openly said” (xv). So Montesquieu was a wily 
practitioner of the arts of indirection, an ironist to put it bluntly; and Rahe 
proposes that we read carefully and pay special attention to how he was 
read by Rousseau and Tocqueville, i.e., that we read readers reading. This 
“intellectual” challenge, which, Rahe adds, “is also literary” and “unavoid-
ably historical” corresponds closely to what was for many “in a time now 
largely forgotten and unfamiliar” (xv) the bread and butter of “a free and 
ordered space”: the utopian paradise known as Comparative Literature.
The promise Rahe makes us, his readers, is that if we take his advice 
and “undertake a journey into the past” (xv) to the days of the great 
teacher Montesquieu, an “archeological” task Rahe calls it (winking at 
Michel Foucault?), and then move forward to the time of his disciples 
Rousseau and Tocqueville, and if we read carefully at each step along the 
way, then we can experience a “liberation” (xv) from the unsettling devel-
opments in recent times and “recover from the profound sense of malaise 
to which we are now prone” (xvii).
And what is the malaise, the new “mal du siècle,” for which Rahe offers 
us a cure? It is “Soft Despotism,” an unhealthy condition first diagnosed 
among his French compatriots by the brilliant independent scholar 
Tocqueville and then re-diagnosed by Rahe (with Tocqueville’s assis-
tance) in full-blown form in contemporary France (see Chapter Three, 
“The French Disease”) and then again in a perhaps treatable form in the 
United States (see Chapter Four, “Despotism of Administrators,” and 
“Conclusion”). So we (the French, Americans, and lots of others in the 
European Union, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand!) are sick. But if 
we virtuously take individual responsibility as Rahe recommends (280), 
such as by reading carefully, we can cure ourselves and be well again. 
That’s a stern yet ultimately hopeful message, but as with other recom-
mendations about eating right, exercise, etc., the prescription is “easier 
said than done.”
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One would expect Rahe to lead by example and be a careful reader. 
But is he? I leave it to others to decide what they think about his treatment 
of Pascal, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, but when it comes to Tocqueville, 
my answer is No. One symptom is that his text never doubts or ques-
tions anything that Tocqueville ever said or did. For him, it would seem, 
Tocqueville is an infallible prophet, his texts an oracle, a set of revelations 
that speak for themselves and thus need (must!) only be cited, accepted, 
and applied to modern times. Tocqueville’s oeuvre is Rahe’s bible, and 
its literal truth goes unquestioned by him. Again, this is unusual com-
ing from a university history professor. Couldn’t Tocqueville, like his 
teacher Montesquieu, also have been forced to write in a multilayered, 
rhetorically complex, nonliteral way at times? Was his age not also sub-
ject to tough censorship laws, the clunky weight of inflexible Aristotelian 
logic, and peer pressure? Were not freedom of speech and freedom of 
association severely limited and under constant threat of further erosion 
throughout his lifetime? And didn’t Tocqueville have his weaknesses and 
blind spots like anyone else? If the answers to these questions are Yes, 
then one would expect Rahe to be more careful, i.e., more circumspect 
and resistant, when quoting and discussing Tocqueville.
Consider, for example, the long passage (quoted and discussed a bit 
hastily in my last chapter) where Tocqueville offers his vision of the “new 
features despotism might have in today’s world” (G818). Given his title 
and the whole drift, to borrow a term, of the second half of his book, one 
would expect Rahe to be scrupulously attentive here. He is certainly 
interested in quoting from these pages, and he does so four different 
times in different ways (nearly always in English). First on page vi as one 
long, unreferenced epigraph; then on pages 186–88, where key words 
and phrases are cut and pasted into his own prose (the technique I earlier 
referred to as Tocqueville sauce); then again on page 237, where some 
of the most jarring images (“immense tutelary power,” “herd of timid 
and industrious animals”) are recycled into Rahe’s diagnosis of what 
he calls “the French disease”; and then once more for good measure on 
page 270, where large portions of the whole passage are again interwoven 
with Rahe’s prose to form the concluding paragraph of the “Despotism of 
Administrators” chapter. But that’s not reading, that’s typing.
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A more careful reading of these four reiterations would go beyond 
the framework of this survey, but it would be hypocritical of me to pass 
on without noting how, for example, Rahe uses Tocqueville to effect 
the transition he wants to make between “long ago” and “France today.” 
In the key paragraph on page 237, Rahe plays political pundit, opining 
that even if (then) French president Nicolas Sarkozy “succeeds glori-
ously, in the manner in which Thatcher did... it is hard to imagine that 
he would move decisively beyond what she achieved—in the direction 
of dismantling the administrative state or dramatically reducing its size 
and scope.”101 
Then comes the Tocqueville sauce whose main function is to make 
the reader swallow that opinion and give it the allure not just of argument 
but of “brute fact.”
For what Tocqueville discerned in embryo long ago is now 
a matter of brute fact. Over the people of France today, as 
he feared would someday be the case, there “is elevated an 
immense, tutelary power, which takes sole charge of assuring 
their enjoyment and of watching over their fate,” and it threat-
ens to reduce this astonishingly talented nation “to nothing 
more than a herd of timid and industrious animals, of which 
the government is the shepherd” (II.iv.6, pp. 265–266). It is a 
truly astonishing sight. (237)
When I read this passage, I am first struck by the effort at yoking 
(zeugma in the rhetoric manuals) attempted with “astonishingly… aston-
ishing.” Rahe is dumbstruck, he seems to be saying, by how sixty-five mil-
lion people can be so dumb. Such talented people behaving like a herd 
of animals—astonishing! But, what about that herd metaphor? Hasn’t 
it been used as an unfair put-down, insulting to animal intelligence, by 
superior feeling anthropocentric humans since forever? My point is that 
herd animals, real ones, are neither timid nor industrious—those are pro-
jections we’ve learned from Aesop and La Fontaine—they’re just doing 
what comes naturally to them; and man, whose true nature is closer to 
that of a pack animal, like the wolf, than to either a herd animal, like the 
emperor penguin, or to a solitary animal, like the tiger, should perhaps 
neither emulate nor condemn the evolutionary success of other species. 
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Many herd animals existed before man appeared, and perhaps some will 
outlive our species.
Second, note the embryo metaphor that attempts to naturalize the his-
tory of the French nation as progressing in a deterministic way (acorn 
to oak) rather than in a more open, things-could-have-gone-differently 
way. This is a bit surprising coming from a history professor, since one 
assumes that historians all judge certain “hours” and “moments” to be 
finer, graver, or rougher than others, no matter where they position them-
selves on the continuum between “hero” historiography and “forces” his-
toriography. Third, note the clever pun effected with “brute fact.” Fourth, 
note the telepathy effect accomplished with “Over the people of France 
today, as he feared would someday be the case”—as though Tocqueville 
really had in mind Sarkozy’s presidency under the Fifth Republic when 
he was writing in the 1830s.
When I read the Tocqueville passage, it strikes me that one source 
of its seductive power is that it never specifies any particular time frame 
or people. This indeterminacy, perhaps the result of Tocqueville’s alter-
nating, ghostlike interest and disinterest in the material world, may be 
what has allowed generation after generation of readers of this passage to 
color in Tocqueville’s spooky outline as they wish. Wow, he’s predicting 
the Soviet Union, the British Labor Party’s “Nanny State,” France’s Fifth 
Republic, “Obamacare,” etc. But that’s not careful reading, that’s reading 
into the text.
Nevertheless, aside from the questionable use of Tocqueville sauce to 
sharpen certain complaints, Rahe does give the reader some important 
historical information and political judgments that are worth considering. 
For example, besides the more commonly cited motives Tocqueville may 
have had for going to America, Rahe reminds the reader that Tocqueville 
was looking to confirm or refute democracy skeptics like his onetime 
teacher and future political adversary Guizot who believed that represen-
tative government would and should evolve toward an oligarchy of supe-
rior men (like himself) ruling over the ordinary masses.102 This rivalry 
with an intellectual father figure, along with the rivalry with his royalist 
biological father and other peers, seems plausible.103 But when he got to 
America, he didn’t see the mass of men leading lives of quiet desperation. 
“Beat ’em or join ’em?”—that’s the question I imagine Tocqueville asked 
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himself, in impeccable French of course. And though ultimately he fails 
to beat them definitively (Democracy in America offers no knockdown 
argument for or against democracy), he nevertheless refuses both royal-
ists and socialists and sides instead with God, a catholic God—small c—
whom he has decided is a Democrat in favor of popular sovereignty and 
not a Republican who would prefer a grand guardian class of rulers, and 
this despite being himself the ultimate Ruler.
A second useful reminder reminiscent of Adam Ferguson’s 1767 
declinist warnings (“Of Relaxations in the National Spirit, incident 
to Polished Nations”) comes in this passage that starts off Rahe’s 
“Despotism of Administrators” chapter.
In the face of Europe’s decline, Americans should not gloat or 
be smug—for, unless something dramatic is done in the near 
future, the odds are good that we will follow our European 
cousins on the path that leads to servitude. After all, in the 
course of the last century, we, too, contracted the French dis-
ease; and among us today, under Democrats and Republicans 
alike, the malady advances at a quickening pace.
This development Alexis de Tocqueville did not foresee. His 
worries concerning the United States were of another sort. He 
was a great proponent of administrative decentralization and 
local self-government, but it would be a grave error to think of 
him, in American terms, as an Anti-Federalist. In the 1830s, 
when he pondered the American prospect, he worried far less 
about the dangers attendant on centralized administration 
than about the possibility that the American union would 
come apart. Like Alexander Hamilton, for whose political 
perspicacity he evidently had great admiration, he was sensi-
tive to the fact that state and local governments were present 
to the populace in a way that the national government was not 
and inspired a measure of loyalty that it could not match, and 
he was acutely aware of the tensions generated between the 
South and the North by the presence of slavery in the former 
and its gradual disappearance from the latter. (242–243)
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The first paragraph is Rahe’s sententious diagnosis and prediction, 
now applied to present-day America. To my knowledge, Tocqueville 
never says that the “social state” of one people, whatever it may be, is 
easily transmitted to another. On the contrary, the specificity of the his-
tory, laws, and mœurs in each case tends to make exporting or import-
ing democracy—which relies so much on local circumstances and 
energies—difficult.104 Therefore the risk of infection or catching some 
“French disease” may be a fanciful misreading more appropriate to a cre-
ative writing workshop or a paranoid Homeland Security immigration 
policy debate than to a history department.105 
More interesting is the second paragraph, which continues for a little 
over half of the next page. First, note how Rahe asserts with no argument 
that Tocqueville did not foresee “this development.” Which one does he 
have in mind? He has just named at least four developments (Europe’s 
decline, American smugness, Americans contracting the French disease, 
the “quickening pace” of that disease). In any case, it’s not clear why Rahe 
would consider Tocqueville to have been so prescient about the Fifth 
Republic but blind when it comes to the future of America. Of course it 
does allow him, Rahe, to have the privilege of being the visionary when it 
comes to America, but could that be the only reason?
Second, it may indeed be an error to think of Tocqueville in 
“American terms”—i.e., translated into the American context—but that’s 
no less true of anyone else’s writings, since all translation is impossible, 
and yet we all do it, more or less carefully and well, all the time. At any 
rate, I agree with Rahe that it would be incorrect to think of Tocqueville 
as an Anti-Federalist. But it’s also hard to think of him exactly as a con-
vinced Hamiltonian-style Federalist given his praise of local associa-
tions and community spirit. Yet wasn’t this true for a lot of people at the 
time? Remember how close the ratification vote on the Constitution was 
in several key states. Really the whole thing could have gone either way. 
(NY 30–27, MA 187–168, VA 89–79). Like a lot of people, then (1788, 
1835, 1840, 1848, 1850, 1860, etc.) and now, Tocqueville saw on both 
continents the real and potential strengths and weaknesses of both union 
and disunion—of a confederate republic of states (in France régions and 
départements) united as one probably wealthier, stronger nation versus a 
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collection of smaller and probably weaker entities, though perhaps also 
more cohesive, responsive, and maybe responsible and accountable.
If in France the risk of getting the centralization versus regionalism 
equation wrong has sometimes been a debilitating quagmire of resent-
ment, distrust, fear, antipatriotism, and low productivity that spreads 
out between Paris and the provinces, I agree with Rahe that Tocqueville 
saw plainly the potential dissolution of the United States over the slavery 
issue (for economic as much as moral reasons).106 Tocqueville recognized 
that in an age when public virtue can be hoped for but not counted on, 
because, as Publius says, “men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious” 
(Federalist #6) and tend to follow their interests and those of their peer 
group, a nation in which large numbers of people think differently about 
a major issue (such as slavery) is unlikely to survive.
The Kentucky and Virginia resolutions (to disobey federal law) and 
the rise of political parties, which Rahe mentions in the second half of this 
paragraph, are further symptoms of the fragility of the American union 
that Tocqueville was sensitive to. Why he wouldn’t or couldn’t have been 
equally sensitive to the threat of a “despotism of administrators” in the 
American case, as Rahe claims, is unclear to me, since the signing over of 
one’s right to political participation to a select group of managers, albeit 
elected, does not seem to preclude “soft despotism” from taking hold in 
the U.S. if the auxiliary precautions of its laws and customs (i.e., the self-
correcting feedback loops of democracy: an independent judiciary, a free 
press and other free institutions, and the right to freely associate whether 
to talk about God, politics, business, or sports) were to break down from 
abuse or disuse, or if government were to become completely outsourced 
to a professional-managerial class of administrators.107 
When it comes right down to it, I think Rahe has been taken in by 
the astonishing, spooky passage he can’t stop quoting from, and just plain 
wrong if he is claiming that the drift of Tocqueville’s argument in Part 
Four of DA II is that Soft Despotism is the biggest and worst evil that 
should be avoided at all cost. At the end of the “French Disease” chap-
ter, Rahe writes, “In short, in France, Tocqueville’s worst nightmare has 
largely come true” (236–237). I disagree. First, it’s not certain the ani-
mals of France (all species considered) are suffering as much as Rahe and 
others may want us to believe. Second, let’s recall that Tocqueville’s true 
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worst nightmare is “a bunch of guys with a guillotine killing all your rela-
tives” (Gopnik, 214)—and for good reason, it already happened once!
Tocqueville, who had his practical side just like Publius, renounces 
looking for the ideal Democracy or the ideal anything. He’s not wait-
ing for Godot or any tutor to step forward with some master plan, nor 
is he offering one. He would prefer Democratic Liberty over Democratic 
Tyranny, that is, if he can get it; who wouldn’t? But if we can’t have robust 
and resilient Democratic Liberty right now, for whatever combina-
tion of reasons (lack of attention, motivation, intelligence, experience, 
trust, etc.), it would be better to hunker down (or buck up) and accept 
Democratic Tyranny since it would be preferable to Tyranny tout court; 
i.e., Hard Despotism of the traditional kind that goes straight for the body. 
Besides, there’s always a chance, in the fullness of time, and with a kick 
from man’s unpredictable indocility, that things will be able to swing 
back in the direction of Democratic Liberty, and then some grandeur, 
some creativity, some love for love’s sake could yet take place. So I agree 
with Rahe when he writes (270) that we could beneficially reassert as 
our motto “Don’t Tread on Me” as an expression, say, of our commonly 
shared desire to avoid torture and other cruel and unusually invasive pun-
ishments. But shouldn’t we also adopt in the characteristically American, 
pragmatic, keep-as-many-doors-open-as-possible sort of way, “Give me 
Liberty or Give me Soft Despotism”?
Another aspect of this book that deserves more attention than I will 
give it here is the intellectual cover that Rahe offers to the questionable 
doings of the so-called Tea Party in the United States. Even though Rahe 
does not mention the Tea Party by name, it is plain to anyone who has 
followed American politics since 2008 that he is sympathizing with the 
indocility and some of the views of that loosely organized group. Since 
publishing his book, Rahe has continued to express that viewpoint in 
more direct forums on the Internet, especially (Biggovernment.com and 
Commentary, for example). These matters have little direct bearing on 
Tocqueville studies, except perhaps for the biographical similarity that 
one might see between the careers of Tocqueville and Rahe insofar as 
they both drifted from the library and classroom to more contested areas 
and arenas over the course of their lives. One may wonder if Professor 
Rahe will go all the way, as Tocqueville did, and seek elective office to 
Tocqueville’s Commentators 101
actually try and implement some of the policy recommendations that he 
casually puts forward in the final ten pages of his astonishing book.
Emmanuel Todd, Après La Démocratie (2008, 312 pages )
Emmanuel Todd became better known in the United States after the 
publication of After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American Order 
(2003).108 Its fall release was well timed to take part in the first wave of 
criticism of George W. Bush’s war of choice in Iraq. In France, however, 
he often participates on the public intellectual circuit (radio, TV, glossy 
magazines), though less frequently than some, attuned as he no doubt is 
to the economics of scarcity. Todd’s preferred role is to be the impromptu 
gadfly who takes pleasure in biting or tipping over sacred cows on all 
sides with a mix of edgy provocation and coolly delivered statistical 
analysis. He’s a demographer by training, a comparatist at heart, and an 
author of a series of sociology- and anthropology-informed economics 
studies that regularly challenge received ideas. He has an enviable record 
as a debunker and fortune-teller. He made his name with his very first 
book, La Chute Finale (1976; The Final Fall, 1979), which “predicted” the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Eight books later, he published L’Illusion 
économique: Essai sur la stagnation des sociétés développées (1998)—
another success, but nothing compared to the bestseller Après l’Empire 
(2002), which was even rumored to have caught the ear of the French 
Foreign Ministry and to have been influential in articulating France’s 
decision to not take part in the American-led coalition’s invasion of Iraq 
in the spring of 2003.
Après la démocratie, which has been translated into Spanish but not 
English unfortunately, is another turn of the screw.109 The book was pub-
lished in the spring of 2008, roughly one year after the French presiden-
tial election of 2007. Among its many declarations on a variety of top-
ics, there is Todd’s repetition of the prediction, which he already made 
in After the Empire, of an immanent financial crisis throughout the West 
(2003, 98; 2008, 269): “The only thing certain is economic catastro-
phe, but we know neither its exact form nor its timing.” Cool analysis or 
hot air? If Todd acted on his own speculation, like Mike Burray, he has 
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probably become very wealthy by now as a short seller, but that kind of 
speculating may not interest him.110 
Overall, Todd’s democracy book has the same approach and contains 
some of the same arguments that appeared in earlier work. For exam-
ple, as literacy rates go up, birthrates tend to go down; equality matters 
more to a universalist people (e.g., the French) that views humanity as 
one (brothers) than to a differentialist people (e.g., Anglo-Saxons) that 
tends to divide and rank mankind in distinct groups (brothers and oth-
ers) according to certain criteria (e.g., skin color, religion, SAT scores); 
universalist empires last longer than differentialist empires, etc. In the 
democracy book Todd offers his theoretical spectacles again to take into 
account historical events in France since 2003, notably the call in some 
quarters for more “participatory democracy,” the persistent efforts of 
France’s far-right party the National Front to get their foot (or boot) in 
the door, and the presidential victory of Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007, a man 
who has been compared to Napoleon III, George W. Bush, and many 
other dubious leaders, but whom many think of as just one more lean and 
mean leader of traditional “republican” politics, i.e., the head of an oligar-
chy of trusted career politicians who rely on party discipline and staying 
on message. That message goes something like this: The world outside the 
Hexagon is nasty, brutish, and short, but that’s OK because you’re French, and 
if you vote for us, there’ll be nothing to be afraid of; just work, vacation, and 
obey the laws that we’ve passed for your own good and we’ll take care of you, 
and you’ll live to a ripe old age. With some slight modifications this can 
also function as the message of the so-called opposition, a homogenizing 
tendency that exasperates wide-ranging intellectuals like Todd and con-
fuses many ordinary people, some of whom are drawn into more extreme 
parties while others buy his books in search of an explanation of the big 
picture and “a theory of everything (sort of).”111 
So where does Tocqueville fit in? Well actually he doesn’t, at least not 
as much as one might expect, and that’s one of the things I find most inter-
esting about reading Todd. Before Zbigniew Brzezinski, Chomsky, Chua, 
Friedman, Gladwell, Paul Kennedy, Christopher Lasch, Oswald Spengler, 
or Todd, there was Montesquieu (1689–1755) and Adam Ferguson 
(1723–1816), Gibbon (1737–1794)… and Tocqueville (1805–1859). 
Anyone with the least historical, comparatist bent who’s living in 
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interesting times, or “between two worlds,” generally devours the books 
of these authors and others like them. Todd has clearly read Tocqueville 
and may even be indebted to him for certain things. Indeed, they seem to 
be kindred spirits in some ways (cosmopolitan, restless, contrarian). And 
yet Todd chooses to not accord “notre élégant Normand” much space in 
his own books. Whether this is a case of Bloomian “anxiety of influence,” 
Emersonian “self-reliance,” or something else is hard to say.
In After the Empire, Todd’s resistance to Tocqueville, if it even existed 
then, was hardly noticeable. He’s only mentioned briefly four times, two of 
them being footnotes, and one of those is a translator’s note cribbed from 
Seymour Drescher that tells the reader who Tocqueville was (206n3). 
Of the other three, one is a polite difference of opinion: Todd underlines 
higher literacy rates as one of the main material changes that contributes 
to expanding equality of social conditions, whereas Tocqueville used the 
catch-all fudge term providential to describe that long-term evolution 
(though he does discuss access to education, property, and other material 
causes). The second mention is a note of scholarly debt to Tocqueville 
for the interesting definition of Russia he sends in a letter to Beaumont: 
“America without the Enlightenment thinkers and liberty. A scary demo-
cratic society” (206n6). It’s an intriguing “tweet” that Todd chose in turn 
to forward to his readers. The third mention looks like a case of colle-
gial mutual support wherein Todd incorporates a nod to Tocqueville’s 
Democracy in America to reinforce his own main idea: “American society 
has in effect recreated the three-part structure that existed at the time of 
independence and later when De Tocqueville made his observations at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century: Indians, blacks, whites” (111).
In Todd’s democracy book, Tocqueville is referred to three times in a 
negative way. The first is by far the longest and most interesting. The sec-
ond and third are two quick slaps that reinforce the negative assessment 
made earlier. The first slap takes the form, “One must really pay attention 
to x and not to y as Tocqueville did” (260). This is all that is likely to 
register with the general reader since the actual content (which requires 
knowing what happened on a certain August 4) is elliptically presented. 
Translated, the second slap says, “At the rate things are going in politi-
cal philosophy today, democracy-loving intellectuals will soon miss 
the banal old Tocquevillism”112 (273). The expression “le tocquevillisme 
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banal” leaves unspecified whether Todd is knocking Tocqueville, certain 
Tocqueville-inspired studies, or both.
The more detailed treatment of Tocquevelle, compared to which 
these two later mentions are mere glancing blows, comes in an earlier 
section of Todd’s third chapter (“From Democracy to Oligarchy”) enti-
tled “Mass Literacy and the Emergence of Democracy” (84–88). What’s 
evident from these five pages is that Todd is upset about the same things 
that bothered him already in 2003; namely Tocqueville’s use of the fuzzy 
God-talk word providential and his negligence, according to Todd, of 
education, especially literacy, as a democratizing factor, which for Todd 
is of capital importance. So already with two strikes against him, Todd 
notes that Tocqueville’s stock has risen lately and attracted more con-
tinuators than detractors (“plus d’héritiers que de contradicteurs”); but for 
Todd that’s bad, not good, because these practitioners of “tocquevillisme” 
are only recycling “a few banal theories such as the one about a type of 
equality that is menacing for liberty and the one about a type of individu-
alism that tends to undermine itself ”113 (84). The adjective banal has sev-
eral meanings in French. Is Todd using it negatively to mean worn out, 
worthless, trivial; or positively in the sense omnipresent, common, widely 
accepted? I suspect negatively, but in either case, he is manifestly unin-
terested in being more explicit about this tocquevillisme banal, since he 
neither quotes or references the relevant passages where these theories 
come from (such as DA I, 1, 5 and DA II, 2, 2). Instead he gives a celeb-
rity endorsement to the Le Strat and Pelletier book, calling it “excel-
lent” and then wittily embroidering on its thesis: “in our present age of 
a resurgence of unegalitarian feeling, the Norman aristocrat has become 
a totemic figure” (85, my emphasis). This paragraph concludes with an ad 
hominem put-down of the presumed middle-class origins of those who 
study Tocqueville today just as, he says, before 1989 those studying Marx 
came from a similar social class. In other words, for Todd there are two 
kinds of readers: the intrepid who seek truth and find it in a concatena-
tion of books that truly matter and the insecure who follow fads down 
blind alleys. But Todd’s animus doesn’t stop there.
In the next paragraph he notes that Tocqueville has become a sym-
bol of a Transatlantic relation (“lien transatlantique”), only to ridicule 
that link by alleging that Tocqueville was secretly disgusted (“secrètement 
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dégouté”) by the United States and, unlike Nicolas Sarkozy, who was criti-
cized by some for being too “pro-américain,” would never stoop to spend 
a vacation in a country whose democratic mores repelled him. Without 
citing a specific letter or any other source, Todd claims the correspon-
dence contains evidence that Tocqueville cut short his American stay 
out of disgust with those democratic mores, even though it is more fre-
quently reported that he and Beaumont were called back for professional 
and family reasons (Brogan, 197). He concludes this paragraph with a 
dry mock: “It was all the more meritorious of him to have accepted with 
pursed lips the inevitability of democracy.”114 But this too is misleading 
because it’s not liberal democracy that Tocqueville claimed was inevi-
table, it was the expanding equality of social conditions. Furthermore, 
as Todd must know, democracy is never something singular or static for 
Tocqueville but comes in many different, usually hybrid, forms (tyranni-
cal, aristocratic, liberal, venal, grand, petty, etc.), none of which are inevi-
table but depend on man’s collective and individual choices and behav-
iors over time
In the next paragraph Todd quotes a passage from an example of 
tocquevillisme that he finds particularly “simplified” and “degraded.” 
It’s a study by Guy Coq entitled (I translate), “Does Democracy Make 
Education Impossible?” Instead of being drawn to titles that ask ques-
tions, for Todd its trendiness is repellent. He then quotes ten lines from 
the book and discusses the phrase “l’individu démocratique.” Their gist 
is that democracy doesn’t necessarily produce new and better men, but 
instead people of ambiguous value. In support of this claim, Coq turns 
to Tocqueville: “Let’s recall Tocqueville for whom democracy’s success 
entails a danger for its own survival, namely that the democratic individ-
ual’s behavior, attitudes, and self-affirmation engenders a new despotic 
power” (Todd, 86; Coq, 13, my translation).
Aside from going a bit fast, jumping a few steps, and making the 
cause and effect relationship sound more fated with that verb engenders 
than I think Tocqueville really says or means, this particular instance of 
Tocqueville sauce does not seem abusive to me. For Todd, however, this 
passage serves as an example of how the “canonization of Tocqueville” 
squashes the necessary critical faculty. He claims Tocqueville almost got 
it, but didn’t quite see (as Todd has) the fundamental role literacy plays in 
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the birth of democracy. Todd clarifies his position: “One does not learn 
to read to become the equal of others, or to be a ‘democratic individual,’ 
but to be a better educated individual intellectually.”115 What Todd has in 
mind by “a better educated individual intellectually” is as vague as the old 
term well-rounded; nor is it easy to see how he has refuted Tocqueville or 
Coq here, since he cites no text of Tocqueville that makes the claim he 
attributes to him, and nowhere in the passage quoted from Coq does the 
author embrace (or exclude) the subject of reading.
So there is no clear victor in this odd cockfight, but Todd is still intent 
on establishing, over Tocqueville’s dead body, that the spread of literacy 
equals the birth of democracy “understood as the equality of conditions.” 
He then adds, “But political democratization is only an effect, not a cause.” 
This is rather elliptical, and its value is hard to gauge for that reason and 
also because Tocqueville has not been allowed to defend himself, so to 
speak. In the next and last paragraph of this section, Todd shows some 
mercy and pardons Tocqueville for not having had access to the statisti-
cal information about literacy rates that only began to be collected and 
published around 1826. Todd’s conclusion: Tocqueville’s reasoning was 
faulty, but it’s not entirely his fault because he lacked some empirical evi-
dence that only later research into the subject, such as mine, could incor-
porate into new and improved theories about the birth of democracy.
It would seem that Todd needs to get Tocqueville and his followers 
out of the way to clear a space for his own theorizing. This is a famil-
iar story and somewhat understandable given the do-it-yourself spirit 
of democratic times—everyone wants an original relation to the uni-
verse; everyone wants to be Adam and have one’s own chance to name 
the animals.116 Nevertheless, it’s regrettable that Todd’s will to open up 
for himself new horizons of meaning should have been done with such 
a crude scalpel and so little respect for Tocqueville’s contribution. The 
result is that his book sends the unhelpful messages that the absent are 
always wrong, the present is superior to the past, theorists are a bunch of 
insecure, passive-aggressive nitpickers, and reading Tocqueville is a waste 
of time. Literacy may be a necessary condition for democracy (though 
I would want to ask anthropologists more about that claim), but it is 
hardly sufficient (look at Cuba). Also required are certain customs and 
dispositions, what Tocqueville called mœurs, and these would include 
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agreement about the basic rules of engagement (such as good manners, 
mutual respect, security, generosity, honesty, and trust). The scarcity and 
fragility of those qualities might account in part for why democracy is so 
difficult to establish and sustain even among highly literate populations.
Another matter raised in the closing pages of this book is Todd’s pol-
icy recommendation to his universalist compatriots and other Europeans 
that the only way to safeguard European democracy is to adopt me-and-
mine-first practices of protectionism; in other words the establishment 
of a differentialist hierarchy (an “invidious distinction” as Veblen would 
say) into brothers and others (e.g., European / not-European) with the 
attendant consequence of unequal treatment accorded to each. Is this 
an apology for “fortress Europe” or “La France forte” (Nicolas Sarkozy’s 
2012 campaign slogan)? Or is it intellectual cover for right-wing nation-
alism? Or an excuse for a new kind of exclusionary democracy like the 
American one Tocqueville studied that advanced in predatory fashion 
via “force and fraud”117 on the backs of women, blacks, and Indians (now 
women and “Arabs”)? If so, is it really the best policy for Europeans or 
others to adopt now? Why? Why not? Moreover, for Todd this protec-
tionism is not just about the circulation of people and material goods, but 
seems to extend to the marketplace of ideas as well. Is this underwriting 
of a division into strident factions wise? We may wonder if there aren’t 
better alternatives.
Agnès Antoine, L’Impensé de la démocratie: Tocqueville, 
la citoyenneté et la religion (2003, 410 pages)
Why Todd should want to practice protectionism against Tocqueville, 
why he shepherds the reader away from the elderly “elegant Norman” as 
though he were senile instead of treating him like a brother, a familiar, 
a colleague as interested in the good, the true, and the beautiful as the 
next person, are mysteries that lead me to wonder if democratic asso-
ciation within even the most liberal, inclusive democracy is not always 
also dependent on an expulsion and continued exclusion of something 
or someone as part of the constituting frame or foundation of itself. 
Might this be part of what Agnès Antoine is getting at when she speaks of 
“l’impensé de la démocratie”?
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Another technique for drawing the reader in besides using a title 
question (Stanley Fish’s Is there a Text in this Class? is a famous example) 
is to use a noun in one’s title, such as impensé, that doesn’t exist in the 
dictionary as such, but whose existence we can logically imagine since it 
is constructed out of something that does exist: the verb penser, to think, 
and its past participle pensé, thought, which is not exactly the same thing 
as une pensée, a thought, or la pensée, (the) thought. So with the prefix im-, 
l’impensé would then mean the unthought or the not thought. Follow this 
nonexistent (because as yet unthought until now!) noun impensé with 
a genitive construction, de la démocratie, and you add another layer of 
intriguing complexity because of the objective/subjective genitive ambi-
guity. So the title could be naming either democracy’s unthought, what 
democracy has not thought about, but knows it possesses and is maybe 
just keeping in reserve for later, or something that democracy doesn’t 
have a clue about, not the slightest idea of, because it lies outside, beyond 
democracy’s ken, beyond what it can ever know or imagine. The latter 
would be closer to something we’re more familiar with; at least the notion 
exists as entries in the dictionary, i.e., l’impensable, the unthinkable, and 
l’inimaginable, the unimaginable. So is it x or y, or both x and y? And then 
comes the subtitle, a list of three items—a proper noun and two com-
mon abstract nouns: Tocqueville, Citizenship, Religion. There is not a 
colon or equal sign between the title and subtitle, but sophisticated read-
ers familiar with such titles often add, infer, or read them into the title.118 
Then the subtitle would be naming three “things” that are unthought by 
democracy—things democracy has not (yet) thought about, because it 
is keeping them in reserve, or three things that democracy cannot think 
about, because they are beyond its reach, beyond its grasp, properly 
unimaginable, unthinkable. Or “repressed,” as Françoise Mélonio sug-
gests in the conclusion to her study Tocqueville and the French.
People who find such observations interesting and not simply annoy-
ing—perhaps because they too enjoy puzzling over things and believe 
that figuring something out and knowing it is, like virtue, its own 
reward—are generally drawn to philosophy and may even, under rare 
circumstances, rare under any regime let’s recall, become professional 
philosophers themselves. Agnès Antoine has had the good fortune, and 
manifestly done the hard work that puts luck on one’s side, to become a 
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professional philosopher, and she is the author of a book on Tocqueville 
that could be fairly characterized as grand, important, big. That it will 
probably not be read by the likes of Le Strat, Pelletier, and Todd, because 
for them Tocqueville is bagged and tagged forever it would seem, is 
not something she is likely to lose any sleep over. Should she? For oth-
ers, perhaps, her book will not remain a dead letter, but instead add to 
their knowledge and understanding of all four of the things named in her 
title—democracy, Tocqueville, citizenship, religion—as well as that fifth 
most strange “thing,” l’impensé.
Remember Tocqueville’s contrarian declaration in DA II, 1, 15, that 
the study of Latin and Greek is to be recommended to those living in 
democratic times because they usefully recall and may reinstate quali-
ties that tend to drop out of everyday life within a democracy, namely 
“admirable mastery of technique and care in rendering details,” as well as 
patience and motivated choices (545). He doesn’t say everyone should 
become a classics major however.
It is obvious that in democratic societies individual interest as 
well as the security of the state requires that the education of 
the majority be scientific, commercial, and industrial rather 
than literary.
Greek and Latin should not be taught in all schools, but it 
is important that those destined by nature or fortune to culti-
vate literature, or predisposed to savor it, find schools where it 
is possible to gain complete mastery of ancient literature and 
steep oneself in its spirit. A few excellent universities would 
do more to achieve this result than a host of bad schools in 
which superfluous subjects taught poorly stand in the way of 
teaching necessary subjects well.
Everyone who aspires to excel in literature in a democratic 
nation should feast often on the works of Antiquity. There is 
no more salutary hygiene.
Not that I consider the classics beyond reproach. I believe 
only that their special qualities can serve as a marvelous coun-
terweight to our peculiar deficiencies. They prop us up where 
we are most likely to fall. (G546)
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Here is food for thought for harried students, professors, deans, col-
lege presidents, and legislators. I would go further (and forward in time) 
and extend Tocqueville’s recommendation to all texts written before the 
two World Wars, because 1914, roughly speaking, has now become the 
new dividing line today between Antiquity and Modernity, between 
what people today can still find more or less familiar and what stands as 
foreign to us as Greek and Latin were already to Tocqueville’s contem-
poraries. I only regret that Tocqueville was not more explicit about how 
he envisioned the transfer of knowledge and sensibility from the classics 
major who feasts often on the works of Antiquity (which I’m saying these 
days could just as well be the writings of Tocqueville as Tacitus) and the 
majority of “us” who are obviously required to devote ourselves to scien-
tific, commercial, and industrial arts rather than to literature, philosophy, 
and other nonvocational topics in the arts and sciences. When and how 
will that counterweight, that “prop” as Tocqueville calls it, be applied 
and effectively do the compensatory balancing or steadying, also called a 
“salutary hygiene,” that will allow democratic man to regain and perhaps 
retain a better equilibrium? I’ve not yet found the answer to that question 
in Antoine’s book either. But maybe I have not read carefully enough. Or 
maybe it’s not there because she has not thought about it. Or maybe she 
has thought about it, sort of, but is keeping her thoughts in reserve for 
now and will tell us more about it later.
In any case, I’m convinced that reading Antoine’s book would be a 
salutary counterweight in democratic times. Where others are restless, 
she is calm; where others are in a hurry and interested in getting the most 
with the least effort, she proceeds patiently with a serene aristocratic dis-
interest for any possible conversion of knowledge into fungible capital. 
While others have deadlines, she seems intent on constructing her argu-
ment with the same transpersonal outlook as the cathedral builders of 
olden times. The long maturation of her thought will take however long it 
takes, her own individual contribution being of little importance next to 
that of the work itself which began before her and will continue after she, 
AA, has turned to dust.
I’m also convinced she is devoting her time and effort to what matters 
most to Tocqueville once he has discovered America and how democ-
racy works, namely the compensatory counterweights to democracy’s 
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“peculiar deficiencies” (G546) and self-destructive tendencies. Two 
of these counterweights are citizenship (which maintains community 
spirit) and religion (which stimulates projects and productivity while 
discouraging excess individualism, materialism, and nowism). A third 
counterweight, which Antoine enacts more than she discusses it, is the 
pursuit of a literary education; for example, feasting often on the works 
of Tocqueville, the first social scientist, and other scientists, philoso-
phers, and artists. It is obvious that in democratic societies, only a minor-
ity will by nature or fortune be drawn to Antoine’s Tocqueville book.119 
But those who are so drawn should be allowed to read her and not be 
obstructed in any way or treated with contempt by the rest of us. Why? 
Because it’s in our collective best interest properly understood (“bien être 
proprement entendu”) that they be freely allowed to do so.
It therefore seems juste et bon to include a passage, chosen at random, 
from Chapter Twelve (“La Dialectique Tocquevillienne”), entitled “La 
modernité et la réhabilitation de la chair.” We can cut in midsentence:
… the contemporary slide towards the flesh is dismaying. It 
represents a simple inversion of the preceding imbalance and 
a new extreme. One humanity, that of the former or “aristo-
cratic” society, had reached too high, forgetting all other men. 
Another, that of democratic society, took into account the 
totality of human beings, but being preoccupied mostly with 
caring for well-being, it finds itself too low, and does not yet 
constitute a true humanity. Therefore, one must strive for a 
new balance, by giving the well-being society the possibility 
to rediscover more spirit. To guarantee the existence of this 
just middle within the democratic condition, the civic dimen-
sion is for Tocqueville the fundamental mediator. It helps the 
individualistic person raise herself from the sphere of material 
interests, just as it helps the religious believer not lose sight of 
the world. As in Aristotle, the important thing is to live nei-
ther above nor below humanity, and the man who places him-
self outside the city is, definitely, a brute animal or a god.
This perspective allows one to better understand 
Tocqueville’s “aristocratism.” Tocqueville dreads the demo-
cratic condition’s leveling effect on man’s grandeur, but in no 
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way does he recommend a return to the former social order, 
despite that order’s inherent beauty; nor does he wish to rec-
reate a new aristocracy based on other social criteria. If some-
thing from the aristocratic condition is to remain present, it 
is not a social reality, but a dimension of being, a desire, an 
élan, an energy—that which pushes man to transcend in him-
self the animal and point his efforts in the direction of the 
high. At the same time, however, it is not about substituting 
for the mediocrity of the “last man” a new species of “over-
man,” as Nietzsche attempted, even though his critique of the 
democratic, bourgeois order might seem, in some ways, to 
be a radicalization of Tocqueville’s intuitions. (264–265, my 
translation)
By chance we’ve hit on a passage that (1) touches on the main the-
sis of Antoine’s book—the necessity of democracy’s supplements 
(Tocqueville, citizenship, and religion), which it protects even while 
sort of ignoring them; (2) features the need for striking a new balance 
as mentioned above in the context of Tocqueville’s recommendation to 
protect and honor the voluntary pursuit of a literary education; and (3) 
shows Antoine practicing what she preaches, so to speak, with a piece of 
careful reading that is attentive to making sure the reader does not fall 
into misunderstanding. There is an evident desire for clarity as her prose 
guides the reader with its parallel repetition, “Une humanité, celle de… 
Une autre, celle de…”; phrases that underline the point to be understood: 
“Il faut donc… il s’agit de… Il ne s’agit pas de…”; and the judicious use 
of outside points of reference: Aristotle, Nietzsche. The latter are offered 
tactfully, as tools to even better understand Tocqueville’s position, but 
they are optional, like hiking with ski poles, and the reader who knows 
nothing about Aristotle or Nietzsche is not made to feel stupid, excluded, 
or blocked from understanding and continuing to follow the argument.
Antoine’s strategy and tactics exemplify the still dominant approach 
to reading in France; namely, critical explanation or interpretation that 
they call explication de texte or commentaire de texte. It is an approach that 
considers it to be in the reader’s best interest to place the text first and 
try to serve it well by illuminating its truth and protecting it from pos-
sible misinterpretation by roving wolves or thirsty leopards who might 
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willfully attempt to drag it off in other directions or change its spots. 
In Tocquevillian terms, one could say it’s a form of rational patriotism 
within the republic of letters. It is a way of reading that tends to be con-
servation-minded, literal, and spiritual, and aristocratic in the sense that 
it believes in good, better, best, takes the long view, lives frugally off the 
light and nourishment engendered in the encounter between reader and 
text, and draws as little attention to itself as possible, convinced that indi-
vidualism and narcissism, like Pascal’s “moi,” are “haïssable” and vulgar.
People raised in democratic lands where individualism, materialism, 
and nowism may have been allowed to develop unchecked can find read-
ing a book like Antoine’s unbearable or, on the contrary, wonderfully 
liberating, a refreshing change, a salutary counterweight to democracy’s 
short-term thinking, pragmatist bullying (“There is no alternative”), 
and unquenchable thirst for news, novelty, change, progress.120 I for one 
admire the way her 410 carefully composed pages push back against the 
general passion (“engouement général”). Just as I like the rock in the repro-
duction of the painting that was chosen to adorn the cover of her book—
a rock that juts up above the water on which two fur traders in a long 
canoe are floating with their goods and their cat, all three staring out at a 
spectator on the riverbank, if there is a spectator.121 
Jon Elster, Alexis de Tocqueville: The First 
Social Scientist (2009, 202 pages)
Jon Elster starts off his Tocqueville book with a personal testimony about 
his first and second experiences reading Tocqueville:
I first read Tocqueville almost fifty years ago, as part of my 
French studies at the university. As I was largely ignorant of 
social science and of history, I was unable to benefit from 
him. When I returned to Democracy in America fifteen years 
later, having spent most of the intervening years learning 
those disciplines, I had an experience I have only had with 
two other books, Thomas Schelling’s Strategy of Conflict and 
Paul Veyne’s Le pain et le cirque. The work put me in such a 
state of intellectual and nervous excitement that I could not 
114 Chapter 2
sit still, but had to get up from my chair and walk about from 
time to time.
When I tried to penetrate more fully into the work, its bril-
liance began to seem more blinding than illuminating. (vii)
This autobiographical anecdote is valuable for many reasons. First, it 
humanizes the author by recalling for us, his readers, that he too was a 
reader once, “clueless in academe,” and later, though older and smarter, 
still challenged and ill at ease with a set of texts that both stimulated and 
blocked his efforts at understanding, texts that were teaching him more 
and better than almost anything he had ever read, but that still remained 
somehow unknowable, unmasterable. The feelings of exhilaration, frus-
tration, adventure, and humbleness expressed here are emotions most 
readers who take on the task of reading nine hundred pages of argument-
driven prose can relate to, and this creates sympathy or shared feeling 
between him and us. Second, it reminds us of something that is easy to 
forget: the words on the page may not change, but we do, and therefore 
we never step into the same text twice no matter how familiar we may 
think it has become for us. We may think we’re reading the same text, and 
in a sense we are, but the text is reading a new you every time you read it. 
Third, it enthusiastically puts Tocqueville’s texts in a constellation with 
two others that we can file away for later and test whether we have the 
same reaction as Elster. And fourth, by being so intimately confessional 
with the reader from the start, it also allows him to put the personal aside, 
because it’s clear from what follows that Elster, like Antoine, does not 
want this to be about him. He merely wants to be a helpful guide to those 
who are inclined to make use of his services as an experienced reader of 
Tocqueville, a pedagogue, and a fellow social scientist.122 
His focus will be Tocqueville and especially Tocqueville’s texts, and 
among those many pages he concentrates our attention on the least bio-
graphical and empirical dimensions, which he names in the second para-
graph “small and medium-sized causal mechanisms and highly sophisti-
cated methodological insights that”—and now here comes the claim that 
Elster will defend in the next two hundred pages—“although they do not 
add up to the grand theory to which he aspired, have lasting value. Even 
today, it seems to me, they are not as fully explored and utilized as they 
ought to be” (vii).
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Translated into the language of mid-twentieth-century philosophy 
of language, Elster’s book could be entitled “How to do things with 
Tocqueville.” In the language of the Internet age, it is the Tocqueville 
“apps” store with Elster as the general manager in charge of inventory, 
configuration, and local installation. His book could be compared to 
Gene Sharp’s free, downloadable, how-to manual, From Dictatorship to 
Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation (4th edition, 2010) 
that is reported to have been widely read and highly influential during the 
Arab Spring.123 There are a few differences though. Sharp’s inventory of 
strategies, tactics, and methods is more succinctly presented (93 single-
spaced, large-type pages), and it addresses the roughly 2.5 billion people 
who are living in countries officially designated as “not free.” Elster’s book 
contains about four times as many words and could be addressed to read-
ers of any political persuasion from dictators to democrats because it is 
not arguing in favor of any particular form of government but instead 
sticks to its self-imposed pedagogical mission of highlighting frequently 
overlooked causal mechanisms and insights in Tocqueville’s text that 
could be used in many ways—to promote democracy, to foil democracy 
and favor liberal or tyrannical republicanism, or other purposes. In this 
way Elster’s book and by association Tocqueville’s texts (which Gene 
Sharp never mentions) are potentially more useful “playbooks,” since the 
range of possible applications is much wider.
Before turning to a partial inventory of the Tocqueville tools that 
Elster’s book passes along at little cost to the reader, it’s worth noting 
Sharp’s constant attention to the open-ended, probabilistic nature of 
politics and his reminder that “the conflict in which political defiance is 
applied is a constantly changing field of struggle with continuing inter-
play of moves and countermoves” (34). This sounds very much like 
Tocqueville, especially the later politically seasoned Tocqueville of DA 
II, Recollections/Souvenirs, and The Old Regime and the Revolution. Here 
is a passage, for example, from a section of Sharp’s Chapter Two (“The 
Dangers of Negotiations”) entitled “‘Agreeable’ Dictators”:
Dictators may have a variety of motives and objectives under-
lying their domination: power, position, wealth, reshaping the 
society, and the like. One should remember that none of these 
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will be served if they abandon their control positions. In the 
event of negotiations dictators will try to preserve their goals.
Whatever promises offered by dictators in any negotiated 
settlement, no one should ever forget that the dictators may 
promise anything to secure submission from their democratic 
opponents, and then brazenly violate those same agreements.
If the democrats agree to halt resistance in order to gain a 
reprieve from repression, they may be very disappointed. A 
halt to resistance rarely brings reduced repression. Once the 
restraining force of internal and international opposition has 
been removed, dictators may even make their oppression and 
violence more brutal than before. (13)
Aside from certain thematic resemblances to the famous Part Four of 
DA II, what attracts my attention, now sharpened by what I’ve learned 
from reading Elster, is the repeated use of may (i.e., possible/probable, 
maybe/maybe not); the use of cause and effect formulas such as “effect x, 
if cause y / if y, maybe x”; and especially the warning in the last sentence 
to beware of making concessions because you could end up in a worse 
situation than before, which sounds a bit like the folk wisdom “Be careful 
what you wish for.” It is also similar to the set of cause and effect scenar-
ios that Elster groups under the heading “Precipitants: the Tocqueville 
Paradox” (162–169)—the crucial resemblance being the observation 
made by both Sharp and Tocqueville, and highlighted by Elster, that 
in real life the actual consequences of an action may be other than the 
hoped for consequences and may even be precisely the opposite of what 
the action aimed to achieve.124 
Shakespeare and other writers of comedies and tragedies going back 
to Antiquity have always known this of course, but literary irony is not 
generally considered to be the stock in trade of social scientists. This 
makes Sharp’s, Elster’s, and Tocqueville’s attention to backfiring, back-
lashes, boomerangs, and the other ironies of everyday life all the more 
special and striking to the social science reader who may have thought 
she was in the “real world” of more knowable, static truths—even though 
Tocqueville repeats over and over that democratic times are character-
ized by constant change, mobility, dynamic tensions, and blended con-
tradictory impulses and identities.125 
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Tocqueville’s discoveries, which all have as their source his insight into 
the not-necessarily-Newtonian physics of the mind, are not presented as 
a mere list of forces, but as an intellectual narrative that is argued and 
directed.126 With its embrace of a formation-of-thoughts-while-thinking 
approach, Tocqueville’s text is obviously closer to the French essay tradi-
tion of Montaigne and Montesquieu than it is to a PowerPoint presen-
tation. Nevertheless, it’s helpful to us here in the Internet age to have 
Tocqueville’s innovative achievement highlighted by Elster’s rigorous 
translation of Tocqueville’s lively prose into more easily graspable dis-
crete units. Taking a cue from Sharp’s book, Elster could go even further 
in that direction and add an appendix with a glossary if he gets a chance 
to rework his book for a second edition.
Elster clearly states his interest in Tocqueville in the Introduction: 
“the main task I set myself is to elucidate the structure of his arguments, 
their validity, and their relevance for us today.” This relevance depends on 
proving that Tocqueville’s writings offer “exportable causal mechanisms.” 
Note, his claim is not the same as that of utopian, ideal State theorists 
from Plato down to modern times for whom designing, installing, and 
fine-tuning a given political regime, as though it were a computer operat-
ing system, seems entirely feasible. The causal mechanisms that he calls 
“exportable” are in effect underappreciated but knowable laws of psy-
chology, especially group dynamics, and their exportability is predicated 
on certain universalist assumptions about how all our minds work, indi-
vidually and collectively.
Among these laws are those that concern, for example, “preference 
formation.” Elster lists three: the spillover effect (“behavior p in context 
x will be repeated in context y”), the compensation effect (“not behav-
ior p in context x, but behavior p in context y”), and the satiation effect 
(“not behavior p in x, not behavior p in y”) (13). Elster’s goal is to train 
the reader’s ear to hear Tocqueville using these analytical tools to make 
observations about the relationships between behaviors across one or 
more spheres of activity. These spheres include “religion, literature and 
the arts, politics, warfare” and “civil society” or “private life” (14). On 
the next page, Elster gives an example of Tocqueville observing how the 
spirit of risk taking and risk loving spills over from industry to warfare:
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Men in democracies naturally feel a passionate desire to 
acquire quickly and enjoy easily the goods they desire. Most 
adore risk [le hasard] and fear death far less than toil. It is in 
this spirit that they pursue commerce and industry; and this 
same spirit, when they carry it to the battlefield, makes them 
willing to risk their lives in order to assure themselves in an 
instant of the spoils of victory. No form of grandeur satisfies 
the imagination of a democratic people more fully than mili-
tary grandeur, which is spectacular and sudden and obtained 
without effort, merely by risking one’s life. (Elster, 15; DA 
II, 341, G775)
The persuasiveness of Tocqueville’s argument depends on accept-
ing at least (1) the feeling he claims democratic man has (“a passionate 
desire to acquire quickly and enjoy easily the goods they desire”), (2) the 
transfer of that feeling to another context (“It is in this spirit that…”), 
and (3) the stable reality of “military grandeur” and “the imagination of 
a democratic people.” If no doubts are raised about any of that, chances 
are the reader will find Tocqueville’s spillover observation perceptive 
and convincing.
Another area that interests Elster is Tocqueville’s analysis of “Belief 
Formation” (Chapter Two), especially conformism. He claims that “Next 
to ‘the Tocqueville paradox,’ [it] is probably the piece of analysis in his 
writings that has had the greatest influence on social science” (40). He 
gives several examples of Tocqueville’s observations about conformity, 
many of which rest on the presupposition that similar causes produce 
similar effects. Consider, for example, this passage from DA II.
Men equal in rights, education and fortune—men of like con-
dition, in short—necessarily have needs, habits, and tastes 
that are not very dissimilar. Since they see things from the 
same angle, their minds are naturally inclined towards anal-
ogous ideas, and while each of them may diverge from his 
contemporaries and form beliefs of his own, all end up unwit-
tingly and unintentionally sharing a certain number of opin-
ions in common. (Elster, 40–41; DA II, 318–319, G754)
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In this same chapter, but developed further in Chapter Six, “Patterns 
of Social Causality,” is Elster’s commentary on Tocqueville’s doubts 
about the possibility and sustainability of so-called halfway houses, i.e., 
intermediate “centrist” positions where one might try for bargains, com-
promises, or half-measures with the idea of attaining harmony or getting 
the best of both worlds, and instead one ends up with more conflict and 
less power or advantage than before. This presupposition (an apology 
for hard-liners and an admonishment to compromisers?) conditions 
Tocqueville’s pronouncements about the dynamics of equality at the end 
of DA I, 1, 3:
I know of only two ways to achieve the reign of equality in 
the world of politics: rights must be given either to each citi-
zen or to none.
For nations that have achieved the same social state as the 
Anglo-Americans, it is therefore quite difficult to perceive a 
middle term between the sovereignty of all and the absolute 
power of a single individual. (DA I, 115, G60)
The weakness of halfway houses also conditions the “hang together or 
hang separately” thought lower down on the same page.
Furthermore, when citizens are all almost equal, it becomes 
difficult for them to defend their independence against the 
aggressions of power. As none of them is strong enough to 
fight alone with advantage, the only guarantee of liberty is for 
everyone to combine forces. But such a combination is not 
always in evidence. (DA I, 116, G60–61)
The idea here is that a group may try and win liberty for all together 
or risk seeing it taken away from each individual one by one. This almost 
sounds like Tocqueville coming out in defense of labor unions, with a 
cautionary doubt raised in the last sentence about how often they might 
really win their battles due to the difficulty of forming efficient collab-
orative groups.
The phrase “all almost equal” is typical of another theme that Elster 
explores, which is Tocqueville’s sensitivity to how cause and effect rela-
tionships as well as perceptions of size (large, medium, small) can vary 
depending on whether one is living in a state of approximate equilibrium 
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(in a democracy or under absolutism, for example) or transitioning 
between steadier states (such as during a revolution). As always, Elster 
keys his remarks to examples from Tocqueville’s text. Thus, a sentence 
praising freedom of the press in a democracy as “the only cure for most of 
the ills that equality can produce” is juxtaposed with a warning about the 
harm a free press can cause when it occurs in contexts where it had previ-
ously been absent: “Woe unto those generations that abruptly introduce 
freedom of the press for the first time!” (DA I, 272, G213). Forgetting 
the difference between “transition effects” and “equilibrium effects” says 
Elster, echoing Tocqueville, can cause a lot of confusion, misunderstand-
ing, and harm.
Ultimately, Elster’s pedagogical laying out of Tocqueville’s contri-
butions to social science permits asking clearer questions about “the 
quality of democratic government” and the possibility and probability 
of containing “the pathologies of democratic government” (147–149) 
within reasonable, nonfatal limits. These are similar to the questions the 
American framers asked in Philadelphia and that Publius tries to answer 
in The Federalist. In Elster’s plain style the question is posed this way: “To 
assess the quality of the system we may ask, therefore, whether it tends 
to produce wise aggregate beliefs and just aggregate values” (145). In 
other words, with statistical tabulation of choices (essentially “votes” of 
all kinds) over a sufficiently lengthy and broad sample space, we can mea-
sure the wisdom and justice of this or that regime, with whatever mix of 
democratic, oligarchic, or monarchical components it may have. It will 
test, among other things, the “wisdom of crowds” to see to what extent 
it really exists and to what extent it may be merely the ideological prefer-
ence, the wish, of democracy sympathizers.127 
Elster also stresses how important it is to have enough time. This is 
especially true for democracies, says Elster, echoing Tocqueville, because 
if people in democracies are guided by the principle that “the interests of 
the many ought to be preferred to those of the few” (Elster, 145; G285), 
and if they are able to correct their mistakes and counteract their own 
worst tendencies, then they may, in the long run, be able to avoid the 
ten “pathologies of democratic government” that Elster distills from his 
reading of Tocqueville (147–149). But in the short term, democracies 
frequently make bad policy choices due to “motivational and cognitive 
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deficits” (144). This underscores the importance of making “repairable 
mistakes” (DA I, 318, G258)—something democracy is good at—but 
this takes time, which is uncompressible.128 Here again is Elster’s com-
mentary (147):
The crucial condition is that they have enough time for the 
learning to take place: they must have “the faculty of com-
mitting errors that can be corrected” (G258) The Americans 
have this enviable faculty because their geographic isola-
tion ensures that they have no enemies who might exploit a 
momentary weakness (G192–3). “But democracy can dis-
cover truth only through experience, and many nations will 
perish before they have had an opportunity to learn from 
their mistakes” (DA I, 258). Even when a regime is free of any 
tendency to make systematic mistakes, a single large mistake 
might, in a hostile environment, be enough to bring it down. 
An implication is that “in order for a democratic republic to 
survive easily in a European nation, all the other nations of 
Europe would have to establish democratic republics at the 
same time.” (G256)
It’s easy to see from this passage why Tocqueville was picked as 
Foreign Affairs minister in 1849 even though there’s doubt about whether 
he really did a good job or, we may add, had enough time (less than two 
years) to learn from and repair his mistakes.129 Along the same lines, it’s 
tempting to think Elster’s Tocquevillian sensitivity to the influence that 
geography, neighbors, and other variables have on public policy (leading 
to outcomes that are more or less wise and just) would make him a good 
consultant in Brussels, Paris, London, or Cairo; but then again that same 
knowledge might lead him to hold tight to the arms of his chaire at the 
Collège de France and be thankful for the chance to continue making his 
living peacefully in amphitheaters, libraries, and his study.
Unlike Rahe’s ten-page Conclusion, which may strike some readers as 
a rather abrupt passage from the classroom to the war room, from talking 
points to bullet points, Elster’s last ten pages follow the advice to orators 
at this stage of the game (“Tell ’em what you told ’em”) and provide a 
clear summary of what he considers to be Tocqueville’s key insights and 
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strengths as a researcher. He then offers a diplomatic assessment of what 
Tocqueville’s future role might be.
Even if the spillover effect turns out to be a marginal phenom-
enon or envy to be less important than Tocqueville thought 
it was, his work can still remain as an inspiration. It is impor-
tant to understand what it could be an inspiration for; not for 
the construction of a general theory of the kind proposed by 
Talcott Parsons and his followers, but for the fine-grained 
analysis of a given society or regime.130 
In other words, Elster is not claiming that air-dropping copies of 
Tocqueville over Europe, the Middle East, or other hot or cold war zones 
will solve the world’s problems. He does believe, however, that “There 
is… a Tocquevillian mind-set that is consistently helpful” (190) when 
it comes to thinking about transitional effects and equilibrium effects, 
including the challenge of knowing which are which.
Another aspect that I will not develop here is Elster’s conviction that 
Recollections is more than just anecdote and caricature, but offers a “psy-
chology of revolutionary action” (151) that he says is also one of the 
hallmarks of The Ancien Régime and the Revolution. He praises that late 
unfinished work in his last paragraph as perhaps “the most theoretically 
informed historical analysis ever written” (191). Elster backs this up with 
an impressive list of what he says one can learn about from AR:
Among the themes of this work are the “Tocqueville para-
dox,” pluralistic ignorance, the dangers of concession or mod-
erate repression and the superiority of preemptive measures, 
the causes and effects of emotions such as envy and hate, and 
the inevitable and inevitably futile attempt to harness revolu-
tionary forces to partisan ends. (191)
These are some of the causal mechanisms that Elster says have not 
been taken into account as much as they could be, especially in rapidly 
changing parts of the globe such as Eastern Europe (190). He suggests 
that a more open-minded reading or rereading of Tocqueville would 
allow one to get a better grip on what those mechanisms are and how 
they work, or might work, case by case, since the Tocquevillian mind 
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knows that “results may vary” and “past performance is not necessarily 
indicative of future results.”131 
Jean-Michel Heimonet, Tocqueville et le devenir de la 
démocratie: la perversion de l’idéal (1999, 397 pages)
Jean-Michel Heimonet is the author of eleven books published over a 
twenty-year period (1986–2007) by smaller but thoroughly respect-
able presses. In 1999, after having devoted years of teaching, research, 
and writing to topics often lumped together under the heading “French 
theory,” he turned his attention to the honorary American that some 
Frenchmen love to hate, and came out with a big book on Tocqueville.132 
He has followed that up with three shorter essai books that all explic-
itly make use of Tocqueville as an important guide.133 Heimonet’s other 
“tutelary deities”—comparable I’m suggesting to Tocqueville’s daily 
exercise with Pascal, Montesquieu, and Rousseau—are Georges Bataille 
(1897–1962, especially the writings devoted to evil and the sacred) and 
Albert Camus (1913–1960, especially L’Homme révolté, 1951).134 As far 
as I know, none of Heimonet’s books have been translated, and none of 
his fellow Tocqueville enthusiasts seem to have read him—not Rahe, 
whose fifty pages of footnotes crammed with book titles testify to his 
having read just about everything on Tocqueville that’s out there, and 
not Antoine, despite the fact that one of her central themes, religion, 
is also of prime importance for Heimonet. And yet his books are all in 
print and as easy to procure as anyone else’s. The website goodreads.com 
lists no reader reviews, and under the heading “Jean-Michel’s Fans” are 
the dispiriting words: “None yet.” How could Heimonet’s Tocqueville 
book have made no friends or enemies in all this time? Simple oversight? 
Willful neglect? Malicious intent? It’s hard to say.
The silence or silent treatment in response to what Heimonet has 
written about Tocqueville recalls the modern death sentence that 
Tocqueville says falls on the writer who dares to venture beyond the for-
midable barrier around thought erected by the omnipotent majority in 
today’s democratic republics.
…You will remain among men, but you will forfeit your rights 
to humanity. When you approach your fellow creatures, they 
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will shun you as one who is impure. And even those who 
believe in your innocence will abandon you, lest they, too, be 
shunned in turn. Go in peace, I will not take your life, but the 
life I leave you with is worse than death. (G294)
I don’t want to exaggerate. There are some book reviews only a click 
away online, but very few on the four Tocqueville books. And presum-
ably Professor Heimonet has not been “deactivated” from the Catholic 
University of America, where, according to the school’s website, he holds 
the position of “Ordinary Professor of French” and in that capacity pre-
sumably still goes to faculty meetings, teaches, holds office hours, and 
grades papers, just like any other humanities professor in America.
Could there be something offensive or upsetting in his writings that 
would cause the majority of professional Tocqueville scholars to shun 
him? Is he maybe a silenced “whistle-blower”? Or is it perhaps that 
his work on Tocqueville is so derivative, amateurish, or off-base (“hors 
sujet”) as to be not worth reading let alone making use of or quoting 
from? The last hypothesis seems impossible since Heimonet’s interest in 
religion (and the sacred) clearly overlaps with Tocqueville, for whom, as 
everybody agrees, religion occupies a central place as the spiritual stuff 
within democratic societies that makes democratic man care about the 
public sphere and work on meaningful group projects that in turn affirm 
and strengthen community spirit.135 Religion also keeps the demolander 
from acting on the temptation to abandon civilization and simply strike 
out for the territory like the carefree boy Huckleberry Finn.
Secondly, there’s nothing amateurish in the sense of sloppy or slap-
dash about Heimonet’s books. There is only the amateurism that he him-
self admits to on the first page: coming to Tocqueville belatedly with the 
inexperience but also the fresh enthusiasm of an outsider. The “tolle lege” 
story he tells on the first page—rereading Tocqueville after living as a 
Frenchman in America for fifteen years, still trying to make sense of it 
all—is as believable and endearing in its own way as Elster’s story or that 
of any other close encounter whose mix of intrigue and mystery makes a 
big impression.
Could one say Heimonet is derivative in the sense of being a copycat 
or lazily following the lead of others? He is clearly indebted to Eduardo 
Nolla’s edition of Democracy in America like a lot of other readers and has 
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learned things from Claude Lefort.136 He is also familiar with the work of 
Furet, Mélonio, Gauchet, and Manent. But he specifically marks disagree-
ments he has with the last two about the status of religion in Tocqueville’s 
writings (against Manent, pp. 273–275; against Gauchet, pp. 326–330). 
Nor is it likely he derived his views from the work of Agnès Antoine, 
since he published his book on religion and citizenship four years before 
hers came out; and he probably has had little contact with her given the 
distance between the academic worlds of Paris and Washington, D.C. If 
anything, there is a certain sui generis, “my way” quality to Heimonet’s 
Tocqueville books. They put Democracy in America into new constella-
tions with the writings of authors that I dare say had never before been 
associated with him, notably Bataille, Barthes, and Camus. Besides the 
use of these stars from the world of French theory, which strikes me 
as motivated and instructive and not forced or fraudulent, Heimonet 
also makes use of a broad literary background (familiarity with Orwell, 
Huxley, Popper, German idealism and romanticism) and his knowledge 
of current events and the commentators that surround them (Barber, 
Mailer, Soros, Sunstein).
Before 9/11 and the ensuing resurrection of Orwell’s “Two Minutes 
Hate” strategy on ideologically polarized American radio and TV shows 
over the last decade, not as many people were quoting Benjamin Barber 
or Cass Sunstein, and certainly not in books about Tocqueville.137 The 
use of these contemporary cultural critics becomes more prominent in 
Heimonet’s three smaller Tocqueville & Co. books. But in all four there is 
a strikingly original back and forth movement between the here/now of 
our terror-stricken modern societies and the there/then of the first half 
the nineteenth century in America and Europe that seems to most of us 
now like ancient history.
Along the time line of the last 150 years, at roughly the same eighty-
year distance between “us” and “them,” between our Internet age and the 
age of Jackson, Lincoln, Napoleon III, and Tocqueville, lies the disturb-
ing decade of the 1930s. This decade, I am claiming, is what now sepa-
rates our modernity from the “Antiquity” of Tocqueville’s day and all that 
came before him.138 Our own time, interestingly, is often compared to the 
1930s—it’s a decade that haunts us—and it was also around the cente-
nary of Democracy in America, in 1935, that Tocqueville first began to be 
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“rediscovered.” The 1930s is an important decade in the lives of Forster, 
Huxley, and Orwell, who will be discussed later, and in the career of 
Georges Bataille (1897–1962), whose writings are of crucial importance 
for Heimonet. He stands as a hybrid, transitional figure on the borderline 
between the new anciens (the pre-1914, pre-1930s world) and the new 
modernes (the Internet age), just as Tocqueville stood or floated—along 
with his countrymen—between the Old Regime and a new age still 
struggling to come into existence as he put it.
The title (in English) of Heimonet’s first Tocqueville book—Toc-
queville and the Becoming of Democracy: The Perversion of the Ideal—gets 
across two ideas. First, that it is going to be about Tocqueville’s vision 
of democracy and how it might develop by its own means (or lack of 
means, incapacity, vulnerability), its own becoming that grows out of 
its being by its agency. That notion of becoming must be important to 
Heimonet, because otherwise the first part of the title could simply have 
been Tocqueville et l’avenir de la démocratie (Tocqueville and the Future of 
Democracy), which suggests a mere inventory of “forces” in the most gen-
eral indeterminate sense. The second part of the title after the colon, The 
Perversion of the Ideal, names the low distortion or degradation from the 
once high élan of democracy’s becoming that had been boldly launched 
by the Puritan idea/l, namely that a religious spirit and a spirit of freedom 
could and ought to be complementary and mutually reinforcing. This is 
the story that Heimonet understands to be the main thrust of the open-
ing chapters of Democracy in America, and it is the falling off from the 
grandeur of this ideal to the sterility and vulgarity of small, overly private 
concerns that Tocqueville worries about for the rest of DA I and all of 
DA II—and rightly in Heimonet’s view. Hence the need to insist on the 
example set by religion, which serves a double role: (1) it lubricates the 
wheels of democracy by encouraging cohesiveness and dynamism; (2) it 
directs that energy (or at least a portion of it) to higher projects and goals 
(such as passions and powers) beyond the most primary needs for basic 
survival: food, shelter, clothing, and sex. It even reinvents the notion of 
basic needs and inserts the religious, the sacred among them (“L’âme a 
des besoins qu’il faut satisfaire”—“the soul has needs that must be satis-
fied,” DA II, 2, 12, 169). For Heimonet, it is an important moment later 
in DA II when Tocqueville declares that faith is the norm within human 
Tocqueville’s Commentators 127
existence and incredulity is the accident or aberration: “L’incredulité est 
un accident, la foi seule est l’état permanent de l’humanité” (DA II, 2, 9, 
403). Here Heimonet understands Tocqueville to be claiming a status 
for religious faith—which will be lived through acts of experiencing the 
sacred—that is very close to Bataille’s affirmation one hundred years later 
of man’s primal need for the sacred.
What Bataille contributes to Heimonet’s reading of Tocqueville is the 
insight that the perversion of the ideal, the desecration of the grandeur by 
the low, the dirty, the vulgar, is necessary to establish the very notion of 
the ideal, the high, the transcendent. And therefore religion’s role is not 
only to encourage cohesiveness but to also permit, and even incite, trans-
gression, going against the grain, being an annoying irritant; for exam-
ple, to the majority and its mœurs (its beliefs, routines, and values). The 
religieux plays this paradoxical double role of being the shepherd of the 
flock of co-believers, but also standing outside the “flock” of civil soci-
ety, and thereby reminding everyone that there is an outside, and calling 
the parishioners to contemplate it while yet not dissolving the bonds that 
constitute the order of church and state (e.g., our ties to family, friends, 
employers, clubs, governors, and the law). This outside/inside double 
status is the model that Tocqueville, Bataille, and Heimonet (and long 
before them, John Calvin, John Knox, and Cotton Mather, for example) 
incarnate as writers and theorists. Theirs are quasi-priestly services in 
modern society comparable to the work of shamans and medicine men 
in earlier civilizations.
Bataille was a librarian and an author of some provocative stories 
and essays. He was a smuggler or passeur, both within a community and 
between a community and the transgressive outside of that community. 
His transgressions, going too far—like Don Giovanni, say, or Dimmsdale 
or Hester Prynne—were also a nourishment of the community, food 
that necessarily must come from some outside if it is to nourish and 
keep the community from turning in hungry stagnant circles. Via the 
example of Bataille, Heimonet reminds us that Tocqueville, like Adam 
Ferguson, Gibbon, and other general commentators of world civilization, 
insisted on the importance of invention and innovation, which explains 
Tocqueville’s allegorical use of China as a negative example of traps to 
avoid; his scolding assessment of his own countrymen’s disorientation 
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and improductivity; and his warnings about America’s potential for 
perversion and degradation—paradoxically because there has not been 
enough perversion (i.e., transgression—call it “Pussy Riot”139 ) of the 
enlivening kind that would nourish. Thoreau, a classics major of aris-
tocratic bearing, was a good example of someone who experienced the 
sacred, lived sacredly, and nourished his community through the act of 
being outside and coming back and producing Walden (1854), the tes-
timony of his disobedient transgression outside the community and an 
immense gift.
Reading Tocqueville and Bataille together, as Heimonet invites us 
to do, highlights the importance of certain remarks of Tocqueville that 
we had not fully measured. For example, when he witnesses the Fourth 
of July celebration and remarks on that solemn, spiritual atmosphere. 
What’s going on there in Albany? Tocqueville realizes he is in the pres-
ence of the sacred and that in fact democracy in certain circumstances 
brings individuals a type of ecstatic, religious experience. But there 
should not be career politicians as there are career religieux in their vari-
ous orders. It would be better if everyone rotated in and out of these 
quasi-priestly civilian roles, nourishing themselves and their community 
in turns, like at a potluck supper. What matters is belief in the religious 
experience, the sacred, and that can happen in many democratic offices, 
such as jury duty, serving on a community board or committee, or serv-
ing in the police, fire brigade, militia, or when voting—because in those 
roles one is signifying the community, in and outside the community at 
the same time, connected and the connection, the agent and the acted 
on. In those passing moments of communion (paradoxical because they 
consist in being in an oblique semidetached status vis-à-vis the commu-
nity) one feels particularly alive, charged, meaningful. One’s life and life 
in general feels important, validated, and one is at the source of that vali-
dation, not God, but godlike in the sense of creating, doing, making as 
God is said to be able to do.
Along the way Heimonet makes many worthwhile observations. For 
example, that Tocqueville’s method is Socratic and not magistral, that 
he is his own midwife and wants to be a midwife for the thought of the 
reader, not the master, not the grand arrogant father as Guizot was and 
perhaps his own father Hervé as well (59). Second, that Tocqueville’s 
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method is itself democratic—open, free, disinterested inquiry, ready 
to look at as many sides as can be identified for inspection and weigh-
ing (83). Third, that life is the goal of democracy, just as truth is the goal 
of science and beauty is the goal of art (83). Fourth, that individualism, 
materialism, and nowism only become problematic for democracy when 
they stop being perverse (i.e., transgressive) but become a banal norm—
because then they are not even in fact themselves: individualism flips 
into a simulacrum of individualism that is really just another conformity 
(to the uniform—e.g., having it “your way” composed from a pre-set 
menu of choices); materialism and shopping become sacred; the now is 
worshipped as though it were transcendent outside of time (slow-motion 
cinema, such as the plastic bag scene in the film “American Beauty,” is 
often used to suggest this idea).
Reading Tocqueville and Bataille together lets one better under-
stand how Tocqueville could be opposed to excess individualism and 
yet favor free individuals; i.e., a defender of an individual’s right to liberté 
d’intelligence, liberty of action, initiation, invention, including the pursuit 
of eccentric or geeky (but generally law-abiding) minority pleasures such 
as studying Greek and Latin, for example. Tocqueville realizes that the 
spirit in “community spirit” is the gift that each individual gives as a sacri-
fice of his own energy for the sake (sacredness) of the group—it’s a don, 
a free gift. But the community can only benefit from that energy if they 
themselves are free gifts, if they are not constrained, not duty-bound. The 
mistake of the Puritans was perhaps to have forgotten this freely given 
quality of each individual’s participation. Voting must not be made com-
pulsory for this reason. That turns the gift of voting into a due, a duty, 
and perverts its sacred dimension—something that we can perhaps only 
clearly appreciate when a country (Australia, Brazil, etc.) imposes man-
datory voting.140 
The problem with despotism, says Heimonet, is that it’s “asymbol-
ique,” which is a fancy way of saying that it is sterile because it has no proj-
ect, it is throwing nothing together, making no meaning, and therefore 
obstructing man’s nature which is precisely to make meaning141 (123). 
Politics, Tocqueville realized, is one material form of an inner psychic 
need of the mental life not unlike the circular processes of toddler’s play 
130 Chapter 2
or experimental science: a continuous contest of problem solving by 
making projects and seeing them through to fruition.
So why is the transgressive writer punished by the omnipotent major-
ity? It would be surprising if Heimonet did not comment on “the power 
that the majority in America exerts over thought,”142 which he seems to 
know so intimately. The reason is because the despotic majority can-
not tolerate that its project be questioned, doubted, competed with by 
an alternate project, an alternative vision. It wants more than to be right 
(which would imply that there’s a possibility of being wrong, an out-
side); it wants “to go without saying,” “aller de soi,” to be the way it is—
i.e., immanence—not just the unique thought (la pensée unique), but 
beyond thinking. In other words, The Truth. To achieve this total mas-
tery, it will exert overwhelming force when necessary against the slightest 
signs of resistance. It manifests itself in countless everyday situations as 
the immense pressure of the collective mind over the intelligence of each 
individual (“la pression immense de l’esprit de tous sur l’intelligence de cha-
cun,” DA II, 18, G491).
Heimonet remarks on the moments when Tocqueville seems to 
despair of finding anything sacred or high in America, any product of a 
spirit of creative, “manly” liberty. Such as on page 149 where he quotes 
the Norman aristocrat’s lament: “Il n’existe pas de genie littéraire sans lib-
erté d’esprit, et il n’y a pas de liberté d’esprit en Amérique.”143 He is less mind-
ful of other moments (such as DA II, 1, 9–10) where Tocqueville says 
that while for now there is no American Pascal (see DA II, 56), that sort 
of extraordinary genius may emerge eventually, because Americans have 
set up so many free institutions where they are able to exercise and give 
expression to an esprit de liberté: social clubs, libraries, schools, jury duty, 
and later liberal arts colleges and research universities, museums, parks, 
and vast wilderness and urban reserves. In all these places the democrat 
learns, in his bones, that liberty is something sacred—“chose sainte,” (DA 
II, 1, 2, 19).
Like Tocqueville again, Heimonet wants to balance his despair with 
hope. He wants to insist on the “nature preventive de notre analyse” (155). 
In other words, like the ghost’s lecture to Scrooge, he’s not saying what 
will happen, but what could happen if certain steps are not taken—cer-
tain counterbalancing reforms. Heimonet seems to trust in Tocqueville’s 
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idea that democracy contains within it the cure for what ails it. (Recall 
Elster’s ten “pathologies of democratic government,” 147–149.)
For example, there is the religieux, who, like the teacher, practices a 
profession that has both conservative and subversive dimensions: con-
servative because his memory and his literacy allow him to strengthen 
the connective tissue of the community; subversive because he leads, 
and while leading by definition he is not following, not consuming, not 
merely receiving the sense, the products made and delivered by others, 
but is taking the Promethean step of having an original relation to the 
world—as Emerson recommended he do—“building his own world,” 
which is transgressive of the values of the group, but which is also neces-
sary if the group is to avoid stagnating and turning in sterile circles.144 So 
there is at once tolerance and intolerance for the religieux, the teacher, the 
artist, and for the scientist who is researching and not merely applying 
the results of yesterday’s research.
Reading Tocqueville and Bataille together, as Heimonet recommends 
we do, reveals why judging Tocqueville; i.e., deciding whether he is lib-
eral or conservative, progressive or regressive, avant-garde or reactionary, 
attracts so much attention. That he could be both, that he has to be both 
if he is to be true to the high—grand—role that he set for himself, this is 
not easily accepted by those in different camps who need him to be one 
or the other. “Reactionary” for the revolutionary Left and therefore to 
be rejected. “Communitarian” (an epithet) and (overly) protective of the 
community’s local prerogatives for a certain nationalist Right that may 
deploy the terrifying (and hence uniting) specter of soft despotism, as 
Rahe does, or else denounce localism as “populism” (another epithet) in 
order to get people to accept “aristocratic liberalism”; i.e., their brand of 
managed democracy that they’ll name approvingly liberal republicanism 
or meritocracy…and impose confidently with one-size-fits-all expedi-
ency no matter how suffocating or ill-adapted in certain circumstances.145 
Unlike Marx, says Heimonet, Tocqueville never gives priority to mat-
ter over spirit, nor does he dissociate the two, but views them instead 
as always co-dependent, the one requiring the other for its very knowl-
edge of itself (165). Heimonet clarifies this interdependence via some 
instructive borrowing from an early essay by Roland Barthes in which 
the famous semiologist takes stock of the wider social significance of 
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Ferdinand de Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics (1916).146 Barthes 
points out that what Saussure did by shifting the focus of his discipline 
from diachronic to synchronic studies was to democratize it (374). In 
this view Saussurean linguistics becomes the scientific equivalent of the 
French Revolution in that it ends the dominance of the former regime 
that was predicated on vertical lineage and inherited meaning and puts 
in its place horizontal relations where signifiers, like citizens, are all égaux 
en droits, i.e., have equal rights, and jockey for their significance amid a 
network of other competing signifiers each with the interest of pursuing 
its project, making its meaning, asserting itself, its existence and its power 
to signify, to do things with that significance.
Heimonet repeats that he is not trying to be alarmist or elegiac when 
he draws attention to the perversion of the ideal (171). The perversion 
has to happen. We have maybe to lose our community spirit in order 
to reinvent and cherish it anew. A version of the fortunate fall. So while 
the perversion is bound to happen, equally necessary is the recovery or 
relève through meaning making. Heimonet is fond of repeating Camus’s 
affirmation from the Introduction to L’Homme révolté, “Parler répare”—
Speaking repairs. The regrettable scenario in Heimonet’s view would be 
unmanly cowardice, cowering and retiring, leaving the field to the polar-
ized and complementary opponents—Jihad and McWorld—the two 
faces of terrorism: the one that swears by the annihilation of all mean-
ing making by exterminating you, and the other by the annihilation of all 
meaning making by stuffing you with the “burgers” (meanings) they’ve 
already made and force you to consume. The one keeps you living in fear 
of being killed next; the other claims to nourish you, but not so you grow 
up to be big and strong, but instead so that you live forever dependently, 
having to receive all from McWorld or from “Dreamworks,” the dream 
factory that saturates you with its images, its narratives, its software, leav-
ing you little chance of creating anything on your own. It tolerates poets, 
geeks, and nerds, so long as they’re “hacks” providing content, entering 
code under their orders and not competing with them independently.
Heimonet, like Tocqueville, points out problems and cruxes, act-
ing as a warning sign, but does not presume to know a miracle cure. He 
offers hints about the kind of behaviors that might get one out of the 
quagmire, out of the predicament of triviality and sterility, the “informe,”, 
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the “autodéstruction,” the “perversion” toward a grander future—which 
doesn’t mean simply a restoration of Classics or the pre-democratic clas-
sical doctrine. Heimonet’s is not a nostalgia-driven enterprise angling 
for any particular past; it’s a call similar to Emerson’s in his “American 
Scholar” essay to battle the “counterenlightenment” that democracy is 
prone to by lighting the lamps that have gone out, if necessary at the light 
of previous examples that can serve as sources of inspiration—such as 
Bataille or Camus or Tocqueville.147 Their revolt, their example, is what 
Heimonet calls us to pay attention to and admire for its bold transgres-
sive qualities that went largely against received ideas, simplicity, the easy 
way out, and consensual thinking and behaving. Democracy, if it remains 
an open society, preserves the possibility of this revolt that can happen 
when democratic man realizes that he has allowed his own system to turn 
on him, on his freedom (of intelligence); and the revolt is at once this 
realization and the expression of a new launching or lighting, a “reboot” 
to start anew. While at the same time there must be a conservation-
minded desire to prevent “overkill” in the very gesture that clears a space 
for the new freedom to express itself, not to kill off others, their habitats, 
and their projects, which, on the horizontal playing field of democracy, 
have as much right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness as the next 
person’s. But there is no ducking contest which is the basis of true poli-
tics. Let there be competition but let it be fair competition that moder-
ates the inevitable pride and violence that come with being the winner, 
restrains the impulse to humiliate and reject out of hand, and allows los-
ers to play again another day.
Heimonet sees religion as Tocqueville’s best bet as to how democratic 
ages might be able to keep democracy off the twin rocks of entropy and 
totalitarianism (182). Totalitarianism, despite disguising its sterility 
under a momentary period of intense efficient productivity as all move 
in the same direction (think Sputnik or Minitel), ultimately reveals and 
stumbles on its entropy. Tocqueville had in mind a certain sclerotic 
China, but there are plenty of other examples (the Soviet Union, North 
Korea), as well as sclerotic corporations that either redo or die (GM, 
IBM, Xerox), bureaucracy-heavy (and sometimes corrupt) NGOs and 
charities, unwieldy school systems and political parties, and of course 
bad marriages and stale friendships.
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Heimonet reiterates his essential message in different ways in the three 
shorter follow-up books. They dispense with the exegesis of Tocqueville 
accomplished in the first longer study and use what was learned there 
to illuminate and comment on various geopolitical events, social phe-
nomena, and transitional effects that Heimonet’s Tocqueville mind-set 
(which is also a Bataille mind-set) allows him to diagnose with verve and 
insight. Among these phenomena are (1) apathy; (2) hétérophobie, a dis-
trust of others (autrui) and disbelief in Autrui (the transcendent); (3) a 
distrust (méfiance) that a contract culture exacerbates; (4) twin, comple-
mentary terrorisms, Jihad and McWorld, which, Heimonet stresses, are 
not opposed, as Barber claimed in his book title—the mission of both 
being to extend dehumanization and the prime tactic being visceral anti-
intellectualism (“anti-intellectualisme visceral”) crushing the soul and 
man’s capacity for sacred meaning making; (5) the power of the archaic 
to be revolutionary in archconservative, antirevolutionary times or, alter-
natively, to be conservative and therapeutic in revolutionary times of dis-
location and dismantling.
Faith changes objects, it doesn’t die (“la foi change d’objet, elle ne 
meurt point,” DA I, 406). This claim is what leads Heimonet to insist that 
for Tocqueville it’s not a specific past tradition that matters as much as 
vision, faith in a future project so as to avoid resignation (“démission”) 
and renunciation of one’s proper humanity. The proper goal is to con-
serve religion’s role within a democracy, to unseat the false, abusive total 
sacralization of private interest, of mere things, of the accidental ephem-
eral I-me-mine-here-now.
Sheldon S. Wolin, Tocqueville Between Two Worlds: The Making 
of a Political and Theoretical Life (2001, 650 pages)
“Il faut un courage singulier pour ne pas succomber à la 
depression et continuer – au nom de quoi ? Pourtant je con-
tinue, dans mon obscurité: l’homme continue en moi, en 
passe par là”
“Je me détruis dans l’infinie possibilité de mes semblables, 
elle anéantit le sens de ce moi.” (Georges Bataille, Oeuvres, 
V, 45–46, 48)
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“It takes singular courage not to succumb to depression and to 
continue on—in the name of what? And yet I continue, in my 
obscurity: man continues through me, passes through there.”
“I destroy myself in the infinite possibility of my fellow 
man, it annihilates the meaning of this me.”
To get them in the same room, so to speak, I begin this presentation of 
Sheldon S. Wolin’s Tocqueville book with an epigraph from Georges 
Bataille, as quoted by Jean-Michel Heimonet at the end of Chapter 
Twelve of one of his Tocqueville follow-up books, La Démocratie en mal 
d’altérité (2003). I don’t claim complete understanding of these three 
sentences that I’ve translated as best I can into English. It would seem 
Bataille is asking the question that occurs to every writer—For whom do 
I write?—and roughly speaking his answer is: For the infinite possible 
uses of mankind, for other language-users like myself but beside and 
beyond myself, “mes semblables,”—from before Baudelaire to Heimonet 
and beyond. Bataille, I take it, is saying that writing involves self-sacrifice 
for others and an infinite other, or Other, if you like, whom we can never 
completely know or master but to whom we can make our meaning-full 
contribution, our gift, in language—if we manage to fend off depression 
and mutism. Ultimately, that may be the answer given by any writer, any 
artist, or any person who builds, transforms, or reinvents something. It 
is an answer at once true, or at least plausible, but so general, so banal 
perhaps, as to hardly seem interesting or worthy of our attention. So let’s 
ask a more pointed question: What does Sheldon S. Wolin want, and 
who cares? Taking the second part of the question first, the short answer 
is Not as many people as you might expect given his stature, the praise 
he receives from academic colleagues, the importance of the subjects 
he treats (politics, democracy, America, the social), and the painstak-
ing attention that characterizes all of his writing—all two thousand or so 
pages of it.148 
Some facts about his Tocqueville book. The book was published in 
2001, well before the bicentenary, but has still not been translated into 
French or any other language as far as I know. Among the six endorse-
ments on the back cover, we’re told that “Sheldon Wolin speaks with a 
master’s voice,” has “enormous intellectual energy and flair,” and the book 
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is “penetrating, thorough, and authoritative,” “a work of supreme scholar-
ship,” and a “magisterial study of Tocqueville.” I happen to agree with all 
those claims. In addition, an online merchant lists only praising declara-
tions, fifteen in all, from diverse authorities, including one who calls the 
work “masterful” and another who claims “the strength of Wolin’s mono-
graph lies in his patient, close readings of Tocqueville’s major works.” But 
that same online merchant lists no customer reviews for the book. This 
fact may lead one to reread differently one of those back cover blurbs that 
calls the book “an arresting critique.”—arresting how? Is it a treatment 
of Tocqueville that makes you stop and think, or is it a book that makes 
you stop, period? Here we’re faced with another embarrassing case of 
unintended consequences it seems. Presumably, Wolin’s goal is to reach 
out to ordinary people, the demos, and raise their consciousness, edu-
cate, guide, embolden, and empower them.149 It’s his proper professional 
role as set down in Emerson’s “The American Scholar” speech (1837). 
But he’s manifestly not getting through—not to ordinary people, not to 
American intellectuals other than those who were paid to comment on 
his book, and not even to French Tocquevillians and democracy sympa-
thizers whom one would expect to be enthusiastic allies.150 Why not?
One answer is that he doesn’t always know how to talk to ordinary 
people in democratic times. It was a good idea to go for “the making of ” 
narrative structure, because ordinary people like to have ideas told to 
them in the form of a story, especially a life story, plus it’s easier to remem-
ber, just like when things are arranged in a tuneful song such as the letters 
of the alphabet. On the other hand, it was maybe a bad idea to make up 
new words for new ideas near the end of his story, whereas he could have 
simply followed Tocqueville’s strategy (in DA II, 4) and described those 
new things without giving them names. Hearing what sounds an animal 
makes and seeing how it behaves is often more memorable than being 
told its name.
“Postdemocracy,” for example, and in the follow-up books “fugitive 
democracy” and “inverted totalitarianism” are three important neolo-
gisms for Wolin in which he invests a lot of explanatory energy, but none 
of these notions has gained any traction with the general public, perhaps 
because all three go against strongly held positions. First, the temporal 
prefix post- would be offensive to millions of people who believe they are 
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living in actual democracies with democratic forms of government and a 
democratic way of life, however flawed and fragile. The words posthuman 
and postmodern are similarly counterintuitive for most people who con-
sider themselves human beings and modern, because alive, and so these 
name tags may only work as shibboleths among academic oligarchs. 
Second, democracy does not typically cower, flee, or hide, and there-
fore to be linked with the noun or adjective fugitive (the connotations 
of which are runaway slaves or convicts) doesn’t compute for ordinary 
people. Finally, the word totalitarianism sounds scary and hyperbolic 
and makes no sense to a card-carrying Democrat living in a wide open, 
unpredictable world that includes wet T-shirt contests, the Internet, 
Tony Hawk, and Sheldon Wolin. Totalize that! As for the word inverted, 
the likely associations are gymnastics or other extreme sports, neither of 
which is doing Wolin’s argument much good. Therefore, despite his over-
all pedagogical clarity, at crucial moments he goes for lame names that 
have no “stickiness” for ordinary people and on the contrary risk being 
a drag or a turnoff.151 This tone deafness is somewhat surprising coming 
from someone who lived in demotic California in the 1960s, but there it 
is. The French would call it déformation professionnelle—one of the dis-
advantages of an elite education and an overly insular professional life 
perhaps.152 
A second explanation is that his “friends” in intellectual circles have 
not been as helpful as they might have been. The words magisterial, mas-
terful, monumental, supreme, and masterpiece are the kiss of death in dem-
ocratic times, as any reader of Tocqueville (DA II, 1) knows.153 Those 
words, decoded by the demos, are saying “forbidding,” “over my head,” 
“not for me,” “I’m not worthy,” “I’d turn back if I were you”—“stop.” In a 
similar vein, being an intellectual “star” openly associated with elite insti-
tutions of higher learning (Berkeley, Princeton) risks harming instead of 
helping in a demoland where a combination of envy and resentment is 
directed toward anyone who thinks. Tocqueville never tires of remind-
ing his reader that thinking presupposes having the time, energy, and 
desire to think and is therefore an activity that, in the mind of the ordi-
nary demolander, places the thinker in a leisure class from which she may 
feel mostly cut off and toward which she may also feel either hostility or 
indifference.154 Anyone who has read Tocqueville knows that publishers 
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who want to sell brainy books in democratic times would be better off 
not advertising the prestigious institutional affiliations of their authors or 
their diplomas, concours victories, or awards.155 
Another hypothesis might be that the book is too long. But demolan-
ders are not put off by big books. Look at The Da Vinci Code or the Harry 
Potter books. Is the book’s subject matter—a hero moving between dif-
ferent worlds, acquiring special powers, witnessing battles between weak 
and strong filled with reversals of fortune—not engaging enough? But 
demolanders love those kinds of stories, just as they are regularly seduced 
by “making of ” supplements to their favorite movies that take them 
“behind the scenes.” So what is it? Why isn’t Tocqueville Between Two 
Worlds a best seller?
Setting aside these marketing questions, we can take a step closer to 
the book itself and ask why Wolin cares about Tocqueville and about 
the importance his writings seem to have had over his long career. First, 
Wolin has an interest in origins and beginnings that is common to many 
researchers (Darwin, Heidegger, Said). Just as with Elster, for whom 
Tocqueville is the first social scientist, Wolin claims “Tocqueville” repre-
sents many firsts. It’s the first time democracy is taken as the central focus 
of a political theory (59), the first time a living democracy’s practical sus-
tainability and not just its formal structure comes in for scrutiny, the first 
time someone advances any serious belief in that sustainability, and the 
first time a major theoretical voice also participates in his country’s politi-
cal life through elective office. Wolin is also convinced that Tocqueville 
“was among the first to sense that modernizing is potentially totalizing” 
(97) and therefore that society could and most likely would in the years 
ahead either be steered toward or away from unfree status, i.e., to more 
authoritarianism or to more liberty.
Following Hannah Arendt (1906–1975), the study of the genesis and 
genealogy of authoritarianism and totalitarianism was common during 
the Cold War, and it has been the central concern of many of Tocqueville’s 
earlier and more recent readers, including Rahe and Heimonet. Wolin, 
who had just graduated from college at the beginning of the Cold 
War, has also written two follow-ups to his big Tocqueville book that 
focus on the dangers of “managed democracy,” “postdemocracy,” and 
“inverted totalitarianism.” They are the second half of the new expanded 
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version of Politics and Vision (2004) and Democracy Incorporated (2008). 
Wolin’s concerns in these later studies build on his early encounter with 
Tocqueville; in a certain sense one could say they have been ghostwrit-
ten by Tocqueville under the shadow of the Cold War, by which I do not 
mean that they are derivative or outdated.156 Wolin’s long professional 
career spans the revolutionary “sixties” and the neoconservative backlash 
that took shape with Ronald Reagan in the 1980s and on into the Internet 
age. Moving with the years as a scholar and a citizen between ancient and 
modern worlds—for example, between the turbulent times of mid-nine-
teenth-century America and Europe and/versus the problematic start to 
the third millennium—I can easily imagine Wolin being spurred on to 
write these two additional pieces before it was too late. They are shorter, 
more declarative, and somewhat testy books written with an urgent indoc-
ile tone. These are characteristics that Wolin shares with Heimonet, Rahe, 
Todd, and Le Strat and Pelletier (and with the post-1848 Tocqueville, 
one might add). Is the older theorist inclined to scramble a bit, thinking 
that time is running out, and not just his own?
In contrast, Wolin’s Tocqueville book, like his early breakthrough 
book Politics and Vision (1960), has an aristocratic calm and patience 
that are similar to the tone set by Agnès Antoine or by the younger 
Tocqueville, especially in those longer, unhurried chapters of DA I. 
Time is not money, and money is no object for at least some scholars 
even in democratic times.157 Wolin takes more time to ask questions in 
the Tocqueville book, and they’re mostly real open questions that stand 
out and genuinely draw in the reader, inviting his participation in the 
thought-journey that’s taking place. In other words, they are not just 
send/reply placeholders, so-called rhetorical questions or leading ques-
tions that allow the master to display knowledge or opinions and catch 
a breath before barreling on with the demonstration. Here’s an example 
taken at random from page 268:
How could Tocqueville recommend American democracy 
to the world while acknowledging that slavery was so deeply 
embedded in American society that he doubted equality 
between the races would ever be realized?
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Compare that with this piece of pseudo-Socratic method on page 285 
of Democracy Incorporated:
How can elite calculation promote demotic irrationality that 
then feeds elite miscalculation? How are elites able to manip-
ulate the demos, shape it into an irrational electorate, and then 
capitalize on it? The answer to both of those questions is this:
The point I want to make is that in the Tocqueville book Wolin is 
more willing to be the midwife of the reader’s own thoughts and his 
own—because the questions are more real and the answers less clear—
whereas in Democracy Incorporated his thoughts are put forward with less 
doubt and more affirmation—take it or leave it.158 
This turn toward the magisterial—the academy’s version of the 
totalitarian state, let’s be clear, where the professor, if he chooses, can 
play the great dictator, the benign despot, the clown, or any combina-
tion of personae—may already be under way in the last chapter of the 
Tocqueville book, “Postdemocracy” (561–572).159 There, less than two 
pages from the end, Wolin asks this question:
… If, as Tocqueville believed, self-government would be 
the crucial loss, how might that loss be concealed or, better, 
sublimated so that it appears to be flourishing? If despotism 
signifies, at the minimum, the destruction of the political in 
its modern form, we need to ask, What was that form? The 
answer is not obscure.
I regret that the answer is not more obscure or open for Wolin, just as 
I regret that he talks about the political in the past tense (“What was that 
form?”), as though it were already gone for Tocqueville and perhaps for 
us. This choice of the past tense leaves him no alternative, it seems, but 
to sign off with a final bitter declarative: “Democracy is perpetuated as 
philanthropic gesture, contemptuously institutionalized as welfare, and 
denigrated as populism” (572). Note how the ternary rhythm gives the 
list an air of exhaustivity—that’s all, folks! How depressing.
Wolin might have made better use of this scorn and mourn technique 
by following it with a repetition of the real question he asked at the end 
of the paragraph just cited (570), like this:
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Currently, democracy is perpetuated as philanthropic gesture, 
contemptuously institutionalized as welfare, and denigrated as 
populism. Who tomorrow will control the meanings of democracy 
and, thereby, its fate?
Not only would this ending have been more in the spirit of 
Tocqueville’s own interrogative mood at the conclusion of DA I and II, 
but it would have left the reader with a real challenge, worthy of his full 
attention and intelligence, because the answer is obscure.160 One of the 
reasons it’s obscure is that one cannot even be sure that it’s only a person 
or group—a “who”—that will control the meanings of democracy.
If Barthes, following Saussure, is right when he says that democracy 
is structured like a language, well, then, that means no one of us is going 
to totally decide on the meaning of democracy and its fate any more than 
Lewis Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty decides on the meaning of individual 
words. The meanings of democracy tomorrow—like the meanings of 
friendship, marriage, love, liberty, equality, art, war, peace, death, life, and all 
the other big subjects that interest most of us (e.g., the Internet)—will 
be decided on by all of us (not each of us), and maybe by some things 
beyond anyone’s will or control.161 Will some individuals or groups have 
more influence than others? Perhaps. But how could we ever predict in 
advance or measure with certainty afterward whose actions had done 
what? Who, for example, could predict that the wintry discontent and 
immolation of a Tunisian fruit seller would change the fate of the Arab 
world? And why did so many think, before this man’s decision to light 
himself on fire, that certain peoples are fated to remain unfree?162 
•
In the final analysis, however, whatever tactical flaws there might be take 
little away from the intrinsic merit of Wolin’s truly grand, not just “fine,” 
achievement. It would again be in Tocqueville’s spirit of paradox to argue 
that those flaws are even “fortunate falls,” since they are instructive and 
also humanize Wolin, thus bringing him closer to the rest of us more 
ordinary mortals. Demolanders may love perfectibility, but they secretly 
hate perfection and are openly hostile to a know-it-all.163 But all carping, 
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paradox, and other inverted figures aside, Wolin’s book is arguably the 
single greatest commentary on Tocqueville ever written.
What’s so great about it? Many things in fact. First, there are “the 
patient, close readings of Tocqueville’s major works”164 and of some 
minor ones such as the prison essay, along with a keen sense of how one 
might think of them as a coherent ensemble.165 Second, there are sub-
stantive but not overwhelming doses of historical background informa-
tion that allow the reader to appreciate the originality and boldness—the 
“material event”—of Tocqueville’s achievements as a writer, as well as 
the complexity and compromises of his political life. Third, the book is 
uncommonly clear, well organized and motivated, and above all interest-
ing. It is a page-turner (!) because Wolin succeeds in laying out a prob-
lem—Where ultimately does Tocqueville stand on democracy?—and relat-
ing it to a multitude of questions that engage us all: Where do I stand? 
where am I going? and my spouse? my kids? their school? my employer? 
my town? my country? my neighbors? These are large matters, and 
Wolin’s Tocqueville book is a very fine guide to thinking about them.166 
Taking these in reverse order we can give an example of each. We have 
already said how real questions addressed simultaneously to the reader 
and to the author are interest-creating, and we can add to that sympa-
thy-creating: they place the reader in collaboration with the author on a 
shared journey of discovery. Here is another example taken from Wolin’s 
discussion of the chapter in DA I that concerns the present and future of 
the three races that inhabit the United States, a chapter that he nominates 
as “at once the lengthiest, the most revealing, and the most enigmatic of 
the entire work” (266):
Was the curse of America not that of egalitarianism driven 
to extremes [producing in its wake extreme individualism, 
extreme materialism and extreme nowism], but something 
within the genius of a people whose vaunted pragmatism 
had allowed them to accept slavery into the original con-
stitution and to trust thereafter in political compromisers 
such as Henry Clay, to put off indefinitely the day of reck-
oning?” (268)
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This is a real question because there is no sign that Wolin has a ready 
answer, and also because it contains within it many important subprob-
lems. How can genius be a curse? Isn’t God what Americans trust in, not 
political compromisers? Was God only a front all along, or did Americans 
lose their way and their nerve—trusting in Clay instead, what a name!—
as Heimonet and Rahe both suggest (each in his own way and each with 
different recommendations about how to recover and repair)?
Wolin’s organizational skills are in evidence with his decision to opt 
for chapters of manageable length with multiple subdivisions that pro-
ceed chronologically through Tocqueville’s life and times. He also offers 
a parallel supplement of bite-size epigraphs that are each referenced, 
thereby allowing the reader to follow up. Unreferenced epigraphs can be 
marveled at like sand dollars, but they risk projecting a haughty, marmo-
real coldness—“Closed”—that may annoy or alienate the ordinary reader 
in democratic times.
Another sympathy-builder is Wolin’s tactful placement of his own con-
tribution within the history of the critical conversation on Tocqueville:
Alexis de Tocqueville made his political and theoretical mark 
in the world as the result of a voyage to America. Modern 
scholars have carefully traced every stage of his journey and 
others have reconstructed in detail the evolution of the manu-
script of Tocqueville’s classic. Little if any attention, however, 
has been given to what might be called the theoretical aura 
surrounding his journey. (34)
Without insulting or bragging, Wolin lets the student who wanders in 
late know she’s welcome, that there is more day to dawn, and she can take 
part in the journey too.
Wolin’s discussion of theory is a good example of an experienced pro-
fessor’s good judgment about how much of the backstory to give. For 
example, in this account of how theory and especially utopian theories 
derive from voyages of discovery:
Beginning early in the sixteenth century, the connection 
between theorizing and journeying acquired an additional 
dimension due to the voyages of discovery that brought 
Europeans into contact with vastly different cultures. The 
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experience, or rather the reported experience, contributed 
to the unsettling of European assumptions about place, 
time, and the possible forms of human organization. As a 
result a quantum leap of the political imagination occurred. 
Mediaeval philosophers had no political utopias. Now, in con-
trast, Europeans could imagine themselves living differently, 
not necessarily by adopting exotic forms of life but by orga-
nizing in a consistent way the “rational” or “natural” possibili-
ties immanent in their own societies.
The word “utopia” (literally “nowhere”) was first coined by 
Thomas More to describe what he called “the best state of the 
commonwealth.” (36–37)
This is smooth sailing for the ordinary reader, because there are few 
things a demolander likes more than to be told some facts that cover a 
lot of ground and order in his mind disparate elements that he had never 
connected before on his own. Wolin gets the job done efficiently here 
and then proceeds to move the reader along through Bacon, Locke, 
Machiavelli, Montesquieu, and others in a way that avoids the reefs 
of superficiality and pedantry and the negative side effects of “great 
men” fatigue.
Examples of Wolin’s sharp textual attention include his two chapters 
(22 and 23) on Tocqueville’s political career: “Souvenirs: Recollections 
In/tranquillity” and “Souvenirs: Socialism and the Crisis of the Political.” 
By keeping the title of Tocqueville’s private political memoir as Souvenirs, 
the reader who knows both French and English can hear the word naming 
both memories and the signifying material tokens a traveler accumulates. 
In these two chapters Wolin demonstrates that while the revolutionary 
events of 1848 may not have been Tocqueville’s finest hour when it came 
to defending the Republican and Christian value of “fraternité” (solidar-
ity), his fears about socialism leading to an expansion of centralized State 
power, and thereby being a threat to his aristocratically tinged concept 
of the political as quintessentially local, had a certain validity. However 
it does also look as though Tocqueville was caught in a contradiction of 
praising popular sovereignty abroad while denying it at home.
A second careful demonstration takes place over the following 
two chapters devoted to The Old Regime and the Revolution. Especially 
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valuable is Wolin’s discussion of Tocqueville’s investment in the “archaic” 
as a means to resist and perhaps check the will-to-level of the modern 
State. Wolin explains:
Usually the archaic refers to a practice or belief that has 
survived the time to which it “properly belongs.” Most of 
Tocqueville’s archaisms derived from the Old Regime, which 
had governed France before the Great Revolution. The princi-
pal archaisms in Tocqueville’s theory were “feudalism,” “aris-
tocracy,” and “political liberty.” As an element in a theoretical 
strategy, archaism aims at unsettling the present, bringing it to 
a temporary pause, insisting that it historicize its self-under-
standing. But the present instinctively resists historicization. 
It wants nothing more than to interpret itself by itself, that is, 
by its own notions and categories, by its own self-confirm-
ing narrative. The intrusion [of the archaic] forces the pres-
ent out of its self-contained hermeneutical circle. Archaism 
can accomplish this effect because, unlike the present, it has 
been stripped of its context. It confronts the present like some 
displaced refugee caught between times and without place. 
Precisely because it cannot represent the abandoned past to a 
present whose identity is staked on the death of the past, the 
archaic trails an odor of death, an unwelcome reminder to the 
present that change not only brings new things into the world 
but causes other things to languish and disappear. The archaic 
forces the modern into self-questioning, slowing the urge to 
totalize. While premodern societies fetishized the past and 
were in constant fear of losing it, modernizing societies seek 
to escape by fetishizing the future. (565–566)
This is well put, but it must be remembered that this is Tocqueville’s 
hopeful vision/version that Wolin is mimicking.167 One may note the 
need to anthropomorphize “the past” and “the present” as signs of the 
strain to tell a coherent narrative. The truth, what may really take place, as 
Wolin goes on to say in the next pages (and seven years later in Chapter 
Seven, “The Dynamics of the Archaic,” of Democracy Incorporated), is that 
two can play at that game; in other words, the force of the archaic is also 
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available for retrofitting and collaborative redeployment by the State (aka 
Superpower, Wolin’s name for the new entity that results from the merger 
of the political and the economic in later modernity). If that happens, 
the resistant, archaic Tocquevilles of the world can be made to fall or 
when necessary be tripped into self-caricature, or flattened into objects 
of unthinking worship or equally unthinking ridicule like Shakespeare’s 
Polonius, Wilde’s Canterville Ghost, or Ishiguro’s butler in Remains of 
the Day (1989), or else be smashed like Winston Smith’s precious paper-
weight in Orwell’s 1984.168 Wolin summarizes the predicament this way:
The vulnerability of democracy-modernity is revealed in its 
drift toward self-caricature: the free but privatized individual 
turns out to be the jargon by which identity conceals from 
itself that it is identical and, as such, the condition of despo-
tism rather than its polar opposite.
Thus democracy is poised to become for our times what 
aristocracy was for Tocqueville’s, the archaic remains of a 
superceded past. Unlike Tocqueville’s aristocracy, however, 
the passing of democracy, if that is what is happening, is not 
being experienced as loss, as entrance into a time of postde-
mocracy, but as freedom from an impossible obligation.
What worries Wolin, and what worried Tocqueville, is that we might 
all end up being thankful to sign over our liberty to Superpower—Phew, 
what a load off my mind!—instead of mourning or resisting its passing. 
This possibility, which Wolin spooks up with the “specter” metaphor169 
in the title of his follow-up book, leads him to ask about three pages later 
the real question that I suggested might have more fittingly been placed 
at the very end. I cite it again this time with the contextualizing lead-in 
sentences that make it all the more understandable and engaging for the 
ordinary reader:
The modern political was expressed as the concept of popu-
lar sovereignty, the idea that the citizenry should rule. That 
idea, however, assumed a politically engaged citizenry capa-
ble of disinterestedness. Without that assumption, democ-
racy becomes all-purpose, infinitely plastic, and the question 
Tocqueville’s Commentators 147
becomes, Who controls the meanings of democracy and, 
thereby, its fate? (570)
As I’ve already said, if the goal is to “nurture the civic conscience of 
society” and thereby ordinary popular sovereignty and the real advan-
tages that can come from a democratic regime, I don’t think it’s produc-
tive to scare the reader (or oneself) with the idea that an anthropomor-
phic Superpower is calling all the shots, any more than it would be useful 
or true to say that we are more or less all decultured hollow men living in 
solitary confinement under the surveillance of some Superwarden, like at 
the American prisons Tocqueville visited and perversely recommended 
imitating in his government report (see Wolin’s Chapter Twenty, “The 
Penitentiary Temptation”). Those who agree will prefer to let the ques-
tion hang in the air—Who controls the meanings of democracy and, thereby, 
its fate?—and recall the possible effect of the smallest “Yip” or “Yop,” the 
serendipity of the Tocqueville Paradox, and the chance of unintended 
consequences. This is not a recommendation that we renounce delib-
eration and choice and let “invisible hands” or “forces” do all the work. 
Perhaps better than anyone since Tocqueville himself, Wolin recalls for 
us the high stakes and the infinite responsibility of the task before us. The 
presence of the past, to use his phrase, and the whole arc of Wolin’s proj-
ect are clearly stated in the last paragraph of his Introduction:
A broad aim of this volume, then, is to use Tocqueville’s ideas 
as (con)texts for reflecting upon the passage of liberal society 
from early to late modernity. There is an important sense in 
which Tocqueville was engaged in a lifelong task of retriev-
ing a receding aristocratic past in order to counteract the new 
forms of despotism. One possible task for today’s theorist is 
to ponder his example and to undertake the task of retriev-
ing a receding democratic present in order to counteract even 
more novel forms of despotism. (9)
The task: to retrieve a receding democratic present. Keeping in mind 
Wolin’s lesson that “theorist” means traveler and witness, it should be 
stressed that he is inviting each and every one of us to take up the task of 
retrieving democracy, and not merely an avant-garde of “brainworkers” 
(Orwell) as the elitist, professional-managerial-academic connotation of 
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that word theorist might suggest. What the world needs now, says Wolin 
at the end of the expanded version of Politics and Vision (606), is a dis-
cordant, dissonant democracy—because the former project of reconcili-
ation between community and authority has been largely bulldozed by 
Superpower and won’t be able to be salvaged until communities dig out 
from beneath the rubble and rebuild. “There’s a place for us,” sing Tony 
and Maria in two-part harmony during the height of the Cold War (West 
Side Story, 1957, 1961)—a democracy composed of public-spirited ama-
teurs and professionals, ordinary and extraordinary individuals whose 
diverse talents, dispositions, and types of intelligence are aggregated in 
ways that welcome open debate, pursue projects of common interest, and 
avoid unrepairable mistakes.
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100. My definition of research is borrowed from Wayne Booth et al., The Craft of 
Research, 3rd edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).
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101. It is easy to imagine Rahe awaiting further confirmation of his diagnosis of a 
“French disease” and welcoming any bad news out of France (such as capital 
flows out of the country or wealthy citizens self-deporting to flee steep tax 
increases) in the wake of center-right Nicolas Sarkozy’s defeat on May 6, 
2012, and the victory of center-left François Hollande, who is France’s first 
Socialist president since François Mitterrand (1981–1995). For another 
Schadenfreude-tinged profile of Nicolas Sarkozy and France in the run-up to 
the 2012 presidential election, see Philip Gourevitch, “No Exit: Can Nicolas 
Sarkozy—and France—Survive the European Crisis?” New Yorker, December 
12, 2011, 46–61. 
102. On the French historian and politician François Guizot (1787–1874), see 
Pierre Rosanvallon, Le Moment Guizot (Paris: Gallimard, 1985).
103. For a comparative study of the father-son relationship, see R. R. Palmer, 
ed., The Two Tocquevilles, Father and Son: Hervé and Alexis de Tocqueville 
on the Coming of the French Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1987).
104. See Tocqueville’s differentiating remarks in his Introductions to the 
first and twelfth editions of Democracy in America and the early chapters 
on the “configuration,” “point de départ,” and “état social” specific to 
North America.
105. On paranoia and politics, see Richard J. Hofstadter, “The Paranoid Style in 
American Politics,” Harper’s Magazine, November 1964, 77–86. This essay 
has received much attention in recent years. See George Packer, “Populism 
and Paranoia,” New Yorker, March 24, 2009, and “More Paranoia,” March 
27, 2009. The Hofstadter essay is accessible here: <http://www.harpers.org/
archive/1964/11/0014706>. And there is a 2008 Random House/Vintage 
reissue with Foreword by Sean Wilentz.
106. See Tocqueville’s comparison of life on the two banks of the Ohio River in 
Kentucky versus Ohio that evolves into a detailed comparison of life in slave 
states versus the free soil North: DA I, 2, 10, 459–480.
107. Worry about the soft despotism of an “imperial presidency” starting with 
the Franklin D. Roosevelt “administration” sparked the Twenty-second 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (enacted in 1951) establishing term 
limits—two four-year terms. Since then, similar allegations have fueled 
angry efforts to use the courts and Congress to undo many New Deal reforms 
perceived by Orwell- and Tocqueville-influenced conservatives as symptoms 
of the evil of “big government.”
108. I translated this book for Columbia University Press in the first three 
months of 2003.
109. In the wake of the Arab Spring, Todd published a news analysis interview he 
gave under the title Allah n’y est pour rien (2011)—Allah has nothing to do with 
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it. His most recent book, in collaboration with Hervé Le Bras, is L’Invention 
de la France: Atlas anthropologique et politique (Paris: Gallimard, 2012)—an 
update of their earlier 1981 publication entitled L’Invention de la France. 
110. Mike Burry is one of the short sellers featured in Michael Lewis’s best-
seller The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine (New York: Norton, 2010). 
For a summary, see Michael Lewis, “Betting on the Blind Side,” Vanity 
Fair, April 2010.
111. See Thomas Friedman, “A Theory of Everything (Sort Of),” New York 
Times, August 13, 2011. Todd could be seen as a French version of Thomas 
Friedman, Amy Chua, or Malcolm Gladwell. Like these three, he spends 
considerable time thinking about big trends, the rise and fall of civilizations, 
and tipping points. For representative works of these three, see Thomas 
Friedman, Hot, Flat, and Crowded (2008); Amy Chua, Day of Empire: How 
Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance—and Why They Fall (2007); Malcolm 
Gladwell, The Tipping Point (2000).
112. “Au rythme où évolue actuellement la philosophie politique, les intellectuals 
de tradition démocratique vont bientôt regretter le tocquevillisme banal.”
113. “Mais si Tocqueville a aujourd’hui plus d’héritiers que de contradicteurs, 
c’est aussi pour quelques thèses banales, dont celle d’une égalité menaçante 
pour la liberté, ou celle d’un individualisme qui tend à se contredire elle-
même.” This sentence ends with the footnote that refers the reader interested 
in knowing more about the “increasing power of tocquevillisme” to the 
“excellent book” by Claire Le Strat and Willy Pelletier, La Canonisation 
libérale de Tocqueville. Rahe also recommends this book (337, 54n) “to get a 
sense of the sources of resistance in France to learning from Tocqueville”, i.e., 
as a further symptom of the harmful French disease Rahe has diagnosed.
114. “Il n’en a eu que plus de mérite d’avoir accepté, du bout des lèvres, l’inévitabilité 
de la démocratie” (85). The lips metaphor here is supposed to convey the 
idea of someone accepting something with resistance, as though it were 
an unpleasant food or medicine, like cod-liver oil, perhaps. In English 
the expression “while holding his nose” is perhaps more common. The 
more standard view is that Tocqueville did not resist the advent of greater 
equality, except during the revolutionary events of 1848 when he opposed 
what he considered to be socialist extremism, and he accepted the idea of 
popular sovereignty and expressed his preference for liberal democracy 
though, as I have argued, he was ready to accept democratic tyranny, so-
called soft despotism, if the only alternative was old-fashioned “sticks and 
stones” tyranny.
115. “On n’apprend pas à lire pour être l’égal des autres, pour être un 
‘individu démocratique,’ mais pour être un individu mieux formé 
intellectuellement” (86).
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116. Or be their own Descartes, as Tocqueville observes in the opening chapter 
to DA II, “De la méthode philosophique des Américains,” G483: “America, 
then, is one of the countries in which Descartes is studied least but his 
precepts are respected most”—especially with the American’s habit of relying 
“solely on the unaided effort of his own individual reason.”
117. The phrase “force and fraud” comes from Thorstein Veblen’s The Theory of 
the Leisure Class (1899), a serious parody of the West’s tradition of grand 
theorizing about the history of civil society and man’s alleged “progress.”
118. Another example would be Joshua Mitchell’s The Fragility of Freedom: 
Tocqueville on Religion, Democracy, and the American Future (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995). The colon is absent on the cover but 
appears on the Library of Congress publication data page.
119. In these two excerpts from her Introduction and Conclusion one gets the 
drift of Antoine’s singular project: Introduction, p. 7: “En ce début du XXIe 
siècle, ou pour le dire autrement, depuis la chute du mur de Berlin qui a mis 
fin symboliquement, au siècle précédant, la pensée de Tocqueville jouit tant 
en France qu’en Amérique d’un engouement général.” Conclusion, p. 350: 
“Contre ceux qui veulent poser les conditions de ce qu’il est permis d’espérer, 
[Tocqueville] essaie de préserver la possibilité d’espérer ce qui n’est pas 
encore permis.” “Here at the beginning of the twenty-first century, or, to put 
it differently, since the fall of the Berlin Wall that symbolically put an end to 
the previous century, there is a general passion for Tocqueville’s thought both 
in France and America. (…) Against those who want to set the conditions of 
what is permissible to hope for, [Tocqueville] tries to preserve the possibility 
of hoping for that which is not yet permitted.” 
120. For a second opinion, see the book review by Cheryl B. Welch in French 
Politics, Culture & Society 23:2 (Summer 2005): 145–148. Welch is also 
the author of the monograph De Tocqueville (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001).
121. It is as though Antoine were saying, “No animals were harmed in the making 
of this book”—because she is the rock and not a fur trader. The painting is 
Fur Traders Descending the Missouri (1845) by George Caleb Bingham (New 
York: Metropolitan Museum).
122. The back cover states that Jon Elster (1940–) holds the Chair of Rationality 
and Social Sciences at the Collège de France. This is one of France’s most 
prestigious institutions of learning, comparable to the Académie Française, 
to which Tocqueville was elected on December 23, 1841.
123. See the news article by Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Shy U.S. Intellectual Created 
Playbook Used in a Revolution,” New York Times, February 16, 2011.
124. The concept of “unintended consequences,” the idea that there are outcomes 
that are not the outcomes of purposeful action, is often said to have 
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originated with Bernard Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Publick 
Benefits (1705, 1714). An earlier source may have been the thought behind 
Christ’s pronouncement “Father, forgive them, for they know not what they 
do” (Luke, 23:34 KJV). The concept gained wider circulation during the 
Scottish Enlightenment in the writings of Adam Smith (A Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, 1759; The Wealth of Nations, 1776) and in Adam Ferguson’s An 
Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767). The notion received its modern 
name and scholarly attention in the twentieth century starting with the 
American sociologist Robert K. Merton in his essay “The Unanticipated 
Consequences of Social Action” (1936). Merton also developed related 
concepts, such as “the self-defeating prophecy” and “the self-fulfilling 
prophecy,” that have become standard sociological tools. Elster’s claim is 
that Tocqueville intuited and used many of these tools to understand social 
phenomena such as democracy in America and the French Revolution.
125. These include the blending and bending of real and ideal, life and literature. 
Perhaps more than other human species, demolanders carry out Nietzsche’s 
call to live one’s life as a work of art—with all the attendant thrills and 
agonies. On conflicts between the humanities and social sciences, see David 
A. Hollinger’s book review of Bruce Mazlish’s The Uncertain Sciences (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), “Running To and Fro,” New York Times, 
May 23, 1999. See also Gary Gutting, “How Reliable are the Social Sciences?” 
New York Times, May 17, 2012; and Jim Manzi, Uncontrolled: The Surprising 
Payoff of Trial-and-Error for Business, Politics, and Society (New York: Basic 
Books, 2012).
126. It is plausible that Tocqueville’s wide reading brought him into contact 
with the innovative theories of Pierre-Simon de Laplace (1749–1827) 
on statistics, probability, and Newtonian physics—especially the less 
technical versions that he wrote up in Exposition du système du monde (1796) 
and Essai philosophique sur les probabilités (1814). Raymond Boudon raises 
the possibility of this link in his discussion of Tocqueville’s thoughts on 
necessity and chance (20–26). My point is that Tocqueville may have become 
attuned to the explanatory power of statistics applied to a given sphere of 
activity without being aware of the actual numbers themselves. He may 
also have been stirred by Laplace’s famous relegation of God to the status 
of a “hypothesis.” For a discussion of Laplace in the context of American 
pragmatism, see Chapter Eight, “The Law of Errors,” in Louis Menand’s The 
Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 2001), 177–200.
127. Elster, 145. Elster does not mention The Wisdom of Crowds (2004) by James 
Surowiecki, but they’ve hit on the same phrase to explore similar questions 
about group intelligence and group decisions. See the Wikipedia entry 
“Wisdom of the Crowd” for additional bibliography.
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128. This discussion in DA I, 2, 5, takes place in a subsection appropriately titled 
“On American Democracy’s Power Over Itself ”—“Du Pouvoir qu’exerce en 
général la démocratie américaine sur elle-même” (317–319). The “en général”—
generally, in general, i.e., not all the time—is lost in Goldhammer’s 
translation and others. This is a pity since Tocqueville’s point here is that 
democracy’s mastery is not total, and it is able and willing to make nonfatal 
mistakes because it is a somewhat childlike regime that knows it learns best 
from trial and error. Remember Manzi’s title, Uncontrolled: The Surprising 
Payoff of Trial-and-Error for Business, Politics, and Society. 
129. See the useful Chronology in Goldhammer, especially pages 898–904.
130. Elster, 184. Talcott Parsons (1902–1979) was an influential American 
sociology professor at Harvard University from 1927 to 1973. Three of his 
major theoretical works are The Structure of Social Action (1937), The Social 
System (1951), and Toward a General Theory of Action (1951).
131. Google “Tocqueville” and you will find among the top-listed links 
Tocqueville.com, a New York–based asset management company, and 
Tocquevillefinance.fr, its French partner.
132. Heimonet’s Tocqueville book is searchable at Google books.
133. La Démocratie en mal d’altérité: Masse et terreur, réflexions sur l’informe du 
pouvoir moderne (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2003); Les Deux faces du terrorisme 
et l’autodéstruction des sociétés ouvertes (Paris: Éditions Kimé, 2005); La 
Raison démocratique dans les limites du religieux: Terreur intellectuelle et l’âge 
postmoderne (Nantes: Éditions Cécile Defaut, 2007).
134. Three of Bataille’s most influential texts are L’Expérience intérieure (1943), La 
Part maudite (1949), and L’Érotisme (1957).
135. For a recent study of the uniting and dividing forces behind religious beliefs, 
see Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by 
Politics and Religion (New York: Pantheon, 2012). For an example of the 
French interest in the subject of care, see Fabienne Brugère, L’Éthique du 
“care” (Paris: PUF: Que sais-je?, 2011), as well as Brugère’s meditation on 
revitalizing French democracy, Faut-il se révolter? (Paris: Bayard, 2012). 
Recent French interest in “care” and caring (about relationships especially, 
such as those fostered by democracy) has been partly inspired by the belated 
French discovery of the work of American feminist and ethicist Carol 
Gilligan, especially her groundbreaking study In a Different Voice (1982), 
which appeared in a French translation only recently as Une voix différente: 
Pour une éthique du care (Paris: Flammarion, 2008). Another classic study 
along these lines that exists in Italian but not in French translation is Robert 
Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American 
Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, 1996, 2008). See also 
Robert Bellah et al., The Good Society (1992).
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136. Claude Lefort (1924–2010), a French philosopher and political scientist, 
wrote a dozen books, the most well known being L’Invention démocratique 
(1981) in which he specified the crisis and chance of democracy to be that it 
is a “lieu vide”—an empty or open space. Heimonet summarizes it himself on 
page 174: “Or ce vide fait tout en un leur malheur et leur chance.”
137. Among their many books, see Benjamin Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld: Terrorism’s 
Challenge to Democracy (1995), Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a 
New Age (1984); Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech 
(1993), Going to Extremes: How Like Minds Unite and Divide (2009).
138. Abraham Lincoln (1809–1865) was only four years younger than 
Tocqueville, Napoleon III (1808–1873) three years younger. Andrew 
Jackson (1767–1845) was five years older than Tocqueville’s father, Hervé 
(1772–1856).
139. See the Wikipedia entry for the controversial Russian rock band 
“Pussy Riot.”
140. See the Wikipedia entry “Compulsory Voting” for an outline of the 
arguments in favor and against and a list of countries that practice 
compulsory voting.
141. Veblen called this “the instinct of workmanship.”
142. See DA I, 2, 7, 352–355; G292–295, “On the power that the majority in 
America exerts over thought.”
143. DA I, 2, 7, 355, G295. See also DA I, 353, G293: “Je ne connais pas de pays où 
il règne, en général, moins d’indépendance d’esprit et de veritable liberté de 
discussion qu’en Amérique.” [I know of no country where there is in general 
less independence of mind and true freedom of discussion than in America.] 
Note here again Tocqueville’s use of en général, which has the effect of 
moderating his claim somewhat.
144. I am borrowing the terms subversive and conservative here to link up with the 
observations of the cultural critic Neil Postman (1931–2003) in two of his 
most well-known books, Teaching as a Subversive Activity (1969, with Charles 
Weingartner) and Teaching as a Conserving Activity (1979). His Wikipedia 
entry gives more bibliography and links, including one to a 1990 speech 
entitled “Informing Ourselves to Death” that has lost none of its relevance in 
the Internet Age.
145. An example in France that regularly divides “Left” and “Right” is the debate 
around the advisability of a “collège unique,” i.e., a common curriculum 
policy for French middle schoolers that has existed since 1975. See the 
documents assembled here: <http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.
fr/dossiers/college-unique/index.shtml> and these two comments 
by a collective, < http://www.millenaire3.com/uploads/tx_ressm3/
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College_unique.pdf>, and by François Dubet, an outspoken defender of 
the “collège unique” policy and an opponent of early tracking: <http://
www.scienceshumaines.com/menace-sur-le-college-unique-rencontre-
avec-francois-dubet_fr_27203.html>. This debate (common core 
curriculum versus tracking; socialization versus individualization, etc.) is 
likely to heat up in the coming years, in France and elsewhere, as part of a 
general reexamination of the methods and aims of all schools in the global 
Internet Age.
146. For Heimonet’s discussion of Barthes, see pages 23–24 and 373–377. See 
Roland Barthes, “Saussure, le signe, la démocratie” (1973), in L’Aventure 
sémiologique (Paris: Seuil / Points essais, 1985), 221–226.
147. See MLA president Russell Berman’s 2011 call to resist the contemporary 
“counterenlightenment.” See DA II, 59, for Tocqueville’s warning about 
the high price to be paid for allowing the “lights” to go out: “Si les lumières 
qui nous éclairent venaient jamais à s’éteindre….” Emerson also uses the 
familiar light metaphor in “The American Scholar” essay when discussing the 
proper use of books in dark “idle times”: “But when the intervals of darkness 
come, as come they must,--when the sun is hid and the stars withdraw their 
shining,--we repair to the lamps which were kindled by their ray, to guide our 
steps to the East again where the dawn is” (The Portable Emerson, 57). For a 
contemporary example of this relighting of extinguished lamps, see Andrew 
Delbanco, College: What It Was, Is, and Should Be (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2012).
148. Besides writing six hundred pages on Tocqueville, Sheldon S. Wolin 
(1922–) is the author of The Presence of the Past: Essays on the State and the 
Constitution (1989), Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western 
Political Thought (1960, 2004 expanded edition), and Democracy Incorporated: 
Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism (2008; 2010, 
with a new Preface by the author). The last two have been translated into 
both Spanish and Italian. His work has also been the subject of a volume 
of scholarly essays, Democracy and Vision: Sheldon Wolin and the Vicissitudes 
of the Political, ed. Aryeh Botwinick and William E. Connolley (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2001). 
149. Wolin has tried to broadcast his educational message about the need “to 
nurture the civic conscience of society” (Politics and Vision, 606) in many 
ways, including on YouTube; but extracts from his conversations with Bill 
Moyers, for example, have been viewed less than 10,000 times, despite 
Wolin’s eloquence and the relevance of his topic.
150. None of the contributors in the volume dedicated to Wolin’s work (Democracy 
and Vision) is French. Symmetrically, of the eight prominent contributors to 
an ostensibly inclusive well-informed volume of essays entitled Démocratie, 
dans quel état? (Paris: La Fabrique, 2009) only the two Americans, Wendy 
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Brown and Kristin Ross, make use of Wolin. Wolin’s early essay “Archaism 
and Modernity” (Tocqueville Review n. 7 [1985–1986]: 77–88)—a testimony 
to the long maturation of his ideas about Tocqueville (despite his near 
total absence from Politics and Vision)—was not included in the “best of ” 
25th anniversary collection of that journal. His absence from some French 
Tocqueville books is to be expected, but it is somewhat surprising in the case 
of Antoine and Boudon, for example, who clearly are familiar with the work 
of some other American Tocqueville scholars. Rahe in his characteristic 
thoroughness notes the existence of Wolin’s Tocqueville book, which he 
dubs “fine,” but in the same sentence he slams Wolin for being “too wedded 
to the shibboleths of the 1960s to be able to properly consider the present 
discontents in light of the Frenchman’s analysis” (339, n1) Rahe’s comment 
would have been more useful to the reader if he had identified those 
“shibboleths” (i.e., code words that identify and unify a group) and if he had 
specified what individuals or groups are behind his own coded reference to 
“the present discontents.” If Heimonet has read Wolin, with whom he has 
so much in common, both thematically and rhetorically, he is keeping it to 
himself—and vice versa.
151. A more felicitous Wolin creation is the term managed democracy, which has 
caught on, perhaps thanks to its slightly Orwellian oxymoronic quality. 
Managed democracy is the term used approvingly by Vladislav Surkov to 
describe Putin’s Russia in two recent New Yorker articles. See David Remnick, 
“The Civil Archipelago: How Far Can the Resistance to Vladimir Putin Go?” 
New Yorker, December 19 & 26, 2011, 95–108, especially page 107; Julia Ioffe, 
“The Master and Mikhail: Are Putin and Prokhorov Running for President 
against or with Each Other?” New Yorker, February 27, 2012, 40–45, page 41. 
“Managed democracy”—“a postmodern system that includes elements of 
autocracy, democracy, and sheer brutalism,” says Remnick—describes well 
the whole technocratic movement that seeks, for example, to replace elected 
mayors with appointed “city managers.” Another Wolin term that may catch 
on is Superpower without the Cold War article the or a. “Superpower” puts a 
new anthropomorphized twist on a familiar concept, and the capital S links 
in with the longtime French custom of referring to an anthropomorphized 
governmental/administrative apparatus as the State. In place of “fugitive 
democracy,” Wolin’s “discordant democracy” might be more successful; in 
place of “inverted totalitarianism” perhaps “the new totalitarianism” (TNT). 
I would avoid “soft totalitarianism” because TNT follows the policy of “speak 
softly but carry a big stick” and is hard when it needs or wants to be, such as in 
Guantanamo or Bagram. The long-term success or failure of these neologisms 
is unpredictable.
152. See William Deresiewicz, “The Disadvantages of an Elite Education,” 
American Scholar (Summer 2008), referenced in Andrew Delbanco’s op-ed, “A 
Smug Education?” New York Times, March 8, 2012.
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153. Cornel West’s use of the word magisterial to characterize Manning Marable’s 
biography Malcolm X: A Life of Reinvention (New York: Penguin, 2011) does 
not augur well for the sales of that book.
154. One need only think of the desired comic effect when the American tourist 
in Paris poses mockingly next to Rodin’s famous sculpture depicting 
cerebral effort.
155. In meritocratic France, however, it is common for publishers to name on the 
back cover the university that the author graduated from as well as concours 
achievements and other honors and titles. See, for example, Yvan Elissalde, 
Du Silence: L’homme et ses prosopopées (Bordeaux: Presses Universitaires 
de Bordeaux, 1997)—“Yvan Elissalde, né en 1965, ancien élève de l’École 
Normale Supérieure, Agrégé de philosophie, Docteur de l’Université Paris-
Sorbonne, enseigne actuellement au Lycée de Blaye.”
156. Overall, Wolin is both a sympathetic and resistant reader of Tocqueville. 
He admires strengths, but does not hold his tongue about what he considers 
to be troubling moments in Tocqueville’s writings and actions, notably his 
recommendation of “tough love” in the prison essay and his problematic 
resistance to socialism in the 1848 period. Wolin resists falling under 
Tocqueville’s spell, while casting a few of his own, perhaps inadvertently.
157. Two other examples would be Wayne C. Booth (1921–2005), who published 
his breakthrough book The Rhetoric of Fiction (1961) when he was forty, and 
Angus Fletcher (1930–), who published Allegory: The Theory of a Symbolic 
Mode (1964) when he was thirty-four. Fletcher also published A New 
Theory for American Poetry: Democracy, The Environment, and the Future of the 
Imagination (2004) at age seventy-four.
158. In this respect Wolin’s later rhetoric is not so unlike Rahe’s, though they 
offer very different diagnoses of “democracy’s drift.” This might be an 
example of what Cass R. Sunstein calls “group polarization.” See his Going 
to Extremes: How Like Minds Unite and Divide (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009). This is a book-length expansion of an early Sunstein essay, 
“Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes,” Yale Law Journal 
110:71 (2000): 71–119.
159. In the French university setting, a lecture course is called a “cours magistral.”
160. It is worth recalling Tocqueville’s challenging address to the reader in the 
rousing Introduction to DA I, 60, G6: “Where are we headed, then? No one 
can say, because we have no basis for comparison.” And yet everyone has a 
say, because in a democracy, meanings (sens) and directions (sens) are not 
determined vertically, from high to low, but horizontally by all stakeholders.
161. On the question “Who controls the Internet, and, thereby, its fate?” see 
Vinton Cerf, “Keep the Internet Open,” New York Times, May 24, 2012. See 
also Carl Bildt’s celebration of a recent resolution endorsed by the United 
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Nations Human Rights Council, “A Victory for the Internet,” New York Times, 
July 5, 2012.
162. On France’s blindness to the Arab Spring, see, for example, Pierre Vermeren, 
“Printemps arabe: Pourquoi la France s’est aveuglée,” Libération, February 17, 
2011, 22: “Having built so many myths in partnership with authoritarian and 
corrupt Arab elites, the French ended up believing in them: Arabs, Berbers, 
Kurds, Persians can only be governed by force. Dictatorship is a necessary 
evil that alone will permit the transformation of these societies at some future 
time. For now, the irrationality, religiosity, and chronic violence of these 
peoples necessitates an authoritarian government!” (my translation).
163. Besides Tocqueville’s observations on demoland envy in DA I, 2, 5, see the 
prizewinning study by Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American 
Life (New York: Knopf, 1962).
164. This is an excerpt from Thomas Pavel’s review in the Wall Street Journal 
quoted on Amazon.com’s sales page for this book.
165. As far as that coherence extends. Wolin is not silent about the questionable 
coherence of Tocqueville’s praise of the process of mastering and taming 
(dompter) prisoners, especially the use of solitary confinement, a form of 
lawful tyranny that needs to be compared with Tocqueville’s account of 
the death-in-life solitude of the dissident writer who transgresses majority 
opinion in democratic societies (cited above, DA I, 2, 5, 294, and DA 
I, 2, 7, 354).
166. I am purposely echoing here the large questions Tocqueville addresses to his 
readers in the Introduction to DA I: “Where are we headed, then? No one can 
say, because we have no basis for comparison…. [G6] Where, then, do things 
stand?… [G13] Has every other century been like this one? Has man always 
confronted, as he does today, a world in which nothing makes sense? In 
which virtue is without genius and genius without honor? In which the love 
of order is indistinguishable from the lust of tyrants? In which the sacred cult 
of liberty is confounded with contempt for the law? In which conscience casts 
but an ambiguous light on the actions of men? In which nothing any longer 
seems forbidden or allowed, honest or shameful, true or false? [G13]”
167. In Democracy Incorporated (118) Wolin elaborates on this definition of the 
archaic and distinguishes it from the relic, which is dead. The archaic is living 
on, ghostlike, a “presence of the past” that is hard to master and therefore 
potentially subversive.
168. Wolin’s chapter on the “Dynamics of Archaism” in Democracy Incorporated 
shows how the archaic can either resist the present, as one would intuitively 
expect, or oddly consent to the futurist, permanently revolutionary “new” 
program of Superpower. Wolin would be providing here a different, perhaps 
more compelling answer to Thomas Frank’s question, What’s the Matter 
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with Kansas? (2004). An important moment in the chapter is Wolin’s halt 
to ask a real question: “The Question: is the archaic ultimately antithetical 
to a power-and-profit regime and its technology of continuous innovation; 
or is the archaist’s dedication to the timeless implicitly exploiting the 
intolerableness of existence under the reigning mania for the new; and 
is its political support for Superpower a tactic, a way of hurrying society 
toward the apocalypse?” (121–122). That, it seems to me, is a real question. 
The strategies of suppression and exclusion, which include the dismissive 
rhetorical question and ridicule as two tactics among others, are directed 
against the threat represented by the archaic. Other examples would include 
the need to turn Thoreau, a man who embraced the archaic against the 
onslaught of the market-, tech-, and transportation revolutions of his day, into 
an eccentric figure of fun or into the hero of a children’s story that represents 
him as a bear, not a man (see D. B. Johnson, Henry Hikes to Fitchberg [New 
York: Houghton Mifflin, 2000]); or Robert Frost, whose embrace of the 
archaic during the time of the rise of the military-industrial complex is 
neutralized by turning him into a harmless, grandpa figure writing nature 
poems in a cozy place called Bread Loaf. Similar attempts at suppression 
of the archaic elements in Wordsworth, Emerson, Ruskin and Morris, and 
others uneasy about “keeping up with the times” (in French, “vivre avec son 
temps”—see Yasmina Reza’s play Art [1994]) could be recounted.
169. Jacques Derrida also had recourse to this metaphor for his title Spectres de 
Marx (1993, 2006).

II
Democracy

Chapter 3
“Who controls the meanings of 
democracy and, thereby, its fate?”
Not everyone who is interested in democracy (to build it or block it) 
is necessarily interested in what Tocqueville had to say on the subject. 
Millions of course have never even heard of him. Tocqueville enthusiasts 
may regret this, just as admirers of Freud or Saussure may regret the lack 
of attention accorded to those “founding fathers” by contemporary prac-
titioners in the fields they pioneered. But that’s the way it goes, especially 
in democratic times where memory is faulty, time is scarce, and history 
and the other humanities subjects struggle to remain in the lifeboat of 
the university.
Democracy, however, seems to be on everyone’s mind lately, with 
or without Tocqueville’s help.170 But appearances and perspectives can 
diverge.171 The NGO Freedom House divides the world’s seven billion 
people into three groups according to whether they are living in coun-
tries that are “free” (43%), “partly free” (22%), or “not free” (35%). In 
other words, 57% of the world’s population do not live in an open society 
(it was 61% in 1989) and therefore literally cannot know (in their bones) 
what’s being talked about when democracy comes up for discussion.172 
This was obvious in Tocqueville’s day but is probably overlooked by some 
contemporary authors of books with democracy in the title who may too 
easily assume that their audience has at least a rough idea of the subject. 
My point is the foreignness of democracy should not be underestimated, 
and even those who believe they are living in a fairly open society may 
never have really thought about what democracy means, let alone what 
its history or future might possibly be.173 
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Of those who think, write, or speak about democracy today we can 
identify four main groups. First, those who primarily do statistic gather-
ing and analysis such as Freedom House, Democratic Audit, openDem-
ocracy, Equality Now, and similar policy studies organizations dedicated 
to compiling and disseminating information about democracy and its 
core values (free and fair elections; an open and accountable government; 
civil and political rights; a curious, productive, public-spirited civil soci-
ety). Second, authors of recent studies of democracy, which in English 
would include the work of Stephen G. Breyer, Bernard R. Crick, Robert 
A. Dahl, Larry Diamond, John Dunn, David Held, John Keane, Richard 
A. Posner, Robert Putnam, and Charles Tilly.174 In French, besides 
Emmanuel Todd, there are the books of Fabienne Brugère, Marcel 
Gauchet, Sandra Laugier, Jacques Rancière, and Pierre Rosanvallon, 
who also supervises an important political science website (La vie des 
idées) and a collaborative democracy-analysis project (La république des 
idées) with the publisher Seuil.175 Third, would be the authors of “big 
picture” books for whom democracy is usually an important piece in a 
larger puzzle. These authors are frequently named in lists of the world’s 
top public intellectuals. They include Jacques Attali, Thomas Friedman, 
Jürgen Habermas, Paul Krugman, Kishore Mahbubani, Parag Khanna, 
and Amartya Sen, for example. Their books are easily recognizable with 
bold titles such as How to Run the World or Tomorrow Who Will Govern 
the World? or Can Asians Think? and they regularly turn up at “grand strat-
egy” forums and summits around the world—Davos, WTO, G-20, etc.176 
The fourth group are the rest of us: ordinary people who have never been 
called “whiz kid” or “genius” and who may or may not read, vote, belong 
to a political party or other interest group, sign petitions, write letters to 
leaders or newspapers, demonstrate, or talk about politics at the dinner 
table—and who may or may not even be allowed to do one or more of 
those things under local law and mores. Each of these groups has a differ-
ent amount of power—imprecisely measurable and ever changing in the 
Internet age—when it comes to controlling the meanings of democracy 
and, thereby, its fate.
This last group is in theory the most powerful in a democracy, since 
when it comes to selecting leaders, numbers are supposed to trump other 
criteria (such as family ties, intelligence, wealth, physical strength, or 
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beauty). But in practice we know it does not always work out that way. 
Ordinary people have long been the main concern of the first group of 
fact gatherers, but before the Internet age the information they gathered 
was not readily available and what was collected was exploited mostly by 
elites in government, business, and academia since the information was 
typically stored in large libraries to which only they and a few others had 
access. The main concern of academic elites, whether democracy authors 
or big picture book authors, is more complicated. Whether they care 
more about ordinary people and are writing to them and for them, or 
instead for other elites like themselves, is a real question. Obviously the 
audience one chooses to write for conditions both what one says and how. 
A strong suspicion of a conflict of interest or loyalty disconnect between 
academic elites (who can use the Internet to further amplify their talking 
points) and ordinary people (whose chance to be heard is more hit or 
miss) is probably behind derogatory names for the former, including “the 
chattering classes,” “pointy heads,” or “pundits.” And today “blogosphere” 
competes with “ivory tower” to describe where elites congregate, while 
“academic” is still shorthand for “beside the point, irrelevant.”
And yet in the Internet age the humble fact gatherer and organizer has 
the potential to become much more powerful as the information can be 
relayed more, and in more ways, than when those roles for shaping and 
transmitting were solely in the hands of professors, university presses, 
and librarians. Formerly only eyewitness accounts, whether elite or 
popular, could be relied on as a source of information about facts on the 
ground. Therefore diaries, memoirs, and the narratives of professional or 
amateur historians, as well as literature (poems, plays, narrative fiction) 
and other arts (music, painting, sculpture, photography, cinema), were 
valuable sources to get an idea about what was really going on inside a 
particular regime whether “free,” “partly free,” or “unfree.” But those per-
sonal accounts, whether fiction or nonfiction, Proust or Pepys, still repre-
sented the reality of only a small selection of the overall population even 
if some of them emanated from nonelite sources and news outlets. Today 
that is changing as social networks, e-mail, and other forms of communi-
cation make “broadcasting yourself ” easier and more affordable.
The information gathered and organized at the websites of Freedom 
House, Democratic Audit, and Transparency International, to name just 
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three, is as available to ordinary people with basic computer knowledge as 
it is to elite brainworkers such as Robert Putnam or Pierre Rosanvallon. 
At least in theory. One needs to keep in mind that the two billion richest 
people in the world count six times as many Internet users as the other 
five billion and possess ten times more personal computers.177 The gap in 
cell phones, however, is only three to one, which suggests the upcoming 
potential for larger shifts in power as knowledge becomes more widely 
shareable. This will of course also depend on whether information on 
the Internet remains widely accessible, in other words whether the Web 
becomes more or less democratic, accessible, and “crowdsourced” in the 
years ahead.
The example of Democratic Audit is instructive. This website based at 
the University of Liverpool is a valuable source of information about how 
various countries around the world measure up when it comes to democ-
racy. The nonprofit organization that runs the website was started in the 
years directly following the end of the Cold War when it was clear that 
British democracy was underperforming. Three key founders of the orga-
nization, David Beetham, Kevin Boyle, and Stuart Weir, developed the 
idea of conducting an “audit” of democracy in the United Kingdom in 
the early 1990s in response to a massive social and political problem, and 
an embarrassing one for a country that, along with the United States and 
other so-called Western democracies was supposed to be feeling upbeat 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall. The 
reality, they say, was quite otherwise.
Our starting point has been the widespread sense of unease 
among both the public and political elites about the quality 
of government and public life in the UK and the deteriorating 
relationship between the people and their government. This 
unease is long-standing and cumulative. The public now tend 
to believe that their country is becoming less democratic; 
they want more power than they now have between elections; 
and they have lost confidence and trust in elected politicians. 
There has been a broad gap in the 1990s between people’s sat-
isfaction with their own lives and with public life, politics, and 
democracy in Britain.
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That assessment from the opening page of the first audit, Political 
Power and Democratic Control in Britain: The Democratic Audit of the 
United Kingdom, dates from 1997, the first year of Tony Blair’s decade 
as Labor Party prime minister when hopes were high that “a new rela-
tionship between government and the people, based on trust, freedom, 
choice, and responsibility,” was about to start.178 Since then three more 
audits of democracy in the United Kingdom have been completed (1999, 
2002, 2009), and the practice has been imitated by many other countries 
around the world, but not necessarily by the ones you would expect or 
hope would lead the way. Neither France nor the United States, for exam-
ple, is listed among the countries that have conducted an audit to assess 
people’s power and political equality in those lands. In fact only nine of 
the G-20 countries have done so.179 
The democratic audit of the UK in 2009 provides valuable and eas-
ily accessible information for anyone wishing to better understand, for 
example, the 2011 summer riots in London and other English cities. It 
is worth knowing, for example, that voter participation has declined sig-
nificantly in the UK over the past twenty years (dropping from turnouts 
averaging roughly 75% from 1945 to 1990, to roughly 65% today) and 
that the four lowest postwar turnouts have all occurred since 1997.180 
More troubling are the statistics about who is not voting. The voter 
turnout gap between lower income versus higher income British citi-
zens (55% vs. 75%) signals a sharper disaffection for democratic prac-
tices in the United Kingdom among the part of the population that in 
theory has the most to gain from democracy, such as by voting in favor of 
progressive taxation and the redistribution of private wealth in the form 
of government-subsidized and government-supervised public services 
(notably schools and hospitals) that benefit everyone. Also noteworthy is 
the fact that membership in political parties has fallen from roughly three 
million to less than half a million over the past fifty years. However, other 
forms of political participation—signing a petition, discussing views 
with an elected representative, attending political meetings—while low, 
have remained fairly steady over the past ten years; and membership in 
more special-interest organizations such as nature conservation groups 
has significantly increased. Overall, on the matter of popular participa-
tion, the 2009 UK democratic audit shows (1) a shift away from the more 
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traditional political processes within a representative democracy toward 
more direct democratic involvement and (2) a growing class divide when 
it comes to levels of political involvement.
Unless reversed, the second fact will likely confirm one of the basic 
observations of Tocqueville’s “audit” of American democracy in 1835 
and 1840, namely that extreme inequality renders democracy nearly 
impossible since radically unequal citizens do not have the same interests 
and therefore will see no reason to cooperate freely and fairly in devel-
oping and carrying out projects together (“traiter en commun les affaires 
communes”). It’s worth remembering that democracy in America was 
only possible because of that “new thing” that so struck Tocqueville dur-
ing his nine-month stay: “equality of conditions.” How is it possible to 
make democracy work in an era of expanding inequality of social condi-
tions? That is the question facing Britain’s current prime minister, David 
Cameron, and others who have been looking recently to Tocqueville for 
inspiration to construct a new “Big Society” in the UK with a rejuve-
nated local community spirit.181 In a context of extreme social inequal-
ity, however, one of the necessary conditions for a renewal of democracy 
and peaceful, productive civil society is missing, and it is not surprising 
in such a situation that people are not just indifferent to “politics as usual” 
but revolt against the entire “system” that they no longer believe is work-
ing for them, but on the contrary rigged against them.182 
The tools developed by Democratic Audit allow anyone to better 
understand how that rigging—in both the nautical and negative senses 
of the term—works. A list of eighty-five criteria grouped into six key 
areas—(1) free and fair elections, (2) universal suffrage, (3) election 
of key officeholders, (4) popular control of the political agenda, (5) 
access to alternative sources of information, (6) freedoms of association 
and expression—allow anyone to become an auditor to assess whether 
democracy, i.e., popular control with political equality, really exists and to 
what degree. These questions can be asked on the level of a particular ter-
ritory (city, county, region, nation) or about a social structure within a 
territory such as a school, a company, or another social entity where col-
lective decision making takes place (the United Nations, say, or NGOs 
such as Democratic Audit itself). These criteria allow the auditor to ask 
about how well democracy’s “mediating values” are being upheld. How 
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well does a particular government, school system, or health care net-
work measure up when it comes to the values of authorization (granting 
power), accountability,183 participation, representation, responsiveness, 
solidarity, and transparency? How well does a particular government (1) 
respect the rule of law, (2) combat corruption, (3) protect civil, politi-
cal, economic, and human rights, (4) encourage freedom of the press and 
free association and discourage media monopolies and overly powerful 
special-interest groups, (5) keep the military and police under civilian 
control, and (6) mediate a peaceful coexistence between itself and more 
local as well as more international levels of democratic practice? The 
number and variety of questions can seem daunting (the first democratic 
audit of the UK is over five hundred pages), but asking them and working 
to get answers is essential to those who believe, like the Americans who 
drafted the U.S. Constitution, that establishing “good government from 
reflection and choice” is preferable to yielding to “accident and force” 
(Federalist #1, first paragraph).
Introducing Democracy: 80 Questions and Answers by David Beetham 
and Kevin Boyle (1995) is a more manageable primer for anyone in Cairo 
or Chicago who may have downloaded Gene Sharp’s how-to book, From 
Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation, and 
is now looking for more guidance about how to make democracy work 
once the possibility for its genuine existence has been established.184 
Former Soviet bloc countries such as Hungary and Russia provide clear 
evidence of how ephemeral liberation can be if democracy’s ground rules 
are poorly understood or only understood on paper without the deep 
learning that comes over time from the lived experience of democracy. 
Countries that succeed at the first steps of transitioning from dictatorship 
to democracy need more help when it comes to implementing and sus-
taining democratic practices, such as public debate and accountability, 
and seeing why they matter. They need to not only be persuaded ratio-
nally but experience daily what Tocqueville called “the real advantages” 
of democracy: i.e., (1) that it feels good to live free of arbitrary domi-
nation, (2) that democracy is more effective than other systems at pro-
tecting rights and the rule of law, (3) that democracy advances the well-
being of the greatest number and results in better economic performance 
because it encourages confident entrepreneurship and productivity, and 
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(4) that democracy makes for more pacific national and international 
relations because rational patriotism encourages one to be public-spir-
ited, which eventually means accepting not only that my interests and 
the country’s interests overlap, but that what’s good for the “habitat for 
humanity” (clean air and water, arable soil, stable ecosystems, as well as 
literacy, transparency, individual rights, etc.) is also good for me.
These and other truths about democracy were not at all self-evident 
to many of the peoples suddenly left to their own devices at the end of 
the Cold War. Many witnessed instead a new power grab and the persis-
tence of authoritarian habits, including arbitrary, behind the scenes deci-
sion making with no public accountability; the protection of hierarchical 
privilege; encroachment on other branches of government; widespread 
corruption and secrecy; and violations of civil, economic, and human 
rights.185 Even today, twenty years later, many of these countries are hav-
ing a hard time believing in and caring about making democracy work. 
Some even express nostalgia for their former unfree condition.186 
Nevertheless, it is in everyone’s interest—even that of hardened oli-
garchs, one could argue—to facilitate a more successful and sustainable 
set of transitions from dictatorship to democracy in the Middle East and 
to help countries around the world whose transitions have stalled to find 
solutions to get back on track instead of turning into mafia-like oligar-
chies or slacking off and accepting regression into hopeless servitude.
And then there is the troubling case of the so-called Western democ-
racies. which, instead of leading by example since the end of the Cold 
War, are each guilty of serious infractions of the basic ground rules of 
democratic government.187 Studies documenting extreme inequality, 
election fraud and other forms of corruption, political gridlock, collu-
sion with private corporate interests that disregard wider public interests, 
violations of individual rights, and low accountability have become the 
daily “news” in Western Europe and North America, supposedly democ-
racy’s stronghold.
For all three of these groups—(1) the recent and less recent transi-
tioning countries, (2) backsliders like the UK, the United States, Italy, and 
France, as well as (3) ordinary citizens in countries still vaguely dream-
ing about the possibility of democracy such as Iran or China—reading 
Introducing Democracy is a quick way to get one’s bearings. This thorough 
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and accessible synthesis of all of democracy’s essentials, accompanied by 
attention focusing cartoons by Plantu, “was commissioned by UNESCO 
as part of its programme of education in democracy and human rights” 
and was published “simultaneously in many languages” in the 1990s. I 
have been unable to track down a list of those languages, but I imagine 
many former Soviet bloc Eastern European languages were included. 
One hopes that the volume will appear in Arabic, Farsi, and Chinese if 
it hasn’t already and be more widely read in its original English version, 
because it is arguably the best introduction to democracy available.
There is no need to summarize this already short text (135 pages), but 
it is worth praising some of its decisions and positions. Organizing itself 
as eighty questions was an excellent choice. It engages ordinary readers, 
especially those unfamiliar with democracy either as an idea or an experi-
ence who really want answers to questions such as #13, “Can any country 
attain democratic government?” or #9, “Is a free-market economy nec-
essary to democracy?” and of course #2, “Why should we value democ-
racy?” The eighty questions are divided into five sections that treat (1) 
“Basic Concepts and Principles” (#1–15); (2) “Free and Fair Elections” 
(#16–35); (3) “Open and Accountable Government” (#36–50); (4) 
“Individual Rights and Their Defense” (#51–63); and (5) “Democratic 
or Civil Society” (#64–80). Parts Three, Four, and Five comprise the 
“chief components of democracy” that make up what the authors call 
“the democratic pyramid” (see the figure on page 31).
The succinct, forthright answers to all eighty questions cannot be 
listed here, but a few extracts are worth including as an incitement to fur-
ther reading. In their concluding statement to the opening section, the 
authors note that democratic government is on weak soil if civil society’s 
associations are not themselves organized and operated democratically.
If people are conditioned to authoritarianism in the family, 
the school and the church, and if they have no experience of 
self-organization or co-determination in the workplace, the 
neighborhood and voluntary associations, they are unlikely to 
be active citizens or feel any responsibility for the condition 
of their society at large. (33)
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The view, first put forward by Tocqueville, that democracy must be 
more than a form of government but a way of life that operates to various 
degrees in all contexts of collective decision making is repeated several 
times, notably in question #73, “What role can schools play in education 
for democracy?”
A democratic education involves not only the acquisition of 
knowledge [of the rights and duties of citizenship, for exam-
ple], however, it is also fostered through the experience of 
debate on issues of current importance, of presenting argu-
ments and listening to the views of others, and of sharing in 
collective decisions on matters affecting the life of the school 
and its community, for example through classroom assem-
blies, elected school councils, and so on. (119–120)
In answer to question #23, “Should voting be compulsory?” the 
authors answer diplomatically that “there’s something contradictory 
about making a ‘free election’ compulsory, or requiring more people to 
exercise their ‘rights’” (41), and yet they do see an advantage to making 
registering to vote compulsory since this would allow election organizers 
to “legitimate electoral purposes, such as equalizing the number of voters 
in constituencies, which require a full and accurate return to be made” 
(43). In other words it would help fight gerrymandering, ballot stuffing, 
and other fraudulent schemes.
The authors also make tactful observations about the plurality sys-
tem of voting (also known as “first-past-the-post” or “winner-takes-all”). 
Although having the merit of simplicity, this system ends up exaggerating 
the impression of support for the largest party and is undemocratic since 
some votes are in effect “wasted,” a fact that undermines the basic demo-
cratic principle of political equality. (See #28, “What are the differences 
between electoral systems?” and #29, “What are the advantages and dis-
advantages of these systems?” pp. 50–55.)
What comes back over and over in this introduction to democracy 
is that (1) people need to be able to practice democracy (and not just 
be told about it) in order to care about fostering it and “deepening” it (a 
metaphor used several times); and (2) gross inequality of opportunity 
kills democracy.
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We can conclude this evocation of the pedagogical efforts of Beetham 
and Boyle with their answer to question #58, “How do social and eco-
nomic rights relate to democracy?”
In the democratic pyramid (see question 15), the fundamen-
tal rights which secure employment, housing, food, an ade-
quate living standard, education and other needs are treated 
as constituting the essential foundation of civil society. A soci-
ety where there is widespread hunger can only achieve demo-
cratic politics very imperfectly. The satisfaction of the basic 
human need to survive is a necessary platform if democracy 
is to function. Democratic principles require that each elec-
tor or citizen should have an equal voice. To the extent that 
there is gross inequality in life chances, in access to education 
for example, the democratic potential of a society is severely 
limited. At the same time democracy as a collective process is 
a means whereby such inequalities can be identified and alle-
viated. (100)
The authors’ insistence on democracy as a “collective process” and a 
“means” is worth pausing over because it demonstrates the hopeful note 
that runs through this book. This hope is founded on the belief that while 
some misfortune may be the result of bad luck and accidents, much is the 
result of bad policy, and that bad policies can be identified and replaced by 
better policies. There is the further belief that democratic institutions are 
the best “aggregation mechanism” (Surowiecki) for collective decision 
making by a variety of ordinary, differently talented people because they 
get the best results over the long term. This ties into what Tocqueville was 
getting at when he said democratic peoples had the advantage of making 
“repairable mistakes” because, unlike oligarchy or monarchy or any other 
closed, vertical, conflict-intolerant system of government by the Few over 
the Many, democracy is not opposed to learning from its own mistakes, 
to feedback loops, “error reports,” and whistle-blowers.188 In fact, such 
continuous, collective, self-examination and cross-examination about 
what the public good is and the best means for attaining it is at the heart 
of democratic practice, even if it is often resisted and hard to do.
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This may all sound obvious, and in a sense it is to anyone who has 
given it some thought or had the good fortune of living and working in 
a democratically run town, country, school, or company. But often these 
best practices are neglected or ignored and in many cases have not even 
crossed the minds of those who have never known anything but paternal-
istic, authoritarian rule. The former may possess the theory but lack prac-
tice; the latter lack both—all they’ve ever heard is “My way or the high-
way,” and therefore they have no idea how democracy (public debate, 
listening, testing, compromise, accountability, etc.) works. Introducing 
Democracy and The Democratic Audit of the UK are useful Tocqueville-
brand tools for implementing a new democracy or repairing an old one, 
and both can contribute to sustaining a democracy that works better 
over the long haul, with regular “checkups” and “patches,” than any other 
operating system.
•
According to the Democratic Audit website, only about thirty or so 
countries have followed the UK example and conducted a systematic 
“audit” of democratic practices within their territory. It is disappointing 
but not surprising that France and the United States are not among them. 
Disappointing because they are two countries that have also frequently 
expressed universalist pretensions, claiming to set an example for others 
to imitate; and not surprising since both countries have a history of pride 
and occasional smugness that can blind them to some of their own fail-
ings and leave them touchy about the ones they half recognize. For both, 
acknowledging a possible weakness and following a good idea that comes 
from longtime rival England is not easy to do.189 See Tocqueville on the 
effects of envy and resentment (e.g., DA I, 2, 5)—an important subtext in 
all of his major writings.
The U.S. and France happen to be the two countries I know best, or 
am least ignorant about—having now spent almost equal parts of my 
life in each. When asked how they compare, my reply for the past twenty 
years has been that each is the bad conscience of the other, and I think 
that still holds true today. Americans’ “rugged individualism” (whether 
“manly” self-reliance à la Steve Jobs or stubborn anti-intellectualism à la 
George W. Bush) would seem to prevent them from coming together and 
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agreeing on a set of democratic audit criteria, whether those of Beetham, 
Boyle, and Weir or someone else’s set of indicators. Hence we get the 
Joshua Mitchell audit, the Paul A. Rahe audit, the Sheldon S. Wolin audit, 
the Stephen Breyer audit, and a hundred others all diagnosing “drift” or 
“fragility” or “gridlock” or some other “democracy deficit” for which the 
auditor is often light on workable solutions. These may be well-meaning 
studies motivated by a genuine desire to see the situation improve; but 
they are generally uncoordinated and therefore rather isolated and weak 
and can end up mutually drowning each other out even as they compete 
for attention—a typical scenario in democratic times as noted in DA. 
Moreover, their presentation styles suggest they are not addressing those 
who would derive the most benefits from more democracy, namely ordi-
nary unemployed, underemployed, or overemployed people with kids 
and aging parents to care for; and these first two features (going it alone 
and talking over the heads of ordinary busy people) turn off readers who 
come to doubt an author’s motives (How interested in democracy is he 
really?) and methods (Whatever happened to “treating common things 
in common”?)
The French resistance to a democratic audit is a bit different, since it 
is still far from certain whether a majority of French people really want to 
live democratically in the first place. A paternalistic “guardian” republic 
such as Plato described is good enough for many of them, especially it 
would seem for most elected officials in Paris and the provinces, who are 
mostly all older, white, male career politicians. For centuries France has 
been a country that believes in one-person-one-social-status (in French 
statut social; e.g., peasant, merchant, industrialist, student, soldier, poli-
tician, etc.), and this monolithic essentialism about one’s identity (“Je 
suis dentiste,” for example) runs counter to democracy’s requirement 
that nonspecialist voices not only be tolerated but actively encouraged 
to contribute to collective decision making.190 Not to mention democ-
racy’s approving acknowledgment of the amateur, the semiprofessional, 
the multitalented, multitasking jack-of-all-trades, and his or her openness 
to changing jobs, cities, spouses, etc.191 Except in special circumstances, 
amateurism has negative connotations in France and is rejected as unseri-
ous, “pas sérieux.” Therefore, conducting a democratic audit—a general, 
continuous self-examination that itself comes dangerously close to the 
180 Chapter 3
idea of self-governance—would be conceding too much ground of legiti-
macy and desirability to democracy, and France’s power elite has resisted 
letting that cat out of the bag for over two hundred years.
Hence the rather marginal impact of the numerous pro-democracy 
publishing achievements of Pierre Rosanvallon—in his own name and 
on behalf of collaborators.192 Another symptom is the derision poured on 
the high-ranking Socialist and presidential hopeful Ségolene Royal, who 
had the audacity to call for “participatory democracy” during her losing 
effort against then candidate Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007.193 The expression 
amounted to an admission that France’s brand of democracy is “an empty 
shell, a form without any substance” to borrow Beetham and Boyle’s 
characterization of a state where ordinary people come to see no point in 
democracy, “because it seems to have no relevance to their everyday lives 
and the situations in which they live them” (132). Yet the expression also 
contained within it the affirmation that the French were not fated to live 
in a fake democracy but could, if they cared to, live in a real democracy.
A third symptom of French ambivalence toward democracy is the reg-
ular appearance of publications by individual auditors of the American 
kind—Emmanuel Todd of course, but also Jacques Attali, Nicolas 
Bavarez, and Hervé Kempf, for example—whose books lamenting the 
sad state of governance in France may be found on sale in train stations 
and other popular book outlets for a few months before disappearing in 
the news cycle amid endless political and social scandals, stock market 
news, and talk about sports, vacations, one’s employability (“insertion 
professionnelle”), or retirement (“retraite”), and the weather.194 The grand-
daddy of all such singular auditors was Tocqueville himself, but as I’ve 
already said his comeback or “rediscovery” in France is uncertain at best.
•
For the record, as our own synoptic audit, it may be worth recalling 
some of the highlights in the history of democracy in America since 
Tocqueville’s day. Major influences (negative and positive) on demo-
cratic practices include the following: 
Mass immigration in the 1820s, ’30s and ’40s puts into question the 
social homogeneity that was instrumental in getting democracy off to a 
good start in America. Also, millions of new white males crowd in and 
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push down the socioeconomic aspirations of women, blacks, and Indians 
by blocking or delaying their access to jobs and the public sphere.
The Civil War further puts into question the unity of the country and 
the idea of a "general interest" that applies over the whole territory.195 
However the North’s victory does prove that “the bullet would not 
replace the ballot” when a minority is unsatisfied with the outcome of 
an election. It teaches the minority a lesson about the necessity of being 
a “good loser” under a democratic regime and accepting the role of “loyal 
opposition.” It also reveals that while the “omnipotence of the majority” 
is a real danger, so is the powerlessness of a majority when it faces a divi-
sive and well-organized minority faction capable of disrupting national 
unity and throwing into doubt and disarray the coherent, widely shared 
beliefs and collective aspirations of the Many.196 
The rise of large corporations challenges the democratic state because 
in general they are run autocratically and not democratically, and there-
fore the “work world” increasingly becomes a glaring antidemocratic 
contradiction within American civil society.197 U.S. factory life and the 
time and efficiency management studies known as Taylorism establish 
a despotic state within the state—a situation that resembles the society 
described at the end of DA II, 2, where Tocqueville imagines the lean and 
mean “aristocratic” disposition that the division of labor and scientific 
management techniques could bring about. 
The slow but steady push back by labor unions tries to establish more 
freedom, equality, and “horizontal,” democratic self-governance in oppo-
sition to the vertical corporate hierarchy. Labor unions oppose the corpo-
rate model but could sometimes fall into some of the same bureaucratic 
abuses—rigid hierarchies, lack of transparency, exclusivity—and thereby 
undermine their oppositional legitimacy.198 
There is the steady rise in literacy, the increasing number of high 
school graduates, and the rise of American universities and colleges 
thanks to the land-grant funding system and donations from some corpo-
ration presidents who respond to Andrew Carnegie’s “Gospel of Wealth” 
exhortation.199 Quality schools, colleges, and universities become—like 
the legal community Tocqueville admired—a counterforce that relies 
on literacy and memory and as such is able to moderate the tyranny of 
the majority in the United States, as well as democracy’s penchant for the 
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immediate and the approximate “good enough” solution, by creating a 
mostly benign guild aristocracy that prizes history, planning, precise and 
loving craftsmanship, beauty, and truth and defends academic freedom 
and self-governance through the institutions of teacher unions, tenure, 
peer review, and faculty senates and student councils.200 
These conflicting pressures on democracy (to strengthen or to 
weaken it) are followed in the twentieth century by several governmen-
tal paradigm shifts that all move in the direction of greater equality of 
social condition.
They include the following: FDR’s New Deal (America’s first experi-
ment with European-style “social democracy”) and his defense of the 
Four Freedoms: “Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Worship, Freedom 
from Want, Freedom from Fear.”
The continued increases in literacy and the number of high school 
educated people, and the mass expansion of college educated people 
(which accelerated after 1945 with the G.I. Bill).
Nonviolent resistance movements that result in greater inclusiveness, 
social solidarity, and civil, social, and economic rights victories:
1. For African Americans in the 1960s (Montgomery, Birmingham, 
Selma [AL], Albany [GA], St. Augustine [FL]) thanks to Martin 
Luther King, Jr.’s example and President Johnson’s “Great Society” 
leadership (Civil Rights Act, 1964; Voting Rights Act, 1965).
2. For women in the 1970s and 1980s (despite lingering wage 
inequality, discrimination, sexism, and the still unratified Equal 
Rights Amendment).
3. For homosexuals in the 1990s and 2000s (despite lingering dis-
crimination and the as yet unattained national acceptance of “gay 
marriage” or “marriage equality”).
On the other hand, there are many negative trends that have weak-
ened democracy in America (especially since the 1960s) in the fol-
lowing areas:
Elections: the exaggerated importance of money and paid politi-
cal consultants in election campaigns;201 unlimited donations by cor-
porations and unions;202 negative campaigning; style over substance; 
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personality and celebrity positioning over policy and program politics; 
gerrymandering; irregular and sometimes illegal electoral procedures; 
disparate, unwieldy, and inconvenient voting procedures such as con-
tinuing to hold elections on a workday.203 
Education: federal, state, and local cuts in public education budgets 
for K–12, colleges, and research universities; skyrocketing education 
costs and student debt; widespread attempts to redefine education as a 
private good (to be paid for by the “customer”) instead of a public good 
to be financed to a significant extent collectively through taxes and gov-
ernment spending and supervision.
The press: media monopolies; extremes of overly quiescent or hyper-
aggressive behavior in the media; generalized venality that places private 
profits over public interest; the financial crisis of print media without a 
workable business model in the Internet age; underfunding of investiga-
tive journalism and the homogenizing effect of overreliance for content 
on wire services, press releases, and partisan think tanks and lobbies such 
as the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC).
The state: expanded numbers and powers of nonelected officials in 
career civil service administrations, quasi-nongovernmental organiza-
tions, and subcontractors; multiculturalism’s perpetuation of “sepa-
rate but [not] equal”; the legislative and judicial rollback of “affirmative 
action” for women and disadvantaged minorities and the resistance to 
class-based affirmative action;204 categorical, divisive antigovernment 
rhetoric and behavior since Goldwater and Reagan; tax revolts; low voter 
turnout for general elections and a proliferation of single-issue referenda 
that undercut trust and pride in representative democracy; decline of 
rational patriotism, resurgence of jingoistic patriotism; the abuse of the 
filibuster and other congressional rules (arcani imperi) that cause “grid-
lock”; an unrepresentative, obstructionist Senate; no term limits on 
members of Congress, many state governors, and most judges;205 elective 
judgeships and campaign finance abuses by judges.
The economy: lack of supervision of corporate America and Wall 
Street; deregulation; weakening of labor laws and denigration of unions; 
low accountability to customers and clients; the stagnation of incomes of 
the American middle class since the 1970s; sharp declines in U.S. fam-
ily assets since 2007;206 the spread of “unpaid internship” scams; mostly 
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silent acceptance of “corporate welfare” through tax subsidies, credits, 
reimbursements, and exemptions, and of “affirmative action for the rich” 
through legacy set-asides in higher education and “entitled mediocrity” 
(the gentleman’s A-); retreat from a progressive tax code (lowering of the 
highest tax bracket, and favorable tax rates on capital gains and carried 
interest); abandonment of “the war on poverty” and the proliferation of 
“blame the victim” counteroffensives—calling the poor “lazy,” “unde-
serving,” “takers,” “cheaters,” lacking in “character”; the accentuation of “a 
culture of extreme inequality.”207 
Religion and social mores: increased public space and airtime accorded 
to self-righteous religious organizations that divide Americans into saved 
and damned; the abuse of “identity politics” and the return of a winner-
take-all “spoils system.”
Another category of double-edged, positive and negative influences 
on democracy in America, from 1945 to the present, would include 
the following:
The Cold War: a spur to introspection and progress, “win hearts 
and minds,” the Apollo space program; MLK and Malcolm X use the 
“Freedom” ideology of U.S. foreign policy as a lever to advance domestic 
social changes versus a spur to wall off and refuse change; an alibi for self-
righteousness: McCarthyism, “better dead than red,” “my country love it 
or leave it,” and the banalization of “the paranoid style in American poli-
tics” (Hofstadter).
The War on Terror: reaffirmation of basic rights versus fearful, doc-
ile yielding of rights (see “Patriot Act”); foreign wars of choice (Korea, 
Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan); neighborly U.N. “nation-building” efforts in 
former Yugoslavia territories and elsewhere versus arrogance of outside 
meddling experts.
Mass immigration: new ideas and energies versus exploitation, social 
wedge, xenophobia, and homesickness.
The Internet: greater access versus less guidance; more freedom, less 
accountability; blogging brings more, alternative reporting and also more 
“preaching to the converted,” “group polarization,” profiling, and secret 
surveillance; potential for “cyber-democracy” versus potential for “the 
revival of the propaganda state”208 and cyber-bullying.
“Who controls the meanings of democracy and, thereby, its fate?” 185
E-mail and social media: a chance for better communication, dialogue, 
and understanding versus a risk of less and worse communication with 
filtering, unchecked incivility, deception, and incitements to attacks 
(both cyber- and real).
The major challenges that American democracy faces today—
extreme inequality, low social solidarity, a wavering commitment to pub-
lic service, and an ill-defined general interest—all make it difficult for the 
president and Congress to unite the nation around necessary reforms in 
the areas of health care, education, and energy policy, for example. That 
the country has major long-standing problems in these and other areas 
(law enforcement, decent jobs, housing, environmental protection, etc.) 
is not disputed, but how to describe, rank, and solve them is the source 
of major disagreements that impede effective action such that many have 
begun to doubt Tocqueville’s claim about the “real advantage” of democ-
racy’s high productivity.209 
As any reader of Barack Obama’s Dreams from My Father (1995) 
knows, the difficulties of “community organizing” in a culture of 
extreme inequality have existed in the U.S. for forty or fifty years at 
least. They were summed up thirty years earlier in the nervous title of 
a book by Martin Luther King, Jr., Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos 
or Community? (1967). King, Lyndon Johnson, and Franklin Roosevelt 
may have done more than anyone else to make democracy in America 
something more than a dream, myth, decoy, or distant legend recounted 
by an idealistic, freedom-loving French aristocrat, but sustaining their 
achievements has become very difficult to say the least. Tocqueville may 
have wanted to believe that expanding equality of social conditions was 
“providential”; but his own historical account of the material changes that 
gradually brought about greater equality over the preceding seven cen-
turies implies that man’s will, not God’s, could change and swing things 
back toward greater inequality. As President Obama discovered (and 
the South Chicago community organizer before him), it takes not just a 
village, but millions of local initiatives to nurture community spirit and 
sustain democratic habits and institutions, in America or anywhere else, 
because democracy is not the work of one or several heroic individuals, 
nor is it a static guaranteed inheritance.210 It is instead a living credo that 
people can govern themselves translated into a way of life that daily bears 
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out a faith in mankind’s intelligence, imagination, passion, and compas-
sion and welcomes the organizational skills and wisdom of individuals of 
differing talents, predispositions, and interests.211 
•
If democracy in France today has not been exhaustively evaluated by 
any national or international group such as Democratic Audit, it’s safe to 
say that its strengths and weaknesses are somewhat different from those 
in the United States.212 They can be fairly easily summarized as follows. 
Perhaps the leading strength is that, for now, with the exception of some 
fringe groups on the Left and Right, France is not divided into “differ-
ent moral visions,”213 nor is any major political party behaving irratio-
nally or having irrationality become its default mode or new normal. For 
example, no member of any major French political party is running for 
governmental office on the slogan “government is the problem,” nor is 
anyone proposing balancing budgets while simultaneously cutting taxes 
(especially the taxes of the richest). In other words, for two generations 
France has benefited from a fairly strong centrist consensus about desir-
able social ends (e.g., clean air and water, affordable health care and 
housing, quality public schools, secure decent jobs, livable wages, access 
to arts and parks, etc.) and, for the most part, about the ways to attain 
those goals.
The biggest problem (because it risks disrupting that consensus about 
social ends and means) is that, like in the United States, income inequal-
ity, or a division into “two Frances,” has grown significantly in recent 
years, and this division is putting added strain on the already delicate 
but nevertheless still fairly stable postwar welfare state (état providence) 
of France’s Fifth Republic.214 Political, economic, and social equality for 
women and minorities living in France did not fully come about when 
times were good (roughly 1945–1975), though the lot of French women 
did improve somewhat comparatively speaking (right to vote 1955, birth 
control pill 1967, decriminalization of abortion 1975). The progress for 
minorities (especially the children and grandchildren of North African 
immigrants)—always difficult to measure in France due to laws restrict-
ing ethnic identification in census data—appears to have stalled in the 
last thirty years,215 during which France’s economy has cycled through 
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so-so years and bad years. But France’s comfortable white male elites216 
have managed to cushion political inequality and soften socioeconomic 
inequality during the leveling off of the country’s overall prosperity 
thanks to deficit spending that has maintained fairly egalitarian systems 
of health care, housing, and education that remain broadly accessible and 
of relatively high quality. Compared to conditions in the countries of ori-
gin of most French immigrants (Eastern Europe, North Africa, Southeast 
Asia), these basic life-support systems still function pretty well and there-
fore add to the country’s attractiveness alongside its long-standing repu-
tation as a popular tourist destination. However, strains on the social fab-
ric and periodic attention-getting crises are increasingly visible.217 
If France has remained fairly “democratic,” in the above-named sense 
of affordable and accessible, when compared to the United States, it 
remains to be seen how and for how long those favorable conditions will 
be sustained. And as affordability and accessibility become more difficult 
to sustain (amid rising housing prices, increasing health care costs, and 
inequality between schools), levels of anger are likely to increase over the 
lack of decision-making power accorded to ordinary citizens.218 In other 
words, so long as times were fairly good, one kind of democracy (access 
to goods and services—what the French usually mean when they talk 
about démocratisation) could make up for the lack of the other kind of 
democracy (i.e., political power). But as the good times become a dis-
tant memory for all but a few, and the majority of French youth face not 
just the prospect but the present reality of living less well than their par-
ents and grandparents, they may demand that the French Republic grant 
more political equality and accept living with more democratically run 
institutions.219 
The law about legislative parity between male and female legislators 
is one symptom of a certain impatience with the state of democracy 
in France.220 Other features of the French Fifth Republic that are likely 
to become the focus of more vocal protest in the years ahead include 
the following:
Cumul des mandats, i.e., the possibility for an elected official to 
hold more than one elective office simultaneously, such as mayor and 
National Assembly deputy. Currently 80% of France’s deputies hold 
another elective office. This practice limits political participation (which 
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is exactly the intention of those who favor it) and necessarily aggravates 
problems of absenteeism (since a deputy-mayor cannot be in his town 
and the National Assembly in Paris at the same time) while increasing 
elected officials’ reliance on aides, “briefings,” and other secondhand 
information.
The Sénat, whose members are elected indirectly by local elected 
officials (in a way similar to the U.S. Senate prior to the Seventeenth 
Amendment of 1913). France’s Senate is designed to be that temper-
ate body of more dispassionate, wise legislators that the Federalist and 
Tocqueville both praise as a useful counterweight to the possible tyranny 
and impulsive unreason of minority or majority “faction.” However, there 
is a danger that its members can be disinterested to the point of becom-
ing disconnected, in effect an “old boys’ club” out of touch with the reali-
ties of ordinary French people. Others who are more at ease with pater-
nalistic politics—either because they are one of the fatherly “old boys” or 
have been one of the winners within that system—find the Sénat vener-
able and not venal, not senile but sensible.
Term limits. With his election in 2007 and defeat in 2012, Nicolas 
Sarkozy became the second French president to serve the reduced term 
of five years. (In 2008 France changed from unlimited seven-year terms 
to a maximum of two five-year terms.) The previous two presidents, 
François Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac, had served fourteen (2 x 7) and 
twelve years (7 + 5), respectively. There are no term limits, however, for 
other elected officials in France, and French mayors are noted for being 
on average among the oldest in Europe (57) and retaining political power 
for decades.
The Question of the independence of the judicial branch in France and its 
accountability. This is a vast complex subject about which ordinary French 
citizens know very little, one reason being that there are no juries or jury 
duty in France and therefore the experiential education in how the judi-
cial system works in France from the inside is missing. Most people have 
little knowledge of the judicial system unless they happen to be directly 
implicated in it either as a criminal or victim of crime. Crime and court 
scandals are a part of every news cycle of course, and occasionally there 
are massive consciousness-raising affairs, such as the Affaire Dreyfus 
(1895–1906) or more recently the Affaire d’Outreau (2004–2005), 
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which exposed contemporary weaknesses in the French justice system, 
notably concerning the powers of the juge d’instruction. But for the most 
part, crime and justice are treated superficially and emotionally in the 
major media with little effort at educating the public or including them 
in this area of collective decision making. The French like to repeat that 
“No one is supposed to be ignorant of the law”; and yet law and the legal 
world in France is generally considered the arcane domain of experts and 
remains shrouded in mystery, while the ordinary citizen is often left feel-
ing passive and powerless…which suits those in control just fine.
Education. France’s National Education system is the country’s biggest 
employer, and its critics compare it to a wooly mammoth (big and prehis-
toric) and to the Soviet Union (rigid, bureaucratic, unfree, hypocritical). 
Nowhere perhaps are the strengths and weaknesses of France’s pater-
nalistic preferences more in evidence than in its schools. The principal 
strength comes in the area of socialization and the transmission of basic 
knowledge, which is why France continues to do a credible job when it 
comes to preschool, primary, and secondary education. Socialization 
(i.e., learning to work together in a group and toe the line) is well car-
ried out by the clarity, order, and rules that are the hallmarks of French 
“classical” education. But France gets lower marks when it comes to the 
equally necessary “romantic” sides of the educational development of 
older teenagers and young adults, namely individualization, self-reliance, 
experimenting, debating and sifting, problem solving, and innovation.221 
France can be praised for not going the way of the United States and 
Great Britain, where it has increasingly been decided that education is a 
private good to be paid for by the “customer.” In France, nursery school 
through doctoral studies, ages three to thirty roughly, remain essentially 
tuition-free on the theory that educating each generation of young peo-
ple is a collective responsibility and in everyone’s interest since the work-
force of tomorrow will be the country’s economic engine and, crucially, 
will finance the retirement of the workforce of today. However, merciless 
tracking and teaching to the test begins very early (around age eleven), 
and students have access to very different amounts of financial and 
emotional support over the following ten to fifteen school years, often 
depending on how savvy, wealthy, and well-connected their parents are. 
State spending on students in France’s university system is notoriously 
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low compared to per-student spending on primary and secondary educa-
tion—not to mention the lavish public spending on classes préparatoires 
that groom France’s talented tenth for entry into its selective and well-
funded Grandes Écoles, an array of private and public schools that are the 
gateways to power, prestige, and wealth in France.222 There is also the 
problem of France’s long-standing bias in favor of the cerebral (especially 
mathematics) and contempt for the manual despite massive lip service 
to the contrary (Concours Lépine, Prix des meilleurs ouvriers de France, 
etc.)—an obvious stumbling block when it comes to competing inter-
nationally with industrial powerhouses such as China and Germany, or 
even with Denmark and Finland. It is no accident that the leader of the 
pigs, i.e., the “brainworkers,” in Orwell’s Animal Farm (1945) is named 
Napoleon (changed to César in early French translations of that ageless 
“fairy story”). For centuries in France, from royalists to republicans, oli-
garchy did not pose a problem, and top-down, centralized Napoleonic 
methods in all areas from agriculture to telecommunications to educa-
tion have been the accepted norm.
So long as France’s elites had only to convince themselves of their 
own superiority and believe in the “meritocracy” that had formed them 
and that they had inherited and would in turn administrate to form the 
next generation—essentially a form of national cloning through coopta-
tion and “sending down the elevator” (renvoi d’ascenseur)—there were no 
serious challenges to the status quo. The disruption of “mai ’68” is ritually 
exaggerated in France and resulted in no paradigm shift within l’Education 
Nationale. It’s during the Internet age—after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and Communism (which many French educators sympathized 
with all along), and especially since the European Union’s Masstricht 
Treaty (1993) the Shanghai international rankings of colleges and uni-
versities (2003-), and the global impact of Google and Facebook—that 
France has felt the heat of the international spotlight directed at its educa-
tional mores and top-down methods generally.223 Since 1989, in a world 
that is increasingly “hot, flat, and crowded,” France’s national education 
system has found itself having to compete like never before both to place 
its graduates and to convince international students to do their studies 
in France and adopt the “Made in France” label. And at the same time it 
must convince its own best people not to flee the country.224 Pockets of 
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complacency and sheltered privilege are quickly drying up225 as France’s 
education system struggles to embrace ideas like “self-reliance,” “inno-
vation,” and “imagination” that its strict, military heritage going back to 
Napoleonic and pre-Revolutionary Catholic teaching methods had pro-
hibited.226 It remains to be seen whether France innovates in a direction 
that simply becomes leaner and meaner than it already was toward the 
80% of the population whose hearts and minds were never really the pri-
mary concern of France’s teacher-gatekeepers; or whether the country’s 
schools can recast their harsh meritocratic model and embark on a new 
less complacent direction that would nurture the thoughts and feelings 
of each child and essentially educate for citizenship within a democracy 
instead of merely training a workforce for obedient fulfillment of neces-
sary tasks within a tightly regulated republic.227 
Europe. European and transcontinental pressures (in the form of 
treaties and other international agreements and initiatives that regulate 
the circulation or blockage of goods, services, and people) have caused 
changes within France’s National Education system, but this is true in 
every other sector of French society as well—agriculture, industry, trade, 
tourism, hospitals, prisons, and energy and environmental policies. This 
“global” impact of the international on the national raises the question 
of national boundaries and national identity that France has also been 
struggling with for the very good reason that there can be no republic—
democratic or paternalistic—without a clearly defined public, i.e., rules 
that decide who is in and who is out, who gets to vote, work, pay taxes, 
receive government money directly or indirectly…and who doesn’t. 
When Tocqueville traveled to America in 1831 it still took over a month 
to cross the Atlantic in a sailing ship, and even in 1931 or 1981 there did 
not exist today’s super rapid movement of people, goods, and services 
that has caused the very notions of nationhood and national sovereignty 
to become wobbly.
One solution to the problem is to give up on the idea of a bounded 
“public sphere” based on territorial birth and a chosen set of naturaliza-
tion laws, for example. Those willing to give up on this traditional idea of 
a public are often also giving up on the idea of the political and hence of 
government. They seem to be in favor of simply allowing individuals—
living persons defined by the life and death of their physical bodies—to 
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enter into agreements with other individuals or other private entities 
(businesses for example) to buy and sell goods and services as their inter-
ests dictate. It’s the idea of “Doctors without Borders” generalized to all 
trades and professions—defense contractors without borders, call cen-
ters without borders, credit default swaps without borders, etc.228 
A second solution, which had many sympathizers after the interna-
tional disorder brought on by the two World Wars of the twentieth cen-
tury, goes in precisely the opposite direction: instead of giving up on the 
idea of a public, it makes it the cornerstone of a unitary conception of 
human belonging within which particular publics or republics (nations 
if one wants to still use that term from the preglobalized era) are allowed 
at least nominal existence. The United Nations and other international 
organizations were founded to coordinate and harmonize what were still 
called out of habit countries into one supranational republic, organized as 
much as possible along democratic lines with shared values and aspira-
tions embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other 
such documents.
A third solution would be a situation where a traditional public con-
tinues to be bounded in its identity with certain material and symbolic 
documents such as passports and anthems, and by concrete measures 
such as elections and paying taxes into this national treasury as opposed 
to that one; but most large decisions would be made not by elected indi-
viduals but by nonelected world commissions of energy experts, educa-
tion experts, production experts in the areas of agricultural and construc-
tion, water management, and so forth. People would not be a public in 
the traditional sense but closer to what Tocqueville called “les adminis-
trés” (DA I, 131)—administrated units supervised and regulated by a 
worldwide system of controllers to use Huxley’s term or cadres (literally 
“frames”) as the French say.
A fourth solution looks at the upcoming shortages in fossil fuels 
(“peak oil”) and the limited ability (at present at least) to bring other 
energy sources on line quickly enough and sees an inevitable scaling 
down of globalization and a return of localism and small-scale opera-
tions, protectionism, and tribalism. This has been the fertile ground 
for muscly extremist parties and paranoid vigilantism in “rude nations” 
throughout history.
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Perhaps at no time since the 1920s and 1930s—once known as 
“the long weekend”—have there been so many conflicting views about 
whether human societies could or should move in the direction of greater 
universalism and internationalism, protectionist clannish isolationism 
(brothers and others), or regionally defined alliances with one’s closest 
neighbors no matter who they are (hang together or hang separately).
After the “revolutions” of Tocqueville’s day, and the second series of 
rapid and extensive changes that started about a century later with the 
banalization of cars, electricity, indoor plumbing, and centralized heat-
ing and cooling, then air travel, then high speed rail, container ships, 
and computers, there is now a third emergent “revolution” in transpor-
tation, communication, energy, education, and health care captured by 
the name “the Internet Age” that, coupled with the lingering negative 
effects of the economic downturn that began in 2008, has led many to 
draw comparisons between our contemporary opportunities and crises 
and those of the 1930s.229 After arguing at length in favor of the contem-
porary usefulness of a certain French witness of the 1830s, I would like 
to now consider the guidance offered by three British witnesses from the 
1930s, George Orwell, Aldous Huxley, and E. M. Forster, as well as the 
thoughts and feelings of two internationalists of English origin, Charles 
Spencer Chaplin, Jr., and the late Tony Judt.230 
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Chapter 4
Restore Previous Session
Call it, then, the state of exception: these years during which, in 
the name of security, some of our accustomed rights and freedoms 
are circumscribed or set aside, the years during which we live in 
a different time. This different time of ours has now extended 
ten years—the longest by far in American history—with little 
sense of an ending. Indeed, the very endlessness of this state of 
exception—a quality emphasized even as it was imposed—and 
the broad acceptance of that endlessness, the state of exception’s 
increasing normalization, are among its distinguishing marks.
– Mark Danner, “After September 11: Our State of 
Exception” New York Review of Books, September 29, 2011
Even if a catastrophe can be avoided, one thing is certain: the 
pressure to reduce deficits will push the eurozone into prolonged 
recession. This will have incalculable political consequences. The 
euro crisis could endanger the political cohesion of the European 
Union. There is no escape from this gloomy scenario as long as the 
authorities persist in their current course. They could, however, 
change course. They could recognize that they have reached the 
end of the road and take a radically different approach. Instead 
of acquiescing in the absence of a solution and trying to buy time, 
they could look for a solution first and then find a path leading to 
it. The path that leads to a solution has to be found in Germany, 
which, as the EU’s largest and highest-rated creditor country, has 
been thrust into the position of deciding the future of Europe.
– George Soros, “Does the Euro Have a Future?” 
New York Review of Books, September 29, 2011.
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“The primary will of the world is no longer about peace 
or freedom or even democracy; it is not about having a 
family, and it is neither about God nor about owning a 
home or land. The will of the world is first and foremost 
to have a good job. Everything else comes after that.”
– Jim Clifton, The Coming Jobs War, quoted by Charles M. Blow, 
“For Jobs, It’s War,” New York Times, September 16, 2011.
One year before and after the over-hyped “Y2K” that was supposed to 
cause such big problems for us all via the difficulties that our computers 
more than ourselves would have crossing into the new millennium, i.e., in 
1999 and 2001 to be precise, Europe and the United States entered into 
new eras that would fundamentally change the way the people in those 
territories would live. On January 1, 1999, the Euro was introduced as the 
single accounting currency of eleven countries of the European Union.231 
On September 11, 2001 (four months after my daughter Rose was born) 
four passenger planes were hijacked for use in coordinated suicide attacks 
on New York and Washington, D.C. Nearly 3,000 people died. Those 
events in Europe and North America seemed at the time to be setting the 
two continents on very different paths, just as other events had done back 
in 1789. At that earlier time in the U.S., the revolutionary spirit of 1776 
was being reined in somewhat as the country chose, narrowly, to ratify 
a new constitution and experiment with a federal government and its 
first president, George Washington (elected on February 4, 1789). With 
the storming of the Bastille on July 14, 1789, France, and with it Europe, 
embarked on the first wave of its Revolution that would inflame the con-
tinent, disrupt civil society, and provoke conflicts that would subside and 
reignite at irregular intervals for the next 150 years, swinging France and 
its neighbors between tyranny and license, to use Tocqueville’s terms—
too much government or too little—until the emergence of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 and France’s Fifth Republic in 
1958 put things on a somewhat more even keel.
In the past dozen years, the roles seemed reversed, with Europe head-
ing toward ever greater stability and cooperation between its member 
states, while the United States, which had been drifting recklessly for over 
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a decade since the end of the Cold War, was, after “9/11,” entering into a 
new period of panic-stricken crisis government characterized by an emer-
gency mentality of permanent siege, permanent “revolution” and insta-
bility, rising inequality, and paralyzing disagreements between the two 
major political parties. While the U.S. was suddenly waking up to reali-
ties it had mostly ignored for fifty years, especially during its post–Cold 
War complacency (“Why do they hate us?” Is a democratic “free world” 
compatible with the rigors of modern capitalism? Should Christians be 
billionaires?), it’s now widely felt that a European union was more a wish 
(of dogmatic dreamers in and outside government) than a fact, and that 
the European common currency was imposed without sufficient popular 
support, i.e., without taking the time to nurture a stable set of common 
mores or institutions, such as respect for the rule of law, to impose com-
mon tax and spending policies, or even to establish a common European 
treasury. In short, it was and still is a Europe without Europeans.
In 2008, the financial crisis caused the histories of Europe and the 
United States to converge and the illusions on both sides of the Atlantic 
to come into clearer focus. Parallels were drawn with the 1930s, another 
time when both Europe and America faced deep economic hardship, 
social instability, and class divisions.232 Those comparisons multiplied as 
the financial crisis became a full-fledged economic and political crisis on 
at least two continents with secondary effects that risk engulfing the rest 
of the world. Just as local conflicts morphed into “World War” on two 
occasions twenty years apart in the twentieth century, today many around 
the world are wondering what the local consequences will be of the acute 
Euro crisis and the steadily worsening crisis of America’s ongoing “state 
of exception” that has crippled its democratic institutions, tarnished its 
moral standing in the world, and damaged its own faith in its usually 
positive, productive, can-do self. Have Europe and the United States sim-
ply gone too far this time and made mistakes that are unrepairable? Or 
can Europe and America follow the advice of George Soros excerpted in 
the epigraph above, namely “recognize that they have reached the end of 
the road and take a radically different approach”? “Instead of acquiesc-
ing in the absence of a solution and trying to buy time, they could look 
for a solution first and then find a path leading to it.” But will they? And 
can they do this in a way that is democratic instead of employing the 
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usual, and usually disastrous (for the 99%), top-down, elites-know-best 
approach? We will soon find out since living in denial and on borrowed 
time (and money) appear increasingly unsustainable.233 
One thing is certain: change will happen, and the way we live now 
will soon be different, either through deliberation and choice or accident 
and force. While thinking about upcoming changes, how they will feel, 
and what they will mean in the long run, it might be advisable to keep 
a cool head and recall, and perhaps learn from, another tense time that 
millions ultimately survived, though it’s true millions did not, namely 
the 1930s. I find it particularly worthwhile to reconsider the testimony 
of three British witnesses: Orwell, Huxley, and Forster. Perhaps there is 
something special about being British that makes being a witness from 
that old country especially valuable. Could it be its geographic location 
between North America and Europe? Could it be its status as an island 
(I-land/eye-land) that endows its people with uncommonly acute pow-
ers as witnesses? Or is it just that Orwell, Huxley, and Forster were three 
exceptionally gifted and eloquent individuals? Perhaps there’s no defini-
tive answer, but I heartily recommend that citizens today who wonder 
“Where do we go from here, community or chaos?” take time out from 
their busy schedules and their focus on today’s stock market news and 
unemployment figures to reread 1984, Brave New World, and Forster’s 
essays (especially “What I Believe” from the collection Two Cheers for 
Democracy) and his narrative fiction (especially “The Machine Stops”). 
My purpose here is not to offer full readings of these works, but to draw 
attention to aspects of them that can broaden and deepen our under-
standing of Tocqueville, democracy, and the Internet age.
Reading 1984 in the Internet Age
Lately there have been many backward glances to the 1930s, especially 
to the causes and consequences of the Great Depression that famously 
began on October 29, 1929, and to the rise of National Socialism that 
reached a climax with Hitler’s invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, 
and England’s declaration of war against Germany on September 3, 1939. 
The latter event was the focus of an acclaimed film, The King’s Speech, 
released in 2010. One hopes this heightened attention to events that took 
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place in the days of our grandparents and that bear certain resemblances 
to our own times (bank failures, massive unemployment, extremist 
politics) will yet allow us to avoid repeating the worst catastrophes of 
the decade that followed. With that goal in mind, it might be useful to 
unearth other documents, radio broadcasts, and films from that earlier 
era. I would recommend, for example, a remake of Charlie Chaplin’s first 
talking film, The Great Dictator (1940), or at the very least an “HD” re-
release of the original.234 It might also be entertaining and instructive 
to do an Internet age remake of Orwell’s 1984 since the original ver-
sion, released in 1984 during the middle of the Reagan-Thatcher years, 
is marred by traditional totalitarian hyperbole and the ghosts of Wagner, 
Leni Reifenstahl, and Orson Welles. A new version, a job for Armando 
Ianucci, perhaps, or Matteo Garrone, could set the action closer to, say, 
2004 or 2014, by which time Ingsoc and Newspeak would have advanced 
to a cooler, calmer efficiency appropriate to the Internet age of “cookies,” 
drones, Google, and managed democracy’s permanent “war on terror.”
It’s moving to watch The Great Dictator today, especially those memo-
rable scenes of the coin in the pudding, the globe scene, and of course 
Charlie Chaplin’s final impassioned speech, which he wrote himself in 
favor of democratic dignity and liberty.235 It’s also instructive to recall the 
U.S. government’s action in 1952 to keep Chaplin from reentering what 
had become his adopted country. Chaplin was a victim of McCarthyism, 
which, in a cruel irony, turned him into the homeless person he often 
portrayed in Depression-era films. Chaplin’s humor might seem miles 
away from Orwell’s gravitas, and yet his films and Orwell’s writings are 
underlining a common vulnerable human condition with our upside 
potential for kindness and love, and our downside risk for violence, intol-
erance, manipulation, and being manipulated by others. They each knew 
what George Kennan was getting at when he said in a speech to the Naval 
War College in 1947—during the early, pre-McCarthy, Cold War time 
when Orwell was writing 1984 (it would be completed in 1948 and pub-
lished in early 1949)—that “there is a little bit of the totalitarian buried 
somewhere, way down deep, in each and every one of us.” Sheldon Wolin 
makes use of that claim as his epigraph to Chapter Two of Democracy 
Incorporated, entitled “Totalitarianism’s Inversion: Beginnings of the 
Imaginary of a Permanent Global War.” The full statement is this:
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The fact of the matter is that there is a little bit of the totalitar-
ian buried somewhere, way down deep, in each and every one 
of us. It is only the cheerful light of confidence and security 
which keeps this evil genius down… If confidence and secu-
rity were to disappear, don’t think that he would not be wait-
ing to take their place. (15)
Of course in 1947 it was impossible for Kennan to imagine the 
evil genius as also possibly a “she” resembling Margaret Thatcher, 
Condoleezza Rice, or Angela Merkel, for example, but nevertheless we 
get his point. Is it not the same point Charlie Chaplin is making when he 
decides to play two matching roles, the antihero barber-tramp and the 
Hitleresque dictator, Adenoid Hynkel? Is it not also why Chaplin injects 
the globe scene—a vivid representation of the dictator’s total political 
control—with buffoonery (the humping fanny that sends the ball into 
the air) and ends it with a final pop, as well as the reason behind having 
the barber’s final speech in favor of democratic socialism crescendo with 
a raised voice and mannerisms that recall certain enthusiastic speeches 
of the leader of National Socialism who is performing on stages across 
Germany at the very same time the movie is released in the United States?
“You must speak. –I can’t. –You must, it’s our only hope.” This imper-
ative to speak out and bear witness that immediately precedes the bar-
ber’s improbable, surprising declaration would seem to have been a 
force behind the steady urgency of the writings of Orwell, Huxley, and 
Forster.236 Orwell’s 1984 is written by a dying man (tuberculosis, like 
Tocqueville and Thoreau) who worries about the end of the world and 
does everything in his power—speaking, writing, leading by example—
to make it more likely that a decent world where people can work and 
play and love each other, and think and say what they want, and move 
about freely will survive. He puts everything he has and much of himself 
into what he must know will be his finale, a sort of valedictory address to 
the world.237 
People who have read the book probably remember the rats and the 
torture in the grim third and final part. Those and other dark aspects 
of the novel are certainly what get played up in the 1984 movie ver-
sion. Besides the sorrowing, however, there are many lighter moments 
of rejoicing and toiling (more or less happily). Winston Smith basically 
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likes his job—rewriting history—and takes quiet pride in his language 
skills, both in English and Newspeak. He’s glad to have fallen in love with 
Julia—standard middle-aged male gratification at winning the affections 
of a sweet young thing—and to have improvised a subversive love pact 
with her in defiance of the Party’s interdiction of private lives and private 
thoughts and feelings.
Despite his brooding private side that makes him revolt against all 
pressures to conform (in conformity with the romantic social code of 
the artist-rebel), Winston likes people, likes striking up conversations, 
likes making connections. Thus he feels bad when his intellectual col-
league Syme is “vanished”; when the avuncular shopkeeper Charrington 
who sold him the beautiful paperweight and rents him the upstairs “love 
shack” turns out to be a member of the Thought Police; or when the old 
man at the bar from whom he hopes to get a usable history about life 
before the revolution turns out to be a chatterbox of disjointed memories 
(“a rubbish-heap of details,” 105); and of course when O’Brien, whom he 
thought was a freedom-loving member of the Brotherhood, and whom 
he looks up to somewhat like an older brother (there’s even a phonetic 
resemblance, “O brother”), becomes his torturer—not Goldstein but 
lead, and misleading. But the fact that these relationships don’t turn out 
well doesn’t stop him from believing in people and the world, its objects 
and textures, until of course the final dehumanizing breakdown is com-
plete. And even so, the novel’s last verb is one of connection, “loved”—
“He loved Big Brother.”
It’s worth noting, and I will return to it later, that this verb is in the 
past tense, just as it is worth noting the assortment of texts and variety of 
writing styles that Orwell packs into this book. Especially noticeable are 
the “Appendix” on “The Principles of Newspeak” and the interpolated 
book by Emmanuel Goldstein, The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical 
Collectivism, that Winston enjoys reading silently to himself and out 
loud to Julia (a clever means for reader sympathy-building). Other vari-
eties of text include the Party slogans, “War is peace,” “Freedom is slav-
ery,” “Ignorance is strength”; the scraps of English poetry (the “bells” 
rhymes); “prole” prose (e.g., “’E could’a drawed me off a pint”); prole 
song (e.g., “It was only an ’opeless fancy…”); Newspeak prose (e.g., 
“times 3.12.83 reporting bb dayorder doubleplusungood refs unpersons 
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rewrite fullwise upsub antefiling”); and Ingsoc poetry—a rewriting of 
the American poet Henry Longfellow’s sonorous ode to honest work 
and strength of character, “The Village Blacksmith,” into a short, chiastic, 
punning ditty: “Under the spreading chestnut tree / I sold you and you 
sold me / There they lie, and here lie we / Under the spreading chestnut 
tree.” In one of Orwell’s many ironic winks, the pub where a range of liv-
ing and dead souls while away their time, including Winston in the final 
chapter, is called the Chestnut Tree Café—“haunt of painters and musi-
cians. There was no law, not even an unwritten law, against frequenting 
the Chestnut Tree Café, yet the place was somehow ill-omened” (64). 
It is the tragic antithesis of the Village Blacksmith’s open air workplace, 
which is a sacred space where all the good, beautiful, and true lessons of 
life are learned.
Alongside the bowdlerized version of “The Village Blacksmith,” 
Orwell allows himself some lyrical prose of his own that hearkens back to 
English romantic poetry of olden times. Here is the opening of Chapter 
Two in Part Two that will center around the impossible love of Winston 
and Julia (Orwell’s wink at Shakespeare’s star-crossed lovers Romeo 
and Juliet):
Winston picked his way up the lane through dappled light and 
shade, stepping out into pools of gold wherever the boughs 
parted. Under the trees to the left of him the ground was 
misty with bluebells. The air seemed to kiss one’s skin. It was 
the second of May. From somewhere deeper in the heart of 
the wood came the droning of ring-doves. (135)
There can be no fall without first establishing the heights from which 
it will take place, no ugly hell without a beautiful heaven, no winter of 
discontent without first a midsummer night’s dream. Orwell’s tale hur-
tles toward its tragic conclusion with all the inevitability of Greek or 
Shakespearean tragedy. And that’s the whole point. Orwell wants to 
pack the entire English language and the achievements of all of world 
literature, of all civilization practically, into this book. He wants it to 
be a readable omnibus of a book—his Ulysses ( Joyce’s had appeared in 
1922). He clearly aspires to have it be a truly great book—one far sur-
passing Goldstein’s political science master’s thesis—a book containing 
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thoughts and feelings, like seeds stored in air-tight jars, out of which 
human civilization could be rebuilt from the ruins of catastrophe. Orwell 
is sending a time capsule into the future, betting on what Tocqueville and 
Sheldon Wolin are also investing in, namely (1) the restorative power of 
the archaic (such as with the disinterested aristocratic treatise and the 
scholarly monograph) and (2) the subversive power (in a world where all 
must serve) of the gratuitous and useless (such as the glass paperweight 
with the coral inside: “It’s a beautiful thing,” 109).238 
In 1948 Orwell, that is, Eric Blair (1903–1950), is a man in his mid-
forties who hopes that 1984 will help prevent English socialism from 
becoming another version of the National Socialism that engulfed 
Germany and much of Europe. He hopes that forty or so years later, in 
1984, when his adopted son Richard Horatio Blair would be about his 
and Winston Smith’s age, England and other countries will still have 
open, decent societies. And if not, if things were to go in a Stalinist-Soviet 
direction between 1948 and 1984 and afterward, Orwell nevertheless 
slips in an indeterminate hopeful note that was brought to my attention 
by Thomas Pynchon’s insightful introduction to a re-edition in 2003 (the 
first year of the second Iraq War and the year my son Daniel was born).
Pynchon asks a basic question that might occur to any reader of 1984: 
“Why end a novel as passionate, violent and dark as this one with what 
appears to be a scholarly appendix?” Here is his answer:
The answer may lie in simple grammar. From its first sentence, 
“The Principles of Newspeak” is written consistently in the 
past tense, as if to suggest some later piece of history, post 
1984, in which Newspeak has become literally a thing of the 
past—as if in some way the anonymous author of this piece 
is by now free to discuss, critically and objectively, the politi-
cal system of which Newspeak was, in its time, the essence. 
Moreover, it is our pre-Newspeak English language that is 
being used to write the essay. Newspeak was supposed to 
have become general by 2050, and yet it appears that it did 
not last that long, let alone triumph, that the ancient human-
istic ways of thinking inherent in standard English have per-
sisted, survived, and ultimately prevailed, and that perhaps 
the social and moral order it speaks for has even, somehow, 
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been restored. (…) In its hints of restoration and redemp-
tion, perhaps “The Principles of Newspeak” serves as a way to 
brighten an otherwise bleakly pessimistic ending—sending 
us back out into the streets of our own dystopia whistling a 
slightly happier tune than the end of the story by itself would 
have warranted. (xxiii–xxiv)
This explanation seems plausible, and it got me thinking more about 
the novel’s last sentence: “He loved Big Brother.” The standard interpre-
tation, I suppose, is that by his loving Big Brother and renouncing as 
“false” his memory of being “wildly excited and shouting with laughter” 
with his mother and sister while playing a board game, the Party has won 
and what’s lost is “the ancient time… when there was still privacy, love 
and friendship, and when the members of a family stood by one another 
without needing to know the reason” (35). Yet Pynchon’s hypothesis 
allows one to reread that closing sentence differently. Not “He loved Big 
Brother,” but “He loved Big Brother”—in other words, we, living at the 
time of the narrating of this tragic love story of Winston and Julia, do not!
The point might be clearer if we substitute different nouns: “In 1848 
the French loved Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte,” “In 1948 the English 
loved Clement Attlee,” “In 1984 Americans loved Ronald Reagan.” But 
they don’t now—at least not so totally and unquestioningly. Our feelings 
about these and other charismatic leaders are much more complex and 
conflicted today than simple love. And one of the reasons may have to do 
with the portrait of Big Brother and the Party he represents that Orwell 
bequeathed to future generations, a portrait that he was already teaching 
us to read critically, discriminatingly, thanks to its juxtaposition with the 
“ancient time” that we could also call archaic or first, with old customs 
and habits (mœurs to use Tocqueville’s favorite term) that existed prior 
to the revolution and the modern revolutionary spirit that is carried on 
by the Two Minutes Hate, the Thought Police, etc. This Old Regime and 
“the presence of the past,” as Sheldon Wolin would say, have constantly 
to be beaten down in a society that demands complete orthodoxy, i.e., no 
critical thinking, no consciousness (61).
But thoughts are constantly cropping up again because there is always 
more past being produced every day, and thinking can arise from mere 
succession, the mere juxtaposition of then and now, or of subject and 
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predicate. Hence the desire of every totalitarian regime to stop time 
and control language. Hence too, then, the desire of Winston, the rebel 
without a cause, to raise his glass of “dark-red liquid”—“‘It is called wine,’ 
said O’Brien with a faint smile. ‘You will have read about it in books, no 
doubt’” (198)—in a toast “to the past” (204). It also explains his willing-
ness, eagerness even, to affirm, “We are the dead.” But surely this is hyper-
bole, spoken for effect. It would be more accurate to say, “We are the 
archaic” or “We are dinosaurs” as some professors refer to themselves, 
since that is what Winston really means—and this is spoken as edgy 
defiance (against the grain, against the conformist pressure of Ingsoc), 
at least the first time he says it (156), and O’Brien too (203), and not 
as deflated resignation as it sounds at the moment of his arrest by the 
Thought Police (252).
Orwell’s 1984 is a nightmare that both retells dreams and is written 
with the odd logic of dreams that Freud sensitized us to. It is Orwell’s 
answer to Hölderlin’s question “Wozu dichter in dürftiger zeit?”—What’s 
a poet to do in hard times? Resist and bear witness. But I am convinced 
by Pynchon’s observations that it is a nightmare from which we are sup-
posed to wake up, like Scrooge, and change our lives. It is inspired writ-
ing, inspired, I think, by a variant of the “religious terror” (DA I, 6) that 
inspired Tocqueville—terror of the “irresistible revolution” toward 
equality, and the prospect that if misused, equality would extinguish all 
meaningful liberty. Orwell, like Tocqueville, worried that socialism, if 
pushed too far by zealots or fanatics, and if it succumbed to the depraved 
instead of the manly passion for equality (DA I, 115), would be incom-
patible with liberty and therefore incompatible with creative develop-
ment, whether scientific, artistic, or simply existential such as the love 
between two people or random acts of human kindness to strangers—
of which Tocqueville was no doubt the grateful recipient in America on 
many occasions.
“What mattered were individual relationships,” says Winston, refer-
ring to “the people of only two generations ago” (191), i.e., back in the 
days before the revolution. “The proles, it suddenly occurred to him, had 
remained in this condition. They were not loyal to a party or a country 
or an idea, they were loyal to one another. (…) The proles had stayed 
human” (191). This may be a slight exaggeration, like Longfellow’s 
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Blacksmith with his “brawny arms,” “strong as iron bands,” that seem to 
have captured Orwell’s imagination; nevertheless we get his point: party 
loyalty can kill loyalty to friends and family. And inversely, affectionate 
clannishness can lead to suffocating provincialism and cronyism that 
shut out the discoveries and productivities of networks of weak ties that 
develop within the massive, moderate middle. What can look like a help 
can end up a hindrance. “Here comes a candle to light you to bed, here 
comes a chopper to chop off your head!” (254). Tocqueville could relate 
to that, since, as Gopnik astutely noted, the question for him was always, 
“Given that democracy is sure to come, how do you make a democracy 
that does not turn into a bunch of guys with a guillotine killing all your 
relatives?” (214) For Tocqueville, as for Orwell, the danger was not so 
much the establishment of “stupid hedonistic Utopias,” as O’Brien calls 
all previous efforts at social engineering, however regrettable such soft 
worlds would be, lacking as they do in grandeur, excellence, and selfless 
courage. The greater danger is the hard-edged world the Ingsoc party 
seeks to establish:
A world of fear and treachery and torment, a world of tram-
pling and being trampled upon, a world which will grow not 
less but more merciless as it refines itself. Progress in our 
world will be progress towards more pain. The old civiliza-
tions claimed that they were founded on love or justice. Ours 
is founded upon hatred. In our world there will be no emo-
tions except fear, rage, triumph, and self-abasement. (306)
This world with its echo of the dark closing of Matthew Arnold’s 
“Dover Beach” is the hard despotism that Tocqueville wanted to avoid at 
all cost, and I think he and Orwell would pragmatically accept soft despo-
tism’s dull vulgarity, if at least now and then—fugitively, as Wolin would 
say—it left room or made room for love and justice, since out of these 
liberty and human dignity have a chance to be revived.
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Revisiting Brave New World (1932) and 
Brave New World Revisited (1958)
In a gesture that both points out and sidesteps the author’s decision to 
adopt and keep a second identity via a pen name, Simon Leys’s review of 
the “Orwell Diaries” leads off with this affirmation: “Blair’s personal life 
and Orwell’s public activity both reflected one powerfully single-minded 
personality: Blair-Orwell was made of one piece: a recurrent theme in the 
testimonies of all who knew him at close range was ‘his terrible simplic-
ity.’ He had the ‘innocence of a savage.’”239 It is worth recalling in this con-
text that Aldous Huxley’s anti-hero, his Winston Smith, his barber-tramp, 
is a bicultural savage later referred to as Mr. Savage. A savage who ends up 
hanging himself at the end of Brave New World, which was published long 
before 1984 or 1984 in 1932, and, like Orwell’s dystopia, sets its action in 
a not too distant future. Was Huxley among those who thought Orwell, 
or at least the mentality evoked in Orwell’s 1984, a bit simplistic, savage, 
and uncivilized?
The Harper editions of Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932) 
and Brave New World Revisited (1958) both reprint in an appendix to the 
texts a letter that Huxley wrote in 1949 thanking Orwell-Blair for send-
ing him a copy of 1984.240 We learn from this letter that Orwell expressly 
asked his publishers to send a copy to Huxley, who had been his French 
teacher at Eton.241 This strengthens the hypothesis that through the voice 
of O’Brien Orwell may be taking aim at his former professor’s “stupid 
hedonistic society” portrayed in Brave New World, criticizing presumably 
the notion that a nonviolent utopian society could be engineered into 
existence merely on the basis of (1) thorough-going infant condition-
ing, (2) strict discipline within and between social hierarchies (Alphas, 
Betas, Deltas, etc.), and (3) the provision of infinite supplies of pleasur-
able substances (soma) and distractions (feelies) to diffuse tension and 
occupy one’s time. Against this pleasure principle totalitarianism that 
Huxley depicted during the height of the Great Depression but before 
Hitler came to power, Orwell offers a pain principle version, one could 
say. Orwell’s ruthless and fearful new world comes directly in the wake of 
World War II with just enough distance from the multiple violent atroci-
ties of that conflict to make it highly provocative in the early years of the 
Cold War as the Western democracies and Eastern Communist bloc were 
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hardening into a permanent, highly militarized face-off, vying for world 
dominance and competing for the allegiance of nonaligned countries in 
the so-called Third World.
Thus, a more gentlemanly, polite rather than political face-off is 
engaged in between Huxley and Orwell; and of course Huxley will ulti-
mately have the upper hand—having the good health and long life that 
enabled him to write both before and after the conflicts of the 1930s 
and ’40s which spurred both men to dramatize in novelistic form their 
thoughts on the threats to democracy and freedom in modern times. But 
Orwell’s visions and mordant language seem to have haunted the older 
Huxley, and therefore declaring who in the end wins their professor-stu-
dent dual can only be speculation.
Huxley chides Orwell and his 1984 for being essentially old-fash-
ioned, archaic let’s say, because it has the ruling oligarchy rely still on the 
“policy of the boot-on-the-face.” Huxley deems the continuation of such 
practices “doubtful,” because too “arduous” and “wasteful.”
My own belief is that the ruling oligarchy will find less ardu-
ous and less wasteful ways of governing and of satisfying its 
lust for power, and these ways will resemble those which I 
described in Brave New World. (…) Within the next genera-
tion I believe that the world’s rulers will discover that infant 
conditioning and narco-hypnosis are more efficient, as 
instruments of government, than clubs and prisons, and that 
the lust for power can be just as completely satisfied by sug-
gesting people into loving their servitude as by flogging and 
kicking them into obedience. In other words, I feel that the 
nightmare of Nineteen Eighty-Four is destined to modulate 
into the nightmare of a world having more resemblance to 
that which I imagined in Brave New World. The change will be 
brought about as a result of a felt need for increased efficiency. 
(BNWR, appendix, 9–10)
Unconvinced, it would seem, by Veblen’s 1899 theories about the per-
sistence of drudgery (for the powerless) and the prestige of waste (for 
the predatory modern leisure class), Huxley accuses Orwell of remain-
ing under the spell of classic totalitarianism, what we’ve been calling hard 
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despotism. In contrast, Huxley sees the menace to human freedom as 
coming from the soft despotism that Tocqueville imagined in 1840 and 
that he, Huxley, in a sense expanded on, standing as he is in 1932 on the 
shoulders of Tocqueville and subsequent commentators (e.g., Gramsci) 
of at least three additional generations of close collaboration between 
the social sciences, monopolistic capitalism, and pseudo-democratic or 
openly authoritarian oligarchy politics.
The God figure in Brave New World, for example, is not a mysterious, 
mustachioed menace but a heroic prime mover, Henry Ford. Time itself 
is measured in annual units of “A.F.” (“after Ford”), and the revolution is 
named after the efficient social organization that his career and name are 
synonymous with: “Fordism.” Those who for whatever reason insist on 
being individuals and not conforming to society’s brave new rules are not 
vanished or reduced through torture to catatonic, zombie-like creatures 
as happens in the world of Big Brother.242 They are merely exiled to far-
away islands in Huxley’s kinder gentler dystopia. Huxley has citizens in 
his post-Ford world diffuse any free-floating anxieties and desires through 
a multitude of pleasure-inducing distractions, whereas in the post-Hitler 
world Orwell chooses to have his fictional Ingsoc citizens kept constantly 
on message and in line via group calisthenics for the body and for the 
mind with the litany of good news about Oceania’s superiority, emotion-
channeling exercises such as Two Minutes Hate and Hate Week, and of 
course constant surveillance by video cameras and spies.
Beyond these and other differences in means, however, what is prob-
ably most striking to the contemporary reader is how powerfully com-
plementary the visions in these two books are—each successful enough 
in its own way to have entered vernacular English. We call something 
“Orwellian” when we want to single out for criticism a piece of harsh 
authoritarian behavior wrapped in euphemism, such as the use of the 
term deactivated to characterize the abrupt firing of some tenured pro-
fessors at the State University of New York at Albany in 2010.243 And we 
call something a “brave new world”—extending Huxley’s ironic borrow-
ing of Miranda’s wide-eyed declaration in Shakespeare’s The Tempest—
when we want to cast doubt on some new attitude or practice that asserts 
itself in the name of progress and modernity.244 In both worlds “history 
is bunk,”245 and art and science as pure creative inquiry are outlawed, 
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as is any individual purpose or private project. One must conform to 
one’s group identity at all times and consistently carry out one’s public 
duties as dictated either by Big Brother and his Party surrogates, such as 
O’Brien, or in Huxley’s world by “Our Ford” and his surrogate Directors 
and Controllers, such as Mustapha Mond. And live happily, or at least 
tranquilized, ever after.
Contemporary observers since the days of Orwell and Huxley (who 
both died during the Cold War in 1950 and 1963, respectively) know 
that neither soft despotism nor hard despotism has disappeared in the 
Internet age. On the contrary, both approaches are exercised by openly 
authoritarian regimes as well as in modern democracies on a regular basis 
as conditions require. For some there is the “Patriot Act” and “Homeland 
Security”; for others there is “extraordinary rendition” and “enhanced 
interrogation techniques.” These groups here are held in thrall by targeted 
advertising, cell phones, smart phones, headphones, and the infinite 
sources for distraction of the Internet; those groups there are deported 
or exterminated or else held in place by solitary confinement, detention 
camps, and other forceful police tactics.
It would seem, though, that for Huxley the differences between 
hard and soft approaches were important (as we saw they were for 
Tocqueville), since he felt compelled to elaborate on them further in a 
more extended reply to Orwell in Brave New World Revisited. In Chapter 
Three of that follow-up book devoted to “over-organization” and its dele-
terious effects on freedom and the chances for democracy, Huxley offers a 
comparison of the ways one might go about imposing a “Social Ethic” on 
a species, man, that according to Huxley’s research is “a moderately gre-
garious, not a completely social animal—a creature more like a wolf, let 
us say, or an elephant, than like a bee or an ant” (BNWR, 23). Man’s mod-
erately gregarious nature is a core belief of great importance for Huxley.
In their original form human societies bore no resemblance to 
the hive or the ant heap; they were merely packs. Civilization 
is, among other things, the process by which primitive packs 
are transformed into an analogue, crude and mechanical, of 
the social insects’ organic communities. At the present time 
the pressures of over-population and technological change 
are accelerating this process. The termitary has come to seem 
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a realizable and even, in some eyes, a desirable ideal. (…) 
However hard they try, men cannot create a social organism, 
they can only create an organization. In the process of trying 
to create an organism they will merely create a totalitarian 
despotism. (BNWR, 23)
Brave New World and 1984 are two imaginary attempts—composed 
amid plenty of real world twentieth-century experiments—to achieve 
this reduction of the indocile, freedom-loving wolf-man into the entirely 
social, tractable ant-man. And Huxley compares the fables two pages later 
in this paragraph:
It is worth remarking that, in 1984, the members of the Party 
are compelled to conform to a sexual ethic of more than 
Puritan severity. In Brave New World, on the other hand, all 
are permitted to indulge their sexual impulses without let or 
hindrance. The society described in Orwell’s fable is a society 
permanently at war, and the aim of its rulers is first, of course, 
to exercise power for its own delightful sake and, second, to 
keep their subjects in that state of constant tension which a 
state of constant war demands of those who wage it. By cru-
sading against sexuality the bosses are able to maintain the 
required tension in their followers and at the same time can 
satisfy their lust for power in a most gratifying way. The soci-
ety described in Brave New World is a world-state, in which 
war has been eliminated and where the first aim of the rulers 
is at all costs to keep their subjects from making trouble. This 
they achieve by (among other methods) legalizing a degree of 
sexual freedom (made possible by the abolition of the family) 
that practically guarantees the Brave New Worlders against 
any form of destructive (or creative) emotional tension. In 
1984 the lust for power is satisfied by inflicting pain; in Brave 
New World, by inflicting a hardly less humiliating pleasure. 
(BNWR, 25–6)
As description this is fine as far as it goes, and it leads Huxley to restate 
a few pages later the chiding criticism he made to Orwell in his private 
letter nearly ten years before. Huxley does not rule out that “torture and 
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massacre, slavery, and the persecution of heretics” may yet return once 
again among so-called civilized people, just as they did to general surprise 
after World War I; but, he affirms, “in the immediate future there is some 
reason to believe that the punitive methods of 1984 will give place to the 
reinforcements and manipulations of Brave New World” (BNWR, 31).
And yet history has shown that the advent of software and other 
soft-serve technologies can take place right alongside harsher traditional 
methods of persuasion.246 It’s strange that Huxley didn’t foresee this com-
plementary coexistence of carrots and sticks, seductive pulling and coer-
cive pushing. Surely he had heard the expression “speak softly but carry 
a big stick.” It’s also strange, since Huxley claims greater verisimilitude 
for his fable, that he would consider plausible a world-state in which war 
and want have been eliminated, for both in the 1930s and in the 1950s 
the global socioeconomic reality was one of scarcity and increasing com-
petition—too many malnourished people chasing too few good jobs. 
Furthermore, it’s Huxley himself who is underlining throughout Brave 
New World Revisited the tension-producing conditions that lower the 
chances of democratic practices replacing dictatorships or of enduring in 
places where democracy has worked up until now thanks to traditions of 
local cooperation and abundance. Therefore, he’s in the awkward posi-
tion of explicitly claiming that the mechanisms of social control depicted 
in Brave New World are the wave of the future and yet having to implicitly 
concede (given the thesis of BNWR) that a state of permanent war over 
immaterial ideologies and a permanent struggle to possess scarce mate-
rial resources spread unevenly over an increasingly crowded planet was 
better intuited in the tripartite, ultranationalistic competitive scenario 
laid out in 1984.
Brave New World posits “Ten World Controllers” and the existence of 
uncivilized areas such as the “Savage Reservation” that the malcontent 
Bernard Marx (Huxley’s “Winston Smith”) visits with Lenina (Huxley’s 
“Julia,” sort of), but there is no account given as to how this peaceful 
world-state came about, nor any explanation of how or why the reserva-
tions continue to exist, nor why troublemakers like Marx, Mr. Savage, 
and Helmholtz are merely exiled to islands for individuals instead of 
being tortured into submission or summarily killed off like Joseph K. or 
any other undesirable misfit.
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In other words, while the essay Brave New World Revisited might have 
been partly motivated by a competitive desire to point out some alleged 
flaws in the work of a famous rival in the field of theoretical-mythical-
prophetic utopia studies,247 Huxley ends up inadvertently revealing some 
weaknesses in his own imaginative creation. This fact takes nothing away 
from the many strengths of the later essay, which offers a persuasive argu-
ment about how hard it will be for democracy to take hold or survive in 
an overcrowded, overorganized world. It also claims that in such a densely 
organized world it will also be next to impossible for man to remain truly 
human and pursue projects freely and lovingly in accordance with his 
fundamental nature and values. Huxley’s argument leads one to won-
der if democracy is integral to man’s preservation of his humanity. Might 
democracy be best characterized not as a human right, but as a human 
requirement? Huxley does not explicitly ask those questions though his 
inquiry leads in that direction. However, he does ask an essential practi-
cal question in his concluding chapter entitled “What Can Be Done?”—
namely, Are humans all that interested in preserving their humanity?
At this point we find ourselves confronted by a very disquiet-
ing question: Do we really wish to act upon our knowledge? 
Does a majority of the population think it worth while to take 
a good deal of trouble, in order to halt and, if possible, reverse 
the current drift toward totalitarian control of everything? In 
the United States—and America is the prophetic image of the 
rest of the urban-industrial world as it will be a few years from 
now—recent public opinion polls have revealed that an actual 
majority of young people in their teens, the voters of tomor-
row, have no faith in democratic institutions, see no objection 
to the censorship of unpopular ideas, do not believe that gov-
ernment of the people by the people is possible and would 
be perfectly content, if they can continue to live in the style 
to which the boom has accustomed them, to be ruled, from 
above, by an oligarchy of assorted experts. (BNWR, 120)
Note the popular “drift” metaphor. Sixty years later, we could wonder 
what today’s opinion polls would report if young people were asked simi-
lar questions in post-Mao, post-Deng China or in Putin’s Russia, Obama’s 
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America, Hollande’s France, or Cameron’s UK, for example. And aren’t 
many Americans and Europeans today saying that the answer to the 
post-2008 bust that has replaced their boom is not more democracy but 
stricter discipline, “austerity,” and top-down management by experts?248 
Huxley recommends “Education for Freedom”—the title of his sec-
ond-to-last chapter—which for him means reaffirming that “without 
freedom, human beings cannot become fully human and that freedom is 
therefore supremely valuable.” But there is a troubling circularity to this 
declaration that perhaps will be most quickly picked up on by someone 
who is malnourished, homeless, uninsured, or unemployed. To them 
freedom may sound like a luxury they can’t afford or just another word 
for “nothing left to lose” ( Joplin). Therefore the burden is on Huxley and 
those who share his views to demonstrate that freedom is “supremely 
valuable” and a necessary condition for achieving all primary human 
needs. If successful, he might gain acceptance for the idea put forward 
by Tocqueville, Heimonet, and others that “the purpose of life was not 
well-being but some intensification and refining of consciousness, some 
enlargement of knowledge” (BNW, 177)—what Tocqueville calls alter-
nately “esprit de liberté” and “esprit religieux,” and Heimonet (following 
Bataille) “le sacré.” And acceptance for the related idea of Saussure, as 
relayed by Barthes, that this “intensification” has to happen with others 
and imposes limits; an idea relayed in turn by Heimonet when he writes, 
“Awakening to the consciousness of one’s non-sufficiency, the common 
feature of religion and associations, is no longer only an art but an ethic of 
limits.”249 Here is what Huxley says educating for freedom would teach us:
The value, first of all, of individual freedom, based on the facts 
of human diversity and genetic uniqueness; the value of char-
ity and compassion, based on the old familiar fact, lately redis-
covered by modern psychiatry—the fact that, whatever their 
mental and physical diversity, love is as necessary to human 
beings as food and shelter; and finally the value of intelli-
gence, without which love is impotent and freedom unattain-
able. (BNWR, 112)
It sounds like the “Humanities” curriculum of a mostly bygone age 
that believed in liberal arts education, such as when William James could 
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write of “The Social Value of the College Bred” (1907). But how many 
today are willing and able to enroll in such courses? And who will pay 
for them? Does a majority of the population think it worthwhile to take a 
good deal of trouble to stop the current drift toward totalitarian control 
of everything?
Forster’s Democracy: A Room with a View
If he had been a fictional character in Huxley’s Brave New World, E. M. 
Forster would certainly have been sent off to a faraway island since every-
thing he wrote over his long life (1879–1970) contained “the threat of 
unorthodoxy” (BNW, 148) and the menace of being true and hence of 
being banned, like Shakespeare (218), whose archaic quality and strange 
beauty, says Mustapha Mond, risked making it too attractive and there-
fore provoking the sort of “deconditioning” that could upset the harmo-
nious, if dull, social state that he and the other World Controllers had 
managed to engineer into existence.
Forster’s indocile writings—his novels, stories, essays, and occasional 
prose pieces—all defend “the infinity of the private man,” his liberty to 
experiment and invent, and his freedom to engage in loving relationships 
with people, places, and things. Human life for Forster was “a room with 
a view,” that is to say, a given form that nevertheless held out a prospect 
for endless renovation and innovation in collaboration with others, living 
or dead. In Huxley’s Brave New World, thoughts such as “Only connect” 
(the epigraph to Forster’s 1910 novel Howard’s End) must be censored. 
Mustapha Mond explains why:
It was the sort of idea that might easily decondition the more 
unsettled minds among the higher castes—make them lose 
their faith in happiness as the Sovereign Good and take to 
believing, instead, that the goal was somewhere beyond, 
somewhere outside the present human sphere; that the pur-
pose of life was not the maintenance of well-being, but some 
intensification and refining of consciousness, some enlarge-
ment of knowledge. Which was, the Controller reflected, 
quite possibly true. But not, in the present circumstance 
admissible. (BNW, 177)
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The total state as depicted in Huxley and Orwell’s fables employs engi-
neers of all sorts for purposes of conditioning and control, but neither 
society can tolerate the artist, the scientist, or the religious mystic since 
these types of individuals have a tendency to wander off and disobey the 
state’s rules while pursuing their own projects for their own sake with a 
self-reliant, aristocratic sovereignty. (“Science is dangerous; we have to 
keep it most carefully chained and muzzled,” BNW, 225.) The appropri-
ately named Mr. Emerson in Forster’s novel A Room with a View (1908) 
is one such individual and the triumph in that love story is the nudge that 
gets his son and Lucy Honeychurch to channel their inner Beethoven 
and connect in the end instead of succumbing to conformist hobgoblins.
Although perhaps tempted by the moralizing tendency of an age that 
can lead smart, sensitive souls to want to teach and remonstrate (think 
of Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath, 1939), Forster’s modesty and ironic 
touch helped him be less preachy and maintain a somewhat clearer bor-
der than either Huxley or Orwell between the narrative mode of his fic-
tions and the declarative mode in his essays. In both genres, however, he 
is offering a steady, low-key defense of tolerance and other “negative vir-
tues” such as “not being huffy, touchy, irritable, revengeful” (46). Forster, 
who says he belongs to “the fag-end of Victorian liberalism,” speaks out 
respectfully but firmly in favor of the same “manly courage” Tocqueville 
extolled and that one finds in earlier British liberals such as Milton 
(Aeropagitica) and Mill (On Liberty), and Lowes Dickinson, author of “A 
Modern Symposium, which might be called the Bible of Tolerance” (47). 
Having the courage to tolerate is the main idea in Forster’s short essay on 
the “very dull virtue” tolerance and its superiority to love when it comes to 
the decent negotiations of public life.
Forster’s essay “Tolerance” is one of sixty-eight pieces written in the 
1930s and ’40s that he published together under the title Two Cheers for 
Democracy in 1951, the year after Orwell’s death. Collectively they look 
back with relief that not quite everything was destroyed in Europe dur-
ing the previous two decades, but with only moderate optimism about 
what lies ahead as the Cold War begins to harden hearts and minds once 
again both in- and outside the so-called Free World. The essays collected 
in that volume, thankfully still in print, are very much “a survivor’s tale”—
to borrow the subtitle of Spiegelman’s Maus—a tale told by a sensitive, 
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considerate, and plucky aristocratic democrat who is leading by example 
in ways that recall Tocqueville, i.e., with a measure of indestructible faith 
in “the strange nature of man” (43), in his wolfish need to live freely and 
semisocially Huxley might say, and (therefore) with few delusions about 
the reliability or abundance of human virtue, patience, or intelligence.
Broadcasting from his island, so to speak, at Cambridge University in 
1951, Forster concludes his “Prefatory Note” to the volume with these 
words: “The darkness that troubles us and tries to degrade us may thin 
out. We may still contrive to raise three cheers for democracy, although 
at present she only deserves two” (xii). The verb thin out is typical of 
Forster’s prose style, which is both high-spirited and down-to-earth. 
Never haughty or folksy, he writes as a man speaking to men about com-
mon problems of urgency (see “Three Anti-Nazi Broadcasts” or “The 
Challenge of Our Time”), neglected figures who deserve greater atten-
tion (see “John Skelton” or “Henry Thornton”), or misconceptions and 
mistakes that more careful second thoughts can perhaps set right (see 
“Jew-Consciousness” or “Art for Art’s Sake”).
Unlike Forster’s charming novels, many of which were lovingly turned 
into movies almost twenty years ago now by the generation raised first 
on bedtime stories and later television, his essays, written for an “age of 
unrest” (102) and an “Age of Faith” (67), risk falling into neglect despite 
their intelligence, good humor, and relevance in our attention deficient, 
restless Internet age marked by increasing isolation and immunity.250 
Forster recognized the danger of his own oblivion as he contemplated 
what we’ve been calling the archaic’s challenge to the modern:
[T]he past, and the creations that derive from the past, are 
losing their honour and on their way to being jettisoned. 
We have, in this age of unrest, to ferry much old stuff across 
the river, and the old stuff is not merely books, pictures, and 
music, but the power to enjoy and understand them. If the 
power is lost the books, etc., will sink down into museums and 
die, or only survive in some fantastic caricature. The power 
was acquired through tradition. Sinclair Lewis, in Babbitt 
[1922], describes a civilisation which had no tradition and 
could consequently only work, or amuse itself with rubbish; 
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it had heard of the past, but lacked the power to enjoy it or 
understand. (102)
Forster’s effort in these sixty-eight pieces is to be the passeur, the fer-
ryman. But he insists repeatedly that he is not simply teaching “art appre-
ciation” or curating reverence. He is not defending tradition and the indi-
vidual talent for their own sakes so much as he is relighting a beacon by 
testifying to the imaginative achievement and “internal harmony” of the 
work of art that “stands up by itself ” like nothing else in the world, as he 
says in “Art for Art’s Sake” (92). Yet appreciation and testimony and cre-
ativity are related, as he notes in “Does Culture Matter?”
The appreciator of an esthetic achievement becomes in his 
minor way an artist; he cannot rest without communicat-
ing what has been communicated to him. This “passing on” 
impulse takes various forms, some of them merely edu-
cational, others merely critical; but it is essentially a glow 
derived from the central fire, and to extinguish it is to forbid 
the spread of the Gospel. (106)
At key moments that become turning points in their lives, individuals 
in Forster’s fictions oppose forces of extinction as they come into contact 
with this “glow derived from the central fire.” That is why spiritual con-
nections and personal relationships that induce such spiritual connec-
tions with “the central fire” figure prominently in the novels and stories.
Personal relationships are Forster’s starting point in the essay “What 
I Believe,” which begins, “I do not believe in belief. But this is an age of 
faith, and there are so many militant creeds that, in self-defense, one has 
to formulate a creed of one’s own” (67). In hard times, even poets must 
account for themselves. This passionate and lucid act of self-defense 
against militant creeds, composed, I imagine, like Tocqueville’s master-
piece out of “a sort of religious terror,” and published in the decisive year 
1939, could be considered the keystone to the whole volume and is the 
source for the expression “two cheers for democracy” that he used for 
its title. This is an apt summary of Tocqueville’s assessment of democ-
racy too: a set of orderly but open relations that produces a more just and 
confident form of society than what Forster calls “efficiency regimes,” 
but one that is also wasteful, reckless, vulgar, and often ruthless toward 
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nonconformists who may (at a price) resist the “salutary yoke” imposed 
by the tyrannous majority.251 For Forster the real advantages of democ-
racy are easily summarized:
[Democracy] is less hateful than other contemporary forms 
of government… It does start from the assumption that the 
individual is important and that all types are needed to make 
a civilization… It does not divide citizens into the bossers and 
the bossed—as an efficiency regime tends to do… It allows 
criticism, and if there is not public criticism there are bound to 
be hushed-up scandals… So Two Cheers for Democracy: one 
because it admits variety and two because it permits criticism. 
Two cheers are quite enough: there is no reason to give three. 
Only Love the Beloved Republic deserves that. (69–70)
The last remark is Forster’s dry mock at the sort of unthinking patrio-
tism that Tocqueville and Orwell both derided as being limiting and of 
limited usefulness. The reason democracy cannot get three cheers from 
Forster is perhaps most clearly stated in the essay “The Challenge of Our 
Time” (1946). It has to do with his preference for the individual over a 
mystic faith in “the people,” or as Orwell has Winston Smith say, “the pro-
les.” His respectful but firm reservation about the people—the demos—is 
worth quoting at length:
Temperamentally, I am an individualist. Professionally, I am a 
writer, and my books emphasize the importance of personal 
relationships and the private life, for I believe in them….
If we are to answer the challenge of our time successfully, 
we must manage to combine the new economy and the old 
morality. The doctrine of laisser-faire will not work in the 
material world. It has led to the black market and the capitalist 
jungle. We must have planning and ration books and controls, 
or millions of people will have nowhere to live and nothing 
to eat. On the other hand, the doctrine of laisser-faire is the 
only one that seems to work in the world of the spirit; if you 
plan and control men’s minds you stunt them, you get the 
censorship, the secret police, the road to serfdom, the com-
munity of slaves. Our economic planners sometimes laugh at 
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us when we are afraid of totalitarian tyranny resulting from 
their efforts—or rather they sneer at us, for there is some 
deep connection between planning and sneering which psy-
chologists should explore. But the danger they brush aside is 
a real one. They assure us that the new economy will evolve 
an appropriate morality, and that when all people are properly 
fed and housed, they will have an outlook which will be right, 
because they are the people. I cannot swallow that. I have no 
mystic faith in the people. I have in the individual. He seems 
to me a divine achievement and I mistrust any view which 
belittles him. If anyone calls you a wretched little individual—
and I’ve been called that—don’t you take it lying down. You 
are important because everyone else is an individual too—
including the person who criticises you. In asserting your per-
sonality you are playing for your side.
That then is the slogan with which I would answer, or par-
tially answer, the Challenge of our Time. We want the New 
Economy with the Old Morality. We want planning for the 
body and not for the spirit. But the difficulty is this: where 
does the body stop and the spirit start?
… Suppose you are planning the world-distribution of 
food. You can’t do that without planning world population. 
You can’t do that without regulating the number of births and 
interfering with family life. You must supervise parenthood. 
You are meddling with the realms of the spirit, of personal 
relationships, although you may not have intended to do so. 
And you are brought back again to that inescapable arbiter, 
your own temperament. When there is a collision of princi-
ples would you favor the individual at the expense of the com-
munity as I would? Or would you prefer economic justice for 
all at the expense of personal freedom? (55–58)
There is much to notice here: first, the allusion to Tocqueville via 
Hayek’s borrowing for the title of his instantly popular libertarian essay 
The Road to Serfdom (1944); second, the concern Forster shares with 
Huxley about overpopulation and how large global problems and the 
urge to solve them via regulation can lead to overorganization that in 
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turn leads to an arrogant oligarchy of experts who endanger democracy 
insofar as they stifle freedom and hem in the participation of individuals 
who are lectured that “there is no alternative” to the dominant viewpoint 
and the public policy that logically follows from it; and third, the pointed 
rejection of any romantic idealization of “the people” as inherently virtu-
ous—a matter he returns to in his essay “George Orwell” (1950), which 
directly follows this one, where he assumes that Orwell (“a bit of a nag-
ger”) shared Winston Smith’s belief in “the proles.” Forster adds, “He 
also believes in ‘the people,’ who, with their beefy arms akimbo and their 
cabbage-stalk soup, may survive when higher growths are cut down. He 
does not explain how ‘the people’ are to make good, and perhaps he is 
here confusing belief with compassion” (62). But perhaps here Forster 
has confused Blair-Orwell with the narrator of 1984.
Rhetorically, the most striking features of the passage are the connec-
tive apostrophes to the reader (“you,” “your”) and the interrogative mode 
at the end that requires each of us to truly think about and take respon-
sibility for the consequences of a decision that will be based not on pure 
reason or calculation but on temperament—a table-turning strategy that 
recalls William James’s use of temperament to dislodge rationalist logic in 
his manifesto Pragmatism (1910). Forster’s description of the dilemma 
and his submission of a true open question to the reader also recall the 
end of Tocqueville’s “Real Advantages of Democracy” chapter (DA I, 
2, 6), where after many apostrophes he essentially asks, “What kind of 
a society do you want? We have to get clear on that” (“Que demandez-
vous de la société et de son gouvernement? Il faut s’entendre”)—if you want 
features a, b, c, don’t pick democracy; but if you want x, y, z, then do pick 
democracy. In both there is a voice that says, “We’re in this together.”252 
Ultimately, Forster’s “two cheers for democracy” is his attempt to get 
around the “collision of principles” and the dilemma of mutual exclu-
sion (and the danger of mutually assured destruction), by substituting 
an “aristocracy of the sensitive, the considerate and the plucky” for the 
third cheer that is rendered impossible (as it was already for Tocqueville) 
by the tyranny of the majority and all the other negative tendencies of 
democracy—notably individualism that runs toward egotism and opens 
the way toward oligarchy by experts; materialism that runs toward fren-
zied overconsumption and indebtedness; and nowism that leads to 
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contempt for the past and no vision (or taking on of responsibility) for 
the future. Forster would rather pin his hopes on the leaven provided 
by the members of his plucky aristocracy rather than on the people’s 
uncertain goodness or the wisdom of technocratic consultants brought 
in from the social sciences and schools of management to advise and 
administrate.253 
Nevertheless, the aristocracy he describes is democratic in the sense 
that its members crop up everywhere and all stand in opposition to the 
traditional hero-worship (especially the worship of power, rank, and 
influence) that comes with traditional aristocracy. “Its members are to 
be found in all nations and classes, and all through the ages, and there 
is a secret understanding between them when they meet” (73); they 
behave a bit God-like, “as if they were immortal and as if society was eter-
nal” (71); what is good in these people is “their insistence on creation, 
their belief in friendship and loyalty for their own sakes” (72); and “such 
people get more of a chance under a democracy than elsewhere” (69). 
These individuals express something spiritual, but in a non-Christian 
form that Forster finds preferable (as it avoids church hierarchies with 
their money-soaked pyramids of power, secrecy, and hypocrisy), which is 
why he concludes by distinguishing his position from that of traditional 
Christian believers who “have Faith with a large F. My faith has a very 
small one, and I only intrude it because these are strenuous and serious 
days, and one likes to say what one thinks while speech is comparatively 
free: it may not be free much longer” (76). Forster feels the urgency of 
bearing witness. He is the consummate professor-artist who accepts that 
no one ought to duck accountability, and so like Shelley before him, he 
defends his actions and those of his tribe, hoping that society will in turn 
remember its duty to artists and not banish or kill them off completely—
hardly a groundless fear in 1939.
•
In 2011 the British publisher Penguin celebrated the fiftieth anniversary 
of its popular series Penguin Classics by putting out a set of low-cost, 
pocket-sized Mini Modern Classics that included a volume containing 
two Forster stories, “The Machine Stops” and “The Celestial Omnibus.” 
The latter had been the title story of an anthology I read more than thirty 
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years ago, but it was “The Machine Stops” that got top billing for this re-
edition, and it’s easy to see why. Market analysts at Penguin, who per-
haps noticed that technology skeptics and other Zeitgeist watchers of the 
Internet age responded favorably to Jaron Lanier’s 2010 manifesto You 
Are Not a Gadget, may have intuited that they could attract a similar group 
of readers with a slim volume hardly bigger than an iphone that features 
Forster’s 1909 “meditation” on a gadget-filled world that gradually comes 
to enslave the minds and bodies of its human inventors. Forster imag-
ines a world where people live underground like bees in cells because 
the surface of the earth has become uninhabitable or is said to be so, and 
they communicate as much as possible indirectly—direct contact being 
shunned as vulgarly “unmechanical”—via “blue optic plates.” Decades 
before “The Jetsons” or Skype, Forster imagined the video call.
But it was fully fifteen seconds before the round plate that she 
held in her hands began to glow. A faint blue light shot across 
it, darkening to purple, and presently she could see the image 
of her son, who lived on the other side of the earth, and he 
could see her. (2)
Change the circle to a rectangle and Forster could be describing a 
contemporary conversation on any computer screen. Other gadgets and 
dry comments in the story are likely to hold the post-9/11 Internet age 
reader’s attention, right up to the “air-ship” that crashes into a building at 
the cataclysmic end of the story.
The mordant irony of this short story starts out from a simple mother-
son “communication gap” in a posthuman world.254 But instead of cast-
ing the boy as the hip technophile and the mother as the square tech-
nophobe, it is just the reverse. The son asks his mother to come and see 
him. “Vashti watched his face in the blue plate. ‘But I can see you!’ she 
exclaimed. ‘What more do you want?’ ‘I want to see you not through the 
Machine,’ said Kuno” (3). Acting on some vestige of maternal instinct, 
she travels to meet with her son and listens as he tells her more hereti-
cal ideas: “The Machine is much, but it is not all… Cannot you see, can-
not you lecturers see, that it is we who are dying, and that down here the 
only thing that really lives is the Machine.” He then recounts his daring 
escape to the surface of the earth; informs her of the Central Committee’s 
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threat to sentence him to “homelessness”; and most importantly makes 
the “venomous” remark, “The Machine stops” (45).
Signs of “the collapse of humanity” (48) multiply in the third act of 
the story, entitled “Homelessness,” until eventually “the Committee of 
the Mending Apparatus” “confessed that the Mending Apparatus was 
itself in need of repair” (49). However, the repairs are not forthcoming, 
and this Machine civilization comes to an apocalyptic end. But in extre-
mis, Forster has Kuno voice the revolutionary credo that the earth will be 
repopulated by a new Humanity of wised up “Homeless” people.
“I have seen them, spoken to them, loved them. They are hid-
ing in the mist and ferns until our civilization stops. Today 
they are the Homeless—to-morrow—”
“Oh, to-morrow—some fool will start the Machine 
again, to-morrow.”
“Never,” said Kuno, “never, Humanity has learnt its lesson.”
As he spoke the whole city was broken like a honeycomb….
Note the echoes from that magical play of misguided statecraft, 
Macbeth: “mist… to-morrow… fool.” Shakespeare seems to have been 
hardwired into British brains in those days. Note also that whatever the 
outcome might be in the play beyond the play, so to speak, Kuno has 
managed to get through to his mother, since it is she who calls the one 
who might start the Machine again a “fool.” This and other subtly hopeful 
characteristics of the story (“Is there any hope, Kuno?” “None for us.”) 
may have led Huxley and Orwell to use Forster’s “meditation” as a tem-
plate for their own mythopoetic utopia studies. At any rate, the sales and 
marketing people at Penguin books would probably be glad if more of us 
would like to make use of it ourselves.
 Missing Tony Judt’s Anger
As a recipient of the Orwell Prize and as a former student of Forster’s at 
Cambridge University, it seems fitting to close out this tour of prominent, 
interrelated 1930s British witnesses of democracy and dictatorship with 
the “audit” carried out by the British-born cosmopolitan historian Tony 
Judt. He was born in 1948 (like Heimonet and Pierre Rosanvallon), 
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which makes him a sort of early baby boomer just as President Obama, 
born in 1961, is the symmetrical late baby boomer. Being born on or 
near the point of articulation between two periods or generations is per-
haps more conducive to becoming the sort of privileged witness or “edge 
person” that Judt identifies himself with. Judt’s name suggests both jut-
ting out and judge, two features that happen to characterize his some-
what “edgy,” against-the-postmodern-grain assessments of the topics 
he treated in his many books and essays. He died in August 2010 of the 
motor neuron disease ALS—amyotrophic lateral sclerosis—also known 
in the U.S. as “Lou Gehrig’s disease” in memory of a famous baseball 
player who died of ALS in 1941. In France it is known as the maladie de 
Charcot, in honor of Jean-Martin Charcot, the doctor who first diagnosed 
it in detail—the same doctor whose work on hysteria and hypnosis 
would influence Freud and the development of psychoanalysis. In the last 
two years of his life, as he was progressively losing power over his body 
from limbs to core, Judt managed to write two fine little books. One is an 
extended essay on the rise and fall of social democracy and the possibil-
ity of its afterlife. The other is a selection of shorter pieces on heartfelt 
topics that are linked together, like the Swiss train cars moving through a 
wintry landscape depicted on the book’s cover, by the warmth and intel-
ligence of Judt’s lively mind. Their titles are Ill Fares the Land (2010) and 
The Memory Chalet (2010).255 
One has to marvel at the extraordinary courage and determination—
comparable to that of Stephen Hawking or Jean-Dominique Bauby—of 
someone undertaking and actually completing these projects. And at the 
combination of generosity and stubbornness that seems to have pushed 
Judt to write to the end where lesser figures with already a shelf of pub-
lications to their names might have occupied their last days sailing or fly 
fishing. But of course those latter activities, while possible for the can-
cer patient, say, are not options for the ALS patient, who instead finds 
himself unexpectedly entombed in the cell of his own body, an odd plot 
twist that even Poe had not imagined, though Forster in “The Machine 
Stops” came close.
There are no doubt plenty of reasons that justify awarding Tony 
Judt the Orwell Prize (2009) and the Hannah Arendt Prize (2007), 
but I would like to create and bestow on him an “E. M. Forster Prize” 
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for “enterprising curiosity, an undefeatable spirit, tenacity in pursuit,”256 
and optimism in the face of a depressing set of crises at every level start-
ing with his own personal condition (advancing paralysis, terminal ill-
ness) and moving out to that of his professional life as a contemporary 
humanities professor (reduced social honor amid a new “counterenlight-
enment”257 ) and then to the world at large (austerity, scarcity). Despite 
the high seriousness of his historical essays, Judt’s true temperament may 
have been closer to Forster’s. Judt is irrepressibly cheerful—just look at 
that endearing smile on the back flap of his two last books—and lacks the 
anger of an Orwell or Heimonet, though he wishes he and his colleagues 
could be angrier.
In his Introduction to 1984 discussed above, Thomas Pynchon says 
that Orwell was constantly worried about losing the anger that seems 
to have been his fuel, his spur. In Ill Fares the Land, Judt seems worried 
about not finding his—not being able to adequately express his anger or 
incite an anger in his contemporaries that would be productive and not 
destructive. Perhaps, like many, he is undecided about the value of anger 
and wonders whether it is best to let it out or hold it in.258 Unlike the 
Memory Chalet, which is Judt’s Forster-like “Harvest,” Ill Fares the Land is 
supposed to be the Orwell book, a jeremiad in the tradition of Politics and 
The English Language (1946) written under the twin signs of lamentation 
and anger, and yet the anger is mostly muted or missing despite repeated 
invocations.
There is much to be angry about (8)… “you speak of being 
angry at our political quiescence” (9)… This is not to say 
that a new generation of radicals was insensitive to injustice 
or political malfeasance: the Vietnam protests and the race 
riots of the ’60s were not insignificant. But they were divorced 
from any sense of collective purpose, being rather understood 
as extensions of individual self-expression and anger (90)… 
Liberation is an act of the will. We cannot hope to reconstruct 
our dilapidated public conversation—no less than our crum-
bling physical infrastructure—unless we become sufficiently 
angry at our present condition (161)… Incremental improve-
ments upon unsatisfactory circumstances are the best that we 
can hope for, and probably all we should seek. Others have 
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spent the last three decades methodically unraveling and 
destabilizing them: this should make us much angrier than we 
are. (224, emphasis added)
The above instances of the words anger, angry and angrier suggest that 
on the one hand Judt believes in the role of anger as a catalyst of con-
sciousness-raising and political action, but he is also perhaps mindful of 
the possibility of (1) its degeneration into tantrum and sterile self-indul-
gence, (2) of not getting beyond that primary gut feeling of pain and hurt, 
and (3) of its escalating out of control. In other words, three counterpro-
ductive outcomes. For anger to be more than mere “venting,” he knows 
that it must be articulate, it must be backed up by well-crafted arguments 
(claims based on reasons and evidence that acknowledge objections and 
alternative views and respond to them), and it must be in the service of 
some “collective purpose” and not pursued for its own sake.
Having been twenty in 1968 and not six, sixteen, or thirty-six, Judt 
was in a better position than many to both take part in and see the limita-
tions of various forms of protest in Europe, America, and Israel around 
that time.259 The possibility of one’s anger being insufficiently articulate 
and articulated to larger aims, and therefore mocked and dismissed as 
childish tantrum and irresponsible pique—as David Brooks does to the 
Occupy Wall Street movement260 —is probably what makes Judt repeat 
(even more times than the word angry) his belief that what’s seriously 
lacking is the proper way of talking about our current social maladies.
That the one groping for a proper diagnosis of the “ill” “land” is an ill 
man dying of a mysterious motor-neuron disease for which there is cur-
rently no cure adds poignancy to the whole enterprise. One should also 
keep in mind that both these farewell books are dedicated to Judt’s teen-
age sons by a third younger wife (i.e., he knows whereof he speaks when 
talking about “divorced from any sense of collective purpose”). In other 
words, they attempt the grand écart of combining a certain insouciance 
with a deathbed admonitory dimension: try and avoid the mistakes made 
by me and mine (including excess insouciance). As another Englishman 
who knows his classics, Judt channels his inner Shakespeare (via Oliver 
Goldsmith) and throws a bit of updated King Lear and John of Gaunt 
(Richard II, “…this sceptered isle…”) into his original remix of empire 
anxiety and declinist talk. Understandably, he wants his heirs to avoid 
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being a part of another “Lost Generation” and to avoid if possible the 
mass suffering that his own parents experienced in the 1930s.
But do we have here a case of the blind leading the blind? Or is it 
instead that in the world of the blind, the one-eyed are worth follow-
ing for a while at least? Judt knows that the historian, like the econo-
mist or philosopher, must neither exaggerate nor minimize the value 
of his contribution to the public debate, and he’s often straining to fol-
low his own prudential advice. This is noticeable in the large number of 
pointed but polite questions and repeated calls for better talking. Here 
are some examples:
If 1989 was about re-discovering liberty, what limits are we 
now willing to place on it? Even in the most “freedom-loving” 
societies, freedom comes with constraints. But if we accept 
some limitations—and we always do—why not others? 
Why are we so sure that some planning, or progressive taxa-
tion, or the collective ownership of public goods, are intoler-
able restrictions on liberty; whereas close-circuit television 
cameras, state bailouts for investment banks “too big to fail,” 
tapped telephones and expensive foreign wars are acceptable 
burdens for free people to bear?
There may be good answers to these questions; but how can 
we know unless we pose them? We need to rediscover how 
to talk about change: how to imagine very different arrange-
ments for ourselves, free of the dangerous cant of “revolu-
tion.” (152–153)
Here we see that Judt’s anger is most articulate in the interroga-
tive mode. He wants to be a catalyst, leading by example by asking the 
questions others have forgotten or forgotten how to ask. But the num-
ber of repeated calls for better talk suggest that better questions are not 
enough—good answers or at least “good enough” answers will also have 
to be formulated and translated into action. Like someone who remem-
bers a past experience of being burned, bitten, or stung, Judt is less 
inclined to go in that more explicit direction, so he mostly stays in the 
comfort zone familiar to the tenured Anglo-Saxon college professor, ask-
ing questions and calling for better talk:
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Something is profoundly wrong with the way we live today… 
We know what things cost but have no idea what they are 
worth. We no longer ask of a judicial ruling or a legislative 
act: is it good? Is it fair? Is it right? Will it help bring a bet-
ter society or a better world? Those used to be the political 
questions, even if they invited no easy answers. We must learn 
once again to pose them. (1–2) … Our problem is not what 
to do; it is how to talk about it. (6) … “What is most striking”, 
she wrote, “about what you say is not so much the substance 
but the form … No one talks like this any more.” Hence this 
book. (9) … Our disability is discursive: we simply do not 
know how to talk about these things any more. (34) … We 
need to rediscover how to talk about change: how to imagine 
very different arrangements for ourselves, free of the danger-
ous cant of ‘revolution’. (153) … [T]o recast our public con-
versation—seems to me the only realistic way to begin to 
bring about change. If we do not talk differently, we shall not 
think differently. (171) … We need to re-open a different sort 
of conversation. We need to become confident once again in 
our own instincts: if a policy or an action or a decision seems 
somehow wrong, we must find the words to say so. (173) … 
Much of what is amiss in our world can best be captured in 
the language of classical political thought: we are intuitively 
familiar with issues of injustice, unfairness, inequality and 
immorality—we have just forgotten how to talk about them. 
Social democracy once articulated such concerns, until it lost 
its way. (234, emphasis added)
“Our problem is not what to do; it is how to talk about it.” Our prob-
lem? That may be the problem for a paralyzed professor or professorate, 
but surely the problem for some of us is precisely what to do, no?
But what if we go along, take Judt at his word, and ask How good is 
he at following his own advice and talking the talk that he recommends 
to others? The answer is, Only so-so. Judt does a fairly good job at retell-
ing the story of social democracy’s rise during the postwar years (Keynes, 
Beveridge, Attlee) and of the “ironic legacy of the ’60s” (i.e., how advo-
cates for more civil rights and individual freedoms became accomplices 
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in the neoliberal, neoconservative resurgence that led to economic 
unfreedom, surveillance, and “the cult of privatization”).261 He also use-
fully names the Austrians (Drucker, Hayek, Popper, Schumpeter, Von 
Mies) who were instrumental or instrumentalized in dismantling social 
democracy’s egalitarian gains in the name of a dubious “freedom to 
choose” (Ill, 91–106)—in part by seizing on some bad plans (e.g., eugen-
ics, shoddy low-income housing) to condemn all public planning and 
subsidized public services. He also does a good job (Ill, 106–19, Memory, 
“The Green Line Bus,” 57–63) at recounting with specific facts and fig-
ures the disastrous consequences of the sell-off of British public assets 
such as the railroad and bus lines, transactions that set the pattern for the 
privatization of profits and the socialization of risk that has only lately 
been denounced since the 2008 bailout of U.S. banks and the similar cav-
ing in to the “bankster” logic of “too big to fail” in the European bank 
crisis that intensified in 2011.262 
For the most part, however, naming names is not Judt’s strong suit, 
and instead of answering precisely a worthy question, “What’s living and 
what’s dead in social democracy?” (the title of his concluding chapter), 
he tends to fall back on vaguely worded condemnations or zingers like 
this remark that concludes the introduction to Chapter Four, “Goodbye 
to All That?”: “The years from 1989 to 2009 were consumed by locusts.” 
Maybe, but who exactly are the locusts Judt has in mind? The reader is left 
to guess and may feel angry at Judt for his silence instead of at the post–
Cold War, Internet age “locusts.” It would have been more helpful—i.e., 
stand a better chance of advancing Judt’s desired aim of channeling anger 
for a worthwhile collective purpose—if he had been less biblical here 
and more bibliographic.263 Judt names none of the principal players in 
the financial crisis of 2008 (Bernanke, Geithner, Greenspan, and Paulson 
on the government side, sort of; as well as Joseph Cassano [AIG], Dick 
Fuld [Lehman], Ken Lewis [Bank of America], Daniel Mudd [Fannie 
Mae], and Robert Williamstad [AIG] on the corporate side); nor does he 
steer the reader toward any useful summary of the 2008 crash and bail-
out such as the documentary films American Casino (2009) and Inside Job 
(2010) or the ongoing investigative coverage of those events in the New 
York Times, the New Yorker magazine, or the New York Review of Books, 
where Judt was a regular contributor.264 Judt’s silence lets everyone off 
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the hook—no account, no accountability—and the image of “locusts” 
naturalizes a man-made disaster by substituting a narrative of inscrutable 
cyclical forces that just happen.
The silence and holes, which any research assistant could have filled, 
weaken Judt’s presentation, which falls back on passive, no-fault accounts 
of social democracy’s demise (“it lost its way”) and on vague metaphors 
such as “dismantling” and the even more regrettable (because mislead-
ing) metaphor of “unraveling” (13, 44, 79, 142, 224) to describe what 
would be more accurately characterized as a hijacking. “Unraveling” is 
not the mot juste to describe the deliberate unmaking, by lawmakers not 
seamstresses or naughty kittens, of the American and British versions of 
social democracy during the thirty years since the hostile takeovers that 
accelerated during the years of Reagonomics and Thatcherism. That the 
cause and effect relationships that led to the transformation of the social 
state into the security state are not entirely clear in Judt’s head seems 
evident from his mixed metaphors in the following sentence, where the 
passivity and accidental nature of unraveled fabric conflict with the activ-
ity of deliberately taking something apart piece by piece: “By eviscerat-
ing public services and reducing them to a network of farmed-out pri-
vate providers, we have begun to dismantle the fabric of the state” (119). 
Dismantle the fabric? Orwell would wince.
Judt is just not adversarial enough to get angry or effectively trigger 
the productive anger that could catalyze the new discourse about social 
ends and means that he repeatedly calls for. Other symptoms of this 
disconnect between what he says he wants and what he does include a 
defense of dissent without naming dissenters (“The Case for Dissent,” 
156–166), and a frequently naive and/or misleading “we” (such as in 
the sentence just cited) despite what he knows to be a divided, conflict-
ridden civil society (in the U.S., the UK, and Europe) with less and less 
consensus and solidarity on very basic matters such as education, hous-
ing, health care, and tax policy. In one instance Judt shows he can strip off 
the wallpaper We.
…It has become commonplace to assert that we all want 
the same thing, we just have slightly different ways of 
going about it.
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But this is simply false. The rich do not want the same thing 
as the poor. Those who depend on their job for their liveli-
hood do not want the same thing as those who live off invest-
ments and dividends. (168)
Exactly. So then why does Judt say on page 119 “we have begun to dis-
mantle the fabric of the state”? And why assert that “We are all democrats 
today”? (emphasis added). There has always been strong opposition to 
democracy coming from many quarters, including from some Democrats. 
And certainly some people have been more active and motivated when 
it comes to dismantling social democracy than others, and many have 
opposed the dismantling, albeit mostly unsuccessfully.265 Furthermore, 
the state as a whole is not being dismantled, only the social state that for a 
few decades (roughly 1940–1980) reduced inequalities that had built up 
during the century after the publication of Democracy in America. In the 
last thirty years the state has only gotten bigger and more entangled in 
the economy under the stewardship of oddly named “conservative” poli-
ticians who profess to be opposed to “big government.” The social secu-
rity state is weaker than it was thirty years ago, but the security state (i.e., 
the highly militarized surveillance state of Superpower that Wolin calls 
“managed democracy” and “inverted totalitarianism”) became stronger 
than ever between 1989 and 2009. Talking about locusts—as though the 
sins were limited to overconsumption and “bumbling” (162)—obscures 
the extent of the deliberate, calculated damage to American democracy 
and other would-be democracies over the past thirty years, and it lets the 
hijackers off the hook, hidden in the wooly prose of a “great unraveling.”266 
It is similarly bewildering to see Judt trust in the good instincts of 
“young people in the United States and elsewhere” (186) when earlier he 
had used Camille Paglia (85) and his own youthful memories to under-
score the fact that his generation’s exaggerated individualism and youth 
worship made him and his self-styled progressive peers complicit in the 
right’s unmaking of social democracy (“The Ironic Legacy of the 60s,” 
85–91). Oddly, he can ignore the way to hell paved by his generation’s 
supposedly good intentions and claim with apparent sincerity that “the 
perennial desire of youth to do something ‘useful’ or ‘good’ speaks to an 
instinct that we have not succeeded in repressing.” Ironic legacy indeed. 
Channeling his inner Rousseau, Judt wants the reader to overlook once 
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again that problematic “we,” believe in such a universal instinct for good, 
and go along with the unproven claim that “selfishness is uncomfortable 
even for the selfish” (186). Judt sees the rise of gated communities as evi-
dence of this discomfort; yet one could argue, on the contrary, that the 
construction of such exclusive and excluding living arrangements and 
other similarly carefree, callous behaviors prove just how comfortable 
many wealthy people are inside their selfish “lifestyle enclaves.”267 
In the book’s penultimate paragraph Judt asks, “But were my students 
of the 1990s and after truly selfish?” With “Business” as far and away the 
most popular major in American colleges and universities,268 the answer 
would seem obviously to be “Yes”; but for Judt the question is concen-
trated on that adverb truly, and he seems ready to let his students off the 
hook too by suggesting they became selfish and money-obsessed from 
bad parenting or bad television broadcasts. He answers his own ques-
tion this way:
Assured from all quarters that radical change lay in the past, 
they saw around them no examples to follow, no arguments 
to engage and no goals to pursue. If the purpose of life as 
lived by everyone you see is to succeed in business, then this 
will become the default goal of all but the most independent 
young person. (237)
Independent-minded like Thoreau or independently wealthy like 
the Astors? But there were plenty of arguments—in Milton’s sense—
to engage young people in the roaring 1990s: the skyrocketing cost of 
higher education, health care, and health insurance; the deindustrializa-
tion and financialization of the American economy with downsizing, off-
shoring, and casualizing of the workforce; the unmaking of unions; the 
privatization and higher riskiness of retirement plans; the rewriting of 
the tax code to favor the very wealthy; and of course a dozen major envi-
ronmental emergencies from global warming to overfishing. With these 
examples of “radical change” staring them in the face, young people truly 
saw no goals to pursue other than selecting business instead of English, 
history, political science, biology, physics or engineering as their college 
major? Whether the youth of twenty years ago, now in their early for-
ties with children of their own, were truly selfish or instead more sinned 
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against than sinning is a question that perhaps only a dying academic, or 
academy, would ask.
And someone who had not read his Tocqueville well enough. 
Democracy in America is constantly wondering how rational patriotism, 
i.e., the simultaneously disinterested and interested communal spirit 
necessary for good governance and treating common affairs in common, 
will be able to survive in democratic lands when everyone is relatively 
weak and therefore restless and nervous about securing their well-being. 
Individualism and clannishness are rational behaviors in democratic 
ages, but he knew they could lead to social pathologies. Democracy 
favors self-reliant banding together of the like-minded but can also trig-
ger selfishness and with it the possibility of disbanding and disconnect-
ing—especially as commerce and industry are allowed to become more 
sophisticated, specialized, and hypercompetitive. Democracy’s looser 
horizontal relations can nurture community spirit or just as easily kill it 
off. See Shakespeare’s King Lear, or Democracy in America II, 2, 16, “How 
Excessive Love of Well-Being Can Impair It” (G638).
Interestingly, Tocqueville comes up three times in Ill Fares the Land, 
but mostly in the form of mild Tocqueville sauce (a cold lead-off epi-
graph on the first page and a second one on page 29—both without ref-
erences).269 The third mention (157) is somewhat more helpful since it 
occurs within Judt’s “Case for Dissent” and alludes (also without page 
reference) to the famous passage from DA I, 2, 7, 354, where Tocqueville 
condemns the soft despotism of the majority in democratic lands that 
can allow token dissidents—an Emerson, a Thoreau, a Judt?—to live on, 
entombed and largely powerless at the mercy of the tyrannous majority:
But the balance, noted by Alexis de Tocqueville among many 
others, has long since swung towards conformity. Individuals 
remain free to say what they wish; but if their opinions cut 
athwart those of the majority they will find themselves out-
cast. At the very least the impact of their words will be 
muted. (157)
Presumably we are to read those words with sympathy for the profes-
sor who is himself slipping into muteness. But what if it’s for the best? Of 
course I don’t mean Judt’s untimely death, which is genuinely tragic; but 
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instead his half-wise, half-foolish valedictory address with echoes of King 
Lear that are more subtly provocative for being most likely quite uninten-
tional. Again the irony of unintended consequences.
Judt’s memoir, like Thoreau’s Walden, has been addressing “poor 
students,” but Judt lacks the irreverent self-deprecation of a Thoreau or 
Forster, nor does he have the anger of an Orwell, and therefore he can’t 
bring himself to add any crotchety aside about the possibly limited prac-
tical usefulness of his address as the thirty-seven-year-old Thoreau man-
aged to do in his opening chapter “Economy”:
Perhaps these pages are more particularly addressed to poor 
students. (…) Practically, the old have no very important 
advice to give the young, their own experience has been so 
partial, and their lives have been such miserable failures, for 
private reasons, as they must believe; and it may be that they 
have some faith left which belies that experience, and they are 
only less young than they were. I have lived some thirty years 
on this planet, and I have yet to hear the first syllable of valu-
able or even earnest advice from my seniors. (4, 9)
Thoreau could also have entitled his book Ill Fares the Land—Oliver 
Goldsmith was available for him too—but he didn’t; and he didn’t end 
his fundamentally joyful memoir like Judt did with a lame covert allusion 
to Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach (1845) or to any other authority. Thoreau 
followed Emerson’s advice, but not his example, and came up with his 
own original relation to the universe, signing off with the declaration 
“The sun is but a morning star.” In so doing he in effect performed, pre-
cisely through an act of creative interpretation, a kind of change. With 
that declaration a new perspective, a new outlook on something very old 
gets invented—and a renewed connection for a new age between man 
and his world is offered to us, his students.
What I want to say is that in 2010 Tony Judt may still have had a bit 
too much 1960s self-indulgence for his own good or that of his reader. 
And yet his heart is in the right place at many junctures in these two 
memoirs, or at least it seems so to me. One sign of Judt’s compassion-
ate fellow feeling comes through with the charts and graphs he makes 
use of to clearly illustrate the disastrous social consequences of extreme 
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inequality: lower social mobility and life expectancy and higher rates of 
crime and mental and physical illness (16–20). Another notable instance 
is what he has to say about playing fields (206) and railroads (207–216) 
as examples of collective public goods that need to be cherished if societ-
ies are going to reclaim a political and social role for the state—one that 
opens windows of opportunity for its citizens that its current missions as 
cop and blackmailed financial backer of last resort do not achieve. Judt 
also speaks Tocqueville’s language when it comes to the “good and ill” of 
individualism:
We too readily assume that the defining feature of modernity 
is the individual: the non-reducible subject, the freestanding 
person, the unbound self, the un-beholden citizen. This unat-
tached individual is favourably contrasted with the dependent 
and deferential subject of the pre-modern world. There is 
something to this account: “individualism” may be the cant 
of our time but for good and ill it speaks to the connected 
isolation of our wireless age. However, what is truly distinc-
tive about modern life is not the unattached individual. It is 
society. More precisely civil—or (as the 19th century had it) 
bourgeois—society. (215)
Ultimately, the wish for a civil society—one composed of decent, 
courteous, tolerant citizens who respectfully grant equal dignity and other 
basic human rights to all and protect them whenever necessary—is what 
links Judt to his 1930s forebears Chaplin, Orwell, Huxley, and Forster…
and to Tocqueville, our common 1830s ancestor, and before him to the 
American framers in the 1780s, and their British and European sources 
of inspiration and guidance (Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, 
Ferguson, etc.). From Jefferson to Judt, we are all flawed contradictory 
individuals, neither angels nor devils, neither exactly wolves, ants, or 
bees, but men and women, and therefore animated by common human 
concerns during “a time of troubles” (Memory, 207), including the hope 
that democratic courage and tolerance continue to be able to repair mis-
takes and allow each individual, whether singly or in groups, to pursue 
new opportunities under the rule of law, with liberty and justice for all.
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In the Internet Age

Chapter 5
Democracy Watch 2011
I wrote the first draft of this chapter—a snapshot of democracy in 
2011—on December 17, 2011, the first anniversary of the day Mohamed 
Bouazizi, a twenty-six-year-old Tunisian, set himself on fire in front of a 
government building in the provincial town of Sidi Bouzid in desperate 
protest against the mistreatment he reportedly suffered from police for 
illegally selling fruits and vegetables.270 Bouazzi would die from his burns 
eighteen days later on January 4, 2011. His action is credited with spark-
ing the Tunisian “Jasmine Revolution” and more generally the “Arab 
Spring”—a series of revolutionary uprisings throughout the Middle 
East that have led to regime change in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. 
Other protest movements against authoritarian regimes, notably in Syria, 
are in progress. Thanks to the Internet, I can “Google” Mr. Bouazizi, read 
an extensive profile of him on Wikipedia, view footage of the day’s com-
memoration that was broadcast on France’s TF1 evening news channel,271 
or watch an “infographe” posted on the website of France’s daily newspa-
per Le Monde by a photo journalist who visited Sidi Bouzid to do a fol-
low-up story one year after Mr. Bouazizi’s immolation.272 Or click on any 
of the hundreds of other links my Google search has generated for me.
On December 25, 2010, Kevin Boyle, an internationally known law-
yer, political activist, and “voice for human rights,” died of cancer in 
England at age sixty-seven. Born in Newry, County Down, one of nine 
children of a Northern Irish Catholic taxi driver, Kevin Boyle studied, 
practiced, and taught law for thirty years in Galway, Ireland, and later at 
the University of Essex in England. He was active in the Northern Ireland 
civil rights movement and went on to defend vulnerable individuals and 
groups suffering human rights abuses, notably in Turkey, Russia, and 
South Africa, in trials that contributed significantly to the development 
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of international human rights law. He first came to international promi-
nence on July 19, 1989, with the launch of the world statement in defense 
of Salman Rushdie—a declaration signed by many famous writers and 
academics who united to oppose the death threats and official fatwa 
against Rushdie issued by Ayatollah Khomeini earlier that year in the 
wake of the publication of Rushdie’s controversial book The Satanic Verses 
(1988).273 On September 11, 2001, Kevin Boyle began a new job as a 
close collaborator with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Mary Robinson, the former president of Ireland. He also wrote and 
edited many books, including Article 19 World Report (1988), Introducing 
Democracy (1995, with David Beetham, discussed above), and Human 
Rights and Democracy—The Role of the Supreme Constitutional Court of 
Egypt (edited with Adel Omar Sherif, 1996). I don’t know if Kevin Boyle 
took note of Mohamed Bouazizi’s act of protest during his own last diffi-
cult days. His widow, Joan Boyle, told me she wasn’t sure. It’s a pity in any 
case that neither man lived long enough to witness the struggle for and 
against democracy and human rights that ignited in 2011.
On December 5, 2011, parliamentary elections were held in Russia. 
These elections were marred by allegations of fraud, and these charges—
some of which are backed up by video clips uploaded to websites such as 
Youtube274 —triggered protests, notably the large assembly in Moscow 
on December 10, 2011.275 Many observers now wonder if Putin’s Russia 
will also undergo Middle Eastern–style regime change sometime in the 
near future.276 On December 17, 2011, Ellen Barry reported that Russian 
president Dmitri Medvedev would like to see his and Putin’s United 
Russia Party take the lead in reforming the model of the Russian state, 
which Medvedev said had “exhausted itself.” But it is uncertain how much 
power or influence Medvedev will have since Putin took over again as 
president in 2012.277 
On December 15, 2011, the former French president and former 
mayor of Paris, Jacques Chirac, was convicted of embezzlement and mis-
use of public funds to finance his political party by having created ficti-
tious municipal jobs during his tenure as mayor. The court ruled that 
“Jacques Chirac breached the duty of trust that weighs on public offi-
cials charged with caring for public funds or property, in contempt of 
the general interest of Parisians.”278 He received a two-year suspended 
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sentence. The crimes for which he was convicted date back to the early 
1990s, but he had exercised his right to immunity, granted by the French 
Constitution, during his twelve years as president. From 1995 to 2007 he 
served two terms, first seven years, then five (due to a term-length change 
in the Constitution). Two days later, his Wikipedia page had already 
been updated to take into account this first-ever, “historic” conviction 
of a French president of the Fifth Republic. On December 16, 2011, Le 
Monde quoted an excerpt from a text read by the former president’s law-
yer on his behalf in which Jacques Chirac comments on the significance 
of his trial.279 
Le principe de responsabilité est au cœur de l’action politique. 
Je mesure que ce rendez-vous est nécessairement un instant 
politique. Je crois qu’en permettant de remettre les choses 
à leur vraie place, [ce procès] peut être bénéfique à notre 
démocratie. Il donne tort aux démagogues qui soutiennent 
que, dans notre pays, la justice serait sévère aux faibles et com-
plaisante aux puissants.
If the concept were explained, would Jacques Chirac—or any French 
person—accept “accountability” as the most proper translation for 
“responsabilité” in the above quotation instead of “responsibility”? It 
all depends perhaps on whether one accepts that the French notion of 
responsabilité contains, besides the standard notion of “to be in charge,” 
the future-oriented notion of “to be held accountable” and therefore 
“possibly subject to punishment for wrongdoing if the official account 
of what happened as decided upon in court so demonstrates”—the lat-
ter notion being much more clearly and distinctly accounted for by the 
English term accountability, for which there exists no French equivalent. 
If he would, then a possible translation of Jacques Chirac’s statement 
could be this:
The principle of accountability is at the heart of political 
action. I consider this rendezvous [i.e., this trial] as necessar-
ily a political moment. I believe that by allowing things to be 
put back in their true place, [this trial] can perhaps be of ben-
efit to our democracy. It proves wrong those demagogues who 
allege that in our country justice is harsh toward the weak and 
indulgent toward the powerful.
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The journalist comments in a concluding sentence, “These words 
sounded right [sonnaient juste] in a trial that had become, suddenly, yes, 
historic.” This declaration, including the avoidance of the word trial in 
favor of the euphemistic rendez-vous, can be seen as a modest effort to 
conserve a certain grandeur, with a small “g,” for the former president 
who decided in the same spirit of self-denial (i.e., sacrifice of his own self-
interest in favor of the broader interest of the health of France, its judicial 
system, and democracy in general) to not exercise his right to appeal the 
court’s decision.
The irony that several observers did not fail to underline in the wake 
of the court’s decision was that given the more relaxed mœurs of ten or 
twenty years ago in the area of political corruption,280 Jacques Chirac 
might not have been convicted at all had he not exercised his right to 
immunity back in 1999. Others disagree, pointing to the conviction in 
2007 of his associate Alain Juppé (named France’s Foreign Affairs min-
ister in 2011) in the same affair.281 The Chirac-Juppé affair raises the 
question of evolving visions of justice and judicial procedure as mœurs 
in a particular context change over time. And then there are the compli-
cations that arise when mœurs are significantly different in one context 
versus another at a given time—something the former director of the 
International Monetary Fund, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, learned from 
scandals surrounding his actions in a hotel in New York in May 2011 and 
other places in France.282 
Different continent, different news. On December 15, 2011, the New 
York Times featured this headline in the attention-getting upper-left cor-
ner of its website: “U.S. Marks End to 9-Year War, Leaving an Uncertain 
Iraq.” Reporter Tim Arango summed up Thursday’s big story in America 
with this paragraph:
After nearly nine years, about 4,500 American fatalities and 
$1 trillion, America’s war in Iraq is about to end. Officials 
marked the finish on Thursday with a modest ceremony at the 
airport days before the last troops take the southern highway 
to Kuwait, going out as they came in, to conclude the United 
States’ most ambitious and bloodiest military campaign 
since Vietnam.
Democracy Watch 2011 257
Meetings to discuss who was responsible (i.e., in charge) and ques-
tions about who, if anyone, will be held accountable for this protracted, 
costly, and inconclusive war are ongoing, though mostly in the media and 
on some university campuses, not in the streets or the courts.283 To date, 
for example, no civilian has been convicted of any crime in relation to the 
torture scandal at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq or in relation to allega-
tions of misconduct and illegal actions at other detention facilities since 
2001. Detailed and abundantly footnoted accounts of this scandal and 
of the Iraq War can be found on Wikipedia and in the writings of New 
Yorker magazine contributors Seymour Hersh and Jane Mayer.284 
Arango summarized the state of Iraq at the moment of the U.S. pull-
out with these words:
Iraqis will be left with a country that is not exactly at war, and 
not exactly at peace. It has improved in many ways since the 
2007 troop “surge,” but it is still a shattered country marred by 
violence and political dysfunction, a land defined on sectarian 
lines whose future, for better or worse, is now in the hands 
of its people.
The question everyone is asking is whether now, without the author-
ity of Saddam Hussein or the authority of the armed forces of the 
United States, the different groups that compose Iraqi society are willing 
and able to live together and share power. “We should finally get some 
answers about the future for democracy in the Arab world now that U.S. 
troops have left Iraq,” said Middle East specialist Thomas Friedman in 
his audit-editorial published less than one week after the U.S. pullout on 
December 20, 2011.285 
“A country that is not exactly at war, and not exactly at peace” is also 
an apt description of Egypt during the weekend of the first anniversary of 
the Tunisia uprising. On December 17, 2011, the top story in the Middle 
East for the New York Times was not the first anniversary of Mohamed 
Bouazizi dousing himself with paint thinner and setting himself on fire, 
but instead the latest outbreak of violence in Cairo surrounding the con-
troversial parliamentary election process and popular opposition to the 
military’s choice of Kamal Ganzouri as interim prime minister, an ille-
gitimate choice for many Egyptians due to this politician’s ties to former 
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Egyptian president Hosni Moubarak, who was forced from power on 
February 11, 2011.286 David Kirkpatrick summarizes the grotesque absur-
dity of the situation in his opening sentence.
Egypt’s military rulers escalated a bloody crackdown on 
street protesters on Saturday, chasing down and beating 
unarmed civilians, even while the prime minister was deny-
ing in a televised news conference that security forces were 
using any force.
One does not need to be on drugs to view the world with “kaleido-
scope eyes” these days; indeed, one could say that arranging as best one 
can an ever-changing selection of breaking news fragments has become 
the habit of all those who are trying in good faith to keep up with what 
appears to be an accelerating, decentralized, interconnected and discon-
nected, multipolar and yet polarized world. But as with drugs, this type of 
news gathering can induce dizziness, fever, and fatigue; and it’s tempting 
to respond by either tuning out completely or by delegating the task to 
one news sifter—the American Family Association, Fox News, MSNBC, 
the New York Times, Slate, Arts and Letters Daily (a sifter of sifters spon-
sored by the Chronicle of Higher Education), France 24, Al Jazeera, etc.— 
or to one set of “friends” whose ideology, values, or take on the world 
one more or less agrees with and let them tell you what you should think 
about everything.287 “It’s the attention economy, stupid”—something 
Tocqueville noticed early on would be of critical importance to relatively 
weak, insecure, overworked citizens in democratic times.
Of course “friends” written with scare quotes has become a standard 
way to allude to Facebook’s “democratized” social network.288 Launched 
in 2004, Facebook has more members today than any other country in 
the world except India and China—over 800 million as of December 
2011. I mention it because the fictionalized movie version of its founding, 
The Social Network (2010), was released on DVD on January 11, 2011, 
just three days before the resignation and departure of Tunisian presi-
dent Ben Ali, and one month before the resignation of Egyptian presi-
dent Hosni Mubarak. The DVD grossed over $13 million in its first week, 
and the worldwide total gross for the film is roughly $225 million.289 
With Facebook, the sublime of large numbers is everywhere. Facebook, 
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along with other social networking sites powered by the Internet, cell 
phones, and multifunction smart phones, is commonly credited with 
playing a crucial role in the events of the “Arab Spring.” New technolo-
gies are also commonly thought to have played an important role in the 
subsequent “Occupy” movements around the world that sprang up in 
2011 in imitation of the occupation of Cairo’s Tahrir Square in the winter 
and spring of 2011, which resumed with more violence in November and 
December of 2011 as noted above.290 Certainly, for now, the violence and 
stalled reforms of the Arab Spring recall more the crackdown of the 1968 
“Prague Spring” than they do the more or less peaceful 1989 “Velvet 
Revolution” led by Vaclav Havel, who died on December 18, 2011.291 
Velvet is not the texture that comes to mind when one thinks of the polit-
ical turmoil that raged across the Middle East between December 2010 
and December 2011.
And then there’s the Euro crisis. On December 15, 2011, while others 
may have been thinking about Jacques Chirac, Iraq, or something else, 
IMF managing director Christine Lagarde, Dominique Strauss-Kahn’s 
replacement as of June 2011 and one of only two women (the other 
being a high-end prostitute) to appear in the documentary film Inside Job 
(2010), gave a speech at the U.S. State Department in which she warned 
that the world faced a 1930s-style economic slump if further interna-
tional cooperation to solve the crisis did not happen soon.292 Lagarde 
avoided using the D-word, but others such as Paul Krugman have said, 
“It’s time to start calling the current situation what it is: a depression.”293 
What’s more, some Europeans, many Catholic-influenced Italians, for 
example, seemed oddly accepting of the harsh austerity medicine that 
will soon take effect in the form of higher taxes and lower government 
services and pensions.294 Atonement for sins widely shared was the way 
it has been presented by the post-Berlusconi government of Mario Monti 
in December 2011, even though many (notably in the “Indignant” and 
“Occupy” protests) reject this blame-the-public narrative and claim 
instead that the crisis is a top-down disaster that resulted from wrong-
headed policies forcibly imposed by ideologically blinded elites; e.g., the 
“Bush tax cuts” for the wealthy, the war of choice in Iraq, financial dereg-
ulation, and the creation of a common currency, the Euro, without com-
mon mores, rules, or principles, such as accountability, to cushion the 
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shocks inherent in capitalism and insure member-countries’ long-term 
probity and credit-worthiness.295 Viewed from Zuccotti Park or Tahrir 
Square, it almost looks as though the Euro crisis exists to neutralize the 
Arab Spring and other grassroots movements in rich or poor countries—
pushing them off the front pages, out of sight, out of mind—and that if 
it didn’t exist, it would have had to be invented. Is there any truth to that 
conspiracy theory?
If we have a moral obligation to be intelligent, we have to ask what all 
these events mean and how they are related, besides being nearly simul-
taneous. Many have compared 2011 to 1848, a year Tocqueville knew 
well, and for that and many other reasons it might be worth looking to 
the “elegant Norman” for some help.296 
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Chapter 6
Democracy and the New Dignity
One way of trying to make sense of the events discussed in the preced-
ing chapter is to interpret them in light of Tocqueville’s study of democ-
racy, especially his compare and contrast analysis of the mores of aris-
tocratic and democratic times. So what do those events have to do with 
Tocqueville and democracy? Directly it would seem not a lot. There 
have been only scant references to Tocqueville in discussions of the 
Arab Spring, the Occupy movements, and other “revolutionary” events 
of 2011. This is a pity, since the escalation of protest in Tunisia, Egypt, 
and Zuccotti Park receives at least a partial explanation if one remembers 
the “Tocqueville effect,” or “Tocqueville Paradox” as Jon Elster calls it 
(162–169)—also known as “the theory of rising expectations.” Simply 
stated, it’s the idea that one becomes both more desirous for some-
thing—e.g., equality, freedom, dignity—as one gets small first doses of it, 
and less tolerant of doing without it. Although he had sketched this idea 
in Democracy in America (DA II, 2, 3), the more memorable formulation 
comes in Book Three, Chapter Four, of The Old Regime and the Revolution 
(Elster, 164).
It is not always going from bad to worse that leads to revolu-
tion. What happens most often is that a people that put up 
with the most oppressive laws without complaint, as if they 
did not feel them, rejects those laws violently when the pres-
sure is alleviated. The regime that a revolution destroys is 
almost always better than the one that immediately preceded 
it, and experience teaches that the most dangerous time for a 
bad government is usually when it begins to reform.297 
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In 2011 the Internet was abuzz with self-congratulations about the 
more level playing field (or battlefield) offered by the savvy use of social 
media sites, laptops, and cell phones that allegedly permitted more effi-
cient organization, mobilization, and execution of protests. Only a few 
commentators of the Arab Spring made the observation that these pro-
tests may have been triggered in part by marginally better living condi-
tions and moderately higher equality that large numbers of both popu-
lations had experienced under the Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes.298 The 
relatively more favorable economic conditions and more liberal political 
situation in comparison with the greater misery within recent memory, 
combined with the yawning chasm between those still generally paltry 
living conditions and the opulence of ruling elites in the Arab world, 
makes the situation rather similar to what Tocqueville describes in the 
France of Louis XIV to Louis XVI, or, we might add, to Honnecker’s 
German Democratic Republic and the whole Soviet Bloc at the dawn of 
the Internet age around 1988. But except for the occasional Tocqueville 
sauce epigraph (most often without a precise reference), his sociological 
observations have so far not been enlisted to help understand the Arab 
Spring or Occupy movements, whether to expand or suppress them.299 
Clearly scholarly voices like Boyle, Elster, Heimonet, and Wolin have not 
gotten through. If only Gene Sharp had told his many followers to down-
load Tocqueville!
As for “democracy,” which has had an image problem going back over 
two thousand years, not just two hundred, there have been many refer-
ences to it, but it has taken a backseat to other more pressing concerns—
jobs and dignity especially. This is partly understandable, especially in 
the Middle East that has no large-scale economic activities to support 
a middle class besides the oil industry and tourism.300 It should be clear 
by now that democracy is viewed with ambivalence by many leaders and 
ordinary citizens—and not just in the Middle East. Republicans—in 
the U.S., France, and elsewhere—generally favor oligarchy and plutoc-
racy and actively oppose most attempts to introduce more horizontally 
organized institutions and practices that would welcome and value the 
presence and input of ordinary people in any decision-making process 
or collective action. Others, though professing democratic sympathies, 
often prefer managed, white collar, paternalistic democracy (“Brussels 
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knows best”) and have hardly any more respect or patience for ordinary 
contributions than do their Republican counterparts. Both highly cre-
dentialed groups generally mock the idea of the “wisdom of crowds” and 
deride the political involvement of ordinary people as “populism,” “mob 
rule,” or “socialism,” “fascism,” or “communism”—depending on who’s 
listening.301 
Many people who have never known anything but power pyramids 
with rigidly hierarchical and static economic and political institutions 
may be deeply skeptical of democracy as well. Theirs is a radical doubt 
that doesn’t question democracy comparatively—Democracy brand x 
versus Alternative regime y—on, say, criteria of sustainability, productiv-
ity, or other short- and long-term costs and benefits. Instead of arguing, 
they fundamentally doubt popular sovereignty from the get-go. They no 
more believe in democracy than they believe in Santa Claus. “Seven bil-
lion people governing themselves? Not in a million years!” Others may 
be honestly undecided about democracy but firmly believe that it’s not 
a priority at the moment, and therefore they push it down lower on their 
“To Do” list somewhere between “Solve global warming” and “Floss 
teeth.” Or else democracy seems to them like an unreliable, superfluous 
luxury.302 Or too wasteful and slow given the enormity and urgency of 
present-day global emergencies.303 The excuses, always called reasons, are 
endless. For them, democracy can and must wait. A dream deferred.
All of these views that set democracy aside—whether motivated by 
cynical power grabs, argued skepticism, paralyzing ambivalence, or total 
incomprehension and unfamiliarity—are flawed, and yet somewhat 
understandable in certain circumstances. Again, look at the Middle East. 
The twenty-three-year-old national motto used throughout the reign 
of Ben Ali, “Liberté, Ordre, Justice,” was replaced not by “Liberté, Égalité, 
Démocratie” but by “Travail, Liberté, Dignité Nationale” (Work, Liberty, 
National Dignity). Liberty is retained in the new motto, but it moves to 
second place, after Work, and functions as the bridge linking Work and 
National Dignity. The contrast with the former motto of Ben Ali’s dicta-
torship, which had unsurprisingly placed Order in the central position, is 
stark. But this new motto with its insistence on the concrete primacy of 
Work before Freedom and Dignity is also strikingly different from the more 
abstract French revolutionary motto (Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité) and 
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from the similarly vague conclusion to the American Pledge of Allegiance 
with its affirmation of “Liberty and Justice for all.” Despite their vagueness, 
however, the words fraternity and all in these two slogans evoke the sort 
of social glue that is supposed to unite people in those societies, namely 
brotherly love and shared freedoms and fairness. Those who put forward 
the new Tunisian motto—a fundamental exercise in rebranding, let it be 
said—clearly wanted to go for something more directly graspable. The 
primacy of assuring one’s basic material needs—food, shelter, clothing, 
health, and education—through “decent work”304 is understandably 
uppermost in the minds of millions of poor, unemployed, undernour-
ished, undereducated Tunisians, Egyptians, and “Occupy” protesters 
throughout the world. Alongside the material benefit of allowing one to 
secure the basic needs for survival, meaningful work is the cornerstone of 
the basic spiritual need for dignity, something that Tocqueville and other 
inheritors of humanist and Enlightenment values came to consider natu-
ral to the human species (DA I, 2, 5, 292).
But why “National dignity”? Excess nationalist fervor in the twentieth 
century in particular has led many to be immediately leery of nationalism 
and patriotism in all their forms. And Tocqueville had already pointed 
out that patriotism based on the mere accident of one’s birth or upbring-
ing in a particular location—“Proud to be a Mainer”—is strained and 
phony if it’s not undergirded by freely contracted collaborative projects 
between the state and the citizen in which general public interests (clean 
air, good roads, quality schools) overlap with particular private ones (my 
health, my commute, my mind)—the famous “win-win” incentive. Time 
will tell if there are dark shadows behind Tunisia’s choice, but the third 
element in its new motto may simply be articulating—perhaps imper-
fectly—another basic spiritual need, which is to belong and to feel a part 
of the group project of a team, band, party, or cooperative. What’s true 
for signs is true for people as well. No one is totally self-reliant. We don’t 
establish or retain worth (dignity comes from the Latin dignus = worthy) 
entirely on our own, but through the recognition, the acknowledgment, 
the respect or love of others, usually close collaborators, whether in run-
ning a business, a family, a city, or a nation.305 Acquiring, maintaining, 
building, or restoring dignity, like all value creation, happens in society 
(including online), and it matters little whether my dignity is inscribed 
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within the social context of a city, town, family, tribe, school, church, 
state, nation, or website. Judt got it right when he essentially repeated 
Adam Ferguson’s affirmation about the primacy of groups (Civil Society, 
10) by recalling that “what is truly distinctive about modern life is not 
the unattached individual. It is society” (Ill, 215). There must be others 
to ignite the “communal spirit” between citizens who are equal in their 
“inalienable” human rights, to which lately has been added the right to 
dignity.306 It’s understandable, therefore, that Dignité, not Démocratie, was 
nominated in December 2011 by the French journalist Didier Pourquery 
as the word of the year.
•
The importance of dignity in 2011 had in fact already been declared fun-
damental back in late January in an eloquent and compassionate edito-
rial by New York Times columnist David Brooks, who rather uncharac-
teristically channeled his inner Martin Luther King, Jr. or Malcolm X to 
comment on “the power of the bottom-up quest for dignity” sweeping 
through the Arab world:
I wonder if sometime around 50 years ago a great mental tide 
began to sweep across the world. Before the tide, people saw 
themselves in certain fixed places in the social order. They 
accepted opinions from trusted authorities.
As the tide swept through, they began to see themselves 
differently. They felt they should express their own views, 
and these views deserved respect. They mentally bumped 
themselves up to first class and had a different set of expecta-
tions of how they should be treated. Treatment that had once 
seemed normal now felt like an insult. They began to march 
for responsive government and democracy….
Protesters invariably say that their government has insulted 
their dignity by ignoring their views. They have a certain tem-
plate of what a “normal” country looks like—with democracy 
and openness—and they feel humiliated that their nation 
doesn’t measure up.307 
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Brooks’s main claim is that dignity has gained more dignity in the 
post-1945 and certainly the post-1989 era, even though it’s unclear 
from his account how “the quest for dignity” could produce “a remark-
able democratic wave” given what he calls the “freedom recession” with 
“more governments retreating from democracy than advancing toward 
it.” Nevertheless, Brooks vividly captures this universal quest for dignity 
(and maybe for democracy) with the novel image that people “mentally 
bumped themselves up to first class.”308 There have been a lot of man-
made events in the last twenty years that would tend to support what 
Brooks says, though they are obscured in his retelling behind fanci-
ful images and water metaphors like “wave” and “tide.” It is also worth 
noting Brooks’s warning, à la Gene Sharp, that “while the public hunger 
for dignity is unabated, the road from authoritarianism to democracy is 
rocky and perilous.” The rocky road image is hardly original, but the point 
being made is hard to disagree with: democracy is definitely not built in a 
day, a year, or even a decade—nor can it survive without regular exercise 
and experimentation. The piece also takes a few jabs at the absurdity and 
fudging of the “tardy” response to the Egyptian revolution by President 
Obama and his foreign affairs team (which in the Libyan conflict the 
White House would spin as “leading from behind”), but it recovers its 
dignity at the end with a concluding recommendation: “If you start with 
a healthy respect for the quest for dignity, if you see autocracies as fragile 
and democratic revolts as opportunities, then you’ll find it much easier to 
anticipate events.” Tocqueville could not have put it better.
But the similarity between Brooks and Tocqueville does not end 
there. Nine months later, in an editorial on the Occupy Wall Street move-
ment (“The Milquetoast Radicals,” October 10, 2011), Brooks roundly 
dismisses the demands expressed by some of his fellow Americans for 
more dignity and fairness and less arrogance and inequality. He shows 
little sympathy or respect for their quest for dignity, little ability to see the 
now famous “1%” as a powerful but fragile autocracy propped up by will-
ing lawmakers who rewrote the U.S. tax code and pushed through dereg-
ulation of the banking industry to allow them to become much richer 
much faster than anyone else.309 Nor does he seem to see the Occupy 
Wall Street movement as a legitimate revolt designed to combat the 
attack on dignity that is aggravated by the increasingly extreme inequality 
270 Chapter 6
that has gripped America over the past forty years.310 Brooks concludes 
that piece with an unproven claim and a zinger: “It’s not about declar-
ing war on some nefarious elite. It’s about changing behavior from top to 
bottom. Let’s occupy ourselves.” Such “gotcha!” moments have become 
common in the Internet age which is also the age of snark.311 
In the middle of the piece Brooks writes, “If there is a core theme to 
the Occupy Wall Street movement, it is that the virtuous 99 percent of 
society is being cheated by the richest and greediest 1 percent.” This is 
a spurious claim. To my knowledge, OWS protestors never claimed that 
the rich are all “nefarious” and “greedy,” only that they could afford to pay 
more in taxes and that extreme inequality is wrong because unfair, and 
wrongheaded because economically counterproductive.312 Nor do I think 
the OWS crowd thought of themselves as necessarily virtuous—whatever 
that means—but that they were decent, hardworking Americans who 
were getting screwed by an entirely legal but immoral economic, politi-
cal, and judicial system—a view not very different from Tocqueville’s 
assessment of the way blacks, Indians, and women were being legally 
mistreated in the 1830s. In any case, this piece and its tart conclusion 
are more in keeping with Brooks’s usual “moderate Republican” stance. 
The quip “Let’s occupy ourselves” is saying “You, Buster, would be bet-
ter off studying to get into a good college, landing a character-building 
summer job, getting some marketable skills… And stop complaining!”313 
Incidentally, this is also the message that Barack Obama heard as a boy 
in Indonesia from his mother, Stanley Ann Dunham (Dreams from My 
Father, Chapter Two).
Of course the classic “bootstrap” argument and “blame the vic-
tim” tactics of both American conservatives and France’s “meritocracy” 
apologists on both the Left and the Right are hardly new, but they are 
less persuasive today when unemployment among college graduates in 
Europe and North America is higher than ever, the purchasing power of 
most salaried workers of all ages has stagnated for years, American stu-
dent debt is through the roof, and median American household assets 
have fallen by 40%.314 Thus it was child’s play for Paul Krugman to nail 
Brooks, whom he refers to via an anonymous plural “pundits,” in a fol-
low-up editorial on November 3, 2011, “Oligarchy, American Style.” The 
irony is that Krugman’s conclusion to this piece could have been written 
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by Brooks himself so long as he were writing about faraway Egyptians, 
sheiks, and emirs.
But why does this growing concentration of income and 
wealth in a few hands matter? Part of the answer is that ris-
ing inequality has meant a nation in which most families don’t 
share fully in economic growth. Another part of the answer 
is that once you realize just how much richer the rich have 
become, the argument that higher taxes on high incomes 
should be part of any long-run budget deal becomes a lot 
more compelling.315 
The larger answer, however, is that extreme concentration 
of income is incompatible with real democracy. Can anyone 
seriously deny that our political system is being warped by the 
influence of big money and that the warping is getting worse 
as the wealth of a few grows ever larger?
Some pundits are still trying to dismiss concerns about ris-
ing inequality as somehow foolish. But the truth is that the 
whole nature of our society is at stake.
The point I want to make is that Krugman’s correction of Brooks’s 
blindness to the merits of the Occupy Wall Street movement—mer-
its that more and more people can see for themselves without being 
a Nobel Laureate in economics316 —has other historic parallels. It’s 
sometimes said that Tocqueville had an easier time praising democracy 
when it was happening in far-off America, but when it risked coming in 
all its unwashed hurly-burly ways to his own backyard in 1848 he was 
less enthusiastic. Especially if it took the form of socialism, which for 
Tocqueville was not true democracy, but merely inverted aristocracy. In 
Tocqueville’s eyes, socialism would be a nightmarish Mardi Gras of role 
reversal between masters and servants extended to all seven days of the 
week, 365 days a year. For Tocqueville, socialists like Louis Blanqui or 
Pierre-Joseph Proudon were not community organizing democrats but 
self-righteous extremists prone to arrogant feelings of superiority and 
divisive moralizing. The socialist seemed to share the smug certitude 
of the aristocrat and a similar willingness to take and use other people’s 
money, but in a grotesque, farcical, impromptu way that underscored 
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its arbitrariness and questionable legitimacy. Right or wrong about the 
intentions and motives of socialists (Taking or making? Predators or 
producers?), Tocqueville’s aversion to the specter of socialism and to 
the revolutionary lyricism of a Lamartine dampened French interest in 
Tocqueville for over a century. During that time the charge of bad faith 
and hypocrisy was leveled at the “elegant Norman” for his opposition to 
Paris workers’ demands in the “June days” of 1848 and his acquiescence 
to an alliance among the various wealthier classes to which he belonged 
that would allow Louis Napoleon to gain power and squash the quest for 
work, liberty, and dignity of wage laborers. In June 1848, an estimated 
6,500 revolutionaries were killed or executed; another 11,000 were jailed 
or sent to Algeria.317 
Reduced to its simplest terms, Tocqueville (or his ghost at least) paid a 
high price—a century of the silent treatment by most of his countrymen, 
not just “Marxists”—for seeming to praise democracy in America from 
his study but impede its advance in France during his ten years as a politi-
cian. For the Right (including most of his family members), Tocqueville 
was faulted for being too sympathetic to the demos; for the Left, he was 
never sympathetic enough, especially in hard times. Others, though 
more admiring of him in general, have difficulty reconciling Tocqueville’s 
many insights about regimes that are quite far from his own in space or 
time (nineteenth-century America, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
France) with what seems to be a lack of feeling and vision in the local 
circumstances in which he wielded some political influence during the 
1840s. However, given the forgetfulness and spontaneous generosity of 
many people living in later democratic times, David Brooks is unlikely to 
suffer the same fate; and some may even remember the January “Quest 
for Dignity” column where the better angels of his nature were singing 
and pardon his reactionary October column against OWS.
As for Tocqueville, I dare say most Americans paid little attention 
to his hypocrisy (if that’s the right word) in 1848, or in 1893 when the 
somewhat self-incriminating testimony of the Souvenirs was published, 
and so they experienced little cause for resentment that would lead them 
to resist reading Tocqueville. However, as Paul de Man pointed out in 
the area of literary criticism, a double-stranded rhetoric of “blindness 
and insight” can weave its way into a variety of contexts, sometimes quite 
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unexpectedly. It could be that Tocqueville’s limitations as a politician 
made him realize finally that Democracy in America could not be read as a 
straightforward how-to manual (a sort of Democracy for Dummies), even 
though he may have fooled himself for awhile into believing it could. 
Those lost illusions may have then allowed him to see beyond the lim-
ited, static accounts of the Old Regime and the Revolution that his own 
study of those times—so strikingly sensitive to the unique and evolving 
conditions constituted by multiple variables—would surpass. The blind-
ness, then, would have been a sort of midwife of the insight.
In the American context, it is generally acknowledged now that a con-
tradiction between generosity abroad and harsh behavior at home has 
taken place several times in the country’s history. Aside from the glar-
ing nineteenth-century example of the practice of slavery in a country 
that proclaimed all men are created equal, there is the early-twentieth-
century example of wishing “to make the world safe for democracy” dur-
ing World War I while denying basic rights to American employees who 
were trapped within the harsh, undemocratic world of the companies for 
which they worked—in effect autocratic states within the supposedly 
democratic United States. The grotesque injustice of this contradiction 
spurred on the Progressive Era and New Deal that resulted in laws that 
would push back against industry’s efforts to flout the more democratic 
mores that were becoming the new normal outside the factory gates.
More recently, the progressive era known as “the Sixties” took advan-
tage of the Cold War strategy “to contain Soviet aggression” to ask when 
America’s elected officials and judges were going to step in to contain 
white America’s aggression toward African Americans, male American 
aggression toward women, or straight America’s aggression toward the 
nonstraight. These and other civil rights movements, for greater religious 
tolerance, for example, included demands for equal dignity and all that 
goes with it, even if freedom and equality were the dominant watchwords 
then and not dignity”
More recently still, after 9/11 (and then two wars and a banking disas-
ter, massive recession, double-digit unemployment, worsening statistics 
on poverty and inequality, and the somewhat disappointing performance 
of the much vaunted first African American president), Americans seem 
finally to be getting past “Why do they hate us?” and coming around to 
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consider the idea that maybe there is something wrong with what hap-
pens on Wall Street—which is of course not an excuse to try and blow it 
up as was attempted in 1920, 1993, and 2001. But this newfound insight, 
sharpened by attention-getting facts (inequality in America is compara-
ble to what it is in Argentina and worse than in Tunisia and Egypt318 ) and 
slogans (“We are the ninety-nine percent”), has led many to decide that 
Wall Street does need to be "occupied" by people with values different 
from the aggressively predatory and unegalitarian culture subscribed to 
by the majority of the deciders who have worked in New York’s financial 
district for the past forty years.319 
In December 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi said in effect, “You have 
robbed me of my freedom, my dignity, my right to work; you have 
crushed me like a ball of paper. Alright, if I am a ball of paper, then I 
will light myself on fire.” It was a radical strategy for reclaiming his dig-
nity from his own ashes, a gambit that cost him his life but turned him 
into a national hero and international symbol. There were several copy-
cat immolations in the days and weeks that followed Bouazizi’s dignity-
seeking act of indignation. None of the OWS protestors has gone that 
far, but they too are trying to reclaim their dignity from the ashes of their 
dreams that have been incinerated by unemployment, mounting debt, 
lost savings, lost homes, and what they consider to be mostly deaf media 
and undignified, derelict politicians and judges. Some are claiming, oth-
ers just hoping, that 2011 marks the beginning of a new Progressive Era 
to push back against the abuses and excesses of the past forty years and 
renew a commitment to protect the universal human right to dignity.320 
•
There are only five references to dignity in the nine hundred pages of 
Democracy in America. Democracy’s emergence out of expanded equality 
of social conditions is Tocqueville’s main topic, not dignity. Nevertheless, 
these five references are worth noting since the necessity of conserving 
“the natural dignity of the human species” would seem to be a central 
concern for him, even if it does not receive lengthy explicit development. 
Dignity and justice are part of the new grandeur of a democratic regime. 
These two values compensate for the diminution of old-style grandeur 
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that is the inevitable consequence of turning away from the paradigm of 
the hierarchically organized aristocratic regime.
The reference to dignity cited above comes at the end of a paragraph 
from DA I, 2, 5, where Tocqueville pauses in his discussion of “public 
officials under the control of American democracy” to express his indig-
nation at the unfeeling arrogance of French magistrates as compared to 
the “natural style in the government of democracy,” which he prefers.
When I see magistrates in France treating the parties before 
them rudely or derisively, shrugging their shoulders at the 
strategy of the defense, or smiling smugly as an indictment is 
read, I wish that someone would strip off their robes to see 
whether dressing as ordinary citizens dress might remind 
these judges of the natural dignity of the human race.321 
This is the second occurrence of dignité, which comes after a first use 
of the term in relation to the early Indians whose imperturbable aristo-
cratic-like independence and dignity Tocqueville admires.322 He points 
out that this is a consequence of a high degree of equality among them, a 
fact that contrasts with the inequality and hierarchy in civilized countries.
If the common people of civilized countries are coarse, it is 
not only because they are ignorant and poor but also because, 
in that condition, they find themselves in daily contact with 
enlightened and wealthy men.
The daily contrast between their own misfortune and 
weakness and the prosperity and power of a few of their fel-
low human beings stirs anger in their hearts at the same time 
as fear. Their sense of inferiority and dependence vexes and 
humiliates them. This internal state of the soul is reflected in 
their mores as well as their language. They are at once inso-
lent and base.
The truth of this is easily proved by observation. The people 
are coarser in aristocratic countries than anywhere else, and 
coarser in opulent cities than in the countryside.
Wherever men of such great wealth and power are found, 
the weak and poor are all but overwhelmed by their base-
ness. Seeing no way to restore equality, they despair utterly for 
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themselves and allow themselves to sink below the threshold 
of human dignity.
This unfortunate effect of contrasting conditions is not a 
factor in the life of the savage. The Indians, though all igno-
rant and poor, are also all equal and free.
When the first Europeans arrived, the natives of North 
America (…) were governed by a habitual reserve and a kind 
of aristocratic politeness. (DA I, 1, 1, 81–82, G27)
The key claim in this passage is that loss of dignity, which manifests 
itself as coarseness (grossièreté), results from unequal conditions and 
despair at “seeing no way to restore equality.” The portrait of the “com-
mon people” Tocqueville gives here is complex, comprising both indig-
nant anger toward others and self-doubt about one’s own worth—and it 
rings true with the testimonies one hears from oppressed groups and vic-
tims in many contexts where dignity is violated or denied in both mate-
rial and immaterial ways.323 
A third reference to dignity occurs in the important tenth chap-
ter of Volume Two, Part One, “Why Americans Devote Themselves 
More to the Practical Applications of Science than to the Theory.” Here 
Tocqueville conducts one of his masterful compare and contrast analy-
ses of the strengths, weaknesses, and trade-offs of democracy and aris-
tocracy. If in democratic times dignity is more widely felt, “in aristocratic 
times, vast ideas of the dignity, power, and grandeur of man are widely 
entertained”—among the aristocrats themselves, it must be stressed, since 
in their eyes they are the only true men.
In aristocratic societies, the class that shapes opinion and takes 
the lead in public affairs enjoys a permanent and hereditary 
place above the multitude and naturally forms a high idea of 
itself and of man in consequence. (DA II, I, 10, 56–57, G525)
From the perspective of the aristocrat, to be less than the best—less 
than an aristoi—is to be less than a man.324 Nevertheless, if dignity in 
democratic times is more widely experienced, and the “family of man” 
therefore a less exclusive club, it is often acquired with difficulty, and 
its maintenance in a world of change, insecurity, and middling talents 
and energies is a constant struggle—whereas for the superior-feeling 
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aristocrat, it comes with the territory so to speak, and remaining digni-
fied is hardly more difficult than breathing.
The fourth reference to dignity comes in a later chapter on manners 
where Tocqueville takes pains to show that American manners may 
not look dignified from an aristocratic perspective, but they have their 
own sort of homespun, middling dignity that is basically decent despite 
possible flashes of haughtiness, vulgarity, and unsteadiness due to the 
democrat’s lack of poise and destabilizing self-doubt about his worth 
and worthiness.
In democratic countries, grand manners are rare because 
private life is usually quite petty. Manners are often vulgar, 
because thought seldom has occasion to rise above a preoc-
cupation with domestic interests.
Genuine dignity of manners consists in always appearing to 
be in one’s place, neither higher nor lower. The peasant can 
manage this as well as the prince. In democracies, everyone’s 
place is in doubt. Hence manners there are often haughty but 
seldom dignified [in the aristocratic sense]. What is more, 
they are never well disciplined or instructed. (…)
Still, this is much more evident immediately after the fall of 
the aristocracy, than it is later on. (…)
In democracies, manners are never as refined as they are 
among aristocratic peoples, but neither are they ever as crude. 
You hear neither the swearing of the rabble nor the noble and 
choice expressions of the high nobility. There is often vulgar-
ity in mores but not brutality or baseness. (DA II, 3, 14, 269, 
271, G711, G713)
This is a good example of Tocqueville’s core belief that expand-
ing equality of social conditions lowers the high and raises the low and 
expands the moderate middle. Cast negatively, i.e., from the aristocratic 
point of view, this evolution lacks dignity in the sense of grandeur, but 
viewed democratically, it gains dignity in the sense of decency—a key 
democratic term of praise. The middle might be less grand or even medi-
ocre, but it is not base and thus conserves a decent amount of dignity.
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Tocqueville comes out squarely in favor of this new democratic dig-
nity as decency in the second to last chapter of the whole book, where the 
best way of defending dignity and independence, he asserts, is by pro-
claiming oneself to be a friend of equality and actually behaving like one. 
This recommendation comes at the end of an important paragraph that 
begins with one of Tocqueville’s firmest declarations that looking back-
ward at supreme dignity, grandeur, and absolute power as they existed in 
aristocratic times is vain and futile. As a reminder to despots still holding 
on to exclusive power today, as well as to their allies and sympathizers, it 
is worth citing the whole paragraph and the short ones that frame it.
I believe that it is easier to establish an absolute and despotic 
government in a nation where conditions are equal than in 
any other, and I believe that if such a government were estab-
lished in such a nation, it would not only oppress men in gen-
eral but in the long run would rob each one of them of several 
of the principal attributes of humanity.
Despotism therefore seems to me particularly to be feared 
in democratic ages.
I would have loved liberty in all times, I think, but at the 
present time I am inclined to worship it.
I am convinced, moreover, that anyone who attempts to 
base liberty on privilege and aristocracy in the age we are 
now embarking on will fail. Anyone who attempts to amass 
and hold authority within a single class will fail. No sovereign 
today is clever enough or strong enough to establish despo-
tism by restoring permanent distinctions among his subjects. 
Nor is any lawmaker wise or powerful enough to maintain 
free institutions if he does not take equality for his first prin-
ciple and creed. Those of our contemporaries who seek to 
create or secure the independence and dignity of their fellow 
men must therefore show themselves to be friends of equality, 
and the only honest way to show themselves so is to be so: the 
success of their sacred enterprise depends on it.
Thus the goal is not to reconstruct an aristocratic society 
but to bring forth liberty from the midst of the democratic 
society in which God has decreed we must live.
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These two fundamental truths are to my mind simple, clear, 
and fruitful, and they naturally lead me to consider what kind 
of free government can be established in a nation in which 
conditions are equal. (DA II, 4, 7, 389–390, G822)
This passage, which includes the fifth and final reference to dignity, 
serves to clarify once more several of Tocqueville’s key positions. First, 
it should be noted that he does not advocate a retreat from equality as a 
way to prevent or reduce the likelihood of despotism. Absolute despo-
tism is more likely under conditions of equality, it’s true, but that even-
tuality should be combated in other ways than by reverting to unegalitar-
ian policies and principles. Second, it is still rather odd that Tocqueville 
again explains the state of equality as God’s decree (or “providential” 
as he wrote in the Introduction) since throughout the two volumes he 
has been alluding to specific geohistoric conditions, man-made customs 
and habits, and policy decisions (e.g., the elimination of entail) that 
each incrementally expanded the equality of social conditions among 
Americans and many Europeans and reinforced egalitarian thinking. 
Moreover, it’s presumably because equality can recede—God’s decree 
disobeyed, justice swept aside—that we need to be “friends of equality,” 
i.e., supporting it as sense and sensibility dictate, and presumably com-
bating any return to extreme inequality.
Therefore, because equality of social conditions may be reversed 
(1830s appearances and a seven-hundred-year-old trend notwithstand-
ing), it is worth befriending and defending equality on the grounds of 
what a more or less egalitarian society makes possible—the “real advan-
tages” of democracy (DA I, 2, 6) that are summarized here as “to create 
or secure the independence and dignity of their fellow men” (and pre-
sumably, one day, of women and minorities). In short, independence and 
dignity, for which equality is a necessary condition, are what Tocqueville 
is proposing as checks against the establishment of “an absolute and des-
potic government,” which, alas, equality also makes it easier to establish.
But it should also be stressed again that the liberty and dignity that 
Tocqueville speaks of here are not the same species that would exist in 
aristocratic regimes. Democratic dignity is more a modicum of decency 
than high refinement; democratic liberty is more law-abiding entre-
preneurship and collaborative experimentation than infinite romantic 
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genius, revolutionary individual virtuosity, or unadorned lawlessness. 
More Ford, less Faust; more Amundsen than Scott, more Emerson than 
Thoreau, more Whig than wigged out. One may be left free to break the 
law, but knowing one may be held accountable.325 Tocqueville summa-
rizes his defense of the moderate middle two paragraphs later.
Hence there is no reason to expect that the sphere of individ-
ual independence will ever be as large in democratic countries 
as in aristocratic ones. But that is not something to wish for, 
because in aristocratic nations society is often sacrificed to the 
individual and the prosperity of the majority to the grandeur 
of the few. (G823)
In other words, Tocqueville would perfectly understand and perhaps 
even share in Thoreau’s disdain for the achievement of the Egyptian pyra-
mids, which are a monument to the absolute domination of the Few over 
the Many.326 (Walden, Chapter One).
However, as we shall see in the next chapter, Tocqueville also recog-
nized the salutary effects of tolerating and even encouraging the “sphere 
of individual independence,” “freedom of the intellect” (DA II, 1, 2, 19, 
G493), and the conservation or restoration of all those tendencies that 
are not native, so to speak, to a particular regime. In the case of a democ-
racy—a predominantly risk-averse regime of savers, not saviors—these 
would include the promotion of the arts, the public display of fine art, 
and the study of Latin and Greek and the other non–vocationally ori-
ented disciplines known as the “humanities.” But equally important 
would be the open-ended tolerance in everyday life, enforced by the U.S. 
Bill of Rights, for example, for indocility, eccentricity, principled civil dis-
obedience, and above all free speech and association. Other “aristocratic” 
checks on the possible despotism that an egalitarian (and therefore con-
servative- and conformist-leaning) democratic government might engen-
der include a nosy, indocile free press and free or low-cost institutions: 
voting, jury duty, libraries, schools, museums, parks, the post office, and 
today Internet access. Other aristocratic touches he favored, all of which 
act as “auxiliary precautions” (Federalist #51) to ward off the bad gov-
ernance, corruption, and possible tyranny of the majority, include an 
independent judiciary, a bicameral legislature with longer terms in office 
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for one of the two chambers, decent wages and working conditions for 
government employees, and the veto power of the president. In general, 
Tocqueville admired the encroachment-preventing apportionment of 
qualified independence and general dignity among the three branches 
of the American federal government and between the states and the 
national government. This can be seen from his sympathetic borrowings 
from both The Federalist Papers and from the writings of Jefferson that are 
closer to the “Spirit of ’76”—notably his quip about the despotism of a 
crowd being no less distasteful than the despotism of a single person.327 
The crucial point of the Tocqueville passage cited above (the open-
ing to the second to last chapter of Democracy in America, where, after 
nine hundred pages, the author has a last shot to achieve clarity and clo-
sure) is that independence and dignity are two of “the principal attributes 
of humanity.” And if humanity is to be defined as all men and women 
(the demos, and not confined to the grand few, the aristoi), then creating 
and securing those principles is more likely in times of equality. But it is 
also at great risk in those same times, and therefore care must be taken 
to encourage the “manly and legitimate passion for equality” and check 
the undignified, humiliating, or as he says “depraved taste for equality, 
which impels the weak to want to bring the strong down to their level, 
and which reduces men to preferring equality in servitude to inequal-
ity in freedom” (DA I, 1, 3, 115, G60). If that could be achieved, then 
the liberty and dignity of a democratic regime could—at least now and 
then, fugitively to borrow Wolin’s term—be as grand as or greater than 
that of an aristocratic or republican regime. It’s worth repeating that for 
Tocqueville democracy was not just a form of government; it was a way 
of life that resulted in a new man. Whether this new man (and woman) is 
absolutely better is probably undecidable since there would not seem to 
be any sufficiently external perspective from which to weigh and compare 
the mores of the inhabitants within different regimes. Therefore, without 
caving in completely to “cultural relativism” and “anything goes,” we can 
say that the merits and demerits of more or less inclusiveness (or exclu-
sion) within more or less horizontally (or vertically) organized institu-
tions and regimes may be something that well-informed, reasonable indi-
viduals and peoples ought to debate and may on various points politely 
disagree about.
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(DA II, 3, 22), the new dignity may have altered the human species.
284 Chapter 6
307. Emphasis added. David Brooks, “The Quest for Dignity,” New York 
Times, January 31, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/01/
opinion/01brooks.html>. Accessed February 28, 2013.
308. A generation ago, this lyrical “we-are-the-world” sentiment was captured in a 
successful photography exhibit and album entitled The Family of Man (1955). 
Roland Barthes published a short semiological study of this photo album in 
his Mythologies (1957). The sentiment has also been expressed by the French 
philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy, who writes in Vérité de la démocratie (Paris: 
Galilée, 2008), 61, “la démocratie est aristocratie égalitaire”—democracy is 
egalitarian aristocracy.
309. And many of “them” are the lawmakers. Forty-seven percent of the U.S. 
Congress belong to the 1% according to the Opensecrets.org website of the 
Center for Responsive Politics as relayed by ABC News: <http://abcnews.
go.com/blogs/politics/2011/11/47-of-congress-members-millionaires-a-
status-shared-by-only-1-of-americans/>, accessed July 4, 2012.
310. In addition to the writings of Piketty, Saez, and Eduardo Porter, see Timothy 
Noah, The Great Divergence: America’s Growing Inequality Crisis and What 
We Can Do about It (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2012). See also Joseph 
Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality (New York: Norton, 2012).
311. See the writings of Brooks’s colleague at the New York Times, Maureen 
Dowd, who makes Brooks sound like a calm sage. See also David Denby’s 
essay Snark: A Polemic in Seven Fits (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009). 
The audio book title is Snark: It’s Mean, It’s Personal, and It’s Ruining Our 
Conversation (2009). Denby comments specifically on Dowd’s destructive 
snarkiness in this essay.
312. Recent studies argue that extreme inequality is bad for business and a leading 
cause of the failure of nations. See Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, 
Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (2012). See 
also Richard G. Wilkinson, The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost 
Always Do Better (2009)—a new edition appeared in 2010 with an even more 
affirmative title, The Spirit Level: Why Equality Is Better for Everyone. For a 
dissenting opinion, see Christopher Snowdon, The Spirit Level Delusion: Fact-
Checking the Left’s New Theory of Everything (2010).
313. This was the dominant message of a second Brooks editorial on the same 
subject published on October 31, 2011, “The Wrong Inequality,” which 
recommends concentrating on “red inequality” (a life expectations gap) and 
not “blue inequality” (the income gap), with little acknowledgment of the 
OWS thesis that extreme income inequality is a major cause of the widening 
gap in life expectations and the disappearance of the middle class. Brooks 
prefers to side with Charles Murray and see “character flaws” as the cause 
of America’s “coming apart” instead of seeing them as effects of social and 
economic injustice. The sharply different reactions to Murray’s book, Coming 
Democracy and the New Dignity 285
Apart: The State of White America 1960–2010 (2012), may be taken as a further 
symptom of the author’s basic thesis, namely that America is deeply divided 
and falling apart.
314. On lost assets, see <http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/
fed-americans-wealth-dropped-40-percent/2012/06/11/gJQAlIsCVV_
story.html>, accessed July 4, 2012.
315. Krugman made his point even more explicit in a follow-up editorial three 
weeks later, “We are the 99.9%,” New York Times, November 24, 2011. “The 
recent Congressional Budget Office report on inequality didn’t look inside 
the top 1 percent, but an earlier report, which only went up to 2005, did. 
According to that report, between 1979 and 2005 the inflation-adjusted, 
after-tax income of Americans in the middle of the income distribution 
rose 21 percent. The equivalent number for the richest 0.1 percent rose 
400 percent.” See also Krugman’s earlier piece on OWS, “Losing Their 
Immunity,” New York Times, October 16, 2011.
316. Other New York Times columnists have written sympathetically and 
eloquently about the OWS movement, notably Nicolas Kristoff, “America’s 
‘Primal Scream’: Income Inequality,” New York Times, October 15, 2011. 
On the problem of Brooks-like denialism, see Charles Blow, “Inconvenient 
Income Inequality,” New York Times, December 6, 2011. See also George 
Packer’s profile of one OWS participant, Ray Kachel, “All the Angry People,” 
New Yorker, December 5, 2011, 32–38.
317. Tocqueville visited Algeria on two occasions in 1841 and 1846. His writings 
on Algeria are collected in Tocqueville, Sur l’Algérie, ed. Seloua Luste Boulbina 
(Paris: GF-Flammarion, 2003). Tocqueville’s views on French colonization 
ought not to be reduced to the labels “hard-liner” or “apologist,” but a fuller 
treatment is beyond the scope of the present study. See Hervé Guineret, 
Tocqueville, De la guerre au colonialisme: Les enjeux des démocraties modernes 
(Paris: Ellipses, 2007). 
318. See Eduardo Porter’s discussion of the measurement of inequality known as 
the “Gini coefficient” in “The 1 Percent Club’s Misguided Protectors,” New 
York Times, December 10, 2011. See also <http://www.globalresearch.ca/
index.php?context=va&aid=22999>, accessed July 4, 2012.
319. The literature on modern predatory culture stretches from Thorstein Veblen’s 
Theory of the Leisure Class to Robert H. Frank and Philip J. Cook’s The Winner-
Take-All Society: Why the Few at the Top Get So Much More than the Rest of 
Us (New York: Penguin, 1996). On predatory culture in politics, see Paul 
Pierson and Jacob Hacker, Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made 
the Rich Richer, and Turned Its Back on the Middle Class (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 2010).
286 Chapter 6
320. See Jeffrey D. Sachs, “The New Progressive Movement,” New York Times, 
November 12, 2011. There are wider questions of animal, plant, and planet 
rights, perhaps including dignity, that extend beyond the scope of the present 
study. See Dominique Bourg and Kerry Whiteside, Vers une démocratie 
écologoque (Paris: Seuil, 2010).
321. This is the Goldhammer translation, page 233, except I have substituted 
Bevan’s word smugly for indulgently to render the French sourire avec 
complaisance. What Tocqueville dislikes is the callous feeling of superiority of 
these French judges, and that seems to be communicated better with smugly. 
See DA I, 2, 5, 292: “Quand je vois, parmi nous, certains magistrats brusquer 
les parties ou leur adresser des bons mots, lever les épaules aux moyens de la 
défense et sourire avec complaisance à l’énumération des charges, je voudrais 
qu’on essayât de leur ôter leur robe, afin de découvrir si, se trouvant vêtus 
comme les simples citoyens, cela ne les rappellerait pas à la dignité naturelle 
de l’espèce humaine.”
322. In his Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767), Adam Ferguson expressed 
similar praise of the inhabitants of “rude nations” based on what he had read 
of Indians in travel narratives.
323. One thinks of the treatment of “aliens” by immigration officials or the 
experience of prisoners such as the account by James Baldwin in his 
autobiographical essay “Equal in Paris” reprinted in Americans in Paris, ed. 
Adam Gopnik (New York: Library of America, 2004), 467–481.
324. See Part One, “L’Invention des semblables,” in Pierre Rosanvallon’s La Société 
des égaux (Paris: Seuil, 2011), 25–106. See also Primo Levi, Se questo è un 
uomo / If This Is A Man (1947, 1958).
325. On the necessity of restraints as a component part of freedom, see Adam 
Ferguson, Essay, op. cit., 150–151: “Where the citizen is supposed to have 
rights of property and of station, and is protected in the exercise of them, 
he is said to be free; and the very restraints by which he is hindered from 
the commission of crimes, are a part of his liberty. No person is free, 
where any person is suffered to do wrong with impunity. Even the despotic 
prince on his throne, is not an exception to this general rule. He himself is 
a slave, the moment he pretends that force should decide any contest. The 
disregard he throws on the rights of his people recoils on himself; and in 
the general uncertainty of all conditions, there is no tenure more precarious 
than his own.”
326. On “vulgar” and “sensible” grandeur, see Henry D. Thoreau, Walden, 
Chapter One, “Economy”: “The grandeur of Thebes was a vulgar grandeur. 
More sensible is a rod of stone wall that bounds an honest man’s field than 
a hundred-gated Thebes that has wandered farther from the true end of 
life. The religion and civilization which are barbaric and heathenish build 
splendid temples; but what you might call Christianity does not. Most of 
Democracy and the New Dignity 287
the stone a nation hammers goes toward its tomb only. It buries itself alive. 
As for the Pyramids, there is nothing to wonder at in them so much as the 
fact that so many men could be found degraded enough to spend their lives 
constructing a tomb for some ambitious booby, whom it would have been 
wiser and manlier to have drowned in the Nile, and then given his body 
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Chapter 7
What Would Tocqueville Do? 
Some Policy Recommendations for 
Democrats and Dictators
But can we be sure that the new dignity is a sign of democracy’s triumph 
in the post–Cold War Internet age? What if this new dignity were not a 
sign of democracy’s victory but of its defeat? It should be remembered, 
for example, that many people view the affirmative action and multicul-
turalism drives of the 1970s and ’80s not as new social strengths that have 
their origins in the liberation movements of the sixties, but as admissions 
of failure (to integrate and involve others around defining and advanc-
ing common goals)—failures that display themselves in the tactical 
maneuvering of “identity politics,” special pleading for “diversity,” quo-
tas, and the like.328 A similar discrepancy between appearances and reali-
ties, theory and practical outcomes, is noted by the critics of organized 
labor who attack the successes of labor unions by pointing to cases of 
abuse or by making unproven blanket statements such as unions are bad 
for business, make the labor market too rigid, tie the hands of manage-
ment, etc.—oddly forgetting that pushing back against the overly free 
hand of management was the whole purpose of unions to begin with, just 
as affirmative action and multiculturalism were generally considered to 
be necessary steps to break the undemocratic white male lock on eco-
nomic opportunity and political power that existed in twentieth-century 
America until the 1970s, even if each in time generated its own set of 
problems (e.g., reverse discrimination and sectarianism).
So what about dignity? Might all the high-minded dignity talk of the 
last twenty years actually be a symptom of today’s phony, cynical democ-
racy-lite as described by Wolin? In other words, is dignity talk a bone 
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thrown to the Many in consolation for the hijacking of public debate and 
political rights by the Few, and for the big merger between today’s politi-
cians and wealthy corporations that took place largely without people’s 
consent or knowledge? Is it a sideshow to conceal democracy’s decline? 
Is dignity talk another case of charity substituting for justice? Or is it jus-
tice trying to emerge as best it can in the face of widespread opposition? 
Just as Jesse Jackson’s poignant “I am somebody” dignity campaign in the 
early 1970s expressed more a future wish for a “rainbow coalition” than a 
present reality,329 it’s worth noting that forty years later some people view 
the “first African American president” as a good house nigger with whom 
they can do business, but a nigger all the same.330 More generally, there 
is certainly ample evidence in the daily news (hazing, sexual assault, 
domestic violence, illegal and immoral predatory behavior of all kinds, 
escalating unemployment, poverty, homelessness, and hopelessness) 
that would suggest the new dignity and the human rights agenda articu-
lated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 remains a 
dream that has not yet been fulfilled.331 A beautiful dream, perhaps, but 
not the daily reality of most people, who, on the contrary, are stuck in a 
“freedom recession.”
If democracy is the form of government best equipped to fulfill the 
promises contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—the 
most translated document in the world according to the Guinness Book 
of Records—there remains the challenge of how to “install” that operat-
ing system in places where it has hardly ever existed, and the even greater 
challenge of how to defend it in places where it is under direct attack and 
shore it up in places where it is suffering daily indirect attacks on its advis-
ability, affordability, or sustainability in today’s world.332 Tocqueville can 
be of help in this struggle for democracy and dignity. And of course his 
words can also be of use to dictators and democracy skeptics who need 
only to read his recommendations and design ways to undermine their 
implementation—the most effective strategy being simply to do noth-
ing, since as Tocqueville has demonstrated, left to its own designs with-
out “auxiliary precautions,” democracy quickly runs itself into the ground 
all on its own without the intervention of outside “evildoers.”
American democracy circa 1830 took two generations to build. It fol-
lowed several generations of local, in-house trial and error experiments 
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in community organizing that had been going on since 1607. A shaky 
version 1.0 came online slowly between 1776 and 1781, and then a ver-
sion 2.0 went public in 1788 with a succession of patches and add-ons 
over the next fifty years. But on its present destructive course, American 
democracy’s death will likely coincide with the extinction of the last baby 
boomers sometime around 2040, i.e., the bicentenary year of Volume 
Two of Democracy in America.
•
Those who would like to avoid the irony of having some lines from 
Tocqueville read out at democracy’s funeral will want to pay attention 
to his list of recommended attitudes and policies put forward with near 
bullet-point clarity in the second to last chapter of Democracy in America 
(DA II, 4, 7, 389–397). His list of the behaviors he wants to encourage 
and those he wants to discourage is predicated on the idea that it would 
be best to avoid “an absolute and despotic government” and embrace 
the “saintly enterprise” of creating and securing ordinary “independence 
and dignity” by being friends of equality. In other words, Tocqueville’s 
list is written for those who want to defend and strengthen democracy, 
not kill it off or keep it from emerging in the first place. He has made up 
his mind that political equality ought not to be denied in times that have 
seen the expansion of equality in all other areas. This follows from his 
early claim (DA I, 1, 3) that it’s impossible to keep men unequal in one 
area while they’re equal in all others: “On ne saurait concevoir les hommes 
éternellement inégaux entre eux sur un seul point, égaux sur les autres” (DA I, 
115, G60). This may sound like trying to get an “is” from an “ought,” yet 
he acknowledges the possibility that some may want to have nearly all 
men (besides themselves, of course) be equally powerless when it comes 
to politics (i.e., public debate and decision making) instead of simi-
larly empowered.
Tocqueville is perfectly willing to concede that some prefer vertical, 
hierarchical social arrangements of authority (in some, many, or even all 
settings) over inclusive, horizontal, i.e., democratic decision making. And 
so do most people. After all, who thinks an airplane pilot should walk 
back to the passengers in coach and ask them how to respond to the tur-
bulence that the plane is experiencing? How many people think children 
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under twelve should be invited to debate their bedtime? Or be co-equals 
in primary school curriculum planning? In many areas most of us expect 
hierarchies of competence and power and find an “elitist” selection based 
on tests, relevant experience, or other objective criteria to be just and 
good. However, there are many areas where reasonable people may differ 
about who gets to participate in the decision-making process, how, and 
how much. This is why Tocqueville concludes his “Real Advantages of 
Democracy” chapter (DA I, 2, 6) with the direct, second-person address 
to his readers to get clear about what they really want. The passage is 
worth citing in full.
What do you want from society and government? Clarity on 
this point is essential.
Do you wish to impart a certain loftiness to the human 
mind, a generous way of looking at the things of this world? 
Do you want to inspire in men a kind of contempt for material 
goods? Do you hope to foster or develop profound convic-
tions and lay the groundwork for deep devotion?
Is your goal to refine mores, elevate manners, and promote 
brilliance in the arts? Do you want poetry, renown, and glory?
Do you seek to organize a people so as to act powerfully 
on all other peoples? Would you have them embark on enter-
prises so great that, no matter what comes of their efforts, they 
will leave a deep imprint on history?
If, in your view, these are the main objectives that men in 
society ought to set for themselves, do not choose demo-
cratic government, for it offers no guarantee that you will 
reach your goal.
But if it seems useful to you to turn man’s intellectual and 
moral efforts to the necessities of material life and use them 
to improve his well-being; if reason strikes you as more prof-
itable to man than genius; if your purpose is to create not 
heroic virtues but tranquil habits; if you would rather see vice 
than crime and are prepared to accept fewer great deeds in 
exchange for fewer atrocities; if, instead of a brilliant society as 
a stage for your actions, you are willing to settle for a prosper-
ous one; and if, finally, the principal purpose of a government 
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is not, in your view, to make the nation as a whole as glorious 
or powerful as can be but to achieve for each individual the 
greatest possible well-being while avoiding misery as much 
as possible; then equalize conditions and constitute a demo-
cratic government.
But if the time for choice is past and a force superior to man 
is already, without consulting your wishes, propelling you 
toward one of these two forms of government, try at least to 
get out of it all the good that it can do; and knowing its good 
instincts as well as its wicked inclinations, strive to limit the 
effect of the latter and promote the former. (DA I, 2, 6, 341–
342, G281–282)
Many readers will probably focus their attention on the contrasting 
portraits of the aristocratic regime (presented via questions) and the 
democratic regime (presented as a series of “if ” clauses), perhaps won-
dering to what extent the two roads pointed out to “you” are mutually 
exclusive. However, the last paragraph is also important since it contains 
Tocqueville’s advice about what to do in the likely event that one is not 
entirely free to choose the regime one will live under. In that case, says 
Tocqueville, whether it be horizontal democracy or vertical authori-
tarianism, or some combination of both, try and make the most of it by 
staying alert to your regime’s positive and negative tendencies and doing 
your best to restrain the latter while encouraging the positive aspects. 
Mindful perhaps of this pragmatic advice from DA I, namely the neces-
sity of paying constant attention to the positive and negative dispositions 
and inclinations given the conditions at a given moment, he then pro-
ceeds in the second to last chapter of DA II to make his list of policy rec-
ommendations that will favor “manly” liberal democracy and discourage 
the oppressive “soft” democratic-despotism he described in the previous 
chapter (“What Kind of Despotism Democratic Nations Have to Fear,” 
DA II, 4, 6).
His first observation is that it makes no sense to come out in favor of 
“small government” and try to shut down or dismantle the state (Paul A. 
Rahe and Teapartiers take note). For Tocqueville, remember, soft despo-
tism is preferable to a free-for-all and also better than traditional, hard 
totalitarianism. It’s necessary and desirable that the state should be active 
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and powerful in democratic times since individuals are all relatively weak, 
but it should be kept from abusing its agility and force (“Il ne s’agit point 
de le rendre faible ou indolent, mais seulement de l’empêcher d’abuser de son 
agilité et de sa force.” DA II, 390, G823).
The second observation is similar to what Publius asserts in Federalist 
#51, namely that “In framing a government which is to be administered 
by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the 
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to 
control itself.” The levers for obliging the central government to control 
itself in aristocratic times were the regional power centers of quasi-inde-
pendent dukes, counts, princes, and other local lords who could extend or 
withdraw their cooperation when it came to the royal administration of 
government policies (i.e., their interpretation, application, and enforce-
ment). (See Shakespeare’s history plays, e.g., Richard II and Richard III, 
for proof of this.) In democratic times those independent instruments of 
control are by definition lacking, but substitute “democratic procedures” 
can replace them, says Tocqueville, and these will serve the same pur-
pose of preventing the central power from both governing and admin-
istering, lawmaking and law enforcing over every nook and cranny of 
citizens’ lives.333 Tocqueville shares the Federalist view that the “partition 
of power,” keeping it divided and dispersed—the famous “branches” of 
government—reduces the likelihood of tyranny, but dismantling the state 
increases the likelihood of having society swing endlessly and unpredict-
ably between extremes of anarchy and tyranny.
I am well aware that today these [aristocratic] methods will 
not do, but I see democratic procedures replacing them.
Rather than transfer all administrative powers from corpo-
rations and nobles to the sovereign alone, some of those pow-
ers can be entrusted to secondary bodies temporarily consti-
tuted of ordinary citizens. In this way, the liberty of private 
individuals can be made more secure without diminishing 
their equality. (DA II, 390, G823)
Over the next seven pages Tocqueville praises once more the freely 
engaged in associative life in democratic regimes as that which will check 
and counterbalance the central power’s tendency to want to make and 
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enforce all the rules. If hereditary civil servants are out, they can nev-
ertheless be replaced in democratic times by elective ones or by indi-
viduals appointed by elected officials to serve on local agencies, boards, 
commissions, and other administrative bodies. These democratic assem-
blies, says Tocqueville, perhaps inspired again by arguments from The 
Federalist, have the benefit of creating quasi-aristocratic offices without 
aristocrats.334 There is the status honor, even holiness (“sainte entreprise”), 
attached to carrying out a certain task judged valuable by the group. And 
since the tasks are carried out by the power vested in one’s office, not “in 
me,” the impersonal execution qua president, senator, sheriff, chair, dean, 
or school superintendent brings less risk of the traditional aristocracy’s 
injustices and dangers, namely arbitrariness, arrogance, blindness, crony-
ism, encroachment, favoritism, impulsiveness, impunity, immunity, insu-
larity, lawlessness, overreaching, secrecy, smugness, or all of the above. 
Play the role of aristocrats, for a term or two, “temporarily,” but not be 
aristocrats—that’s the thing.
I am firmly convinced that aristocracy cannot be reestab-
lished in the world. But ordinary citizens, by associating, can 
constitute very opulent, very influential, and very powerful 
entities—in a word, they can play the role of aristocrats.
In this way one could obtain several of the most important 
political advantages of aristocracy without its injustices or 
dangers. A political, industrial, commercial, or even scientific 
or literary association is an enlightened and powerful citi-
zen that cannot be made to bow down at will or subjected to 
oppression in the shadows, and by defending its rights against 
the exigencies of power it saves common liberties. (DA 
II, 391, G823)
Note the list of the different kinds of associations and therefore pos-
sible roles: “political, industrial, commercial, or even scientific or lit-
erary association.” Tocqueville is clearly suggesting that many other 
groups besides just the legal community (praised in DA I as a check on 
the omnipotence of the majority) can also play a counterbalancing role 
in democratic times. Among these are political groups (parties, lobbies, 
interest groups), private businesses, and as an afterthought perhaps but 
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nevertheless included in the list are academies in the arts and sciences. 
Tocqueville could have little inkling about the future development of 
liberal arts colleges and research universities in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, but these associations qualify in his mind as positive 
counterweights to democratic tyranny, similar to the role played by the 
legal community and religious organizations.
Higher education is inescapably hierarchical and therefore aristo-
cratic with its groupings and rankings of various knowledge workers and 
apprentices. (Those who know about a given subject get to stand at the 
head of the class before those who don’t.) And yet it is oftentimes dem-
ocratic when it comes to its internal organization with faculty senates, 
peer review, and professor-presidents. For a century after Tocqueville’s 
death, higher education’s federating institutions (the Modern Language 
Association, American Historical Association, etc.) expanded and 
gained influence as important “auxiliary precautions” (Federalist #51) 
against the omnipotence of the majority. Like the legal profession with 
its “bar association,” academics in all disciplines value literacy, memory, 
logic, attention to detail and particular cases, and the cautious formula-
tion and application of general principles, theories, and laws within rea-
soned arguments. As such, these “communities of memory” (Bellah) 
where academics do their work (sifting the past, examining the present, 
and setting a course for the future) strengthened democracy’s ability to 
criticize itself—a role that was left to lawyers, judges, preachers, and jour-
nalists in Tocqueville’s day, with imperfect results as he observes when 
lamenting the high degree of conformism and low liberty of intelligence 
in America (DA I, 332). Scientific and literary associations that sprang 
up around the country between 1860 and 1960—whether broad-based 
public universities or smaller but broad-minded private liberal arts col-
leges—fulfilled Tocqueville’s wish for “enlightened citizens” to act as 
defenders of “common liberties.” John Dewey (1859–1952), who was 
born the year Tocqueville died, was instrumental in articulating a new 
democratic relationship between schools and society that became a suc-
cessful nationwide model (see his Democracy and Education, 1916).335 
Today, however, “the higher learning in America” (Veblen), like the 
country’s brand of democracy, is in deep crisis even as foreign students 
continue to flock to American campuses and foreign academics seek to 
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imitate some American academic ways at their home institutions.336 Yet 
one more ironic legacy.
Other things that Tocqueville says ought to be stressed in democratic 
times, precisely because of the demolander’s self-destructive tendency to 
ignore or reject them, include the following three related items.
Teach democratic man the value of forms (G826). In aristocratic times 
when the classical doctrine based on clarity, order, and rules was preemi-
nent, there was no need to insist on the importance of manners, grammar, 
rituals, and ceremonies. In democratic societies where even spelling rules 
or stop signs can seem like an imposition, it is necessary to counteract 
the democrat’s tendency to consider all forms as annoying restraints and 
infringements on personal freedom. Not to do so is to weaken respect for 
the rule of law, which is a cornerstone of any democracy.
Teach respect for individual rights (G824–827). In democratic 
times that develop a passion for equality, tranquility, and blind obedi-
ence to majority rule (often in the name of “team spirit” or “family val-
ues”), it is easy for demolanders to have a bully’s contempt for individual 
rights, especially the right to think and act differently from the group.337 
Therefore it is of special importance that a free press and an independent 
judiciary be able to continuously remind forgetful, busy, outwardly brash 
but secretly insecure demoland citizens of (1) the importance of individ-
ual rights (freedoms to and freedoms from), not least because ideas and 
initiatives are almost always in someone’s head before becoming a col-
lective idea, value, or project; (2) the general superiority of reality-based 
decision making over faith-based or fantasy-based decision making; and 
(3) the utility of the universal insurance policy provided by formal legal 
principles such as habeas corpus and due process that can be exercised 
on a moment’s notice even by individuals who, like in the case of cata-
strophic illness, think “that is never going to happen to me.” Alongside 
respect for individual rights and forms, a free press and independent 
judiciary are two more indispensable cornerstones of a democracy that 
it is in everyone’s interest—for their own good and the good of society—
to cherish and uphold by demonstrating as often as necessary that the 
group (team, town, nation) is safer and stronger with them than with-
out them.338 
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Temper the taste for movement, speed, and revolution (G827). For 
example, nothing is more normal in democratic times than a passion 
for “fast food.” It dovetails perfectly with the democrat’s desire for all 
that is quick, cheap, and “good enough.” But a “fast food nation” could 
learn a thing or two from the “slow food” movement that started in “Old 
Europe.”339 Movement, speed, and change, which have often been prac-
tical necessities at many times in human history, should not be allowed 
to be promoted as ends in themselves—and particular suspicion should 
be applied to instances where, in Orwellian fashion, permanent change is 
promoted by so-called conservatives (“War is peace”). Tocqueville notes 
how the demolander’s “taste for change” is related to his contempt for 
forms and the seductiveness of force.
When any nation changes leaders, opinions, and laws several 
times within a short period, the men who compose it end up 
acquiring a taste for change and becoming accustomed to the 
idea that all change occurs rapidly with the help of force. They 
then naturally conceive a contempt for forms, whose lack of 
power they witness daily, and they become impatient with 
the dominion of rules, which they have so often seen flouted 
before their very eyes. (DA II, 394, G827)
Tocqueville no doubt had France’s protracted nineteenth-century 
revolutionary history in mind, but there are hundreds of more recent 
examples of “revolutionary changes” and not just in the world of high-
tech. For example, it is interesting to learn that PepsiCo, the global snack 
food giant, is in the process of rethinking its 1960s-inspired brand of end-
less, impulsive “fun and freedom” products (e.g., chips and soda) and 
will perhaps try to reposition itself as a health-food giant. Or that Pixar 
thinks of itself as a virtuous “fun factory,” a new-and-improved Disney 
that “really should be running Western Civilization.”340 But experience 
has shown that the virtue of multinational corporations, like the virtue of 
nations, though to be welcomed, is often expensive, unreliable, and short-
lived due to the frequent conflicts that crop up between doing good and 
doing well (enough). And when that happens, some auxiliary force must 
be exerted to advocate and enforce policies that will supply “by oppo-
site and rival interests, the defect of better motives.”341 This auxiliary 
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force, which some will invariably decry and oppose (usually because it 
restrains their force), can emanate from any of the three branches of gov-
ernment—or from another source such as the press (including literature 
and now the “blogosphere” and “twitterverse”), NGOs, the academy, the 
marketplace, the pulpit, or from groups or individuals whose power is 
boosted by the Internet.
In an evocation of the problematic relationship of “Capital and 
Democracy” that occurs late in the expanded edition of Politics and 
Vision, Sheldon Wolin summarizes well the human costs of unimpeded 
glorification of high-speed, permanent change.
[W]ho is to define and control the course of change, and who 
is to bear the brunt of it? The fact that scientific and techno-
logical advances have made available the power of introduc-
ing continuous, unrelenting change as the organizing focus 
and distinctive mark of postmodern societies can also be 
seen as the principle by which elites establish their creden-
tials to monopolize policy determinations and promote the 
culture that validates themselves. As several commentators 
have noted, the powers embodied in modern change do not 
enter the world without disrupting and eventually destroying 
established life-forms of work, play, personal and social rela-
tions, belief, and habitat. Those who define, direct, finance, 
and prosper from significant change rarely experience their 
own lives mangled or stupefied and the misshapen results 
passed on as an inheritance. (597)
Tony Judt might have cited those words in his case study of Britain’s 
mangled rail and bus service; admirers of Charles Murray’s research 
might want to factor in Wolin’s observations when trying to understand 
what’s “coming apart” today and who or what is to be held accountable; 
and Paul Krugman might consider “The Great Mangling” or “Mangled 
and Stupefied” as a catchy title for his next chronicle of world eco-
nomic history.
Turning back to Tocqueville, his observations about contemporary 
trends in this penultimate chapter concludes with a short list of goals 
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(each introduced by an infinitive verb) that are most proper in “a world 
that is totally new” (G7).
The political world changes. We must now seek new remedies 
for new ills.
To set broad but visible and immovable limits on social 
power; to grant certain rights to private individuals and guar-
antee their uncontested enjoyment of those rights; to preserve 
what little independence, strength, and originality is left to the 
individual; to raise him up alongside and support him vis-à-vis 
society; these seem to me the primary goals of lawmakers in 
the age upon which we are just now embarking. (DA II, 396, 
G829, emphasis added)
It is important to note again that these are context-specific recom-
mendations, not absolutes. Just as a cancer patient doesn’t receive the 
same treatment as a diabetic, other social ills would require other rem-
edies. The situation as Tocqueville sees it in 1840 requires the measures 
he lists for the reasons he has already stated at length. And for one more 
that he repeats in the paragraphs that follow the one just cited: namely, 
the fact that in democratic times there are large numbers of people who 
“abandon liberty because they deem it to be dangerous” while others, 
“fewer in number but more enlightened,” also abandon liberty “because 
they judge it to be impossible” (G830). Tocqueville is particularly sharp 
with the latter on this page, probably because many come from within his 
own peer group from which he takes his distance.
Among our contemporaries I see two ideas which, though 
contradictory, are equally disastrous.
Some see in equality only the anarchic tendencies to which 
it gives rise. They are terrified of their free will; they are afraid 
of themselves.
Others, fewer in number but more enlightened, take a dif-
ferent view. Alongside the road that leads from equality to 
anarchy, they have at last discovered the path that seems to 
lead men ineluctably into servitude. They adapt their souls 
in advance to this inescapable servitude and in despair of 
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remaining free already worship from the bottom of their 
hearts the master who is waiting in the wings.
The former abandon liberty because they deem it to be 
dangerous, the latter because they judge it to be impossi-
ble. (G829–830)
However, Tocqueville does not despair but instead tells the reader 
once more the reason behind his whole enterprise—the raison d’être of 
the whole book—which is grounded in his belief that liberty is not nec-
essarily dangerous nor is it impossible.
If I held the latter belief [i.e., that liberty is impossible], I 
would not have written this book. I would have confined 
myself to bewailing the fate of my fellow men in private.
I chose to speak out publicly about the dangers that equality 
poses to human independence because I firmly believe that 
those perils are the most formidable that the future holds, as 
well as the least anticipated. But I do not believe that they are 
insurmountable. (G830)
In other words, Tocqueville does not believe, as many did and still do, 
that democracy is doomed to fail. He goes on to conclude this penulti-
mate chapter with a final recommendation to his readers to maintain a 
“salutary fear” that will keep one “vigilant and ready for battle” and help 
fend off “the spineless and idle terror that afflicts and saps the heart”—
the latter being a self-destructive, unsalutary yoke.
Vigilant and ready for battle strikes me as a stance worth adopt-
ing today if we are to pursue the worthy task that Sheldon Wolin, one 
of Tocqueville’s most astute readers, recommends to us in times of 
Superpower: “to nurture the civic conscience of society” (Politics and 
Vision, 606). But are there enough of us interested in that nontrivial pur-
suit today who are motivated and strong enough to oppose those of us 
who have other interests and motives? We shall see.
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Notes
328. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a 
Multicultural Society (1991).
329. Jackson’s consciousness-raising political career was one of the early 
manifestations of the multicultural movement that grew out of the sixties 
black power movement. A YouTube video of a 1970s Sesame Street episode 
shows him rallying a colorfully dressed, ethnically diverse set of little kids 
around his catechism: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iTB1h18bHlY>.
330. Google “Obama house nigger” to see the number and variety of people who 
have made this charge.
331. The Wikipedia entry “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” contains 
background information and the full text. Dignity is mentioned in the 
first line of the preamble and in the first sentence of article 1: “Whereas 
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights 
of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice 
and peace in the world….” Article 1: “All human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights.” Dignity also occurs in articles 22 and 23 and 
in the fifth clause of the preamble. December 10 is “International Human 
Rights Day” in memory of the declaration’s adoption by the United Nations 
General Assembly.
332. See former U.S. president Jimmy Carter’s lament about the American 
government’s poor human rights record since 9/11, “A Cruel and Unusual 
Record,” New York Times, June 24, 2012.
333. Occasionally in American history, including in recent decades, individual 
states have tried to function as sites of regional opposition to the central 
government—the Civil War being the most well-known example. Calls for 
“states’ rights” date back to Jefferson. However, their fight for independence 
on a single issue or policy, whether slavery, education, banking, or zoning, 
is usually of limited extent and duration since the central government’s 
economic weight (not to mention its military might) can force states to 
comply with federal law. Nor is a regional power necessarily able to avoid 
reproducing a version of the arbitrary rule it may denounce at the national 
level, in other words the hypocrisy of the pot calling the kettle black.
334. See Federalist #51: “… it is evident that each department should have a will of 
its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each 
should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of its members… 
The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of 
the place. It may be a reflection on human nature that such devices should be 
necessary to control the abuses of government.” Culture (i.e., “devices”) must 
supplement man’s imperfect (nonangelic, nonomniscient) nature. Note the 
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deliberately impersonal constructions: the will is in “each department,” and 
the rights are “of the place” not of the person.
335. John Dewey is occasionally looked to in today’s embattled times, but not 
often enough. See, for example, Wesleyan University president Michael 
S. Roth, “Learning as Freedom,” New York Times, September 6, 2012—a 
declaration that has many parallels with the concluding chapter of Huxley’s 
Brave New World Revisited and other defenses of liberal education of the past 
sixty years.
336. To my knowledge, no country has sought to duplicate the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association (NCAA) within its higher education system.
337. See Jane Mayer on American Family Association leader Bryan Fischer, “Bully 
Pulpit: An Evangelist Talk-Show Host’s Campaign to Control the Republican 
Party,” New Yorker, June 18, 2012, 56–65.
338. “Now, in nations and times where men conceive a natural contempt for 
individual rights, the rights of society may naturally be extended and 
consolidated. In other words, men become less attached to particular rights at 
the very moment when it is perhaps most necessary to hold on to and defend 
the few such rights that still exist. (…) [T]rue friends of liberty and human 
grandeur must remain constantly vigilant and ready to prevent the social 
power from lightly sacrificing the particular rights of a few individuals to the 
general execution of its designs.” Unlike in more aristocratic caste societies, 
in democratic societies where the part is more intimately related to the whole, 
a violation of individual rights tends “to deeply corrupt the national mores 
and to place the entire society in jeopardy” (G827). This thought was given 
dramatic representation in a memorable declaration by a fictional Sir Thomas 
More in Robert Bolt’s play A Man for All Seasons (1960): “This country is 
planted thick with laws from coast to coast, Man’s laws, not God’s, and if you 
cut them down—and you’re just the man to do it—do you really think you 
could stand upright in the winds that would blow then? Yes, I give the Devil 
benefit of law, for my own safety’s sake!”
339. See the Wikipedia entry “Slow Food.”
340. For sympathetic profiles of Apple, PepsiCo, and Pixar, see the May 16, 2011 
issue of the New Yorker magazine: Malcolm Gladwell, “Creation Myth” 
(44–53), John Seabrook, “Snacks for a Fat Planet” (54–71), and Anthony 
Lane, “The Fun Factory” (74–87). This trio of you’ve-got-a-friend-in-me 
corporate profiles reveals its unspoken dark side when followed up by the 
next set of profiles in the same issue by Steve Coll, Lawrence Wright, and Jon 
Lee Anderson on Osama bin Laden’s high-tech communications savvy (“The 
Outlaw”) and the unintended consequences of U.S. involvement in Pakistan 
(“The Double Game”) and Afghanistan (“Force and Futility”).
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341. Federalist #51. This same paper, attributed to James Madison, contains these 
famous lines: “But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections 
on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. 
If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on 
government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be 
administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first 
enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige 
it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary 
control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity 
of auxiliary precautions.” In other words, government is not the problem, 
man is the problem ; but man has the ingenuity to craft a treatment, not a 
once and for all cure, to his own problem. The treatment Madison proposes is 
constitutional democracy, and The Federalist, largely endorsed by Tocqueville, 
is its justification and user’s guide.
Conclusion
To conclude, here are ten more specific policy recommendations that 
I believe would help nurture the civic conscience of society. I formu-
lated them with North America and Western Europe in mind, but 
many of these recommendations could be helpful in other parts of the 
world that are struggling to establish more or better democratic institu-
tions and habits.
1. Combat extreme inequality: If expanding equality of social condi-
tions was the necessary condition for democracy to take hold in America, 
obviously a severe and abrupt reversal of that trend—in effect a culture 
of extreme inequality—is the greatest threat to democracy. Recently two 
French economists have done more than most to play Jiminy Cricket and 
denounce the lie that America has been telling itself since the Reagan era, 
namely that income inequality doesn’t matter because there is socioeco-
nomic mobility and equality of opportunity in America, anyone can get 
ahead who really wants to, etc.342 While on salary at American universi-
ties, Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez did the grunt work into the his-
tory of income inequality between rich, middle class, and poor in devel-
oped countries over the past one hundred years and presented it clearly 
in a series of publications that have also exposed the meritocracy myth 
of high socioeconomic mobility in America.343 Their findings have been 
relayed in major media by business journalists such as Adam Davidson 
and Eduardo Porter. Their research also put teeth into the Occupy Wall 
Street movement in 2011 and fueled President Obama’s that’s-not-class-
warfare-that’s-common-sense reelection campaign in 2012.344 The thrust 
of Porter’s work is to present in layman’s terms the research that shows 
high inequality countries, as defined by the so-called Gini index, have 
more trouble sustaining economic growth and often experience “painful 
contractions.”
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It’s not too hard to see why. Extreme inequality blocks oppor-
tunity for the poor. It can breed resentment and political 
instability—discouraging investment—and lead to political 
polarization and gridlock, splitting the political system into 
haves and have-nots. And it can make it harder for govern-
ments to address economic imbalances and brewing crises.345 
These statements echo Davidson’s paraphrase of the book-length 
treatment of the same subject by Acemoglu and Robinson in Why Nations 
Fail (2012).346 Before his death in 2010, Tony Judt made the same case 
in Ill Fares the Land, borrowing a chart from Wilkinson and Pickett’s The 
Spirit Level (Ill, 15) that casts serious doubt on the standard Republican 
claim that high social mobility makes up for income inequality.347 On 
the contrary, the chart shows that more egalitarian countries (Denmark, 
Canada, Germany, etc.) have much higher rates of social mobility (the 
possibility of moving between income quintiles during one’s working 
years) than do high inequality countries such as the United States.
It’s important to recall that political equality, not economic inequality, 
was uppermost in Tocqueville’s mind in the 1830s and that he did not 
live long enough to experience the Gilded Age in America or the con-
spicuous consumption during the Second Empire in his own country. It 
was clear however to anyone who did live through those times that eco-
nomic inequality must be addressed simultaneously with political equal-
ity, as many Progressive Era academics, labor leaders, politicians, and 
judges, such as Louis D. Brandeis, consistently repeated.348 
Other pro-democracy measures, many tributary to the fight against 
extreme inequality, would include the following:
2. Combat excess individualism, excess materialism, and exaggerated 
focus on the present: Go outside. Live one day per week without spending 
money, wearing headphones or a watch, or carrying your phone. If that’s 
too much, try it for one morning or afternoon per week. The preservation 
of the world may be in wildness…and occasional unwiredness.
3. Restore the sacredness of the electoral process and of elective office: 
Remember that serving in government is “an honor not a career” as 
Warren Buffett recalls in his “Congressional reform act 2011.” Other spe-
cific changes must include:
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Election reform: encourage mandatory voter registration, early voting, 
uniform paper voting procedures, and tighter rules and limits on fund-
raising and campaign advertising; discourage excess polling, exit polling, 
and cynical voter ID requirements that disguise a vote suppression tactic 
behind appeals to “common sense” and fraud prevention.
Congressional reform: term limits, accountability for conflict of inter-
est violations, elimination of gerrymandering.
Judicial reform: no elected judges, long-term contracts, eighteen years, 
no life appointments.
Presidential/governor reform: campaign finance reform, term limits, 
clearer definition of powers and limits on power.
4. Combat isolation and immunity: Invest in public spaces (libraries, 
parks, museums, malls, festivals) that foster chance encounters, discov-
eries, and rediscoveries that get people out of their isolated niches and 
comfort zones once in awhile. Invest in public education. Reaffirm edu-
cation as a public good open to all, not a private good reserved for those 
who can afford it. Invest in affordable public transportation (trains, tram-
ways, buses, bicycles). Establish a flexible two-year mandatory national 
service requirement for men and women with military and nonmilitary 
options (avoid using the words draft and conscription with their negative 
connotations).
5. Combat corruption, crime, and low accountability: Defend the rule of 
law (transparency, accountability, consequences). Defend an open inde-
pendent judiciary and the dignity of the legal professions.
6. Combat the worship of change and mobility: Underline the high cost, 
to individuals and communities, of homesickness, dislocation, reloca-
tion, and so-called creative destruction.
7. Combat the worship of get-rich-quick and get-something-for-nothing 
schemes: For example, governments should not associate their names 
with gambling and the “state lottery” and ought to devote a part of the 
tax revenues derived from state-supervised private gambling to public 
information campaigns about the risk of addiction and gambling addic-
tion counseling. Tell citizens the truth about low socioeconomic mobil-
ity to debunk “rags to riches” daydreaming. Encourage effort and reward 
substantive achievements, not mere participation.
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8. Combat the dogma that private is always better than public: Use 
public-private partnerships to fund, build, and maintain open, afford-
able access to institutions that enhance human wellness (sports facilities, 
libraries, museums, parks). Build and defend affordable public health 
care and health insurance systems as a human right (as per education). 
Build and defend affordable public transportation systems (on economic, 
ecologic, and civic grounds).
9. Defend an open, affordable Internet: An Internet that is not focused 
merely on commerce and exploitation but devoted to expanding user 
access to products, services, knowledge, and experiences that build trust, 
love, fun, and ordinary empowerment. Defend Internet freedom while 
pursuing abusers and Internet criminals.
10. Defend individual rights as listed in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.
Many of these recommendations are not new, and some, such as the 
bill in favor of “Universal National Service,” have languished in the U.S. 
Congress for years. Others, such as the “Stop Online Piracy Act,” have 
been met with swift opposition that has forced both sides back to the 
drawing board to come up with better solutions to strike the proper bal-
ance of a free but regulated civil society, including the Internet. Despite 
these setbacks, however, serious discussions and actual work on all of the 
above ten recommendations continues. And there is more constructive 
criticism of democracy’s strengths and weaknesses going on around the 
world, as well as concrete reform proposals being hammered out and 
implemented, than ever before. Perhaps most visibly, the “Occupy” move-
ments have raised awareness that democracy is unsustainable without a 
robust middle class. Many cities in Europe and America have strength-
ened their commitment to public transportation systems (including 
low-cost bike rental networks), as well as to quality public education and 
health care. France curbed its long-standing attachment to a monarchi-
cal style presidency by instituting term limits and reasserting the limits 
of presidential immunity. In the United States, just as most people even-
tually accepted seat belts and motorcycle helmets, the country seems 
to be coming around slowly but surely to the idea that it’s not okay for 
fifty million of its citizens to have no health insurance, and an important 
provision of a major health care reform act that requires individuals to 
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take out health insurance was recently upheld by a 5–4 vote of the U.S. 
Supreme Court.349 The right to “marriage equality” has been granted in 
many countries recently (e.g., Spain, Argentina) and is making progress 
in many others. To get around the inconvenience and voter suppres-
sion of Tuesday voting, user-friendly early voting procedures have been 
established in many American states—a development that significantly 
enhances voter dignity by allowing for less rushed and more thought-
ful voting, combats the delegitimating effect of high abstention rates by 
facilitating higher levels of participation, and therefore strengthens rep-
resentative democracy. Many Internet media have incorporated “reader 
comments” as a standard supplement, and those “threads” have become 
an integral part of the news cycle that in some ways is as important as the 
“news” itself. Canadians have recently pushed back against the privatiza-
tion of their higher education system, and France too has so far resisted 
following Britain’s experiment with sharply higher university fees that 
risk lowering access and narrowing educational paths and career options 
as students take on more debt. The “unmaking of the public university” 
in the U.S. over the past forty years has been met with increasing oppo-
sition in California and elsewhere, and there are many signs that real 
actions are being taken to save American colleges and universities, put 
the focus back on knowledge and know-how (instead of on sports and 
socializing), and make higher education both affordable and valuable for 
the middle class.
My point is that there have been many small victories on the democ-
racy and dignity fronts on every continent in the last twenty-five years, 
even though it would be incorrect to exaggerate their importance and 
impact at this early stage. The “specter of inverted totalitarianism” 
(Wolin), “the forty-year assault on the middle class” (Newfield), and 
“the culture of extreme inequality” (Ehrenreich) are real, cannot be 
wished away, and will likely take at least one or two generations to undo. 
If Tocqueville is right when he asserts that mores, not laws or geohis-
torical circumstances, are the most important factor in maintaining the 
democratic republic in the United States (DA I, 2, 9), it must be remem-
bered that mores are deeply ingrained customs and habits that reflect 
long-standing value judgments, and as such they don’t change quickly 
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or without resistance, even when groups of individuals might express a 
desire for change.
It is clearly democracy’s gradual drift into nondemocracy that has 
Rahe, Heimonet, Wolin, and many other democracy auditors worried…
and working in different ways around the world to reverse. Democracy 
skeptics, of course, don’t mind the “managed democracy” that has 
gripped not just Russia but civil society in the U.S., Great Britain, France, 
and elsewhere. Many have been angling for it all along, and they are quick 
to assert, usually from a stable perch of power and privilege, that “there 
is no alternative” and “it could always be worse” (i.e., gridlock or corrup-
tion is better than, say, mass starvation or genocide). Indeed things could 
always be worse, which is why Tocqueville was willing to express under-
standing for the “soft despotism” of managed democracy even though he 
held out hope for something better.
But no society, whether democratic, partly democratic, or outright 
authoritarian, can exist without an us, and it is generally acknowledged 
today, based on the last three centuries of various experiments in gov-
ernance, that dignity-based democracies—not oligarchies—have the 
advantage of forging the most authentic and least phony or hypocriti-
cal us. And they often turn out to build the most fun, prosperous, and 
sustainable societies as well. The U.S., starting with its famous, “We the 
people,” has demonstrated this to the world more successfully through-
out its history than any other country, though not without some serious 
challenges to the union (and its civic conscience) along the way, such as 
in 1781–1787, 1850, 1860–1865, 1876 (the disputed election of Hayes), 
1886 (the Haymarket affair), 1963 (the March on Washington), 2000 
(the disputed election of George W. Bush)…and now!
Therefore, if there is one thing to take away from reading Tocqueville’s 
Democracy in America today it is that the defense of human dignity and 
the conservation and practice of healthy democratic mores are still 
worthwhile pursuits in the Internet Age.
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Appendix
Here are the answers to the twenty questions listed at the end of Part 
One, Chapter One. Each answer below should be understood as begin-
ning with “According to Tocqueville.”
1. What are three of the original conditions that favored the spread 
of democracy among the Anglo-Saxon people in North America? 
(I, 1, ii)(1) A high level of given (not earned) equality with a 
common language, the same or similar religion (mostly forms of 
Protestantism), a similar middling level of education and socioeco-
nomic standing (not stupid or poor); (2) they were accustomed 
to rights and laws; (3) they were accustomed to self-governance.
2. When studying democracy in America, why is it necessary to 
examine what happens in individual states before considering the 
union as a whole? (I, 1, v)Because at the state and local level one 
can best witness the operation of “community spirit” (common 
people working together to treat matters of common interest) 
which is the lifeblood of self-governance, i.e., democracy.
3. Why do the citizens of democratic lands often elect mediocre gov-
ernors? (I, 2, v)They often elect mediocre leaders because they 
lack the time and intelligence to choose better ones; because the 
best men tend to be attracted to commerce and industry instead 
of politics; because the best men can have a negative image of 
politics as something dirty that they prefer to avoid; and because 
citizens in democratic lands can envy high achievers and (as a per-
verse sort of passive-aggressive revenge) prefer a flawed ordinary 
person over a manifestly more qualified and promising candidate.
4. What are the real advantages derived by American society 
from democratic government? (I, 2, vi)Democracy encour-
ages many positive/healthy things including the well-being of 
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the greatest number; public spiritedness (“rational patriotism”); 
respect for rights and law; productivity, confidence, and self-
esteem. Democracy also makes repairable mistakes.
5. How does the majority in a democratic land become tyrannical? 
(I, 2, vii)A majority in a democratic land can become tyrannical 
when it exploits its mere numerical advantage without reasoned 
arguments (thus substituting “higher numbers make right” for 
“might makes right”); when it ceases to acknowledge or be respon-
sive to alternative minority views—in effect becoming deaf and 
blind; when it ceases to recognize a higher law above itself—often 
called “justice,” “divine justice,” or “God’s will”; or when it ceases 
to even tolerate alternative minority views (through the practice 
of mild or aggressive forms of censorship, for example); when it 
multiplies constraints on fundamental human rights (to equal dig-
nity, for example) and on fundamental freedoms of speech and 
free association.
6. What moderates the tyranny of the majority in the United States? 
(I, 2, viii)The absence of a central administration (unlike France); 
the legal community (especially its brainy dimension, the fact that 
lawyers and judges necessarily rely on argument and memory and 
these can counteract the sometimes headless and heedless “mob” 
dimension of majority rule); juries and jury duty (a continuous 
experiential education opportunity for citizens to learn about citi-
zenship and self-governance through doing it).
7. What are the main causes that tend to maintain a democratic 
republic in the United States? (I, 2, ix)Favorable geographic cir-
cumstances (size, abundant resources, rival powers distant); the 
long-standing systematic rule of law; mores (“mœurs”).
8. What are the main characteristics of the American philosophic 
method? (II, 1, I)Pragmatism; a distaste for rigid methods, sys-
tems, and forms; self-reliance (as opposed to reliance on tradi-
tions, famous predecessors, or outside authorities); antifounda-
tionalist. Americans are Cartesians who mostly have not read a 
word of Descartes.
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9. Why do Americans show more aptitude and taste for general ideas 
than the British? (II, 1, iii)Americans’ belief in equality combined 
with a desire to move quickly and efficiently makes them attracted 
to generalizing and inductive thinking (extrapolating, transfer-
ring), whereas the British with their tradition of class-conscious-
ness and castes are more inclined to focus on the specificity of par-
ticular cases, less open to universalist talk and transferability, and 
more skeptical about inductive reasoning.
10. Why have Americans never been as enthusiastic as the French 
for general ideas, especially in political matters? (II, 1, iv)Despite 
being more comfortable with generalizing and universalism than 
the British, Americans are nevertheless confronted with the real 
experience of decision making more than the French, who are 
often kept on the sidelines or in the classroom or “salon” and thus 
are more inclined toward theory and abstraction because they 
have less practical experience with which to counterbalance it—
unlike Americans who are regularly agents confronting real cases 
and learning from doing.
11. How does religion in America benefit and benefit from demo-
cratic tendencies? (II, 1, v)Religion allows Americans to have 
some matters settled and not open to doubting or questioning—
which is time-consuming and debilitating (see Hamlet). Thus reli-
gion frees the mind and body for other things—notably business 
and industry. Conversely, democracy benefits religion by leaving 
it free to go about its spiritual business within its own sphere—
namely the eternal, the immaterial, and the transpersonal. There 
is a live and let live attitude between the civil society and religions 
within a democracy. Religion brings together ordinary democratic 
people (who are easily absorbed by self-centered individualism, 
i.e., an impatient, perhaps even reckless pursuit of material well-
being) for a shared experience of calm, considered reflection on 
larger purposes that are not about just me, money, now. Religion 
counteracts some of democracy’s negative side effects and vice 
versa. Democracy’s openness can help curb religion’s excessive 
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dogmatism, abstraction, and insularity, and thus they act as checks 
and balances on each other.
12. Why is the study of Latin and Greek beneficial in democratic coun-
tries? (I, 1, xv)The study of Latin and Greek is beneficial (even if 
practiced only by a minority) because it counterbalances negative 
tendencies in democratic countries (namely impatience, inatten-
tion to detail, aversion to difficulty, desire for the cheap, fast, and 
easy, and lack of respect for history)—“C’est un hygiène salutaire.”
13. Why is theater so successful in democratic nations? (II, 1, 
xix)Because you don’t have to be that smart to enjoy it. Unlike 
with novels and epic poetry, theater requires no higher literacy (no 
knowledge of rhetorical figures, allegories, cultural allusions) and 
no strong powers of memory. Most plays (and Broadway shows 
and movies) can be easily appreciated by the masses.
14. Why do democratic nations display a more passionate and lasting 
love for equality than for freedom? (II, 2, i)The benefits of equal-
ity come easily and immediately, those of freedom/liberty require 
more effort and time; liberty has been more recently acquired (by 
most demolanders) and is therefore more easily given up (“Easy 
come, easy go.”); equality being the distinctive feature of the mod-
ern age, it is that to which most people are most attached; the fra-
gility of freedom makes attachment to it less strong in practice; 
men typically notice the negative side effects of extreme liberty 
(license, recklessness, anarchy) more easily than they do the nega-
tive side of extreme equality (sterile conformism, timidity, stagna-
tion); equality can be granted to everyone with little individual 
effort, whereas liberty usually requires personal labor that, more-
over, must be continuously renewed.
15. How do Americans combat the effects of individualism with free 
institutions? (II, 2, iv)Thanks to free institutions (i.e., systems 
and services that are low-cost or free and freely accessible, e.g., 
the press, associations, voting, public libraries, town meetings, 
juries, public post office, the Internet), Americans have ample 
opportunities to get outside of themselves and their own little pre-
occupations and consider the larger issues faced by their village, 
316 Appendix
town, city, country, or the entire world. Moreover, Americans are 
regularly and sincerely invited to get involved in these free insti-
tutions—to write “letters to the editor,” for example—and by so 
doing they are forced (once they accept the invitation) to consider 
what they think and why (or change views) and communicate 
their reasoned convictions to others, and not only to people who 
are already predisposed to agree with them. Making these insti-
tutions free and open, or nearly so, encourages high levels of vol-
untary participation, which is the best kind to insure the cultiva-
tion of rational patriotism, aka community spirit, and continuous 
respect for rights and laws.
16. How do Americans counteract individualism by the doctrine 
of self-interest properly understood? (II, 2, viii)The doctrine of 
“self-interest properly understood” (intérêt bien entendu) is the 
core of rational patriotism and community spirit: the considered 
belief that my interests and the interests of the larger community/
country overlap to a large extent. This doctrine demonstrates that 
individualism and community spirit are not mutually exclusive 
but can actually reinforce each other: because men are mostly rela-
tively weak, they must cooperate, and in fact they voluntarily seek 
each other out to do so—a “win-win” situation—for barn raising, 
apple picking, hay making, etc.
17. Why are Americans so restless in the midst of their prosperity? 
(II, 2, xiii)Fear of falling. Americans seek to overcome their rela-
tive weakness, but those who manage to do so are rarely satisfied 
with their acquired strength and instead always seek to become 
stronger still as a sort of never-ending insurance policy against 
“losing it all.” A second factor is a thirst for perfection (the best) 
on the part of people who themselves are for the most part less 
than perfect and if pressed would grudgingly acknowledge their 
own lack (of intellect, training, patience, passion) that holds them 
back. Demolanders know they are not the aristoi—the smartest, 
the richest, the bravest, the most good-looking—but would still 
like to be “a contender” or own a piece of the best—either really or 
in some fantasy realm.
Appendix 317
18. What is the influence of democracy on the family? (II, 3, 
viii)Relations between family members (father/son, husband/
wife, siblings) are generally softer and looser (because not 
weighted down with centuries of authoritarian tradition and sus-
picious rivalry), but they are also rather rigorist as a result of a 
contractual attitude that is brought to these relations. Girls and 
wives in particular are encouraged to be better educated and well-
informed about their matrimonial choices, but they are confined 
to the domestic sphere for the most part, and any desire to change 
the terms of the agreement that is entered into (through divorce or 
extramarital affairs, for example) is socially unacceptable.
19. How is it that Americans can be generally serious and yet some-
times behave recklessly? (II, 3, xv)They are typically serious 
because they are involved in the political process in high numbers, 
either as voters or elected officials, or both; but they are occa-
sionally reckless because they have neither the time, interest and 
attention, or intelligence to carry out their responsibilities wisely 
and thoroughly.
20. Why do democratic nations have a natural desire for peace while 
the armies within democratic nations naturally seek war? (II, 3, 
xxii)War is bad for business and industry, except for the “business” 
of war, and so while all those in civil society are generally opposed 
to war (except for defense contractors), military personnel gener-
ally favor war since it is their means of obtaining distinctions and 
promotions, i.e., “career advancement.”
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